Women and Justice: Keywords

This Order invalidated Order No 256, which listed heavy work and work with harmful and dangerous working conditions in which the employment of women was prohibited. Order No 256’s list of prohibited work for women included 70 types of work and 558 professions. Among the priority factors were the physical stress associated with lifting and carrying loads, forced working posture, vibration, and other similar tasks that could affect a woman's body and reproductive health. The following types of professions were prohibited for women: the well-paid professions of a subway driver, a motorist on a ship, and long-distance bus driver. In addition, the Law of Ukraine 'On Organization of Labor Relations under the Martial Law' specifies that during the period of martial law, the employment of women (except for pregnant women and women with a child under one year of age) is allowed for heavy work with their consent and in jobs with harmful or dangerous working conditions, including underground works. Invalidating Order No 256 is a positive step because (i) no one has the right to determine what a person should study for and where they should work; (ii) the Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that no one may be discriminated against based on gender, age, religion, etc.; (iii) Order 256’s now-defunct prohibitions deprived women of social protections because, for example, in practice, women unofficially worked in the positions they considered necessary in violation of the Law. This, in turn, led women not receiving salaries equal to men’s because women could not be officially employed.

Цим наказом визнано таким, що втратив чинність, Наказ № 256, який містив перелік важких робіт та робіт із шкідливими та небезпечними умовами праці, на яких заборонялося застосування праці жінок. До списку заборонених Наказом № 256 робіт для жінок увійшли 70 видів робіт і 558 професій. Серед пріоритетних факторів були фізичні навантаження, пов'язані з підйомом і перенесенням вантажів, вимушеною робочою позою, вібрацією та іншими подібними завданнями, які можуть вплинути на жіночий організм і репродуктивне здоров'я жінки. Для жінок були заборонені такі види професій: високооплачувані професії машиніста метрополітену, моториста на кораблі, водія автобуса далекого прямування. Крім цього, Законом України "Про організацію трудових відносин в умовах воєнного стану" визначено, що на період дії воєнного стану допускається прийняття на роботу жінок (крім вагітних і жінок, які мають дитину віком до одного року) на важких роботах за їх згодою та на роботах із шкідливими або небезпечними умовами праці, у тому числі на підземних роботах. Визнання недійсним Наказу № 256 є позитивним кроком, оскільки (I) ніхто не має права визначати, де людина має навчатися і де працювати; (II) Конституція України визначає, що ніхто не може бути дискримінований за ознакою статі, віку, віросповідання тощо; (III) заборони Наказу № 256, які тепер не діють, позбавляли жінок соціального захисту, оскільки, до прикладу, на практиці жінки неофіційно працювали на посадах, які вони вважали необхідними, всупереч Закону. Це, у свою чергу, призводило до того, що жінки не отримували заробітну плату на рівні заробітній платі чоловіків, оскільки жінки не могли бути офіційно працевлаштовані.

The Expert Council on issues of consideration of appeals on facts of discrimination on the basis of gender (hereinafter “the Expert Council”), which was created under the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine with the purpose of responding to complaints and appeals from citizens regarding gender discrimination. Discrimination is when an individual and/or a group of individuals suffers from a gender-based restriction on the recognition, exercise, or enjoyment of rights and freedoms in any form established by the Law of Ukraine 'On the Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine', except for cases in which such restriction has a legitimate, reasonably justified aim that is achieved in an appropriate and necessary way. The main tasks of the Expert Council are: (i) evaluating appeals based on gender discrimination by executive authorities, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and citizens with the aim of providing an expert assessment and taking appropriate measures; (ii) preparing proposals for legislative amendments in order to ensure compliance with protecting equal rights and opportunities for women and men; (iii) preventing all forms of gender discrimination, etc. Most of the appeals considered by this body concern discriminatory advertising (sexist outdoor advertising on the streets of Ukrainian cities). At the same time, the creation of the Expert Council does not guarantee its effectiveness. According to the Order No 345: (i) there is no effective enforcement mechanism for the decisions of the Expert Council (it only provides recommendations to authorities and other entities regarding the elimination of violations and appropriate response measures); (ii) the decisions of the Expert Council are advisory and not binding in nature; (iii) Ukrainian law does not impose liability for failure to comply with decisions of the Expert Council. In addition, there is almost no information in the media about the activities of the Expert Council. Consequently, many citizens are not aware of the existence of this state body and how to contact it.

З метою реагування на скарги та звернення громадян за фактами дискримінації за ознакою статі при Міністерстві соціальної політики України було створено Експертну раду з питань розгляду звернень за фактами дискримінації за ознакою статі (надалі — "Експертна рада"). Дискримінація за ознакою статі означає ситуацію, за якої особа та/або група осіб зазнає обмежень у правах і свободах в будь-якій формі, встановленій Законом України "Про засади запобігання та протидії дискримінації в Україні", крім випадків, коли таке обмеження має правомірну, об’єктивно обґрунтовану мету, способи досягнення якої є належними та необхідними. Основними завданнями Експертної ради є: (I) оцінка звернень щодо гендерної дискримінації від органів виконавчої влади, органів місцевого самоврядування, громадських організацій, громадян з метою надання експертної оцінки та вжиття відповідних заходів; (II) підготовка пропозицій щодо внесення змін до законодавства з метою забезпечення захисту рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків; (III) запобігання будь-яким формам гендерної дискримінації тощо. Більшість звернень, розглянутих цим органом, стосуються дискримінаційної реклами (зовнішньої сексистської реклами на вулицях міст України). Водночас, створення зазначеного органу не говорить про його ефективність, оскільки (I) відсутній ефективний механізм виконання рішень Експертної ради (вона лише надає рекомендації органам влади та іншим установам усунути відповідні порушення та вжити відповідні заходи); (II) рішення цього органу мають рекомендаційний, а не обов’язковий характер; (III) законодавством України не передбачена відповідальність за невиконання рішення Експертної ради. Крім цього, у медіапросторі майже відсутня інформації про діяльність Експертної ради у зв’язку із чим багато громадян не обізнані про факт існування такого органу та можливості звернення до нього.

The Employment Equality Act pertains to discrimination in the employment context. Discrimination occurs where (1) a person is treated less favourably than another person is (or has been or would be) treated in a comparable situation on any of specified “discriminatory grounds,” or (2) a person who is associated with another person (i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and (ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination. (Section 6(1)). The Act renders discrimination unlawful on the following grounds: gender, civil status, family status, sexual orientation, religion, disability, race, age, or membership of the Traveler community.

Article 6 (1) states that all Jordanians are “equal before the law” and that there shall be no discrimination between them in rights and duties on the basis of race, language, or religion. This is an overarching provision, without explicit mention of gender, providing for equality for “all” Jordanians. Article 6 does not apply to Muslim personal status matters, which are instead governed by the Jordanian Personal Status Law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari’ah courts (Article 103 (2) of the Jordanian Constitution).

ورد في الفقرة الأولى من المادة السادسة أن الأردنيين متاسوون في الحقوق والواجبات وإن اختلفت أعراقهم ولغاتهم وأديانهم. من الجدير بالذكر أنه وعلى الرغم من أن الفقرة لم تحدد الجنس كعامل فارق، إلا أن المادة جاءت عامة لتشمل جميع الأردنيين. لا تنطبق هذه المادة على قضايا الأحوال الشخصية، حيث أنها تخضع لقانون الأحوال الشخصية الأردني تحت اختصاص محاكم الشريعة الإسلامية.

Article 48 states that both men and women have equal civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. Articles 49 to 59 protect the family and the rights of each member of its members. In turn, article 60 states that government authorities must promote public policies to prevent any kind of violence within the family unit. Article 89 provides for special labor protections for pregnant and lactating women, who cannot be dismissed by their employers. Article 115 supports peasant woman by allowing their participation in public debates on rural matters. Article 117 promotes the right of women to access public positions and perform as public servants.

El artículo 48 establece que tanto hombres como mujeres tienen los mismos derechos civiles, políticos, sociales, económicos y culturales. Los artículos 49 a 59 protegen la familia y los derechos de cada uno de sus miembros. A su vez, el artículo 60 establece que las autoridades gubernamentales deben promover políticas públicas para prevenir cualquier tipo de violencia dentro de la unidad familiar. El artículo 89 prevé protecciones laborales especiales para las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes, que no pueden ser despedidas por sus empleadores. El artículo 115 apoya a la mujer campesina al permitir su participación en los debates públicos sobre asuntos rurales. El artículo 117 promueve el derecho de las mujeres a acceder a cargos públicos y desempeñarse como servidoras públicas.

The Colombian Constitution of 1991 promotes values and principles that protect and defend the role of women in society. Article 13 prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, national or family origin, religion, language, and political or religious opinion. Article 40 stipulates that authorities must guarantee the adequate and effective participation of women at all decision levels in the Public Administration. Article 42 covers equal rights and duties in domestic and family relationships, providing that any form of violence in the family is considered a severe offense to its integrity and unity and will thus be sanctioned. The Constitution aims to achieve gender equality for Colombian women. Colombia also ratified, by virtue of the Decree Law 251 of 1981, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979.

La Constitución colombiana de 1991 promueve valores y principios que protegen y defienden el papel de la mujer en la sociedad. El artículo 13 prohíbe la discriminación por motivos de sexo, raza, origen nacional o familiar, religión, idioma y opinión política o religiosa. El artículo 40 establece que las autoridades deben garantizar la participación adecuada y efectiva de las mujeres en todos los niveles de decisión de la Administración Pública. El artículo 42 contempla la igualdad de derechos y deberes en las relaciones domésticas y familiares, disponiéndose que toda forma de violencia intrafamiliar se considera una falta grave a la integridad y unidad y, por tanto, será sancionada. La Constitución tiene como uno de sus objetivos lograr la igualdad de género para las mujeres colombianas. Colombia también ratificó, en virtud del Decreto Ley 251 de 1981, la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW) de 1979.

The Constitution is an essential pillar of gender equality legislation in Lithuania. Article 29 affirms that human rights may not be restricted, or any privileges granted, on the grounds of “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, or views.” Further, Article 38 declares that marriage can only be concluded upon free mutual consent between a man and a woman, and that the rights of spouses are equal. The provisions do not declare same-sex marriages or partnerships valid. Article 39 states that working mothers are entitled to paid leave before and after childbirth, and favorable working conditions. English translation available here.

Konstitucija yra esminis lyčių lygybės teisės aktų ramstis Lietuvoje. Straipsnyje 29 teigiama, kad žmogaus teisės negali būti ribojamos ar suteikiamos privilegijos dėl „lyties, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, tikėjimo, įsitikinimų ar pažiūrų“. Be to, straipsnyje 38 nustatyta, kad santuoka gali būti sudaroma tik gavus laisvą vyro ir moters tarpusavio sutikimą ir kad sutuoktinių teisės yra lygios. Šios nuostatos nedeklaruoja tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokų ar partnerysčių galiojančiomis. Straipsnyje 39 nustatyta, kad dirbančios motinos turi teisę į mokamas atostogas prieš gimdymą ir po jo bei palankias darbo sąlygas.

In recognition of the inherent dignity and worth of each human, Article 12 requires that the State and all persons recognize and protect human rights and afford the fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups, and minorities. All persons have equal status before the law. Limitations of rights are only justifiable insofar as they ensure peaceful human interaction in the context of an open and democratic society. Article 13 requires the State to actively promote the welfare and development of the people by affirmatively adopting legislation and policies to achieve gender equality. This requires: (i) women’s full participation in all spheres of society with opportunities equal to men; (ii) the implementation of nondiscrimination principles and other measures; and (iii) the implementation of policies addressing domestic violence, personal security, maternity benefits, economic exploitation, and rights to property, among other relevant social issues. Article 22 mandates that all members of a family shall enjoy equal respect and shall be protected under law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or exploitation. No person shall be forced to enter into any marriage, and no person over the age of 18 can be prevented from entering into marriage. All provisions of this section apply to civil, customary, and other forms of marriage. Article 24 specifically guarantees that women are entitled to full and equal protection of law, and have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender or marital status. This includes the following rights: (i) equal rights under civil law, including equal capacity in the realms of contracts, property, custody, decision-making regarding children, and acquisition and retaining of citizenship and nationality; and (ii) upon the dissolution of marriage, entitlement to fair disposition of jointly held property and to fair maintenance. Further, any laws that discriminate against women are invalid and legislation must affirmatively be passed to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women. This affirmative requirement particularly applies to practices of: sexual abuse, harassment, or violence; discrimination in work, business, or public affairs; and deprivation of property (inherited or otherwise). Article 30 provides that, while all persons have a right to the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development, women in particular shall be given special consideration in regards to this right. The State must take all necessary measures for the realization of this right, including reforms aimed to eradicate social injustice and inequality. Other gender-related provisions include: the prohibition of torture, inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment (Article 19); Article 20’s ban on all forms of discrimination; the right to education for all people (Article 25); Article 27’s prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor; and Article 31’s requirement that all persons are entitled to fair wages and equal remuneration for equal value work without discrimination of any kind, especially on the basis of gender.

Art. 190 prohibits intentional violation or restriction of rights and freedoms, or the establishment of advantages for citizens based on, for example, gender resulting in substantial harm to the rights, liberties, and lawful interests of citizens. This crime is punishable with a fine, correctional labor, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term up to two years, as well as restrictions to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities.

The Brazilian Constitution provides for equal rights to all individuals, regardless of sex, gender and/or sexual preference. However, specific discriminatory conducts are dealt with in the Criminal Code (Federal Decree No. 2.848/1940) and other Federal Laws. English translation available here.

A Constituição brasileira dispõe, expressamente, que todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza (Artigo 5º), seja em razão do sexo, gênero, ou preferência sexual. Contudo, ainda remanescem condutas discriminatórias específicas, seja no Código Penal, seja em outras leis federais.

The Constitution guarantees that all citizens are equal before the law. Article 5 guarantees equality among Taiwan’s various racial groups. Article 7 states that all citizens enjoy the same rights irrespective of their sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation. Article 22 provides that all other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution. Article 23 provides that all enumerated freedoms and rights shall not be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public welfare. In J.Y. Interpretation 748, the Constitutional Court interpreted the classifications listed in Article 7 as only illustrative and recognized constitutional protection of same-sex marriage under Articles 7 and 23. All citizens have equal opportunity to receive an education under Article 159. English translation available here.

This Act amends the Commission on Gender Equality Act of 1996 to align with the Constitution. The Preamble in the Act substitutes the Preamble of the 1996 Act, and holds that §181 and item 20(2) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution provides for the continued existence of the Commission for Gender Equality ("the Commission"). Furthermore, it outlines the purpose of the Commission, which is to promote respect for gender equality and the protection, development, and attainment of gender equality. Among the Commission’s powers outlined in the Act is its power to monitor, investigate, research, educate, lobby, advise, and report on issues concerning gender equality. All its powers and functions are to be prescribed by national legislation.

Article 37 guarantees the full exercise of political rights, in accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty and the laws that are enacted accordingly. Suffrage is universal, equal, secret, and obligatory. The political parties must guarantee the equality between men and women for access to elected and support positions. Article 75 empowers Congress to foster democratic values and equal opportunities free from all forms of discrimination.

El artículo 37 garantiza el pleno ejercicio de los derechos políticos, de acuerdo con el principio de soberanía popular y las leyes que se dicten en consecuencia. El sufragio es universal, igual, secreto y obligatorio. Los partidos políticos deben garantizar la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres para el acceso a cargos electos y de apoyo. El artículo 75 faculta al Congreso para fomentar los valores democráticos y la igualdad de oportunidades libres de toda forma de discriminación.

Section 12 provides that everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Section 15 ensures the equal protection and benefit of the law “without discrimination […] based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Section 28 guarantees that all rights covered in the Charter apply equally to men and women.

Spain’s Constitution contains three provisions particularly relevant to gender justice. Article 14 of the Constitution states that “Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion, or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.” Article 32.1 establishes that “[m]en and women have the right to marry with full legal equality.” Finally, Article 35.1 states that [a]ll Spaniards have the duty and the right to work, to the free choice of profession or trade, to professional advancement through work, and to a sufficient remuneration for the satisfaction of their needs and those of their families. Under no circumstances may they be discriminated on account of their sex.” (Official English translation available here: http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf)

La Constitución de España contiene tres disposiciones particularmente relevantes para la justicia de género. El Artículo 14 de la Constitución establece que “los españoles son iguales ante la ley y de ninguna manera pueden ser discriminados por motivos de nacimiento, raza, sexo, religión, opinión o cualquier otra condición o circunstancia personal o social.” El Artículo 32.1 establece que “los hombres y las mujeres tienen derecho a casarse con plena igualdad legal.” Finalmente, el artículo 35.1 establece que “[todos] los españoles tienen el deber y el derecho al trabajo, a la libre elección de profesión u oficio, a la promoción profesional a través del trabajo y a una remuneración suficiente para la satisfacción de sus necesidades y las de sus familias. Bajo ninguna circunstancia puede ningún español ser discriminados por su sexo.”

Article 7 of the Constitution of Kosovo states that Kosovo’s constitutional order is based on principles including equality, respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and social justice. The article further declares that Kosovo ensures gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural, and other areas of societal life. Article 24(2) prohibits discrimination on grounds of gender and sexual orientation. Article 28(1) stipulates that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude, and paragraph (3) specifically forbids trafficking in persons. Article 37 declares that everyone enjoys the right to marry based on free will. It mandates that marriage and divorce be based on the equality of spouses. Article 71(2) stipulates that the composition of the Assembly of Kosovo shall respect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 101(1) stipulates that the composition of the civil service shall take into account internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 104(2) stipulates that the composition of the judiciary shall reflect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 108(2) charges the Kosovo Judicial Council to ensure that the Kosovo courts follow the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (4) requires proposals for appointment of judges to reflect principles of gender equality. Article 109(4) stipulates the State Prosecutor shall respect the principles of gender equality. Article 110(1) charges the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council to ensure that the State Prosecutor reflects the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (2) requires that proposals for appointments of prosecutors shall reflect principles of gender equality. Article 114(1) requires the composition of the Constitutional Court to respect principles of gender equality. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

Sections 15(2) and 42(1) prohibit sex-based discrimination. Section 17 of the Constitution outlines the elimination of demographically derived disparities as a fundamental objective of state policy. Section 17(3)(e), focuses on gender-based disparity and states that the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that “there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex, or on any other ground whatsoever.” Section 26 of the Constitution, which relates to citizenship, specifically provides for extension of a Nigerian man’s citizenship to his foreign-born wife while making no reference to a similar path to citizenship for the foreign-born husband of a woman who is a Nigerian citizen. Section 26(2) provides that the president may confer Nigerian citizenship on “any woman who is or who has been married to a citizen of Nigeria.” By implication, this section limits the right of a Nigerian woman to transmit her nationality to a foreign husband.

Section 18(1) of the Constitution makes any law with discriminatory provisions or effect presumptively invalid. Discriminatory is defined as “affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly” to their respective descriptions by race, colour, sex, language, and so on. However, Section 18(1) is limited in its scope by the exceptions enumerated in Section 18(4). Section 18(4)(a) exempts any analysis of discrimination for laws pertaining solely to non-citizens of Lesothol; Section 18(4)(b) allows for discriminatory laws related to “adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other like matters which is the personal law of persons of that description”; and Section 18(4)(c) identifies customary law as exempt from evaluation according to Section 18(1). Section 26(1) calls for Lesotho to adopt “policies aimed at promoting a society based on equality and justice for all its citizens regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Section 30 of the Constitution provides for just and favorable conditions of work for women and calls for the creation of particular policies toward the completion of this end, including fair and equal pay, safe working conditions, equal promotion opportunities, and pregnancy and childbirth protections.

Section 6 of the Constitution of Botswana adopted in 1966, and amended in 2006, prohibits sexual slavery or trafficking. It includes the following provisions: 1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude. (2) No person shall be required to perform forced labour. Section 7 of the Constitution of Botswana adopted in 1966, and amended in 2006, prohibits sexual violence that constitutes torture. It includes the following provisions: (1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment. (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful in the country immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution. Section 15 of the Constitution of Botswana adopted in 1966, and amended in 2006, prohibits the making of discriminatory laws

Article 36 of Mozambique’s Constitution provides that “men and women are equal before the law in all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life.” Article 120 recognizes and protects the roles of maternity and paternity. It acknowledges the importance of family to the development of children - socially, morally, and ethically - and so ensures an education to the future generation based on the country’s values, namely equality between men and women. Article 122 states a woman’s rights to participate in society. It specifically supports women’s participation in the struggle for national liberation and defense of sovereignty and democracy, as well as promotes women in their growing role in all spheres: political, economic, social, and cultural.

O Artigo 36 da Constituição de Moçambique prevê que “homens e mulheres são iguais perante a lei em todos os aspectos políticos, econômicos, sociais, e culturais." O artigo 120 reconhece e protege os papéis de maternidade e paternidade. Ele reconhece a importância da família para o desenvolvimento da criança – social, moral, e eticamente – e então garante uma educação para a próxima geração baseada nos valores do país, nomeadamente a igualdade entre homens e mulheres. O artigo 122 estabelece os direitos da mulher em participar da sociedade. Ele especificamente apoia a participação feminina no esforço pela liberação nacional e a defesa da soberania e democracia, assim como promove a mulher no seu papel crescente em todas as esferas: política, econômica, social, e cultural.

The 2011 Amendments to the Jamaican Constitution specifically enumerated a “right to freedom from discrimination on the ground of . . . being male or female.” The amendments also guaranteed a number of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment and torture, and protection of the right to own property, receive an education, vote, and speak freely.

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the National People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation on December 4, 1982. It has been amended several times, with the most recent amendment occurring on March 14, 2004. Article 48 provides that women and men have equal rights. It states that “[w]omen in the People’s Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, economic, cultural, social and family life. The State protects the rights and interests of women, applies the principle of equal pay for equal work to men and women alike and trains and selects cadres from among women.” Article 49, moreover, provides that “violation of the freedom of marriage is prohibited. Maltreatment of old people, women and children is prohibited.” English version available here.

就业、包办婚姻与早婚、性别歧视、财产与继承权

第五届全国人民代表大会于1982年12月4日通过中华人民共和国宪法。宪法经过几次修正，其中最近一次修正发生于2004年3月14日。第四十八条规定妇女享有同男子平等的权利。第十四条规定“中华人民共和国妇女在政治的、经济的、文化的、社会的和家庭的生 活等各方面享有同男子平等的权利。国家保护妇女的权利和利益，实行男女同工同酬，培养和选拔妇女干部。” 第四十九条规定禁止破坏婚姻自由，禁止虐待老人、妇女和儿童。

This Virginia law provides that a married woman shall have the right to acquire, hold, use, control and dispose of property as if she were unmarried.

Under Virginia law, it is a Class 4 felony to cause destruction of a unborn child, abortion, or miscarriage through medical procedure, drugs, or other means. There is an exception for physicians who are licensed by the Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery, to terminate a pregnancy or assist in performing an abortion or causing a miscarriage during the first trimester of pregnancy, among other exceptions. Informed written consent is required for an abortion under Virginia law, subject to civil penalties. It is also a Class 3 misdemeanor to encourage an individual to have an abortion prohibited by Virginia law.

Among other things, the Children’s Status Act gives children born out of wedlock the same legal privileges as children born to married couples (e.g., inheritance rights, custody, guardianship, etc.) and provides various legal mechanisms (e.g., court orders) to protect these rights.

The Constitution serves as the fundamental law of Namibia and establishes the Republic of Namibia as an independent, secular, democratic, and unitary state safeguarding the rights to justice, liberty, dignity, and equality. Chapter 3 of the Constitution protects fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, including on the grounds of sex. It also bans child marriages and mandates equal rights for men and women entering into marriage, during the marriage, and at the dissolution of the marriage. Additionally, Parliament may not make any laws that contravene the Constitution, nor can the Executive take any action that abolishes or contravenes Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Any such laws or actions would be invalid.

In 2015, Alabama amended its gun legislation to prohibit anyone who has been convicted of a misdemeanor offense of domestic violence or is subject to a domestic abuse protective order from possessing a firearm. The amended statute provides: “No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, misdemeanor offense of domestic violence, violence offense as listed in Section 12-25-32(14), anyone who is subject to a valid protection order for domestic abuse, or anyone of unsound mind shall own a firearm or have one in his or her possession or under his or her control.”

Article 44 of Cuba’s Constitution states that women and men enjoy equal economic, political, cultural, social and familial rights and that Cuba (the “State”) “guarantees that women will be offered the same opportunities and possibilities as men to achieve their full participation in the development of the country.” Article 44 further states that the State grants working women paid maternity leave before and after childbirth, and temporary work options compatible with their maternal function.

El Artículo 44 de la Constitución cubana establece que las mujeres y los hombres gozan de iguales derechos económicos, políticos, culturales, sociales y familiares y que Cuba (el “Estado”) “garantiza que las mujeres tendrán las mismas oportunidades y posibilidades que los hombres para lograr su plena participación en el desarrollo del país.” El Artículo 44 establece además que el Estado otorga a las trabajadoras licencia de maternidad remunerada antes y después del parto y opciones de trabajo temporal compatibles con su función materna.

Article 9 of the Constitution provides that all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are equal in their freedoms and rights, regardless of “sex, race, colour of skin, national and social origin, political and religious belief, property and social status”. Article 110 of the Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination among citizens on the ground of sex, race, religion or nation, social or political affiliation. (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)

Section 3 of the Constitution of Belize (the “Constitution”) provides that every person in Belize is “entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual” regardless of sex. Section 16 of the Constitution also prohibits any laws that are discriminatory or have discriminatory effect and defines “discriminatory” to include discrimination based on sex.

Art. 8 of the Constitution provides that all people are equal and no person may be discriminated against because of gender. The Constitution also states that men and women have equal rights and the law shall ensure their equality. Art. 35 provides for protection of fundamental rights even in private relationships.

The Equal Opportunities Act of Ukraine (the “Act”) provides the legal framework for men and women’s parity in all spheres of social life through providing legal support for equal rights and opportunities, removal of gender-based discrimination, and prevention of imbalance between women’s and men’s opportunities in implementing the rights granted to each of them by the Constitution and other laws. The Act defines “equal rights” as the absence of gender-based restrictions or privileges. The Act provides that government regulatory bodies must ensure equal rights for men and women in elections, civil service, employment and career, social security, entrepreneurial activity, and education. The Act prohibits gender-based violence (which is defined as “actions directed at persons through their sex, stereotyped widespread customs or traditions or actions that relate predominantly to persons of a determined sex and create physical, sexual, psychological or financial damage or suffering”) and sexual harassment (defined as "sexual actions of a verbal or physical nature, which may humiliate or insult the person who is dependent on the perpetrator for work, official, financial or other reasons"). Exceptions to the prohibition of gender discrimination include when restrictions or privileges have a legitimate, objectively justified goal achieved with appropriate and necessary methods. Violation of the Act can result in the issuance of a limitation order to temporarily restrict the rights of the offender and protect the rights of the victim, including prohibiting the offender from residing with the victim, approaching the victim within a certain distance, and restricting telephone calls or other communication with the victim.

Закон України «Про рівні можливості» («Закон») створює правові основи рівності чоловіків і жінок у всіх сферах суспільного життя шляхом правового забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей, усунення дискримінації за ознакою статі та запобігання дисбалансу між можливостями жінок та чоловіків у реалізації прав, наданих кожному з них Конституцією та іншими законами. Відповідно до Закону «рівність прав» означає відсутність обмежень або привілеїв за ознакою статі. Закон передбачає, що рівні права чоловіків і жінок забезпечуватимуться у виборчому процесі, державній службі, працевлаштуванні та кар’єрі, соціальному забезпеченні, підприємницькій діяльності та освіті. Рівність забезпечується через відповідні державні/регулюючі органи. Закон забороняє гендерне насильство (діяння, спрямовані проти осіб через їхню стать, або поширені в суспільстві звичаї чи традиції (стереотипні уявлення про соціальні функції (становище, обов’язки тощо) жінок і чоловіків), або діяння, що стосуються переважно осіб певної статі чи зачіпають їх непропорційно, які завдають фізичної, сексуальної, психологічної або економічної шкоди чи страждань, включаючи погрози таких дій, у публічному або приватному житті) та сексуальні домагання (дії сексуального характеру, виражені словесно (погрози, залякування, непристойні зауваження) або фізично (доторкання, поплескування), що принижують чи ображають осіб, які перебувають у відносинах трудового, службового, матеріального чи іншого підпорядкування). Винятки, в яких можлива законна неріівність: коли обмеження чи привілеї мають законну об’єктивно виправдану мету, методи досягнення якої є доцільними та необхідними. Порушення Закону тимчасового обмеження прав правопорушника (цивільна, адміністративна та кримінальна відповідальність згідно із законом) та захисту прав потерпілого, у тому числі заборони потерпілому проживати з потерпілим за місцем проживання, наближатися до потерпілого до певна дистанція та обмеження телефонних розмов чи іншого спілкування з жертвою.

Article 976 states that children born to Iranian fathers are considered Iranian subjects. No clause exists extending the same rights to children born of Iranian mothers where the child’s father is not Iranian. This provision demonstrates that Iranian women cannot pass on their Iranian nationality to their children.

The defendant employed the plaintiff as a librarian in 1995, but dismissed her from her position in 2000 because she married a polygamist. The plaintiff challenged the dismissal as unfair and asked for an order that her former employer, the defendant, pay compensation and long service pay. In siding with the plaintiff, the Court considered the anti-discrimination provisions of the Constitution, given that the facts underlying the offence took place prior to the Employment Act coming into effect. The Court concluded that the termination of the plaintiff qualified as discrimination. The reasoning underlying the termination effectively prevented the plaintiff from marrying a man of her choice, and from engaging in economic activity through employment, both fundamental constitutionally-protected rights. The Court emphasized that it did not matter that the defendant’s conditions of service prohibited polygamous marriages among its workforce, as such a prohibition contravened the Constitution. In closing, the Court ordered the parties to produce documents and other material relevant to the assessment of compensation for the plaintiff.

A Fourth Grade Magistrate convicted the appellant and 18 other women for knowingly living on prostitution earnings, a misdemeanor that carries a maximum sentence of 24 months in prison. In Malawi, Fourth Grade Magistrates’ jurisdiction is limited to cases in which the maximum sentence is 12 months. This jurisdictional limit was the appellants’ first ground of appeal. Despite finding that the appellants succeeded in proving their convictions null and void due to the magistrate’s jurisdictional overreach, the appellate court found it “imperative” to address the appellants’ other arguments because of “the prevalent misuse of section 146 by law enforcement.” The appellants’ second ground of appeal was that Penal Code Section 146, the offence of a woman living on the earnings of prostitution, does not target the sex worker herself, but rather restricts women from exercising influence over the movements of sex workers for monetary gain. Section 145 of the Penal Code addresses men’s criminal behavior toward sex workers. The High Court again agreed with the appellants, concluding that Section 146 of the Penal Code was clearly aimed at targeting those who exploit sex workers, rather than a punitive measure applicable to sex workers themselves. The High Court pointed out that the lower court’s conclusion that the appellants’ convictions rested on the fact that they had booked rooms in a rest house, “conduct which was not criminal at all.” The High Court also expressed concern about how the government obtained the women’s confessions to prostitution, “especially after reading the caution statements.” As a result, the High Court held the trial and convictions of the appellants unconstitutional and predicated on discrimination against women in the sex trade. In conclusion, the judge called for Malawi to have “a frank discussion” about the fact that prostitution-related offences in Malawi “remain an area of blatant discrimination, unfairness, inequality, abuse as well as bias from law enforcement as well as the courts as evidenced in this case.”

The plaintiff’s husband suffered serious injuries in an explosion, one of which impaired his ability to have sex. In the plaintiff’s claim against her husband’s employer, the Minister for Defence, she claimed compensation for loss of consortium at common law. In the past, this action was available only to a husband. The question asked by the plaintiff was whether this was inconsistent with the Constitution, and in particular its guarantee of equality and implied guarantee of spousal equality. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that restricting a claim of loss of consortium to husbands only was inconsistent with the Constitution, but disagreed on how to respond to the inconsistency. A majority took the view that the defect should be remedied in a positive manner, by extending the action to wives, while the minority thought that the solution was to abolish the action of loss of consortium entirely. Thus, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the effect of the principle of equality of spouses was to extend the benefit of the common law rule to the wife.

The appellant, a gay man, entered into an agreement with the respondents, a lesbian couple in a civil partnership, to donate sperm to the respondents so they could have a baby. It was agreed that the respondents would have full care and custody of the child, effectively as parents. They were to be fully responsible for the child’s upbringing, and the appellant, the sperm donor, would be, at most, considered a “favourite uncle.” It was explicitly agreed that the appellant would not have any responsibility for the child’s upbringing and would not seek to influence it. However, following the child’s birth, he attempted to assert rights as the father. While not seeking custody, he sought to be appointed as a guardian of the child and to have rights of access. The respondents opposed his application, and it was their intention to move to Australia, which the appellant sought an injunction to prevent. This case constituted the first time in which the superior courts of Ireland dealt with the matter of parenthood in assisted reproduction, and both the High Court and Supreme Court took different views of the case. McD’s application to be appointed guardian under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 was unsuccessful in the High Court, which found that the donor had acted dishonestly and deliberately misled them as to his intentions. Emphasising the child’s best interests, the High Court, while acknowledging the importance of the blood link between donor and child, found that this was a rare case in which it was not in the best interests of the child to have a relationship with both of his biological parents. The High Court rejected the applications for guardianship and access, finding that granting them would result in too great a cost to the child: the “loss of a tranquil and calm upbringing.” The Supreme Court took a different approach, however, sympathising with the donor’s perspective. Importantly, the Supreme Court ruled that, under Irish law, the lesbian couple was not a family. There was a strong rejection of the idea of ‘de facto families’ having any legal status or rights in Irish law. This concept was relied on by the High Court, where weight was afforded to the position of the ‘de facto family’ consisting of the couple and the child. In this vein, the Supreme Court rejected the applicability of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Supreme Court agreed that it was not in the best interests of the child that McD. be appointed guardian, but held that he should have access rights, and remitted the matter to the High Court for determination of the terms of such access. The case is also important regarding the relationship between Irish law and the ECHR, with the Supreme Court highlighting that the Convention is not directly applicable in Irish law and taking a restrictive approach in relation to its interpretation and application. The Supreme Court also warned against domestic courts ‘outpacing’ the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

The case concerned sexual abuse involving an underage victim. The court ruled in accordance with article 135.1º, 4º of the Criminal Code, on sexual abuse of minors, finding the defendant guilty and sentencing him to eight years in prison. It was argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, who was a minor. For such purposes, the defendant used to pick the plaintiff up at school and take her in his car to empty places to have sexual intercourse. The court held that the plaintiff as a victim shall be protected against all forms of sexual abuse and violence, as established by the national Constitution. Because she was a minor, her consent to enter into such relations was void and, therefore, must not be considered a reason to leave her without protection.

El caso se refería al abuso sexual de una víctima menor de edad. El tribunal resolvió el caso de conformidad con el artículo 135.1º, 4º del Código Penal, sobre abusos sexuales a menores, declarando culpable al acusado y condenándolo a ocho años de prisión. Se argumentó que el acusado mantuvo varios encuentros sexuales con la demandante, quien era menor de edad. Para tales efectos, el imputado recogía a la demandante en la escuela y la llevaba en su automóvil a lugares solitarios para tener relaciones sexuales. El tribunal sostuvo que la denunciante como víctima debe ser protegida contra toda forma de abuso y violencia sexual, tal como lo establece la Constitución Nacional. Por ser menor de edad, su consentimiento para entablar tales relaciones fue nulo y, por tanto, no se considera motivo para dejarla sin protección.

The case concerned abortion, the right to life, the right to health, and the right to self-determination. The court ruled for the partial decriminalization of abortion and set circumstances under which voluntary termination of pregnancy would be permissible. The Criminal Code previously criminalized voluntary abortion with one to three years of imprisonment. The plaintiffs argued that the criminalization of abortion violated women’s constitutional rights to life and dignity, physical integrity, equality, liberty, and unhindered development of personality, health, and reproductive self-determination. The Colombian Constitutional Court determined that abortion shall not be considered a crime in any of the following three circumstances: (i) a physician certified that pregnancy could threaten the woman’s health or life; (ii) a physician concluded that the fetus would suffer from serious malformations that could eventually endanger or terminate his life; and (iii) if the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or non-consensual artificial insemination, as long as the criminal act was lawfully reported to the competent authorities. The court found that articles 32.7, 122, 123, and 124 were constitutional, subject only to the aforementioned criteria. This case is of paramount importance because it established for the first time the right of women to terminate their pregnancy under the three specific scenarios. The scope of this decision was recently modified under Decision C-055-22 by the Constitutional Court, which has been announced but not yet published as of April 2022. This decision decriminalized voluntary abortion under any circumstances until 24 weeks of pregnancy. Voluntary abortions carried out after week 24 will not be deemed criminal offenses only if they are performed under any of the three events previously recognized by the Constitutional Court in the Decision C-355-06.

El caso se refería al aborto, el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la salud y el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. La Corte Constitucional falló a favor de la despenalización parcial del aborto y fijó las circunstancias bajo las cuales sería permisible la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. El Código Penal tipificaba como delito el aborto voluntario con uno a tres años de prisión. Los demandantes argumentaron que la penalización del aborto violaba los derechos constitucionales de las mujeres a la vida y la dignidad, la integridad física, la igualdad, la libertad, el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la salud y la libre determinación reproductiva. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia determinó que el aborto no sería considerado delito en ninguna de las siguientes tres circunstancias: (i) cuando un médico certifique que el embarazo puede poner en peligro la salud o la vida de la mujer; (ii) cuando un médico concluya que el feto sufriría de graves malformaciones que eventualmente podrían poner en peligro o acabar con su vida; y (iii) si el embarazo fue producto de violación, incesto o inseminación artificial no consentida, siempre que el hecho delictivo haya sido legalmente denunciado ante las autoridades competentes. El tribunal consideró que los artículos 32.7, 122, 123 y 124 eran constitucionales condicionados a los criterios antes mencionados. Este caso es de suma importancia porque estableció por primera vez el derecho de la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo bajo los tres supuestos específicos. El alcance de esta decisión fue modificado recientemente mediante la Sentencia C-055-22 de la Corte Constitucional. Esta decisión despenalizó el aborto voluntario bajo cualquier circunstancia hasta la semana 24 de embarazo. Los abortos voluntarios practicados después de la semana 24 no serán considerados delitos si se realizan bajo cualquiera de los tres supuestos previamente reconocidos por la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355-06.

The case concerned maternity leave. In this case, the plaintiff gave birth to a premature baby in the 32nd week of pregnancy. The Colombian Labor Code provides a regular maternity leave of 14 weeks, however, the court ruled that the terms must be extended in cases of premature births since the babies are highly prone to health complications and, therefore, are subject to special constitutional protection. According to the Constitutional Court, maternity health care is not limited to the period of gestation and birth. The court held that, in accordance with articles 57, 59, 236 and 239 of the Labor Code, the extension of maternity leave in premature births must comprise, in addition to the regular 14 weeks, the period between the expected and the premature date of birth. The court explained that the benefit of maternity leave ceases to be exclusively a legal issue, acquiring constitutional relevance, when the rights of pregnant women, such as right to live with dignity, depend on the payment of the maternity leave benefit.

El caso se refería a la licencia de maternidad. En este caso, la demandante dio a luz a un bebé prematuro en la semana 32 de embarazo. El Código Laboral de Colombia establece una licencia de maternidad de 14 semanas, sin embargo, la Corte sostuvo que los plazos deben extenderse en casos de partos prematuros ya que los bebés son altamente propensos a complicaciones de salud y, por lo tanto, están sujetos a una protección constitucional especial. Según la Corte Constitucional, la atención de la salud de la maternidad no se limita al período de gestación y nacimiento. La Corte sostuvo que, de conformidad con los artículos 57, 59, 236 y 239 del Código del Trabajo, la extensión de la licencia de maternidad en partos prematuros debe comprender, además de las 14 semanas regulares, el período entre la fecha de nacimiento esperada y la fecha prematura del parto. La Corte explicó que el beneficio de la licencia de maternidad deja de ser una cuestión exclusivamente jurídica, adquiriendo relevancia constitucional, cuando los derechos de las mujeres embarazadas, como el derecho a vivir con dignidad, dependen del pago del beneficio de la licencia de maternidad.

This judicial review concerned domestic violence. The court ruled that there ought to be greater criminal sanctions for domestic violence offenses. The law provides for four to eight years of imprisonment in cases of domestic violence, irrespective of the magnitude of the injuries. The plaintiff claimed that the article went against the proportionality principle set forth by the Colombian Constitution. The Constitutional Court held that special protection should be provided to families and especially to those who are more vulnerable to domestic violence and are in need of enhanced protective measures. The court pointed out that the family unit shall be preserved, among others, by virtue of the State’s powers and sanctions in accordance with article 42 of the Constitution. That is to say, the Colombian State is obliged to enact and establish a number of strict legal provisions allowing for the investigation and adequate punishment of any sort of domestic violence. To that end, the legislature had the power to discourage the forms of violence that may affect the family unit by increasing sanctions for domestic violence offenses, as provided in article 229 of the Criminal Code –and amended by article 33 of Law 1142 of 2007.

Esta demanda de constitucionalidad se refería a la violencia doméstica. La Corte Constitucional dictaminó que debería haber mayores sanciones penales para los delitos de violencia doméstica. La ley prevé de cuatro a ocho años de prisión para casos de violencia intrafamiliar, independientemente de la magnitud de las lesiones. La demandante alegó que el artículo contravenía el principio de proporcionalidad consagrado en la Constitución Política de Colombia. La Corte Constitucional sostuvo que se debe brindar protección especial a las familias y especialmente a aquellas que son más vulnerables a la violencia doméstica y necesitan mayores medidas de protección. El tribunal señaló que la unidad familiar se debe preservar, entre otras, a través de las facultades del Estado y de regímenes sancionatorios de conformidad con el artículo 42 de la Constitución. Es decir, el Estado colombiano está obligado a promulgar y establecer una serie de estrictas disposiciones legales que permitan investigar y sancionar adecuadamente cualquier tipo de violencia intrafamiliar. Para tal efecto, el legislador tenía la facultad de desalentar cualquier forma de violencia que pueda afectar la unidad familiar mediante el aumento de las sanciones por delitos de violencia intrafamiliar, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 229 del Código Penal –y reformado por el artículo 33 de la Ley 1142 de 2007.

(Sentencia T-274-15 - Acción de Tutela; Expedientes acumulados: T-4.492.963; T-4.715.291; T-4.725.592; T-4.734.867)

These cases concerned women’s reproductive health rights, specifically related to in vitro fertilization treatment (“IVF”). The Constitutional Court analyzed four cases where health care providers refused to perform IVF treatments since they were not covered by the mandatory health plan. The court ruled that the right to reproductive health protects the people's right to make free decisions about their sexuality and reproduction and involves the obligation of the Government to provide the necessary resources to make such determination effective. On this note, the court held that a health care company infringes the fundamental rights of a woman with fertility issues by denying authorization for in vitro fertilization treatment. The Colombian Constitutional Court followed the guidelines provided by other judgments held by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) on this note, including the 2012 case Artavia Murillo and others v. Costa Rica. Furthermore, the court affirmed the decision T-528 of 2014, which instructed the Colombian Government to analyze the possibility to adding IVF treatments to the national mandatory health plan.

La Corte analizó varios casos que se referían a los derechos de salud reproductiva de las mujeres, específicamente aquellos relacionados con el tratamiento de fertilización in vitro. La Corte Constitucional analizó cuatro casos en los que los prestadores de servicios de salud se negaron a realizar tratamientos de fecundación in vitro por no estar cubiertos por el plan obligatorio de salud. La Corte dictaminó que el derecho a la salud reproductiva protege la posibilidad de que las personas tomen decisiones libres sobre su sexualidad y reproducción e implica la obligación del Gobierno de proporcionar los recursos necesarios para hacer efectiva tal determinación. En este sentido, la Corte sostuvo que una empresa de atención médica viola los derechos fundamentales de una mujer con problemas de fertilidad al negar la autorización para el tratamiento de fertilización in vitro. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia siguió los lineamientos brindados por otras sentencias proferidas por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos sobre este aspecto, incluyendo el caso Artavia Murillo y otros vs. Costa Rica de 2012. Asimismo, la Corte confirmó la sentencia T-528 de 2014, que instruyó al Gobierno colombiano analizar la posibilidad de incorporar tratamientos de fecundación in vitro al plan nacional obligatorio de salud.

This decision unified the court’s criteria regarding employment rights for pregnant women and their special labor protections. The Constitutional Court analyzed three cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers, who were not aware of the workers’ pregnancy status at the time of dismissal. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed the importance of guaranteeing job security for pregnant workers, especially during the lactation period, as a measure to avoid discrimination against women at work. Consequently, in order to dismiss a worker whose pregnancy status was known by the employer, an employment inspector must grant permission beforehand. However, the court ruled by elaborating on previous jurisprudence, that it was excessive to oblige a former employer to readmit an employee and pay social security contributions for a worker who was dismissed without prior knowledge of her pregnancy status. In the study of those cases, the court held that when the employer has no knowledge of the pregnancy status and terminates a pregnant employee’s employment contract, no discrimination can be argued and therefore no protection of motherhood can be granted.

Esta sentencia unificó el criterio de la Corte Constitucional respecto de los derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas y su protección laboral reforzada. La Corte Constitucional analizó tres casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores, quienes desconocían el estado de embarazo de las trabajadoras al momento del despido. La Corte Constitucional reafirmó la importancia de garantizar la estabilidad laboral de las trabajadoras embarazadas, especialmente durante el período de lactancia, como medida para evitar la discriminación laboral de las mujeres. En consecuencia, para despedir a una trabajadora cuyo estado de embarazo era conocido por el empleador, un inspector de trabajo debe otorgar un permiso previo. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional dictaminó, con base en fuentes jurisprudenciales, que era excesivo obligar a un ex empleador a readmitir a una empleada y pagar las contribuciones a la seguridad social de una trabajadora que fue despedida, si no tenían conocimiento previo de su estado de embarazo. En el estudio de esos casos, la Corte Constitucional sostuvo que cuando el empleador no tiene conocimiento del estado de embarazo y termina el contrato de trabajo de una empleada embarazada, no se puede alegar discriminación y, por lo tanto, no se puede otorgar protección laboral reforzada.

This case concerned issues of personal freedom and the discrimination against sex workers. The ruling resulted in the protection of two sex workers’ fundamental rights: to be treated equally and not be discriminated because of their profession. The events that triggered such protection concerned a police raid against sex workers in Bogotá under the excuse of regaining a public space. At that time, the Government was working on the implementation of a special protection program, including special training for police, to promote the importance of the dignified treatment of sex workers and the prohibition of verbal and physical abuse. The decision ultimately further reinforced constitutional protections for sex workers’ rights to freedom, work, free movement, and non-discrimination.

Este caso se refería a cuestiones de libertad personal y discriminación contra las trabajadoras sexuales. El fallo otorgó la protección de los derechos fundamentales de dos trabajadoras sexuales a ser tratadas por igual y a no ser discriminadas por su profesión. Los hechos que desencadenaron tal protección se referían a un allanamiento policial en contra de trabajadoras sexuales en Bogotá bajo el pretexto de la recuperación del espacio público. En ese momento, el Gobierno estaba trabajando en la implementación de un programa de protección especial, incluida la capacitación especial para policías para promover la importancia del trato digno de las trabajadoras sexuales y la prohibición del abuso verbal y físico contra ellas. La decisión finalmente reforzó aún más que los derechos de las trabajadoras sexuales a la libertad, el trabajo, la libre circulación y la no discriminación están protegidos constitucionalmente.

The court reviewed a decision made by the ‘Family Commissioner’ (Comisario de Familia) and endorsed by the Family Judge (Juzgado de Familia), denying the plaintiff’s request for precautionary measures against the defendant, based on physical and psychological aggressions. The Commissioner estimated that there was not enough evidence as to affirm that the risk to the plaintiff’s life or integrity. Given the parties’ mutual aggression, the Commissioner advised the couple to cease all acts of violence against each other. The plaintiff alleged that the Commissioner did not take into consideration a medical report by the Institute of Legal Medicine (Instituto de Medicina Legal) acknowledging the existing risks to the plaintiff’s physical integrity. The judge who initially heard the case endorsed the Commissioner’s decision. The Constitutional Court ultimately overturned the court’s decision based on the special protections granted to women in the context of domestic violence. Such special protection arises out of the historical disadvantages that women have had to face within society, especially within the family environment. On this note, the Court ruled that any failure by the competent authorities to provide protection measures against domestic violence violates the fundamental rights of women, understood as a vulnerable group within society.

The plaintiff, the Child and Family Agency, sought permission to disclose the HIV status of A., a minor teenager living with HIV since birth in the plaintiff’s care, to another minor (B.) who the plaintiff believed had a sexual relationship with A. A. denied having a sexual relationship with B. and refused to consent to the disclosure of his HIV status. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to disclose A.’s status so that B. could obtain testing, medical treatment, and counseling. Citing doctor-patient confidentiality, the High Court refused to order disclosure of A.’s HIV status without his consent. The test applied by the court was whether, on the balance of probabilities, the failure to breach patient confidentiality would create a significant risk of death or very serious harm to an innocent third party. The court concluded that it did not because the plaintiff failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that A. and B. were having unprotected sex. In addition, the court reasoned, if B. was willing to have unprotected sex with A., thereby assuming all the risks associated with unprotected sex, then the “low” risk of HIV infection (due to (i) A. taking anti-retroviral medication, albeit without complete consistency, (ii) A. having an undetectable viral load when tested, and (iii) HIV being a "chronic condition" rather than "a terminal illness") in such circumstances is not such as to justify breaching a patient’s right to confidentiality, which should only be breached in exceptional circumstances. The court repeatedly expressed concerns about "paternalistic" state interference in private matters. Finally, the court emphasized the public interest in HIV-positive people seeking treatment rather than foregoing medical care to avoid potential disclosure of their status or sexual activities.

The issue in this case was whether embryos, having been frozen and stored in a clinic, are “unborn” and thus protected by the right to life under Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland. The applicant-wife brought this suit against her husband, the respondent. The applicant had in vitro fertilization treatment ("IVF") and six embryos resulted. Three of the embryos were implanted successfully in the applicant’s uterus and she became pregnant. The remaining three embryos, at issue in the case, were frozen and placed in storage with a clinic. The applicant and her husband separated, after which the applicant requested that the three frozen embryos be released to her to have them implanted. The clinic refused to release them absent consent from the respondent which he refused to provide. The applicant brought the court proceedings to obtain the embryos on constitutional and contractual grounds. The High Court dismissed the case and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. A majority of the Supreme Court held that an embryo is not “unborn” for the purposes of Irish Constitutional law, and that there was no consequential (enforceable) right for the embryos to be released and implanted; Article 40.3.3 only applied after implantation.

The plaintiffs challenged an 1879 Connecticut law, which banned the use of all drugs, medical devices, or other instruments necessary for contraception, by opening a birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut. The Supreme Court found that the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments established a right of marital privacy against state contraception regulations. As a result, the Court held that the Connecticut law violated this constitutionally established right to privacy, so the law was struck down. The Court applied this reasoning, in part, to a case affirming unmarried people's access to contraception in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972).

A federal statute established in 1873 prohibited the mailing of unsolicited pamphlets regarding contraceptives. Filing a friend-of-the-court brief, the ACLU challenged the constitutionality of this statute, alleging that it violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. Applying the test regarding commercial speech established in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Court found that based on the economic motivation of the sender, the advertising content of the pamphlets, and their reference to a specified product, the mail could be classified as commercial speech. The Court also held that the governmental interest in prohibiting the pamphlets was insufficient as recipients could easily discard the information if they wished.

Amongst other things, this case sets out that the constitutional concept of family is not only derived from the institution of marriage. According to the Court, a family formed on the basis of “continuous emotional affection, mutual understanding, responsibility, respect, co-parenting, and the like” is also protected by the Constitution. The significance of such family definition for same-sex partners was proven years later by the Constitutional Court case No. 16/2016. The Court affirmed that the State must not discriminate based on gender and/or sexual orientation in granting Residence Permits to foreign nationals reuniting with their spouses, even if same-sex marriage or same-sex partnership is not legal in Lithuania.

Šioje byloje nustatyta, kad konstitucinė šeimos samprata kyla ne tik iš santuokos institucijos. Pasak Teismo, šeima, sudaryta remiantis „pastoviais emocinio prieraišumo, tarpusavio supratimo, atsakomybės, pagarbos, bendro vaikų auklėjimo ir panašiais ryšiais“ taip pat yra saugoma Konstitucijos. Tokio šeimos apibrėžimo reikšmė tos pačios lyties partneriams po daugelio metų įrodyta byloje Nr. 16/2016, kurioje Konstitucinis Teismas patvirtino, kad valstybė negali diskriminuoti dėl lyties ir (ar) seksualinės orientacijos, suteikdama užsieniečiui sutuoktiniui leidimą laikinai gyventi Lietuvos Respublikoje šeimos susijungimo atveju, net jei tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokos ar partnerystė Lietuvoje nėra teisėta.

The female appellant, a civil servant of the Office of the Austrian Labor Market, applied for a position as head of the relevant regional office with three other male candidates. One of the men was chosen for the position. The plaintiff claimed that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of sex, among other reasons, because she was equally qualified for the position and the interviewer asked her why women could not find fulfilment in educating children during the application process. The Equal Treatment Commission, which the appellant appealed to first, found that the employer violated the directive to promote women. After considering all expert reports, interim judgments and other evidence in the case, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately agreed with the appellant and awarded her compensation. The Court found the decision of the Office to be arbitrary as it was considering facts contrary to the content in the files. Furthermore, the Court found the application process discriminatory because of the question about why women could not find fulfillment in educating children.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, eine Beamtin des österreichischen Arbeitsmarktservice, bewarb sich zusammen mit drei anderen männlichen Bewerbern um eine Stelle als Leiterin des zuständigen Regionalbüros. Einer der Männer wurde für diese Stelle ausgewählt. Die Klägerin behauptete, sie sei unter anderem deshalb wegen ihres Geschlechts diskriminiert worden, weil sie für die Stelle gleich qualifiziert war und der Interviewer sie während des Bewerbungsverfahrens fragte, warum Frauen keine Erfüllung in der Kindererziehung finden könnten. Die Gleichbehandlungskommission, die die Beschwerdeführerin zuerst angerufen hatte, stellte fest, dass der Arbeitgeber gegen das Frauenförderungsgebot verstoßen hatte. Nach Prüfung aller Sachverständigengutachten, Zwischenurteile und sonstiger Beweise in diesem Fall gab der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof der Beschwerdeführerin schließlich Recht und sprach ihr eine Entschädigung zu. Das Gericht befand die Entscheidung des Amtes für willkürlich, da es Fakten berücksichtigte, die im Widerspruch zum Inhalt der Akten standen. Darüber hinaus befand das Gericht das Antragsverfahren als diskriminierend, da es um die Frage ging, warum Frauen keine Erfüllung in der Kindererziehung finden können.

The appellant, a 22-year-old Somali woman, applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection, stating that she was abducted by the Al-Shabaab Militia and her uncle arranged a forced marriage for her. Her application for asylum and international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that the reasons stated by the appellant were not credible, too vague, and contradictory. In addition, the fact that she still had family (including her uncle) in Somalia was deemed as sufficient proof that she could lead a life without undue hardship. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of this case were not given sufficient consideration, particularly, the fact that it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to return to her family. The court did not sufficiently investigate and consider that the appellant’s uncle appeared to have beaten her several times, robbed her, locked her up, forced genital mutilation upon her and arranged for a forced wedding. The Court found the appellant’s right to equal treatment violated.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, eine 22-jährige Somalierin, beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz mit der Begründung, sie sei von der Al-Shabaab-Miliz entführt und von ihrem Onkel zwangsverheiratet worden. Ihr Antrag auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, die von der Beschwerdeführerin angegebenen Gründe seien nicht glaubwürdig, zu vage und widersprüchlich. Darüber hinaus wurde die Tatsache, dass sie noch Familie (einschließlich ihres Onkels) in Somalia hatte, als ausreichender Beweis dafür angesehen, dass sie ein Leben ohne unzumutbare Härten führen konnte. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf, weil er (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) feststellte, dass die Umstände dieses Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt worden waren, insbesondere die Tatsache, dass es für die Klägerin unzumutbar wäre, zu ihrer Familie zurückzukehren. Das Gericht hat nicht ausreichend untersucht und berücksichtigt, dass der Onkel der Rechtsmittelführerin sie offenbar mehrfach geschlagen, ausgeraubt, eingesperrt, ihr eine Genitalverstümmelung aufgezwungen und eine Zwangshochzeit arrangiert hat. Das Gericht stellte fest, dass das Recht der Beschwerdeführerin auf Gleichbehandlung verletzt wurde.

This judgment was issued as part of the assessment proceedings subsequent to a judicial review by the state. This review investigated systemic and individual failures resulting in police officers committing widespread violent and traumatic sexual assaults and rapes of women and girls during the civil unrest in October 2019. The court was tasked with assessing the amount of compensation to be awarded to the 18 applicants on whose behalf the review was conducted. The basis for this award was the previous judgment of the court that: (i) failures by the Inspector General of Police resulted in violence, torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment against the applicants in violation of section 19(3) of the Constitution; (ii) failures by the Inspector General of Police further resulted in violations of the right of applicants to dignity and equality under sections 19(1) and 20 of the Constitution; and (iii) failures by the Clerk of the National Assembly and the Malawi Police Service to investigate and prosecute the allegations of violence and rape resulted in violations of the right of access to justice under section 41 of the Constitution. The court also found numerous violations of domestic laws, including the Police Act, as well as Malawi’s obligations under human rights treaties, including CEDAW. Under section 46(4) of the Constitution, the courts have the power to award compensation to any person whose rights or freedoms have been unlawfully denied or violated. The court applied the principle of restitution intergrum, or making the victim whole as they would have been prior to the violation, and turned to international precedents when evaluating appropriate amounts. The court noted that any amount should be elevated when caused by a “constitutional duty bearer,” such as the police, and that lack of investigation was an aggravating factor. The court awarded different amounts to each applicant depending on the circumstances of their particular harm, ranging from K4,500,000-10,000,000, in addition to costs.

The plaintiff discovered she was pregnant and sought an abortion. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion due to a Texas law that criminalized all abortions except those necessary to protect the life of the mother. The plaintiff alleged that the Texas law violated her constitutional right to privacy. The Court invalidated the law, finding that the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment Due Process Clause protects women’s right to privacy and thus their right to choose to have an abortion before the end of the first trimester. The Court further held that after the first trimester but before fetal viability, the State may only impose regulations related to the protection of the mother’s health. However, the Court found that following the viability of the fetus, the State may prohibit abortions except those necessary to protect the mother’s life. This decision was affirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey.

Article 1002 of the Civil Code in 1998 stipulated," The residence of the wife shall be that of the husband…; nevertheless, in case there is an agreement that the residence of the husband shall be that of the wife…, the agreement shall be upheld." This article was against the principle of equality and proportionality of the Constitution. Though the article allows the husband or wife to make an agreement about their residence, it failed to take into consideration that if a husband refuses to make such an agreement with his wife or if an agreement cannot be made, the wife has no choice but to accept her husband's domicile as hers. This article also failed to consider the wife's freedom to choose her residence; thus, it is unconstitutional.

1998年民法第1002條規定：「妻以夫之住所為住所…，但約定夫以妻之住所為住所…，從其約定。」此一規定因違反平等原則及比例原則而違憲。雖該條賦予夫妻一方得另行約定住所，但如夫拒絕為約定或雙方協議不成時，妻即須以夫之住所為住所。該條規定亦未考慮妻應有選擇住所之自由，故而違憲。

The Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality of Art. 14 of the Labor Code and Arts. 10 and 21 of the law “on Employment of the Population of the Republic of Belarus” and decided that, to ensure the completeness of legal regulation in the field of labor relations and the implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to work, it was necessary to add age and place of residence to the list of circumstances, based on which employment discrimination is prohibited. The Court specifically noted that the employer’s inclusion of requirements based on age, place of residence, or other circumstances that could be deemed discriminatory in job announcements creates the prerequisites for the violation of citizens’ constitutional rights, including the right of women to opportunities equal to those of men at work and career advancement.

On a petition filed by a transgender individual for violation of constitutional rights, arguing that the census excluded transgender people with disabilities. The High Court ordered the Census Commission to include transgender in a separate column. This followed a recent order dated 09 January 2017 in writ petition (No. 37499/2016), where the High Court ordered the Census Commission to include the category “Transgender” under the column “Sex” in Form-2. The transgender category was assigned code/number 3 in the said column of Form-2 under disability. The High Court’s rationale was that exclusion of persons with disabilities from the National Census would offend their welfare and future prospects as a population and therefore violate constitutional provisions of security, dignity and freedom of speech of a person. The court further observed that Pakistan had ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2011, which places an international obligation on Pakistan to collect appropriate information about persons with disabilities and to implement policies accordingly.

In Slovakia, a petition signed by at least 350,000 voters may initiate a referendum as long as the questions relate to public interest. However, the subject of the referendum may not be basic rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Court reviews whether the subject of the referendum conforms to the Constitution. In 2014, 408,000 voters signed a petition asking the President to announce a referendum on the following questions: 1) Do you agree that the term “marriage” may not be used to designate any other form of cohabitation of persons other than the union between one man and one woman?; 2) Do you agree that pairs or groups of persons of the same sex may not be allowed to adopt children and subsequently to bring them up?; 3) Do you agree that no other form of cohabitation of persons other than marriage should be accorded the special protection, rights and obligations which are accorded solely to marriage and spouses by the legal system as at 1 March 2014?; and 4) Do you agree that schools may not require children to attend lessons in the field of sexual behavior or euthanasia, if their parents and the children themselves do not agree with the teaching content? The President asked the court to consider whether the first, second, and third questions were admissible as they related to the right to privacy, and whether the last question was admissible as it might interfere with the right to education. The Constitutional Court balanced the inalterability of constitutional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms with the impossibility of rejecting every question which might minimally affect a right or freedom. The court held that the irrevocability of human rights means the standard of human rights is as set in the constitutional text. Any referendum questions that would lead to a broadening of human rights would be constitutionally acceptable, and any that would reduce human rights would not be constitutionally acceptable. Thus, the first, second, and fourth question were declared acceptable, and the third unacceptable. This case is available through the search function on the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic website here by searching for the case file number (PL. ÚS 24/2014).

Article 239 of the Taiwan Criminal Code stipulates, "Anyone who has a spouse and commits adultery with another person shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. The same applies to those who commit adultery." This Interpretation overrules J.Y. Interpretation No. 554 (2002), which affirmed the constitutionality of the Criminal Code’s restriction on individual sexual freedom on the grounds that such freedom was subject to restriction for the purpose of protecting the marriage and family. In this Interpretation, the Court expanded the scope of sexual autonomy under Article 22 of the Constitution and held that the infringement of the rights to sexual autonomy and of individual privacy by the criminalization of adultery fail the proportionality test in the Constitution’s Article 23. The Court found Article 239 unconstitutional because it restricted an individual's freedom to decide whether and with whom to engage in sexual activity. However, the state should generally limit the punishments for illegal acts to those detrimental to social order or public welfare. Therefore, while adultery is undoubtedly detrimental to the obligation of fidelity in a marriage and the feelings and expectations of the other party, it is not clearly detrimental to the social order or public welfare. Further, adultery mainly occurs in private. The process of discovery, prosecution, and trial inevitably interferes with personal privacy, driving the state's public power straight into the very private space of the people. Therefore, the Court found that the regulation causes more significant damage than the interest it intends to protect. This case is important not only in its recognition of a constitutionally-protected right to sexual autonomy and its emphasis on individual privacy but also because the Criminal Code provisions on adultery reportedly had been applied disproportionately against women and also to pressure women not to pursue sexual assault charges, which could lead to the woman becoming charged with adultery.

刑法第239條規定：「有配偶而與人通姦者，處1年以下有期徒刑。其相姦者亦同。」本解釋推翻司法院第554號解釋(2002)，關於保障婚姻和家庭而限制個人性自主權利之合憲性解釋。憲法法庭認憲法第22條所保障性自主權之限制，與憲法第23條比例原則不符，應自本解釋公布之日起失其效力；於此範圍內，本院釋字第554號解釋應予變更。因而宣告此一規定違憲。此規定立法目的係限制個人得自由決定是否及與何人發生性行為之性行為自由。然基於刑法謙抑性原則，國家原則上應以侵害公益或大眾福祉之違法行為為限。因此，通姦行為固已損及婚姻關係中之忠誠義務及對方之感情與對婚姻之期待，但尚不致明顯損及公益或大眾福祉。再者，通姦行為多發生於個人之私密空間內，其發現、追訴、審判過程必然侵擾個人生活私密領域，致國家公權力長驅直入人民極私密之領域。因此，系爭規定所致之損害大於其目的所欲維護之利益，而有失均衡。本案宣告違憲之重要性不僅在於對於憲法上所保障的性自主權及隱私權的再次確認，更是因為刑法通姦罪適用上對於女性比例上多於男性被告，及適用上經常迫使女性放棄追溯之實證結果，而不符合憲法所保障之意旨。

The plaintiffs were two female criminal defendants who chose to be tried by a jury and objected to the Juries Act of 1927, which excluded all women from jury pools except those who opted to be part of the potential jurors list. The Supreme Court ruled the Juries Act unconstitutional because it constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of sex.

In this case, the Constitutional Court held that §7(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RMCA) was inconsistent with 172(2) of the Constitution, and therefore invalid, because it unfairly discriminated against women in polygamous customary marriages entered into before the enactment of the RMCA on the bases of gender and race, ethnic, or social origin. This case followed Gumede v. President of the Republic of South Africa, in which it was held that §7(1) was invalid as to monogamous customary marriages, but left the question of polygamous customary marriages for Parliament. The effect of this ruling was that pre-RCMA marriages continued to be governed by customary law, while post-RCMA marriages were automatically out of community of property. The Court declared that, in the interim until Parliament changes the RCMA, a husband and his wives in pre-RCMA polygamous customary marriages must share equally in the right of ownership of, and other rights attaching to, family property, including the right of management and control of family property.

In this case, the Constitutional Court declared §2(1) of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (Upgrading Act) unconstitutional. §2(1) of the Upgrading Act automatically turned land tenure rights into rights of property ownership, without providing other occupants or affected parties an opportunity to make submissions. The Court held §2(1) unconstitutional because it had a discriminatory effect on women’s property rights. During apartheid, only men could be the head of the family and hold Certificates of Deed and Grant. This had the effect of excluding women from holding land tenure rights. The Court determined that because §2(1) of the Upgrading Act was based on this apartheid position, it indirectly differentiated between men and women in a way that amounted to gender discrimination.

The plaintiff, a councilwoman in the Comune of Lampa, identified as a woman and presented herself to society as a woman, filed a discrimination complaint against the defendant, claiming arbitrary discrimination for failure by the Mayor, as representative of the State, to respect her gender identity. She sued, claiming a violation of Anti-Discrimination Law No. 20.069 (“the Law”). The court, on appeal, reversed the trial court judgment and imposed a fine, finding that the Mayor of the Comune of Lampa had arbitrarily discriminated against plaintiff by failing to respect her gender identity as a woman. The court held that arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made by agents of the State or individuals that lacks reasonable justification, and that causes deprivation, disturbance, or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Constitution or international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and in effect, including gender identity as defined by the LGBTI Unit of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which includes transgender identity. Therefore, the right to an identity is constitutionally protected, including the right to identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual. Any deprivation, disturbance or threat to such identifying rights constitutes an arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of Article 2 of Law No. 20,609.

La demandante, vecina de la comunidad de Lampa, identificada como mujer y presentada a la sociedad como mujer, interpuso una denuncia de discriminación contra la imputada, alegando discriminación arbitraria por incumplimiento del Alcalde, como representante del Estado, de respetar su identidad de género. Ella demandó, alegando una violación de la Ley contra la Discriminación No. 20.069 (“la Ley”). El tribunal, en apelación, revocó la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia e impuso una multa, al considerar que el alcalde de la comuna de Lampa había discriminado arbitrariamente a la demandante al no respetar su identidad de género como mujer. El tribunal sostuvo que “discriminación arbitraria” significa toda distinción, exclusión o restricción realizada por agentes del Estado o personas que carece de justificación razonable, y que ocasiona privación, alteración o amenaza en el legítimo ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en las normas internacionales, tratados de derechos humanos ratificados por Chile y en vigencia, incluida la identidad de género según la definición de la Unidad LGBTI de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que incluye la identidad transgénero. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la identidad está protegido constitucionalmente, incluido el derecho a identificarse como lesbiana, gay, bisexual, transgénero e intersexual. Cualquier privación, alteración o amenaza a tales derechos identificativos constituye una discriminación arbitraria en el sentido del artículo 2 de la Ley N ° 20.609.

The petitioner filed for divorce and sought an equal share of assets acquired during the marriage. At the time of marriage, neither party owned any property. During their marriage, the plaintiff assisted in building their business and managed their shop while her husband continued to work for the Controller and Accountant General's Department. The plaintiff also advised the respondent on property investments. The respondent denied that the petitioner contributed to the business and claimed that she embezzled money from him, and therefore should not be considered an equal holder of marital assets. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that she was a joint owner of the property and was therefore entitled to an equal share of the marital assets. The Supreme Court affirmed. Previous case law denied a wife a share in property acquired during the marriage unless the wife could show that she had made a "substantial contribution" to the acquirement of these assets. Yet, because more recent cases supported the "equality is equity" principle in the division of marital assets, the Supreme Court concluded that "the death knell has been sung to the substantial contribution principle, making way for the equitable distribution as provided for under Article 22 (3) of the Constitution 1992." Thus, the court held that even if it determined that the petitioner did not make a substantial contribution to the acquisition of marital property, she would still be entitled to a share of the property. To further support its decision, the Supreme Court referenced Article 1 and Article 5 of CEDAW, in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emphasize equality between the sexes.

Five notifications regarding discrimination of students by a Foundation were made to the Equality Ombudsman after the broadcast of a TV program. In the program, the students of a school owned by the Foundation were separated by gender on the school bus. The Equality Ombudsman’s investigation noted that a gender-based separation was also made in the gymnastics classes. According to Chapter 2 Section 5 of the Swedish Discrimination Act, it is prohibited for an education provider or an employee of the provider to discriminate against any child or student that participates in the school’s operations. For gender-based separations not to constitute discrimination, either the activities of the groups must be equivalent, without any student finding it disfavoring to be separated by gender, or the separation must be limited to moments where the students’ gender is of such importance that they are not in a comparable situation. The Equality Ombudsman ruled that the separation of the students in the gymnastics classes constituted a risk of one or more students being discriminated against for gender and transgender identity or expression. However, the separation on the school bus was not found to constitute a risk of violation of the Discrimination Act.

During the night of August 14, 2009, the respondent and another man raped the complainant, a 15-year-old girl, in a motel. The victim testified that she had been given a drink that caused her to fall asleep. When she awoke, the the appellant asked her to accompany him and his companion. When she refused, they forcibly restrained her and transported her to the motel in a truck where they raped her. The appellant was sentenced to 12 years of extraordinary imprisonment (“reclusión mayor extraordinaria”) for the crime. He appealed his sentence to the criminal chamber of the National Court of Justice. The appellant argued that the complainant’s testimony was unreliable. The National Court of Justice denied the appeal, noting that the protection of minors and adolescents against sexual violence is an important government priority, and the rights of this vulnerable group are protected by the Constitution. Furthermore, the National Court of Justice agreed with the lower court’s assessment of the complainant’s testimony, noting that crimes like rape are necessarily perpetrated in private or otherwise hidden and thus there would be likely few witnesses beyond the complainant herself. The lower court, therefore, appropriately afforded the complainant’s testimony particular importance when determining the defendant’s guilt. The court also noted that competent doctors and psychologists who examined the complainant also testified and corroborated aspects of her testimony.

Durante la noche del 14 de agosto del 2009, el demandado y otro hombre violaron a la denunciante, una joven de 15 años, en un motel. La víctima declaró que le habían dado una bebida que la hizo quedarse dormida. Cuando se despertó, el apelante le pidió que lo acompañara a él y a su acompañante. Cuando ella se negó, la sujetaron por la fuerza y ​​la trasladaron al motel en una camioneta donde la violaron sexualmente. El apelante fue condenado a 12 años de prisión extraordinaria (“reclusión mayor extraordinaria”) por el delito. Él discutió su sentencia ante la Sala Penal de la Audiencia Nacional. El apelante argumentó que el testimonio de la autora no era correcto. La Corte Nacional de Justicia denegó el pedido, señalando que la protección de menores y adolescentes contra la violencia sexual era una prioridad importante del gobierno y los derechos de este grupo vulnerable están protegidos por la Constitución. Además, la Corte Nacional de Justicia estuvo de acuerdo con la evaluación del tribunal de primera instancia del testimonio de la autora, señalando que delitos como la violación son necesariamente perpetrados en privado o de otra manera encubiertos y, por lo tanto, probablemente habría pocos testigos además de la propia víctima. Por lo tanto, el tribunal de primera instancia concedió una importancia especial al testimonio del autor al determinar la culpabilidad del acusado. El tribunal también señaló que los médicos y psicólogos competentes que habían examinado a la denunciante también testificaron y corroboraron aspectos de su testimonio.

The applicant (wife), her husband, and their children lived in Austria and held dual Austrian and Kosovar citizenship. After marriage problems arose between the couple, the husband took the children away from the wife while they were in Kosovo and kept them away from her. The husband’s family wanted to resolve the matter according to Albanian tradition, causing the wife to fear that the children would stay with the father. She thus initiated legal proceedings for the children’s return to Austria. Pursuant to The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Children Abduction, the Austrian Ministry of Justice requested the Kosovar Ministry of Justice to assist in the children’s return, and the Kosovar authorities initiated proceedings in the country’s courts for such an order. The District Court held hearings in the presence of the husband but without the wife or prosecutor, and ruled for the husband, finding that no abduction had taken place. The Supreme Court quashed the decision and remanded the case for retrial. Following retrial, the District Court again ruled that, under The Hague Convention, returning the children was unnecessary, as it would have a negative impact on the children because they had developed a strong emotional bond with their father, they were attending school in Kosovo, and the couple had marital problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the return of the children might cause them psychological damage. The wife then filed a request for repetition of procedure, arguing that she and the prosecutor were not given the opportunity to participate in the session in which the District Court reviewed the request to return the children. The Supreme Court rejected the request, stating that the procedural parties were the Ministry of Justice and the husband, not the wife, and that the participation of the prosecutor was not legally obligatory. The wife appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging that her rights guaranteed under Article 31 of the Constitution of Kosovo (Right to Fair and Impartial Trial), and under Article 6 (Right to Fair Trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, had been violated. The Constitutional Court held that by not being present at the session, the wife was unable to refute her husband and was deprived of the possibility of convincing the District Court that the children should be returned. The wife was thus placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis her opponent, in violation of the principle of equality of arms, which is one aspect of the right to fair trial under European Court of Human Rights case law. Finding the wife’s right to a fair trial violated, the Constitutional Court accordingly invalidated the Supreme Court’s decisions and ordered the District Court to repeat the proceedings and invite the wife to participate. (Also available in Srpski, English, and Türkçe.)

The applicant, President of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, referred to the Constitutional Court an amendment to the Constitution proposed by numerous deputies, and requested the court to make a prior assessment whether the proposed amendment diminishes any rights or freedoms under the Constitution. The amendment stipulates that no gender can be represented less than 40% in the positions of ministers and deputy ministers in the government. The proponents argued that a gender quota was needed because women represented no more than 10-15% in ministerial positions and the Law on Gender Equality had not been implemented. The Constitutional Court noted that the principle of gender equality was already included in many provisions of the Constitution and held that the introduction of gender-based quota to ministerial and deputy ministerial positions narrows the applicability of the constitutional safeguards for gender equality and diminishes the rights to gender-balanced participation in public bodies. The court further expressed concern that the proposed amendment may diminish the rights of deputies or qualified persons – from whom ministers are nominated – to become part of the government, and cited case law from the European Court of Justice and the French Constitutional Council against gender quota in government positions. In the court’s opinion, the principle of equal opportunity for both women and men should be applied instead, and positive discrimination whereby preference is automatically and unconditionally granted to a gender, notwithstanding the requirement of professional merit, is not supported by constitutional practice. The court also observed that the proponents of the amendment have not submitted any supporting evidence showing that the current constitutional safeguards of gender equality are insufficient. The implementation of the Law on Gender Equality is the responsibility of the government, controlled by the Assembly. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court concluded that the proposed amendment diminished constitutional rights and was therefore unconstitutional. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The deceased victim D.K. met her partner A.J. in secondary school, formed a union with him, and gave birth to a daughter. D.K. subsequently filed a claim to dissolve the union and for child custody at the Municipal Court because of a deterioration in her relationship with A.J. She also took their daughter to live with her parents. Following continuous threats by A.J., D.K. submitted a request to the Municipal Court for an emergency protection order under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The court did not act within the statutorily mandated 24 hours of the request, and A.J. shot and killed D.K. several weeks later. The Kosovo Judicial Council (“KLJ”, the body which administers the judiciary) disciplinary committee issued a decision to discipline the responsible Municipal Court judge in response to a request by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, but D.K.’s parents were not party to the disciplinary proceedings. D.K.’s parents submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging the Municipal Court by its inaction violated D.K.’s rights under the Constitution of Kosovo, including Article 25 (Right to Life), Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies), and Article 54 (Judicial Protection of Rights), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), including Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 13 (Right to Effective Remedy). The Constitutional Court observed that ECHR caselaw stresses that it is the duty of state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This includes a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to (i) protect one whose life is at risk from another, (ii) where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from a criminal offense, but (iii) failed to take measures which reasonably might have been expected to avoid the risk. The court found the Municipal Court ought to have known about the real risk in existence when D.K. requested the emergency protection order since she had explained the deterioration of her relationship with A.J., specifically his death threats and her reports to the police. Furthermore, the Municipal Court was handling D.K.’s case for the dissolution of union and child custody. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that the Municipal Court was responsible for acting under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and that its inaction was a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the ECHR. The court also found that the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and the statute governing the judiciary do not offer effective legal remedies for the protection of the applicants’ rights, because the former does not contain measures for addressing court inaction, and the latter does not allow the applicants to participate in any disciplinary investigation or procedure. Thus, the inaction of the Municipal Court and the KJC’s practice of not addressing judicial inaction violated the deceased’s and applicants’ right under Articles 32 and 54 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The lower court issued an expedited injunction against the petitioner. The petitioner filed, inter alia, a constitutional complaint appealing the injunction, which prohibited him from approaching or contacting his partner and from re-entering the flat he shared with her to protect her from his domestic violence. The Court did not allow the constitutional complaint, inter alia, on the grounds that the injunction did not breach the complainant’s constitutional rights. The need for immediate short-term intervention to protect the petitioner’s partner from further domestic violence, and to give her space to initiate formal proceedings, justified the expedited nature of the proceedings with an adjusted scope of review by the lower courts.

Der Beschwerdeführer reichte eine Verfassungsbeschwerde ein, mit der er sich unter anderem gegen eine einstweilige Verfügung wandte, die im Eilverfahren in der Vorinstanz gegen ihn erlassen wurde und die ihm unter Berufung auf den Schutz vor häuslicher Gewalt verbot, sich seiner Lebensgefährtin zu nähern und/oder mit ihr in Kontakt zu treten und die mit ihr gemeinsam genutzte Wohnung wieder zu betreten. Das Gericht ließ die Verfassungsbeschwerde nicht zu, unter anderem mit der Begründung, dass die Verfügung den Beschwerdeführer nicht in seinen verfassungsmäßigen Rechten verletze. Die Notwendigkeit einer sofortigen kurzfristigen Intervention, zum Schutz vor weiterer häuslicher Gewalt und um dem Opfer Raum für die Einleitung eines förmlichen Verfahrens zu geben, rechtfertigte die Eilbedürftigkeit des Verfahrens mit einem angepassten Prüfungsumfang durch die Vorinstanzen.

Employees of state hospitals in Hamburg were granted the right in 1995 to continued employment in case of privatization of the hospitals. In 2000, the cleaning staff were spun off into a separate company which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the state hospitals. Upon privatization in 2005, the right to continued employment was applied only to those employees employed by the state hospitals, not those employed by the wholly-owned subsidiary company. The Court held this to be in breach of the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German constitution as the cleaning staff denied the right to continued employment due to the separation were predominantly women and there was no evident justification for the unequal treatment of the two groups of employees.

Den Beschäftigten der staatlichen Krankenhäuser in Hamburg wurde 1995 das Recht auf Weiterbeschäftigung im Falle einer Privatisierung der Krankenhäuser eingeräumt. Im Jahr 2000 wurde das Reinigungspersonal in eine eigene Gesellschaft ausgegliedert, die eine hundertprozentige Tochtergesellschaft der staatlichen Krankenhäuser war. Bei der Privatisierung im Jahr 2005 wurde das Recht auf Weiterbeschäftigung nur den bei den staatlichen Krankenhäusern beschäftigten Arbeitnehmern gewährt, nicht aber denjenigen, die bei der hundertprozentigen Tochtergesellschaft beschäftigt waren. Das Gericht sah hierin einen Verstoß gegen das im Grundgesetz verankerte Gleichbehandlungsgebot, da es sich bei den durch die Ausgliederung vom Weiterbeschäftigungsanspruch ausgeschlossenen Reinigungskräften überwiegend um Frauen handelte und eine sachliche Rechtfertigung für die Ungleichbehandlung der beiden Beschäftigtengruppen nicht ersichtlich war.

The court considered the issues of open justice, fair trials, and the right of the accused to confront the accuser. The prosecution in a rape case applied to the court for orders permitting the complainant to leave the courtroom without going through the public gallery and to give her evidence behind a screen so that she would be shielded from view by members of the public gallery. The defendant opposed the application for the screen, claiming that it would be prejudicial to him. The Court of First Instance held that the use of the screen to shield the witness from the public did not infringe on the right of an accused to confront the accuser, since the screen did not shield the complainant from the defendant.

The appellant challenged section 9(2) of the Tasmanian Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 which prohibits protests that can be seen or heard within 150 meters of an abortion clinic. The appellant was convicted under the Act after standing on a street corner within the protest zone, holding placards with depictions of fetuses and statements about the “right to life.” He sought review of the conviction on the grounds that the law impermissibly burdens the freedom of communications on governmental and political matters, a right implied in the Australian Constitution. The High Court dismissed the appeal unanimously holding that the statute aims to protect the safety, wellbeing, privacy, and dignity of women, and in doing so, adequately balances the right to political communication and protection of those in need of medical assistance. Because the statute is limited in geographical reach and does not discriminate between sources of protest within the protected zone, the burden upon political communication within the Act is minor and proportionate.

The applicant was dismissed by her employer, the respondent, because of operational requirements. The applicant was employed by the respondent from 1 November 2007 until her dismissal on 24 October 2012. The applicant claimed that she was dismissed unfairly because she was pregnant. Prior to her dismissal, the applicant delivered a letter from the Qacha’s Nek Hospital stating that she was pregnant and would be required to attend monthly clinics until she delivered her baby. The respondent then dismissed the applicant, claiming that her employment could not continue because of her pregnancy. The Labour Court referred to subsection 3(d) of the Labour Code Order 24 of 1992, which provides that pregnancy, among others, does not constitute a valid reason for terminating employment. The court stated that this type of dismissal carried an element of discrimination, the freedom against which is protected by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the highest law of the land. The court held that the dismissal of the applicant was unfair, that the respondent must reinstate her to her former position, and that the respondent pay for her lost earnings following dismissal.

Here, the Court held that government officials violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff by illegally raiding plaintiff’s home without a search warrant, seizing plaintiff’s documents related to her work as an advocate for the human rights of LGBTQ persons, and illegally arresting a guest present at plaintiff’s home during the raid. Later, at the police station, plaintiff’s guest was forcibly undressed and fondled to “determine” her sex. The Court held that plaintiff and plaintiff’s guest were treated in an inhuman and degrading manner amounting to sexual harassment and indecent assault.

Here, the High Court of Botswana held in a unanimous opinion that Section 164(a)/(c), 165, and 167 of the Botswanan Penal Code were unconstitutional. These sections criminalized same-sex relations. The Court held that 164(a)/(c), 165, and 167 violated Sections 3 (liberty, privacy, and dignity), 9 (privacy), and 15 (prohibiting discrimination) of the Botswanan Constitution. The Court modified Section 167, which criminalized the offence of gross indecency, to remove reference to private acts. The case overturned Kanane v State.

The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) revoked the pretrial detention order issued against staff and patients of a clinic that was alleged to have been performing clandestine abortions. The 2ND Panel of STF found that criminal laws against abortion were unconstitutional with respect to the case in hand, and the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy during the first three months was incompatible with the protection of multiple fundamental rights of women. The decision set an important precedent for the sexual and reproductive rights of women in Brazil. The court also discussed that the criminalization of abortion disproportionately affected women living in poverty who do not have access to private or public abortion clinics. Justice Barroso stated that while the potential life of the fetus is important, the criminalization of abortion before the end of the first three months of pregnancy violated several fundamental rights of women granted by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (personal autonomy, physical and mental integrity, sexual and reproductive rights, and gender equality). This decision does not decriminalize abortion in all circumstances, and it is not bidding. This is perhaps a softening of the law regarding abortion in Brazil.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF desconstitui prisão de ofício emitida contra funcionários e donos de clinica de aborto presos em flagrante em razão de suposta prática de aborto clandestinos. A 2ª turma do STF entendeu que as leis criminais contra a prática do aborto são inconstitucionais em relação ao caso em análise, estabelecendo ainda que a criminalização do aborto voluntário durante os 3 (três) primeiros meses de gravidez era incompatível com múltiplos direitos fundamentais garantidos às mulheres. Nesse aspecto, trata-se de um precedente importante para os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos das mulheres no Brasil. Ainda a 2 turma do STF discutiu que a criminalização do aborto afeta, desproporcionalmente, as mulheres pobres que não têm acesso a clínicas privadas ou públicas. Ainda, o Ministro Barroso, relator do caso, estabelece que, enquanto a vida potencial de um feto é importante, a criminalização do aborto realizado dentro dos 3 meses iniciais da gravidez viola diversos direitos fundamentais garantidos constitucionalmente, como a autonomia, o direito à integridade física e mental, os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos, além da igualdade de gênero. Ressalta-se que essa decisão não descriminaliza o aborto em todas as circunstâncias, bem como não vincula o STF a emitir decisões com o mesmo posicionamento, apesar de se tratar de decisão favorável às mulheres no tocante a realização de aborto no Brasil.

This case refers to a writ filed by the accused in order to not apply to his case Article 41 of Law 11.340/ 2006 (Maria da Penha Act). Article 41 states that the domestic crimes committed against women cannot be tried by the procedural rite of 9.099/1995 (Small Courts Act), which regulates the trial of petty offenses. The accused argued that his conduct did not fit into Article 41, and that applying this article would be unconstitutional for giving special treatment to women. The Supreme Court of Brazil denied the order and declared Article 41 constitutional. They found that the Constitution gave the legislator freedom to define which crimes will be considered petty offenses. The Court decided that the domestic crimes against women imply greater complexity because they are crimes against the family institution, for which the Constitution has established special protection.

O Habeas corpus 106.212 foi impetrado sob a justificativa de não aplicação do artigo 41 da Lei Maria da Penha – LMP ao caso em julgamento. Referido artigo 41 estabelece que os crimes domésticos cometidos contra as mulheres não podem ser processados e julgados pelos Juizados Especiais Criminais, que julgam infrações penais de menor potencial ofensivo. O acusado argumentou que sua conduta não se relacionava com o artigo 41 da LMP e que a aplicação desse artigo resultaria no tratamento especial as mulheres, o que seria inconstitucional. O STF indeferiu o HC, declarando a constitucionalidade do artigo 41 da LMP. O STF entendeu ainda que a Constituição Federal conferiu ao legislador competência para definir quais crimes são considerados como de “menor potencial ofensivo”. Por fim, o Tribunal decidiu que as práticas delituosas praticadas contra as mulheres implicam em crimes de alta complexidade, vez que são praticados contra a instituição familiar, a qual possui especial proteção constitucional.

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, a member of the Bolivian Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of several articles of the Criminal Code on the basis that they discriminated against women. The Court held that some of the challenged articles were unconstitutional and upheld others. On the grounds of gender discrimination, the Court found unconstitutional Article 56, which prevented imprisoned women from being employed outside of prisons while allowing imprisoned men outside employment, and Article 245, which recognized as a defense to the offense of falsifying a birth record the motive of protecting the honor of one’s wife, mother, daughter, or sister. The Court declared unconstitutional the words “fragility” and “dishonor” in Article 258 regarding infanticide also due to gender discrimination, although this did not affect the operation of the offense. The final unconstitutional issue was that Article 250 criminalized an unmarried man abandoning a woman who became pregnant with him, but did not criminalize a married father’s abandonment of his pregnant wife. The Court was unwilling to hold restrictions on abortion unconstitutional. As such, receiving an abortion remains prohibited under Articles 263 and 264, and the performance of abortion is prohibited under Article 269. However, the Court did declare unconstitutional the requirements in Article 266 that a woman inform the police and obtain judicial authorization in order to obtain an abortion in the case of rape or incest (article 266).

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, quien es miembro del Parlamento boliviano, cuestionó la constitucionalidad de varios artículos del Código Penal sobre la base de que eran discriminatorios contra las mujeres. El Tribunal sostuvo que varios de los artículos impugnados eran inconstitucionales: el Artículo 56, que impedía que las mujeres encarceladas fueran empleadas fuera de las cárceles mientras que los hombres encarcelados, por otro lado, podían tener empleo y el Artículo 245, que reconocía la protección del honor de la esposa, la madre, la hija o la hermana de uno como defensa al delito de falsificar un registro de nacimiento. Ambos Artículos se consideraron inconstitucionales sobre la base de la discriminación de género. La Corte declaró que las palabras "fragilidad" y "deshonra" contenidas en el Artículo 258 en asociación con el infanticidio eran inconstitucionales por la misma base, aunque esto no afecta el funcionamiento del delito. Además, la distinción dentro del Artículo 250 que penalizaba el abandono por parte de un padre de una mujer que no es su esposa después de dejarla embarazada pero que no se aplicaba a la esposa de un padre también se consideró inconstitucional. La Corte no estaba dispuesta a mantener las restricciones sobre el aborto como inconstitucionales. Como tal, recibir un aborto sigue prohibido según los Artículos 263 y 264, y el aborto está prohibido según el Artículo 269. Sin embargo, la Corte declaró inconstitucional los requisitos del Artículo 266 de que una mujer informe a la policía y obtenga la autorización judicial para obtener un aborto en caso de violación o incesto (artículo 266).

The applicant was in a polygamous Muslim marriage. After her husband died intestate, the respondent, the executor of the deceased’s estate, refused the applicant’s claims on the basis that polygynous Muslim marriages were not legally recognised under the Intestate Succession Act. The court held that precluding the applicant from an inheritance unfairly discriminated on the grounds of religion, marital status, and gender, and was therefore inconsistent with section 9 of the Constitution. The court found that section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it did not include more than one spouse in a polygynous Muslim marriage in the protection afforded to “a spouse.” Accordingly, the applicant could inherit from her late husband’s estate.

Die applikant was in ‘n poligame Moslem-huwelik. Nadat haar man intestaat gesterf het, het die respondent, die eksekuteur van die oorledene se boedel, die applikant se eise geweier op grond daarvan dat poligame Moslem huwelike nie wettiglik erken word onder die Intestate Erfreg Wetgewing nie. Die hof het bevind dat daar onbillik gediskrimineer was teen die applikant op grond van godsdiens, huwelikstatus en geslag, was dus strydig met Artikel 9 van die Grondwet. Die hof het bevind dat Artikel 1 van die Intestate Wet strydig was met die konstitusie (Grondwet) en ongeldig is tot die mate dat dit nie meer as een gade in ‘n poligame Moslem-huwelik insluit tot die beskerming wat aan ‘n eggenoot gegee word nie. Gevolglik kon die applikant uit die boedel van haar oorlede man erf.

This judgment constituted three related cases (Bhe, Shibi and SAHRC), which were decided together and concerned the African customary law rule of primogeniture. In Bhe, a mother brought an action to secure the property of her deceased husband for her daughters. In Shibi, the applicant was denied the right to inherit from her deceased brother’s intestate estate under African customary law. In SAHRC, the South African Human Rights Commission and the Women’s Legal Centre Trust brought an action in the public interest to declare the rule of male primogeniture contained within section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 invalid. The Constitutional Court declared section 23 invalid, meaning that all deceased estates were to be governed by the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987, under which widows and children can benefit regardless of their gender or legitimacy. The Court also ordered the division of estates in circumstances where the deceased person was in a polygamous marriage and was survived by more than one spouse and ordered that, in such instances, a surviving spouse shall inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development by notice in the Gazette.

Hierdie uitspraak het bestaan uit drie verwante sake (BHE, Shibi en SARK) wat saam beslis is en het betrekking op die Afrika gebruiks regsreël van eersgeboortereg. In BHE het 'n moeder 'n saak gemaak om die eiendom van haar oorlede man vir haar dogters te verseker. In Shibi is die applikant volgens die Afrika gewoontereg, die reg ontsê om van die intestate boedel van haar broer te erf. In SAHRC het die Suid-Afrikaanse Menseregte Kommissie en die "Women’s Legal Centre Trust" 'n saak in die openbare belang gebring om die reël van manlike eersgeboortereg wat in artikel 23 van die Swart Administrasie Wet 38 van 1927 ongeldig te verklaar. Die Konstitusionele Hof het artikel 23 ongeldig verklaar wat beteken dat alle boedels van oorledenes onderworpe sal wees aan die Intestaat Opvolgwet 81 van 1987 waaronder weduwees en kinders voordeel kan trek ongeag hul geslag of wettigheid. Die Hof het ook gelas dat boedels onderverdeel word in omstandighede waar die oorledene in ’n poligame huwelik was en deur meer as een eggenoot oorleef word. In welke geval ’n oorlewende eggenoot ’n kind se deel van die intestate boedel erf of ’n waarde van die intestate boedel wat nie die bedrag wat deur die Minister vir Justisie en Grondwetlike Ontwikkeling vasgesteld is, oorskry word soos die kennisgewing in die Staatskoerant nie.

This was a dispute involving property in the name of the plaintiff and occupied by the defendant. The plaintiff sought an order for the eviction of the defendant, claiming that he had lawfully acquired the property. The defendant claimed that she was the rightful owner as the surviving spouse of the previous owner of the property through an unregistered customary law union. The court held that defendant had no right to the property as there was no concrete evidence supporting the existence of her customary marriage. The court explained that although the absence of a formal marriage certificate is not fatal to the recognition of a customary law union in matters of inheritance and constitutional protections for surviving spouses and children, the union must be proven to exist. Payment of a roora/lobola, or bride price, remains the most cogent and valid proof of a customary union/marriage, particularly where it has not been formally registered because the ceremony itself involves representatives from both families and others who could attest to the process having taken place. Furthermore, there is often documentary evidence of what had been paid and what remained to be paid. Here, the court held for the plaintiff because there was no evidence of a roora/lobola payment and the defendant could not prove her customary marriage to the deceased.

A mother and daughter sued an abortion provider for having performed an abortion on the minor daughter without first obtaining her parents’ approval, which was in violation of a Tennessee statute. The daughter was 17 years and ten months old at the time. The trial court dismissed the complaint because the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the abortion rights of minors. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed, finding that the statute in question violated the privacy rights of minors seeking abortions.

A Tennessee statute required private clinics providing a “substantial number” of abortions to obtain a “certificate of need” from the Health Facilities Commission and a license from the Department of Health. The Department of Health denied a license to the defendants, and then sued to enjoin them from performing abortions. The defendants alleged that the licensing requirement violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions' protection of women’s right to privacy. The Davidson County Chancery Court upheld the statute and enjoined the defendants from performing abortions. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, holding that the statute was unconstitutional becauese it placed an undue burden on women's right to privacy.

A Tennessee criminal statute required that physicians warn their patients that “abortion in a considerable number of cases constitutes a major surgical procedure,” that second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, and that women wait two days after meeting with a physician to receive an abortion. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of these provisions. The Davidson County Circuit Court struck down as unconstitutional the statutory warning and two-day waiting period as unconstitutional, but allowed the hospitalization requirement. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, finding each requirement constitutional. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that none of the provisions could be deemed constitutional under the proper strict scrutiny framework.

A non-profit corporation filed a claim protesting the validity of a regulation requiring specified facilities, procedures, and personnel whenever a pregnancy is terminated within the geographical boundaries of Rhode Island, arguing that the regulations failed to consider the life of the unborn child. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the regulation did not improperly disregard the life of the unborn child because, as a matter of constitutional law, the only interest that a state may assert in regulating abortion procedures prior to the time of a child’s viability is during the second trimester when the state may regulate abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.

The plaintiff alleged that she was raped several times by a police officer who had been assigned to help her deal with her son’s behavioral issues. The plaintiff reported the rapes to municipal mental health and domestic abuse entities, and she alleged that these entities violated their statutory duty to report these incidents or take further action. Consequently, the plaintiff sued the Alexandria Police Department for intentional tort and negligent hiring. The issue before the Court was whether the sovereign immunity doctrine barred the plaintiff from suing municipal entities for both intentional torts and negligence in failing to act upon plaintiff’s reports and in hiring and retaining the offending officer. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the action as barred by sovereign immunity, explaining that a municipality is immune from liability for negligence associated with the performance of “governmental” functions, which include maintaining a police force and the decision to retain a specific police officer. It declined to adopt an exception to sovereign immunity for the tort of negligent retention, as it had done in the context of charitable immunity. The Court observed that whether a municipality is liable for an employee’s intentional torts was an issue of first impression in Virginia, but the Court relied on Fourth Circuit precedent to conclude that sovereign immunity applies in this context. Finally, the Court held that the then-applicable statute requiring officials to make a report whenever they have “reason to suspect that an adult” has been “abused, neglected, or exploited” imposed a discretionary duty and not a ministerial duty upon the individuals subject to the reporting requirements and thus dismissed the claim. (i.e., ministerial duties make actions necessary when conditions for their performance arise while discretionary duties make actions optional, subject to the official’s judgment.)

Doctors and clinics sued anti-abortion activist group Operation Rescue for invasion of privacy, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy. Anti-abortion activists planned to picket and obstruct abortion clinics and homes of physicians who worked for the clinics to coincide with the 1992 Republican National Convention. The district court granted a permanent injunction to restrict anti-abortion demonstrations, which prohibited activists from, among other things, demonstrating within specified areas of each clinic. Operation Rescue appealed. Pursuant to free speech principles, the Court held that the injunction must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. The Court upheld the injunction as it related to physicians’ homes, but found the injunction overbroad because it limited peaceful communication within speech-free zones, such as peaceful sidewalk counseling and prayer. The Court modified the injunction, allowing no more than two demonstrators within a zone. These two demonstrators may individually sidewalk counsel patients in a normal speaking voice, but must retreat when the patient or physician verbally indicates that they wish to be alone. Otherwise, the lower court’s judgment was affirmed.

Pregnant minor filed an application for judicial bypass to receive an abortion without notifying her parents. The district court did not rule on the application or make findings of fact, but issued a writing that sua sponte concluded that the parental bypass law was unconstitutional. Doe appealed due to uncertainty about the judgment, and the court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that because the judge did not issue findings of fact within two business days, her application was deemed granted.

Physicians and clinics sued the Commissioner of Health sued, claiming that Texas Medical Assistance Program’s (“TMAP”) abortion funding restrictions for indigent women violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Rights Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution, and their rights to privacy. TMAP was prohibited from authorizing abortion services without matching federal funds. The relevant federal law, the Hyde Amendment, prevented TMAP from funding abortions unless the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or placed the woman in danger of death. The plaintiffs argued that the restriction constituted sex discrimination because the state funded virtually all medically necessary services for men while refusing to fund abortions that are medically necessary even though the woman is not at risk of death. The Supreme Court held that although any restriction related to abortion would only affect women, TMAP’s restriction was not “on the basis of sex,” but rather due to the nature of abortion as a medical procedure involving potential life, which has no similar treatment method. The Court noted that other than medically necessary abortions, TMAP funded virtually all other medical treatment for women, and funded abortions to the extent that matching federal funds were available. The Court held that the discouragement of abortion through funding restrictions cannot, by itself, be considered purposeful discrimination against women as a class. The Court recognized the state’s interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion and held that the right to choose an abortion does not translate into a state obligation to subsidize abortions. The Court thus held that the funding restrictions did not violate the Texas Constitution, reversing the Court of Appeals and entering judgment for the defendant.

In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court set out the standard of scrutiny with which to view the constitutionality of laws that discriminate based on gender: “If an act employs a gender-based classification, it is subject to a middle-tier scrutiny in which the classification must be substantially related to the achievement of the statutory objective.”

The plaintiff-appellant, an abortion clinic, sued the Governor of Ohio, the Attorney General of Ohio, and the prosecuting attorney for Montgomery County, challenging the facial constitutionality of an Ohio law regulating abortions. The district court ruled (i) that the prohibition on dilation and extraction abortions placed substantial, and hence unconstitutional, obstacles in the way of women seeking pre-viability abortions; (ii) that the combination of subjective and objective standards without scienter requirements rendered the “medical emergency” and “medical necessity” exceptions to the abortion prohibitions were unconstitutionally vague; and (iii) that the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions in the law could not be severed. The district court thus struck down the entire law and prohibited its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The plaintiff-appellant a trans woman lieutenant in the Salem, Ohio, Fire Department, sued the City of Salem, alleging discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. According to the plaintiff’s complaint, after she began expressing a more feminine appearance at work on a full-time basis, her co-workers informed her that she was not acting masculine enough. She then notified her immediate supervisor that she had been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and that she planned to physically transition from male to female. The plaintiff’s supervisor met with the City of Salem’s Law Director and other municipal officials, who required the plaintiff to undergo three psychological evaluations. The plaintiff retained legal counsel, received a “right to sue” letter from the U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, and was shortly thereafter suspended for one 24-hour shift, allegedly in retaliation for retaining counsel. The district court dismissed his complaint, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently plead a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, as well as claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.

The plaintiff-appellant operated an abortion clinic in Dayton, Ohio. Ohio law required it to be licensed, which in part required it to enter into a written transfer agreement with a Dayton-area hospital. When no hospital would enter into such an agreement with the plaintiff, it sought a waiver of the transfer agreement requirement. Even though the plaintiff had both a back-up group of physicians ready to provide emergency care and a letter from Miami Valley Hospital confirming that it would admit patients in the event of an emergency, the Director of the Ohio Department of Health denied the plaintiff’s request for a waiver and ordered that it immediately close. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and an injunction against the Department of Health’s order. The District Court granted both requests and awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were violated, but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for a hearing on the denial of the plaintiff’s application.

After the plaintiff-appellant, a theater professional who was openly homosexual, complained that a coworker had threatened him based on his sexual orientation and a union hiring hall of which the plaintiff was a member refused to provide him with work. Gilbert sued his union and a collection of various employers, alleging, among other claims, discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court observed that, while Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, and that this prohibition includes “sex stereotyping” whereby a plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action due to his or her nonconformity with gender stereotypes. The court held that Gilbert had not plead a sex stereotyping claim since other than his sexual orientation, the plaintiff fit every male stereotype, and sexual orientation did not suffice to obtain recovery under Title VII: “[f]or all we know,” the Court stated, “Gilbert fits every ‘male stereotype’ save one—sexual orientation—and that does not suffice to obtain relief under Title VII.”

The plaintiff-appellants’ sons were members of their middle school basketball team who were victims of sexual harassment by their teammates. The harassment ranged from arguably innocent locker room pranks to sexual violence. The plaintiffs sued the Wayne County Board of Education, alleging that the school board was deliberately indifferent to student-on-student sexual harassment in violation of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. The District Court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and awarded the plaintiffs $100,000 each in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had established the following elements of a deliberate indifference claim: that the sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; that the funding recipient (i.e. the board of education) had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, and the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.

The plaintiff-appellant worked as a mental health technician for the defendant, Detroit Receiving Hospital’s Mental Health Crisis Center. Her duties included assisting registered nurses with treating psychiatric patients. A few days after assisting a nurse with the mistaken discharge of a patient who should not have been discharged, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, even though she consistently received high ratings on her performance evaluations. The plaintiff sued the defendant for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, in part because two men committed “nearly identical” infractions of “comparable seriousness” and were not terminated like the plaintiff. The appellate court remanded the case for trial proceedings.

The respondent, a German national, was denied permanent residence in Namibia despite being in a committed relationship with a Namibian woman, residing in Namibia for many years, and having a highly skilled job in Namibia. The respondent claims that the only reason her application was denied is because she was a lesbian woman in a homosexual relationship. She therefore filed suit against the Immigration Selection Board (“ISB”), arguing that it had discriminated against her in denying her application. The lower court found in favor of the respondent and ordered the ISB to grant the respondent’s application. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, finding that the respondent had not proven discrimination and that the ISB had wide discretion to deny applications. However, the Supreme Court judge explicitly stated: “I must emphasize in conclusion: Nothing in this judgment justifies discrimination against homosexuals as individuals, or deprive [sic] them of the protection of other provisions of the Namibian Constitution.”

Defendant Mr. H.R.A was convicted of aggravated homicide based on his prior ties and relationship with the victim, Ms. N.A. (his partner), whom he murdered with a gun. Mr. H.RA. was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to Law No. 26,791, Article 80, which provides that “[l]ife imprisonment or confinement shall be imposed upon a person that murders an ascendant, descendent, spouse or ex-spouse or a person that kills another with whom he or she maintains a relationship, irrespective of whether they maintained a joint household.” The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it violates principles of equal protection because it does not afford (or it is not clear that the statute affords) equal protection to similarly situated homosexual couples. In rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the court notes (1) Supreme Court precedent making clear that holding legislation unconstitutional is a grave act that should be taken as a last resort and when it is clear that the legislation is clearly unconstitutional, and (2) the legislation in question sought to introduce as aggravating circumstances factors that had previously been ignored, extending the definition of the concept of “family” to include different family realities.

El acusado, el Sr. H.R.A fue condenado por homicidio con acciones agravadas debido a sus vínculos anteriores y su relación con la víctima, la Sra. N.A. (su pareja), a quien asesinó con un arma. El Sr. H.RA. fue condenado a cadena perpetua con conformidad con la Ley Nº 26.791, Artículo 80, que dispone que “se impondrá la reclusión o el encarcelamiento a una persona que asesine a un ascendiente, descendiente, cónyuge o ex cónyuge o una persona que asesine” otro con quien él o ella mantiene una relación, independientemente de si mantuvieron un hogar conjunto ”. El acusado impugnó la constitucionalidad de la ley, argumentando que violaba los principios de protección igualitaria porque no permite (o no está claro si el el estatuto otorga igual protección a las parejas homosexuales en situación similar). Al rechazar la impugnación del acusado, el tribunal señala (1) el Tribunal Supremo precedente, dejando en claro que mantener la legislación inconstitucional es un acto grave que debe tomarse como último recurso y solamente cuando está claro que la legislación es claramente inconstitucional, y cuando (2) la legislación en cuestión buscaba introducir como circunstancias agravantes factores que anteriormente se habían ignorado, extendiendo la definición del concepto de "familia" para incluir diferentes realidades familiares.

A licensed abortion facility and its owner sued Alabama’s Attorney General and the Montgomery County District Attorney. Among Plaintiffs claims were allegations that the 2014 amendments to Alabama Code Title 26’s judicial bypass law violated the due process rights of minor patients seeking abortions because it failed to provide an adequate judicial bypass by permitting adverse parties and the court to disclose private information about the minor to others. Citing Supreme Court precedent enshrining a minor’s constitutional right to seek an abortion through judicial bypass without outside interference violating her privacy, the court ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and severed the unconstitutional provisions allowing the participation of (1) the district attorney, (2) the minor’s parents, and (3) a guardian ad litem for the fetus from the judicial bypass process.

Parents of students enrolled at Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, a private all-male high school, filed suit to prevent the implementation of an order of the High Council of the National University of Córdoba (Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba) mandating that the high school admit female applicants. They argued that parents have the right to choose the type of education their children receive. The court of first instance found partially in favor of the parents, which was overturned by the appellate court. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court ruling on the basis that (1) the High Council of the National University of Córdoba acted within its statutory authority, (2) the Argentine constitution does not guarantee the right to enroll children in schools limited to a specific gender, (3) mixed gender schools do not infringe on the rights of parents to elect the type of education their children receive, and (4) establishing a mixed gender school is the only alternative compatible with the constitutional principles of equality and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to which Argentina is a signatory.

Los padres de los estudiantes matriculados en el Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, una escuela secundaria privada exclusivamente masculina, presentaron una demanda para evitar la implementación de una orden del Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba que ordenaba que el la escuela secundaria admitiera mujeres solicitantes. Argumentaron que los padres tienen derecho a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos. El tribunal de primera instancia falló parcialmente decidiendo a favor de los padres, lo que fue anulado por el tribunal de apelaciones. Entre otras razones, la Corte Suprema confirmó la sentencia de la corte de apelaciones sobre la base de que (1) el Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba actuó dentro de su autoridad estatutaria, (2) la constitución argentina no garantizaba el derecho a matricular a los niños en las escuelas limitadas a un género específico, (3) las escuelas mixtas no infringen los derechos de los padres a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos, y (4) establecer una escuela mixta es la única alternativa compatible con los principios constitucionales de igualdad y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer de la que Argentina es signataria.

The Supreme Court, in deciding upon the applicability of certain procedural rules, confirmed the main international definitions of violence within relationships. Particularly, the local court dismissed the case against a man charged with the crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, without giving any notice of the motion to dismiss to the person injured by the crime in accordance with Article 408 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The injured person appealed the decision of the local court and requested that the Italian Supreme Court declare the dismissal of the case null and void. In deciding the procedural issue at hand, the Italian Supreme Court pointed out that the Italian criminal law has drawn the definitions of gender violence and violence against women mainly from international law provisions, which are directly enforced in the system pursuant to Article 117 of the Constitution. In this decision the Italian Supreme Court gave all the definitions of violence within gender relationships in consideration of international conventions and specifically European law, and concluded that such definitions, even if not directly included in domestic regulations, “are fully part of our national system through international law and are therefore enforceable.” According to this interpretation, the definitions of gender violence given by the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence are directly applicable in the Italian legal framework. On this basis, the Court ruled that notice of dismissal of the case must always be served on the person injured by crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, as those provisions relate to the gender violence notion set forth under the international and EU provisions applicable in the Italian legal framework.

La Corte di Cassazione, in una decisione riguardo all’applicabilità di alcune regole procedurali, ha confermato l’applicabilità delle principali definizioni internazionali in tema di violenza di genere. In particolare, il Tribunale ha archiviato un caso contro un uomo accusato di aver commesso i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, senza aver dato avviso della richiesta di archiviazione alla parte offesa secondo quanto disposto dall’articolo 408 del codice di procedura penale italiano. Il difensore della persona offesa ricorreva per cassazione e chiedeva alla Corte di Cassazione di dichiarare nullo il provvedimento di archiviazione. Nel decidere la questione procedurale, la Corte di Cassazione evidenziava che il diritto penale italiano ha tratto le definizioni di violenza di genere e violenza contro le donne principalmente dalle disposizioni di diritto internazionale, che sono direttamente applicabili nel sistema ai sensi dell’articolo 117 della Costituzione. In questa decisione la Corte di Cassazione ha fornito tutte le definizioni di violenza di genere in considerazione delle convenzioni internazionali e in particolare del diritto europeo, e ha concluso che tali definizioni, anche se non direttamente incluse nelle normative nazionali, “per il tramite del diritto internazionale sono entrate a far parte dell’ordinamento e influiscono sull’applicazione del diritto”. Secondo questa interpretazione, le definizioni di violenza di genere previste dalla Convenzione di Istanbul sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza domestica sono direttamente applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano. Sulla base di ciò, la Cassazione ha ritenuto che l’avviso della richiesta di archiviazione debba sempre essere notificato alla persona offesa nel caso in cui si proceda per i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, in quanto queste disposizioni si riferiscono alla nozione di violenza di genere sancita dalle disposizioni internazionali e comunitarie applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano.

The Court of Appeal of Turin upheld the lower court’s judgment deeming a clause of a collective agreement negotiated at the enterprise level to be discriminatory because it infringed on Articles 3 and 37 of the Constitution, Article 25, para 2bis, of Decree No. 198/2006 and Article 3 of Decree No. 151/2001. Under the relevant clause the “real presence at work” was as an eligibility criterion to receive an additional remuneration, it being understood that any family-related leave, including any compulsory maternity leave, parental leave, and/or leave for illness, could affect the employees’ level of performance in that respect. The Court maintained that even though the criterion was formally neutral, it resulted in an indirect pay discrimination since female workers usually take more family-related leave than male workers. Moreover, during the trial, the company failed to provide a permissible justification regarding the requirement of “real presence at work.” Therefore, the employer was ordered to (1) cease the discrimination by computing leave as actual time worked for the purposes of achieving the real presence requirement and becoming eligible for the additional remuneration, (2) to pay the additional remuneration incentive to the plaintiffs, and (3) to enhance a plan to remove the discrimination by avoiding the inclusion of the above criterion in any future collective bargaining at the enterprise level. The latter was promoted by the intervention of the Regional Equality Adviser as a case of collective discrimination.

La Corte d’Appello di Torino ha confermato la sentenza del Tribunale di primo grado che considerava discriminatoria una clausola di un contratto collettivo negoziato a livello di impresa in quanto contraria agli articoli 3 e 37 della Costituzione, all’articolo 25, paragrafo 2 bis, del decreto n. 198/2006 e all’articolo 3 del decreto n. 151/2001. Ai sensi della clausola rilevane, l’“effettiva presenza in servizio” era un criterio di ammissibilità per ricevere una retribuzione aggiuntiva, fermo restando che qualsiasi congedo per motivi familiari, compresi i congedi di maternità obbligatori e i congedi parentali e/o congedi per malattia, avrebbero potuto influire sul livello di prestazioni dei dipendenti a tale riguardo. La Corte ha sostenuto che, pur essendo la clausola formalmente neutrale, il criterio comportava una discriminazione retributiva indiretta, in quanto le lavoratrici prendono generalmente un numero di congedi familiari superiore a quello dei lavoratori di sesso maschile. Inoltre, durante il processo, l’azienda non aveva fornito una giustificazione ammissibile per quanto riguarda il requisito dell’“effettiva presenza in servizio”. Pertanto, al datore di lavoro è stato ordinato di (1) cessare la discriminazione calcolando il congedo come tempo effettivo di lavoro ai fini del raggiungimento del requisito di presenza effettiva in servizio e quindi di poter essere ammessi al percepimento della remunerazione aggiuntiva, (2) versare l’incentivo retributivo supplementare ai ricorrenti, e (3) implementare un piano per rimuovere le discriminazioni evitando l’inclusione della clausola di cui sopra in qualsiasi futura contrattazione collettiva a livello di impresa. Quest’ultimo obiettivo è stato promosso dall’intervento del Consigliere regionale di Parità al fine di far cassare un caso di discriminazione collettiva.

The appellant, Pathmanathan (husband), and the respondent, Indira Gandhi (wife), were married and had three children. In March 2009, the husband converted to Islam. In April 2009, the husband obtained certificates of conversion to Islam issued by the Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak over all three children as well as an ex-parte interim custody order over the children. In September 2009, he obtained a permanent custody order from the Syariah Court. In 2013 and 2014, the mother obtained orders from the High Court annulling the unilateral conversions and the Syariah Court’s custody order, inter alia, on the grounds that vesting equal rights to both parents to decide on a minor child’s religious upbringing and religion would be in accordance with international human rights principles, specifically the convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and CEDAW. The first appeal in this case concerned the validity of the conversion of the children to Islam. The majority in the Court of Appeal allowed the husband’s appeal and held that the Syariah Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the children’s conversion to Islam. Dealing with the issue of whether the conversions violate international norms, the Court noted that international treaties do not form part of domestic law unless those provisions have been incorporated into domestic law and that the High Court’s approach of following very closely the standard of international norms in interpreting the Federal Constitution is not in tandem with the accepted principles of constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal did not declare that the conversions of the children were invalid. The Federal Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions on appeal, reasoning that the children had not met the statutory requirements of conversion. Specifically, the Court found that the children did not state the two clauses of the Affirmation of Faith in Arabic as the Perak Enactment requires for a valid conversion to Islam. In addition, the Federal Court held that mothers have parental rights equal to fathers, so the permission of both parents is required for a child’s religious conversion.

The appellant filed a complaint to divorce her husband and an action of summary proceedings to recover her property from the appellee. The appellee-husband claimed he was entitled to a property acquired during the marriage because a married woman cannot acquire property in her own name solely for herself. The Court held that, under the 1986 Constitution, (a) there is no legal significance of a woman choosing to use her husband’s surname; it does not affect the right of a woman to own property while married; (b) a woman can purchase property in her maiden name during marriage; (c) unless freely consented to, property which is owned solely by a husband’s wife cannot be controlled by her spouse. The Court ruled that the appellant proved her title to the property by a preponderance of evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the verdict and directed the lower court to enter judgment to evict the appellee.

An indigenous man was charged with physical violence and threats against his ex-partner (a non-indigenous woman), a violation of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence (the “statute”), which created special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute. The special court issued a restraining order in lieu of detention pending trial. Prosecutors appealed. While the appeal was pending, the man violated the restraining order. The court of appeals vacated the restraining order and ordered detention. On a constitutional appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that, because of his identity as an indigenous person, his community’s authorities had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court acknowledged that (1) the Organic Law on Indigenous Peoples and Communities creates special jurisdiction authorizing indigenous communities to resolve controversies arising among their members within their lands, (2) this special jurisdiction allows the communities to apply their own laws, and (3) the national courts must recognize the decisions of the communities. But the Court also stressed that international conventions, the national constitution, and special laws (such as the statute) placed limitations on that jurisdiction. The Court cited, for example, Article 9 of the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which provides that “the methods customarily practiced by the peoples concerned for dealing with offenses committed by their members shall be respected,” but only “[t]o the extent compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognized human rights.” More precisely, the Court noted that the statute itself established that indigenous authorities could serve as agents for receiving complaints of violence against women, but only without prejudice to the victim’s right to seek remedy in the special courts. Based on that analysis, the Court held that the special courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute, regardless of the defendant’s ethnic identify. Notably, the Court ordered that its holding be published as binding precedent.

The Act Creating Criminal Court E, Section 25.3(a), requires magistrates to forward a case alleging a sexual offense to the circuit court within 72 hours of arrest without first investigating the charge. However, the Constitution of Liberia, Article 21(f), requires courts in general criminal matters to conduct an investigation, known as a preliminary examination, within 48 hours to determine whether a prima facia case exists, thereby prohibiting preventively detaining the accused. The petitioner was arrested for rape, and the magistrate forwarded the case to the circuit court without first conducting a preliminary examination. The Supreme Court of Liberia held that forwarding such a case to the circuit court under the Act does not violate the Constitution, notwithstanding the additional time and its potential characterization as preventive detention, because magistrate courts are not equipped to protect witnesses from public exposure and the psychological harm resulting from directly facing the defendant. The objective of promoting witness protection having outweighed the additional time required by forwarding such cases to the circuit court, the Constitution is not violated, and Section 25.3(a) stands.

Gülsim Genç petitioned the court of first instance to allow her to use her maiden name only, which the Turkish Civil Code prohibits. The court had previously filed an unsuccessful application to the Constitutional Court to annul this provision and, therefore, dismissed Genç’s petition accordingly. Genç appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the court of first instance’s dismissal. Genç then filed an application to the Court. The Court referred to Article 17 of Turkish Constitution, which reads as follows: “every person has the right to preserve and improve one’s existence, both materially and spiritually.” Genç asserted that her surname formed part of this spiritual existence. The Court acknowledged that rights and freedoms may be limited under certain conditions, and when a limitation is placed on those rights, the Court should assess whether such limitation is permitted by law. Under Turkish law, if a contradiction exists between Turkish codes and international agreements on fundamental rights and freedoms, such international agreement shall prevail and apply to the case at hand. The European Court of Human Rights’ rulings indicate that forbidding women to use their maiden name violates the European Convention of Human Rights’ non-discrimination article. The Court remanded the case to the court of first instance for proceedings consistent with the Convention to the extent that the Turkish code violates the Convention. The Court repeatedly referenced the application by Sevim Akat Eşki, which is an indication that similar future rulings may result.

The Turkish Civil Code permits a married woman to use her maiden name only if the maiden name is used in conjunction with her husband’s surname. Three applicants, each in separate petitions to courts of first instance, sought to use their maiden names only. The courts of first instance applied to the Constitutional Court, which denied the request because the legislature did not abuse its discretion in determining that the husband’s surname should be the family surname, and this did not violate the Constitution’s equality principle. The Court reasoned that surnames are important for identifying not only the individual, but also the family and ancestry. Consequently, the law requiring women to take their husbands’ surnames benefits public welfare and order. The Court also reasoned that having (the husband’s) surname is a personal right that cannot be renounced or alienated. Moreover, the fact that the surname is an individual right does not mean that the legislature cannot act to ensure public welfare and order. The Constitution states that the family is the foundation of the Turkish society and requires the State to promulgate necessary regulations to preserve the family.

During a divorce proceeding, a matter arose regarding contribution and participation receivables, particularly the application of the Turkish Civil Code, Number 4721, Article 219, Sub-Article 2, Sub-Paragraph 5, dated November 22, 2001, which provides that the income from a personal asset is such spouse’s acquired asset. The court of first instance held that this provision violated the Constitution, Articles 2 and 35, because it unreasonably interfered with property rights and would, therefore, prevent civil marriages. The Constitutional Court, considered the Constitution, Article 35, which simply states that property rights are universal, and this right shall only be limited if public welfare requires. The Court also considered Article 13, which states that fundamental rights and freedoms may be limited only by statute, so long as the core of such rights, as well as other relevant constitutional provisions, are not affected. The Court also noted that Article 41 establishes the state’s positive obligation to promulgate regulations to protect and preserve the institution of the family. The Court held that, while the law in question limits property rights, this limitation does not affect the core of the right and is based on justifiable purposes, and the law in question does not violate the Constitution. The justifiable purpose is protecting families, and especially women, by requiring income from a personal asset to be mutually distributed, thereby promoting public welfare.

On 24 May 2013, the applicant was found guilty of the abduction and rape of a 14-year-old girl. He had a good relationship with the parents of the girl and thus was a trustworthy person to her. The applicant’s first appeal application was denied. He renewed his application and the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeal granted the application. This time his conviction was quashed, the sentences were set aside, and the Court ordered a new trial at the next sitting of the Circuit Court. The applicant criticized the quality of the representation given by his counsel at the trial, arguing that his attorney did not provide an adequate defense and did not take full instructions from him. The attorney defending the applicant at the first trial argued that the applicant was properly defended, that the prosecutor also submitted that the defense was adequate and that, as the case turned on the contest of credibility between the complainant and the applicant, the jury’s verdict would have been the same, regardless of any omission by the defense counsel at the trial. Despite the seriousness of the alleged crime, the Court held that the applicant was denied the substance of a fair trial and quashed the conviction, setting aside the sentences, without doing a balancing test between the rights of the 14-year-old girl who was a victim of a crime, and the sex offender’s due process rights.

In 2002, the Basic Court in Doboj convicted A.P. of Trafficking of Minors for the Purpose of Prostitution under Article 188 of the Criminal Code of the Republika Srpska. The Court sentenced A.P. to two years’ imprisonment and prohibited him from operating a catering business for five years. A.P. appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the Republika Srpska and then to the Constitutional Court of BiH. He argued his right to a fair trial under the Constitution of BiH and the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated because he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the victims at his trial. Instead, the statements of the victims were read aloud in court. The Constitutional Court of BiH found that, despite A.P. not having an opportunity to cross-examine the victims, his right to a fair trial had not been violated. First, the victims were not present at A.P’s trial because they are foreign nationals who no longer resided in the Republika Srpska. Second, the victims gave their testimony in person during preliminary criminal proceedings, and A.P. was allowed to refute the statements at his trial. Third, the judgment of the Basic Court was not based solely on the victims’ statements, but also on the testimony of a third witness – who had paid to have sex with one of the victims at A.P.’s establishment – and material evidence.

Decision available in English here.

The appellant was convicted in a regional magistrates' court of one count of human trafficking, three counts of rape, one count of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and one count of common assault against a 14-year-old schoolgirl, whom he had married in accordance with customary marriage laws. After she ran away from the appellant, the appellant took the complainant to Cape Town by taxi, where they resided with the appellant's brother and his wife. There, the incidents of rape and assault occurred. The appellant raised as one of his defenses and as a ground of appeal that the alleged rapes took place in the context of a customary arranged marriage, or ukuthwala. According to expert evidence, ukuthwala was an irregular form of initiating a customary marriage. Experts have stated that, in its traditional form, ukuthwala was consensual and innocuous, but there existed an 'aberrant' form in which young girls were abducted and often raped and beaten to force them into marriage. The magistrate held that the matter was not about ukuthwala and its place in our constitutional democracy, but about whether the state had shown that the accused had committed the offences he was charged with and, if so, whether he acted with the knowledge of wrongfulness and the required intent. The court held that child-trafficking and any form of abuse or exploitation of minors for sexual purposes is not tolerated in South Africa’s constitutional dispensation. Furthermore, it ruled that the appellant could not rely on traditional ukuthwala as justification for his conduct because practices associated with an aberrant form of ukuthwala could not secure protection under the law. Thus, the Court could not find that he did not traffic the complainant for sexual purposes or that he had committed the rapes without the required intention ̶ even on the rather precarious grounds of appellant’s assertion that his belief in the aberrant form of ukuthwala constituted a 'traditional' custom of his community.

Die appêlant is skuldig bevind in 'n streek magistraat hof op een geval van mensehandel, drie gevalle van verkragting, een geval van aanranding met die opset om ernstige liggaamlike skade te berokken en een geval van algemene aanranding teen ’n 14 jarige skoolmeisie met wie hy getroud is volgens die gebruiklike huwelikswette. Nadat sy weggehardloop het van die appèllant, het die appèllant die klaer per taxi na Kaapstad geneem waar hulle by die broer van die appellant en sy vrou gewoon het. Daar het die voorval van verkragting en aanranding gebeur. Die appèllant het as verdediging en op gronde van ’n appel beweer dat die sogenaamde verkragting plaas gevind het binne konteks van ’n gebruiklike gerëelde huwelik of ‘ ukuthwala’. Volgens kundige getuienis was ukuthwala ’n onreëlmatige vorm om ’n gebruilike huwelik te begin. Kenners meen dat ukuthwala in sy traditionele vorm, konsensueel en onskuldig was maar dat daar ’n afwykende vorm bestaan waarin jong meisies ontvoer en dikwels verkrag en geslaan is om hulle tot die huwelik te dwing. Die landdros het gesê dat die aangeleedheid nie oor ukuthwala en die plek daarvan in ons grondwettige demokratse gaan nie maar wel of die staat bewys het dat die beskuldigde die misdrywe gepleeg het waarvoor hy aangekla is en indien wel, of hy opgetree het met die wete van onregmatigheid en die vereiste opset(intent). Die hof het beslis dat mensenhandel of uitbuiting van minderjariges vir seksuele doeleindes nie geduld word in Suid-Afrika se gondwetlike bedeling nie. Verder het dit beslis dat die appèllant nie op die tradisionele ukuthwala kon staatmaak as regsverdediging vir sy optrede nie omdat prakyke wat verband hou met ’n afwykende vorm van ukuthwala nie beskerming onder die wet verkry nie. Die Hof kon dus nie bevind dat hy die klaer nie vir mensenhandel met seksuele doeleindes gebruik het nie en dat hy die verkragtings sonder die verwagte intensie gepleeg het nie - selfs op die taamlike onveilige gronde van die bewering van die appellant dat sy geloof in die afwykende vorm van ukuthwala, ’n tradisionele gewoonte in sy gemeenskap is.

After a Methodist Church minister (applicant) announced to her congregation her intention to marry her same-sex partner, the Methodist Church (respondent) suspended and subsequently discontinued her role as an ordained minister in early 2010. In March 2010, the applicant referred the matter to arbitration according to the Laws and Discipline of the Church. The parties could not agree on the applicant’s procedural rights and the arbitration convener proceeded with the process as provided by the Laws and Discipline of the Church. On her behalf, the convener then entered into a final agreement with the Church in May 2011. In 2012, the applicant approached the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town seeking an order to set aside the arbitration agreement in terms of the Arbitration Act. She contended that she was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation. The High Court held that the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. She then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The majority judgment of that Court agreed with the finding of the High Court. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court made four findings. First, the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. Because the issue related to interpretation of religious doctrine, arbitration would be the appropriate forum. Second, since the applicant had unequivocally disavowed her unfair discrimination claim before the High Court, she was not free to raise the claim for the first time on appeal. Third, pursuant to the principle of constitutional subsidiarity, the applicant should have first brought her unfair discrimination claim to the Equality Court. Finally, the applicant failed to file a notice in terms of the Uniform Rules of the High Court, an omission that deprived other interested parties including religious communities of the opportunity to intervene as parties to the dispute or seek admission as amicus curiae in the High Court. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Nadat ’n predikant van die Metodiste Kerk (applikant) aan haar gemeente aangekondig het dat sy van voorneme is om met haar maat van dieselfde geslag te trou, het die Metodiste Kerk (respondent) vroeg in 2010 haar rol as ’n geordende predikant opgeskort en daarna gestaak. In Maart 2010 het die applikant die saak na arbitrasie verwys volgens die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die partye kon nie saamstem oor die prosedurele regte van die applikant nie en die arbitrasie- sameroeper het voortgegaan met die proses soos bepaal deur die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die sameroeper het namens haar in Mei 2011 ’n finale ooreenkoms aangegaan met die Kerk. In 2012 het die applikant die Wes-Kaapse hooggeregshof, Kaapstad, genader om ’n bevel aan te vra om die arbitrasie ooreenkoms ingevolge die Wet op Arbitrasie tersyde te stel. Sy het aangevoer dat daar onbillik teen haar gediskrimineer word op grond van haar seksuele oriëntasie. Die Hooggeregshof het beslis dat die applikant nie goeie rede vir die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms getoon het nie. Sy het toe appél aangeteken by die Hoogste Hof van Appèl. Die meerderheidsuitspraak van daardie Hof het saam gestem met die bevinding van die Hooggeregshof. Die applikant het verlof gevra om tot die Konstitusionele Hof te appelleer. In ’n eenparige uitspraak het die Konstitusionele Hof vier bevindings gemaak. Eerstens het die applikant nie goeie gronde getoon om die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms ter syde te stel nie. Omdat dit die kwessie rakende die interpretasie van godsdienstige leerstellings is, sou arbitrasie die gepaste forum wees. Tweedens, aangesien die applikant haar onbillike diskriminasie-eis voor die hooggeregshof onomwonde verwerp het, was sy nie vry om die eis vir die eerste keer op appèl aanhandig te maak nie. Derdens moes die applikant volgens die beginsel van grondwettige subsidiariteit haar eis op onbillike diskriminasie eers by die gelykheidshof ingedien het. Uiteidelik het die applikant versuim om ’n kennisgewing in te dien ingevolge die eenvormige Reëls van die Hooggeregshof, ’n versuim wat ander belanghebbende partye, waaronder godsdienstige gemeensappe, die geleentheid ontneem het om as partye tot die geskil in te gryp of om toelating as amicus curiae in die Hooggeregshof te verkry. Die hof het die appèl gevolglik van die hand gewys.

The applicant, a male, applied for a senior managerial position previously occupied by a woman. After undergoing a psychometric assessment, he was recommended for appointment. The recommendation was turned down “due to the gender imbalance at SMS level”. The applicant claimed that he had been unfairly discriminated against on the basis of his sex because the target, set by the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, did not comply with the provisions of the Employment Equity Act (EEA), 55 of 1998. The respondent contended that, although it had not adopted an equity plan, it had set itself a target of 50% females in senior management positions. The Court noted that when the second respondent took the decision not to appoint the applicant, there was great confusion regarding the actual gender balance at the senior management level. However, the Court was prepared to accept that, at the time, females filled only 29% senior management posts. The EEA requires that equity plans must provide objectives for each year, their duration, and procedures for evaluating their implementation. The Court noted that, in SA Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union as amicus curiae [2014] 11 BLLR 1025 (CC)), the Constitutional Court had confirmed that competent courts must ensure that validly adopted equity plans are applied lawfully. Apart from the fact that the respondent had no plan, it had no mechanism to track the levels of gender representation. The second respondent had applied the target without considering the panel’s reasons for its recommendation. Affirmative action had been applied ad hoc, in a haphazard, arbitrary, and random manner. The responsible official had applied a quota system and raised an absolute barrier, both of which were impermissible. The affirmative action measure applied by the respondents conflicted with both the Constitution and the EEA. Accordingly, the measure had unfairly discriminated against the applicant. The respondents were directed to appoint the applicant to the post concerned and pay him compensation equal to the difference between the salary he had earned and the salary he should have earned, with retrospective effect.

Die applikant, 'n man, het aansoek gedoen vir 'n senior bestuurs-posisie wat voorheen deur 'n vrou beset was. Nadat hy 'n psigometriese assessering ondergaan het, is hy vir aanstelling aanbeveel. Die aanbeveling is afgekeur "as gevolg van die geslagswanbalans op SMS-vlak". Die applikant het daarop aanspraak gemaak dat hy op grond van sy geslag onregverdig gediskrimineer is omdat die teiken, wat deur die Gautengse Provinsiale Wetgewer gestel is, nie voldoen het aan die bepalings van die Wet op Gelyke Indiensneming (EEA), 55 van 1998 nie. Die respondent het beweer dat, hoewel dit nie 'n ekwiteitsplan aangeneem het nie, het dit 'n teiken van 50% vroue in senior bestuursposte gestel. Die Hof het opgemerk dat toe die tweede respondent die besluit geneem het om nie die applikant aan te stel nie, was daar groot verwarring oor die werklike geslagsbalans op die Senior bestuursvlak. Die hof was egter bereid om te aanvaar dat vrouens slegs 29% senior bestuursposte gevul het. Die EEA vereis dat ekwiteitsplanne doelwitte moet gee vir elke jaar, hulle duur en prosedures om die implementering daarvan te evalueer. Die Hof het opgemerk dat, in SA Polisiediens v Solidariteit nms Barnard (Polisie en Gevangenisse Burgerregte-Unie as amucus curiae [2014] 11 BLLR 1025 (CC)), het die Konstitusionele Hof bevestig dat bevoegde howe moet verseker dat aanvaarde ekwiteitsplanne wettig toegepas is. Afgesien van die feit dat die respondent geen plan gehad het nie, het dit geen meganisme gehad om die vlakke van geslagsverteenwoordiging op te spoor nie. Die tweede respondent het die teiken toegepas sonder om die paneel se redes vir die aanbeveling te oorweeg. Regstellende aksie is in 'n lukrake, arbitrêre, en willekeurige wyse toegepas. Die verantwoordelike amptenaar het 'n kwota-stelsel toegepas en 'n absolute versperring geopper wat albei ontoelaatbaar was. Die regstellende aksie maatreël wat deur die respondente toegepas is bots met beide die Grondwet en die EEA. Gevolglik het die maatreël teen die aansoeker onregverdig gediskrimineer. Die respondente is gerig om die aansoeker aan die betrokke pos toe te stel en vergoeding gelyk te skenk aan die verskil tussen die salaris wat hy verdien het en die salaris wat hy moes verdien het, met 'n terugwerkende effek.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a part of a provision in the Japanese Nationality Act conformed with Article 14.1 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on race, belief, sex, social status, or lineage. The provision at issue did not grant Japanese nationality to a child born out of wedlock to a non-Japanese mother and a Japanese father––even if the father formally declares and recognizes the father-child relationship––unless the child obtains legal recognition as a child of the man and the woman through their marriage. The Supreme Court first noted that the Japanese Nationality Act does not grant Japanese nationality to a child in the aforementioned situation although it recognizes a parent-child relationship and grants Japanese nationality to a child born out of wedlock if (1) the child’s mother was Japanese or (2) the child’s Japanese father filed for the recognition of the father-child relationship before the child’s birth. The Court found that, while creating this distinction was reasonable at the time of the legislation, such a distinction amounted to unjustifiable discrimination in present day Japan. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the part of the provision at issue was unconstitutional and invalid. In its reasoning, the majority opinion stated, inter alia, “under the Japanese Nationality Act that adopts the principle of jus sanguinis, maintaining a distinction in terms of eligibility to have Japanese nationality based on whether the Japanese parent is the mother or the father of the child at issue does not accord with the basic principle of equality of the sexes.”

本件の争点は、当時の日本の国籍法の一部の合憲性である。当時の国籍法は日本国民である父の非嫡出子について、父母の婚姻により嫡出子たる身分を取得した者に限り日本国籍の取得を認めている。同じく日本国民である父から認知された子でありながら父母が法律上の婚姻をしていない非嫡出子は、その余の同項所定の要件を満たしても日本国籍を取 得することができないという区別が生じていた。最高裁は、このような区別を設けることは、立法当時は合理的であったが、現在の日本では合理的理由のない差別であると判断し、問題となった規定の一部を違憲・無効とした。その理由として、「日本国民である母の非嫡出子が出生により日本国籍を取得するにもかかわらず，日本国民である父から出生後に認知されたにとどまる非嫡出子が届出による日本国籍の取得すら認められないことには，両性の平等という観点からみてその基本的立場に沿わない」と述べた。

A legal scholar and four non-governmental organizations filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court of Macedonia for the commencement of a procedure to review the constitutionality of the Law on Termination of Pregnancy ((“Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia”, nos.87/2013, 164/2013 and 144/2014”) (the “LTP”) and its compatibility with international law, on the basis that the LTP created “a possibility of state interference into the right of choice and free decision-making of the women (which was contrary to Article 41 paragraph 1 and Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia)”. Further, the applicants stated that the LTP contravenes Articles 11 paragraph 1, Article 39 paragraph 2 and Article 41 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides that female citizens had sovereignty over themselves, their life, physical integrity and health. The applicants pointed out, inter alia, that the requirement to submit a written request, mandatory counselling, and waiting period were incompatible with the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of choice regarding childbirth. In addition, given that those provisions in the LTP did not exist for any other medical intervention, they represented a discrimination against women. All but one of the judges stated that they do not consider the LTP to be problematic and fully rejected the initiative.

The appellant was charged in the Subordinate Court of attempted rape contrary to Section 137 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The statement of offence read defilement, contrary to Section 138 of the Penal Code. The appellant was convicted of indecent assault, a minor offence per Section 181(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appellant appealed on two grounds. First, the statement of offence was defective, as (i) it did not specify the offence by section and subsection of the provision of the law contravened, and (ii) it was amended late which was unjust. Second, on the available evidence, a court could not have properly convicted appellant for attempted rape or indecent assault because the allegation of attempted rape impliedly includes both an allegation of assault and of indecency; on the facts, there was only an element of indecency (and not assault). The Supreme Court rejected both grounds of appeal on the basis that: (i), indecent assault, attempted rape, rape and defilement are offences of the same genus and therefore a defendant charged with attempted rape may be convicted of a lesser related charge like indecent assault; (ii) the appellant had an opportunity to defend himself in relation to the alternative charge, so there was no constitutional violation of the fairness of the trial; and (iii) the findings of fact were in accordance with the evidence on the record, as the appellant was ‘caught in the act’ and there was medical evidence of injuries sustained by the victim. Accordingly, there was no reason to interfere with the findings of fact or the minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge. The Court dismissed the appeal.

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará,” states that violence against women is an offense against human dignity, which constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. In addition, Article 18 of the General Law for Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence establishes that any public servant’s conduct, whether by act or omission, which is discriminatory or which impairs the woman’s human rights is considered institutional violence. Therefore, if a governmental authority deprives a woman of any right in the context of family law, the court shall acknowledge the authority’s intention to discriminate or impair the plaintiff’s human rights in its ruling. Further, any court ruling seeking to restore the woman’s rights shall identify the authority responsible for the violation. (Amparo Directo: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=462/04620000174646210006004.d...)

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer "Convención de Belém do Pará", afirma que violencia contra la mujer es un delito contra la dignidad humana y constituye una violación de los derechos fundamentales. Además, el artículo 18 de la Ley General para el Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia establece que la conducta de cualquier servidor público, ya sea por acto u omisión, que sea discriminatoria o que perjudique los derechos humanos de la mujer se considera violencia institucional. Por lo tanto, si una autoridad gubernamental priva a una mujer de cualquier derecho en el contexto del derecho de familia, el tribunal reconocerá la intención de la autoridad de discriminar o menoscabar los derechos humanos del demandante en su decisión. Además, cualquier fallo judicial que busque restaurar los derechos de la mujer deberá identificar a la autoridad responsable de la violación.

This jurisprudential thesis is a relevant example of case law, as the criteria issued by the Mexican Supreme Court is binding on all courts in the country. Every court shall rule based on a gender perspective. Therefore there should be a test to determine whether there is a gender violence case before the court. This test shall be performed by the court regardless of whether a party makes such a petition. The court shall take into consideration the following points: (i) if the particular case involves gender violence, taking into account the facts and the evidence, excluding any stereotype that the court may have; (ii) in the event that the evidence is insufficient to determine whether the case involves gender violence, the court shall request more evidence to make a determination; (iii) if the court determines that the case involves gender violence, it shall apply the relevant law to the particular case and issue a ruling; (iv) human rights shall be taken into consideration at all times during the process and; (v) the use of inclusive language to ensure access to justice that is free of gender-based stereotypes.

Esta tesis jurisprudencial es un ejemplo relevante de jurisprudencia, ya que los criterios emitidos por el Tribunal Supremo de México son vinculantes para todos los tribunales del país. Cada tribunal decidirá con una perspectiva de género. Por lo tanto, debe haber una prueba para determinar si hay un caso de violencia de género ante el tribunal. Esta prueba será realizada por el tribunal, independientemente de si una parte hace tal petición. El tribunal deberá tener en cuenta los siguientes puntos: (i) si el caso en particular involucra violencia de género, teniendo en cuenta los hechos y las pruebas, excluyendo cualquier estereotipo que el tribunal pueda tener; (ii) en el caso de que la evidencia sea insuficiente para determinar si el caso involucra violencia de género, el tribunal deberá solicitar más evidencia para tomar una decisión; (iii) si el tribunal determina que el caso involucra violencia de género, aplicará la ley pertinente al caso particular y emitirá un fallo; (iv) los derechos humanos se tendrán en cuenta en todo momento durante el proceso y; (v) el uso de un lenguaje inclusivo para garantizar el acceso a la justicia sin estereotipos o discriminación sexual.

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Mexican Supreme Court has previously determined the social benefits to which a former public safety employee is entitled at the time of her termination. The social benefits and salary must be paid upon termination and must account for both the period before and after an unjustified termination for pregnancy. The Mexican Constitution (Article 123, section B, item XI, subparagraphs (a) & (c)) recognizes the rights of pregnant women. These include social benefits during pregnancy. Consequently, the impairment that results from the termination must be paid and includes: (a) medical bills and payments made to private medical institutions due to the lack of social security benefits and (b) the payment of the full salary from the last month before birth as well as the two months after it, unless there is a court ruling in relation to unpaid wages. This provision of the Mexican Constitution, as well as other provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment And Eradication Of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará” compels the courts to rule with a gender perspective in order to ensure justice for this historically vulnerable social group. (Amparo Directo Administrativo 121/2016: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=1320/13200000186095880003003....)

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son relevantes a todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, dichos criterios pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La Corte Suprema de México ha determinado previamente los beneficios sociales a los que tiene derecho un ex-empleado de seguridad pública en el momento de su despido. Los beneficios sociales y el salario deben pagarse a la terminación y deben tener en cuenta tanto el período antes como el de después de una terminación injustificada por embarazo. La Constitución mexicana (Artículo 123, sección B, artículo XI, subpárrafos (a) y (c)) reconoce los derechos de las mujeres embarazadas. Estos incluyen beneficios sociales durante el embarazo. En consecuencia, el deterioro que resulta de la terminación debe pagarse e incluye: (a) facturas médicas y pagos realizados a instituciones médicas privadas debido a la falta de beneficios de seguridad social y (b) el pago del salario completo del último mes anterior al nacimiento, así como los dos meses posteriores al mismo, a menos que exista un fallo judicial en relación con los salarios impagos. Esta disposición de la Constitución mexicana, así como otras disposiciones de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW) y la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer "Convención de Belém do Pará" obliga a los tribunales a gobernar con una perspectiva de género para garantizar la justicia para este grupo social históricamente vulnerable.

Mrs. and Mr. Gumede, both domiciled in KwaZulu-Natal, entered into a monogamous customary marriage in 1968 and four children were born during their marriage. Because she was forbidden by her husband to take up employment, Mrs. Gumede never worked and could not contribute to the accumulation of the family’s estate, which included two family homes. She was always the primary caregiver of the children. After forty years, the marriage broke down irretrievably. Mrs. Gumede had no family and was dependent for financial support upon her children and her old-age pension. In 2003, Mr. Gumede instituted divorce proceedings before the Divorce Court. Mrs. Gumede also approached the High Court and obtained an order invalidating the discriminatory legislative provisions on which the Divorce Court could rely. The Constitutional Court subsequently was approached by the Minister of Home Affairs and the KwaZulu-Natal Member of the Executive Council for Traditional Leaders and Local Government Affairs who resisted the order, for the reevaluation of the order of the High Court declaring constitutionally invalid certain sections of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, of the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 and certain sections of the Natal Code of Zulu Law (Proc R155 of 1987), which regulate the proprietary consequences of customary marriages. In a lengthy judgment, the Constitutional Court took great pains to explain that any distinction between the consequences of customary marriages entered into before and after the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act came into operation is discriminatory, inconsistent with the Constitution, and invalid. The Constitutional Court noted the international instruments that South Africa has ratified that prohibit forms of discrimination against women, including CEDAW. It held that the two provisions are patently discriminatory, unfair, and not justifiable. In terms of the judgment, all monogamous customary marriages entered into before the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act came into operation are now ipso facto in community of property, excluding customary marriages which had been terminated by death or by divorce before the date of the judgment. The Constitutional Court further held that the constitutional invalidity of Section 7(1) was limited to monogamous marriages and should not concern polygynous relationships or their proprietary consequences, determining that polygynous marriages should continue to be “regulated by customary law until parliament intervenes.”

Mev. en Mnr. Gumede, beide in KwaZulu-Natal gedomisilieer, het 'n monogame huwelik in 1968 aangegaan en vier kinders is tydens hulle huwelik gebore. Omdat sy deur haar man verbied is om te werk, het Mev. Gumede nog nooit gewerk nie en kon nie bydra tot die bydrae van die familie se boedel nie, wat twee familie-huise ingesluit het. Sy was altyd die primêre versorger van die kinders. Na veertig jaar het die huwelik onherstelbaar verbrokkel. Mev. Gumede het geen familie gehad nie en was afhanklik van finansiële steun van haar kinders en haar pensioen. In 2003 het Mnr. Gumede egskeiding verrigtinge voor die Egskeidingshof ingestel. Mev. Gumede het ook die Hooggeregshof genader en 'n bevel verkry wat die diskriminerende wetgewende bepalings waarop die Egskeidingshof op kon staatmaak, ongeldig maak. Die Konstitusionele Hof is vervolgens deur die Minister van Binnelandse Sake en die KwaZulu-Natal lid van die Uitvoerende Raad vir Tradisionele Leiers en Plaaslikeregeringsake wat die bevel teengestaan het, vir die herevaluering van die bevel van die Hooggeregs Hof wat sekere afdelings van die Wet op die Erkenning van Gebruiklike Huwelike, van die KwaZulu- Wet op die wet op Zoeloe Wetgewing 16 van 1985 en sekere afdelings van die Natalse wet op Zulu regte (B.proc R155 of 1987), wat die gevolge van gebruiklike huwelike reguleer, ongrondwetlik verklaar het. In 'n lang uitspraak het die Konstitusionele Hof baie moeite gedoen om te verduidelik dat enige onderskeid tussen die gevolge van gebruiklike huwelike wat voor en na die inwerkingtreding van die Wet op Erkenning van Gebruiklike huwelike aangegaaan is, diskriminerend, strydig is met die Grondwet en ongeldig is. Die Konstitusionele Hof het kennis geneem van die internasionale instrumente wat Suid-Afrika bekragtig het wat vorme van diskriminasie teen vroue verbied, insluitend CEDAW. Dit het beslis dat die twee bepalings oorwegend patriminerend, onbillik en nie regverdigbaar is nie. Ingevolge die uitspraak is alle monoggame gebruiklike huwelike aangegaan voor die Erkenning van Gebruiklike Huwelike Wet in werking gekom het, tree nou ipso facto binne gemeenskap vangoedere op, uitsluitend gebruiklike huwelike wat beëindig is deur die dood of deur egskeiding voor die datum van die vonnis. Die Konstitusionele Hof het verder bevind dat die grondwetlike ongeldigheid van artikel 7(1) beperk was tot monogame huwelike en behoort nie poligame huwelike of hul eie gevolge te bemoei nie, met die bepaling dat poligame huwelike steeds gereguleer word deur gewoontereg totdat die Parlement ingryp.

Due to the increase of femicide crimes in the Dominican society, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the termination of violence against women in all its forms as it is a violation of the Constitution. The proclamation was made in commemoration of the murder of Mirabal, Minerva, Patria and María Teresa, political opponents of the regime of Rafael Trujillo, and in accordance with the international agreements executed in defense of women's rights, as well as the laws issued against gender violence, sexual violence and femicide.

Debido al aumento de los delitos de femicidio en la sociedad dominicana, el Tribunal Constitucional proclamó el cese de la violencia contra la mujer en todas sus formas, incluyéndolo como una forma de violación de la Constitución. Dicha proclamación se realizó en conmemoración del asesinato de Mirabal, Minerva, Patria, y María Teresa, quienes fueron opositores políticos del régimen de Rafael Trujillo. La proclamación está en conformidad con los acuerdos internacionales celebrados en defensa de los derechos de las mujeres y con las leyes emitidas contra la violencia basada en género sexual, violencia sexual en sí, y femicidio.

Mrs. Angela Merici Mendoza Minier challenged the constitutionality of Article 35 of Law number 1306-Bis published on May 21st, 1937, which provided that a divorced woman could not marry within 10 months after the divorce. Mrs. Angela argued that Article 35 contravened the gender equality provision provided in Article 39 of the Constitution because the 10-month waiting period to remarry did not apply to men. Article 35 thus conferred a privilege only to men. The attorney-general disregarded the action on the basis that the petitioner lacked legitimate interest. However, the Constitutional Court determined that as a woman, Mrs. Angela could be affected by Article 35 and ruled that she therefore had a legitimate interest in challenging Article 35. The Constitutional Court subsequently admitted the action and nullified Article 35 on the basis that it no longer fulfilled its aim to prevent a woman from remarrying when already pregnant with her former husband’s child because it could have negative consequences for the child or the newly formed couple. As technology now allows women to know their state of pregnancy at an early stage, the restriction is no longer needed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that it is a woman’s decision to remarry, pregnant or not.

La Sra. Angela Merici Mendoza Minier desafió la constitucionalidad del artículo 35 de la Ley número 1306-Bis publicada el 21 de mayo de 1937, la cuál establecía que una mujer divorciada no podría casarse por un período de 10 meses posteriormente a un divorcio. La Sra. Angela sostuvo que el artículo 35 era contrario a la disposición de igualdad de género garantizada en el artículo 39 de la Constitución porque el período de espera de 10 meses para volver a casarse no se aplicaba a los hombres. Ella propuso que el artículo 35 confería un privilegio único a los hombres. El fiscal general ignoró la acción basándose en que la peticionaria no tenía un interés legítimo en la acción. Sin embargo, el Tribunal Constitucional determinó que, como mujer, la Sra. Angela podría verse afectada por el artículo 35 y dictaminó que, por lo tanto, esto era un interés legítimo suficiente para impugnar el artículo 35. Posteriormente, el Tribunal Constitucional admitió la acción y anuló el artículo 35 sobre la base de que no cumplía su objetivo inicial de evitar que una mujer se volviera a casar mientras ya estaba embarazada con el hijo de su ex esposo, lo cual podría tener consecuencias negativas para el niño o para la pareja recién formada. Como la tecnología ahora permite a las mujeres conocer su estado de embarazo desde una etapa temprana, dicha restricción ya no es necesaria. Además, el Tribunal Constitucional agregó que es una decisión personal de la mujer volver a casarse, embarazada o no.

The appellant sought to set aside a lower court’s decision and remove his deceased paternal grandmother’s estate executors. The lower court found that the appellant had no locus standi to bring forth the application as he was not the lawful beneficiary of his grandmother’s estate—he was born out of wedlock and his father predeceased his now deceased paternal grandmother. Therefore, the appellant had no right of inheritance intestate. The Supreme Court found that Section 31 of the Constitution (the abolition of the common law status of illegitimacy of a person born out of wedlock) abolishes the principle that children cannot inherit from their father. The Court upheld the appeal and found that the applicant had locus standi to institute or defend legal proceedings relating the deceased estate.

The appellant was the maternal grandfather of two minor children (the subject of the application). The appellant was appealing a decision of the trial court which ordered that the children be placed the custody of their biological father (the respondent). The children stayed with the appellant for a period of time while the respondent pursued his education in South Africa. Upon the respondent’s return, he fetched the children from the applicant’s residence. One of the appellant’s arguments was that because the marriage between the appellant’s deceased daughter and the respondent was invalid under Swazi law, the custody of the children should be with the maternal family (in accordance with Swazi law and custom). The Court stated that Section 29(4) of the Constitution removes the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children as it states that children whether born in or out of wedlock shall enjoy the same protection and rights. The Court found that the most important considerations were the welfare, interests and happiness of the children. The Court found that no evidence was adduced to prove that the respondent was not fit to have custody over the children and the appeal was dismissed.

Following a proceeding brought by a Belgian consumer organization to seek the annulment of a law amending the Gender Law of 2007 in so far as it allowed certain differences in insurance premiums to be paid by men and women, the Constitutional Court (drawing on a judgment of the European Court of Justice as this concerned a question of the interpretation of a provision in a European Directive) ruled that such different treatment was permitted only for policies concluded before 21 December 2012.

The Labor Court of Ghent referred a number of prejudicial questions to the Constitutional Court in the context of a dispute between a woman who claimed that her employer dismissed her after having requested maternity leave, parental leave and the continuation of a related “time credit” contract. The Labor Court agreed that the company had not provided justification for the dismissal, but had questions about how to calculate the indemnity. The applicant claimed it should be calculated on the basis of full-time employment. The Constitutional Court, however, ruled that reducing an employee’s benefits proportionally for part-time workers (which disproportionately affects women) was not a form of discrimination as the regime applies equally to men and women.

Edith Mmusi and her sisters, all over 65 years of age, brought a case against their nephew, Molefi Ramantele, who claimed to have rightfully inherited the home that was occupied by Mmusi and her sisters and tried to evict them. The sisters contested the eviction, arguing that they had paid for the home’s upkeep and expansion costs. The applicable customary law, that of the Ngwaketse tribe, dictated that the family home of a deceased individual was to be reserved to the last born male child. The rest of the property was to be divided among the children, regardless of gender. The Lower Customary Court found in favor of the nephew; the Higher Customary Court held in 2008 that the home belonged to all of the children; and the Customary Court of Appeal, to which both parties appealed, held that the home should be inherited by the nephew. The High Court noted that the issue of law being considered was whether the Ngwaketse customary law, to the extent that it denied the applicants the right to inherit the family residence intestate, "solely on the basis of their sex, violate[d] their constitutional right to equality under section 3(a) of the Constitution. In 2012, the High Court awarded the home to the sisters, ruling that the local customary laws prioritizing male inheritance were not in keeping with the promise of gender equality enshrined in the Constitution of Botswana and in international conventions such as CEDAW, thereby recognizing for the first time the right of women in Botswana to inherit property. In 2013, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court, observing that “Constitutional values of equality before the law, and the increased leveling of the power structures with more and more women heading households and participating with men as equals in the public sphere and increasingly in the private sphere, demonstrate that there is no rational and justifiable basis for sticking to the narrow norms of days gone by when such norms go against current value systems.” This case was a landmark case that effectively ended the patriarchal inheritance system in Botswana. The High Court decision is available here.

In light of the ruling in Roe v. Wade, which established a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability the plaintiffs challenged various abortion-limiting restrictions in Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act. The act restricted public funding to abortion clinics. It also required women to obtain informed consent, notify their husbands if married, wait 24 hours before proceeding with the surgery, and obtain parental consent if underage. In response, the Supreme Court created a new test that asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden,” which the Court defined as a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Though the Court reaffirmed Roe pursuant to this test, the Court upheld nearly all of the restrictions in Pennsylvania’s state abortion law, including parental notification/consent requirements for minors and limitations on public funding of abortions. However, the Court did find that the statute’s husband notification requirement was unlawful.

The applicant, was a security guard. She was employed on a fixed term renewable contract, renewable upon satisfactory performance. On December 26, 2005, near the end of her employment term, one of the applicant's colleagues attacked her and attempted to rape her, only stopping after being apprehended when she shouted for help. The applicant reported the incident to her employer’s management, which convened a hearing. During the hearing, the company’s human resources representative accused the applicant of misconduct and embarrassing the company by discussing the attempted rape, which the company considered to be an "inside thing." On December 31, 2005, the company fired the applicant, citing the expiring fixed term contract for support. The applicant brought her case to the Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (the “Court”). Calling it "a case of the worst forms of unfair labour practices," the Court found that (i) the applicant had reason to believe that the company would renew her contract and (ii) that their refusal to do so was based on the attempted rape incident. According to the Court, the company’s actions breached an implied term of the plaintiff’s employment contract relating to mutual trust and confidence as well as the company’s obligation under the contract to protect female employees from sexual harassment and abuse. Until recent amendments to the Employment Act, the labor laws of Malawi did not address sexual harassment, other than reading § 5 of the Employment and Labor Relations Act with § 20 of Malawi’s Constitution, which prohibit unfair discrimination in all forms. Despite the lack of a legal provision specifically addressing sexual harassment, the Court found that sexual harassment creates a hostile work environment, leads to unfair labor practices, and thus constitutes discrimination based on sex. Therefore, the Court found the plaintiff's dismissal invalid and held that the company violated her “right to fair labor practices, the right to work, her right to safe working environment and personal dignity.” The Court considered remedies, finding that compensation in the form of 57 months' salary was appropriate, noting that the first-choice remedy in unfair dismissal cases, reinstatement, was not acceptable in this case because of the egregious conduct of the company's human resources representative.

The Civil Code requires a husband and wife to both adopt the surname of either the husband or the wife at the time of marriage. The plaintiffs in this case were five women who had either chosen to continue using their pre-marriage surnames, or who had had their notifications of marriage rejected for failing to choose a surname. The plaintiffs sued the State pursuant to the State Redress Act, arguing that the provision violated the Constitution and therefore the failure to take legislative measures to amend or abolish the provision was illegal. The District Court and the High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court found that 1) there is no constitutional right to freedom from being forced to change one’s surname upon marriage, 2) the provision does not formally create inequality between the sexes and the fact that the overwhelming majority of married couples choose the husband’s surname is not a direct consequence of the substance of the provision, and 3) the provision does not lack reasonableness nor restrict the individual dignity or the essential equality of the sexes. However, the Supreme Court also noted that while the current provision may not be unconstitutional, it does not mean that allowing married couples to choose separate surnames would be constitutionally unreasonable.

民法では、夫婦が同姓となることが義務付けられている。本件の原告らは、結婚前の姓を使い続けることを選択したか、1つの姓を選択しなかったために婚姻届を却下された5人の女性である。原告らは、国家救済法に基づき国を訴え、同規定が憲法に違反しており、修正または廃止するための立法措置を取らなかったことは違法であると主張した。地裁と高裁は原告らの請求を棄却し、最高裁も同じくその請求を棄却した。最高裁は、（1）婚姻に伴って姓の変更を強制されることを免れる憲法上の権利はない、（2）夫婦同制自体は男女間の不平等を生じさせるものではなく、夫の氏を選択する夫婦が圧倒的多数でも、これは夫婦同制から生じた結果だとは言えない、（3）同規定は合理性を欠き、個人の尊厳と両性の本質的平等を制限するものではない、と判断した。ただし、最高裁は、同規定は違憲ではないが、夫婦が別々の姓を選択することを認めることが憲法上不合理ではないとも指摘している。

The applicant, Ayla (Şenses) Kara, filed a complaint against a male co-worker, H.A., who insulted her. After filing her complaint, the applicant’s employer terminated her employment contract notwithstanding the fact that she had been the one who had been insulted. The Court of First Instance accepted the applicant’s complaint because her employment contract had been terminated “without any valid reason” and ruled that she should be re-hired. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Despite being ordered to re-hire the applicant, the employer failed to employ her. The applicant filed a lawsuit before the Court of First Instance to address her employer’s violation of that order. She claimed that she was dismissed as a result of gender discrimination while the male employee who should have been dismissed was allowed to stay on, which was a violation of her rights to equal treatment and a fair trial. The Court of First Instance rejected the lawsuit because it had already ruled on her termination and it was not possible for her to claim compensation based on the same event. The Court of Appeals also rejected her appeal which led to her individual application to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court set aside the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for re-trial. The Constitutional Court rejected her claim that her right to equal treatment had been violated because there was inadequate evidence to find discriminatory intent. However, the Constitutional Court held that he right to a fair trial had been violated because of an unjustified judgement. The court found an unjustified judgement in her case because the lower courts had failed to properly assess her claim of gender discrimination.

The applicant, Ms. Kaya, applied to the Office of Public Prosecutor (the “OPP”), claiming that she had been the victim of domestic violence. After investigating, the OPP charged the applicant’s husband with domestic violence and went to trial. However, during the trial, the applicant withdrew her claim and said that the bruises she had submitted as evidence were actually the result of an accident at the couple’s home. The OPP dropped the charges against the applicant’s husband. Two years later, the applicant filed another claim with the OPP alleging that her husband stole her jewellery and again subjected her to domestic violence. The OPP notified the proper Court of First Instance for Family Affairs (the “Court of First Instance”). The Court issued a restraining order against the husband that prevented him from approaching the applicant and ordered that he pay alimony to her for four months. The government offered the applicant state housing for the victims of domestic violence, but she rejected the offer. The applicant was subjected to several more incidents of domestic violence. During that time, the OPP requested the Court of First Instance to issue a warrant for the arrest of the applicant’s husband. The Court of First Instance rejected the OPP’s request. The applicant appealed, but her appeal was dismissed because Ms. Kaya’s statements alone were not adequate evidence of domestic abuse. After Ms. Kaya appealed, the Constitutional Court ruled that Turkey had a duty to take affirmative steps to prevent further acts of domestic violence against the appellant and effectively investigate her claims in this case. However, after applying the legal framework addressing victims of domestic violence, the Constitutional Court ruled that Ms. Kaya’s fundamental rights under the framework had not been infringed. This decision is important because it demonstrates that even though there is a legal framework available for women affected by domestic violence, claims against state officials for failing to act on their duties under that framework need to be specific and supported by substantial evidence.

The applicant, Ms. Kaya, was arrested for alleged political offences. After she was released, she submitted a petition to the Office of Prosecutor General, asserting that she had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment while she was in custody. She also claimed that physicians at the state hospital ignored her complaints related to torture and inhuman treatment. After the incident, Ms. Kaya received asylum from Austria in 2002. Concurrently, the Office of Prosecutor General brought an action against the gendarmerie personnel and the physicians who ignored Ms. Kaya’s complaints to address her complaint regarding inhuman and degrading treatment. The trial at the Court of First Instance took about nine years. During that period, the claim against physician was dropped due to the lapse of time. Ms. Kaya was outside of Turkey during the trial. However, she remotely applied to several hospitals in Turkey to get consultations regarding the medical reports that were prepared while she was in custody. All of Ms. Kaya’s medical reports indicated that she showed signs of torture and inhuman treatment. She submitted those reports to the Court of First Instance. In 2011, the Court of First Instance dropped the case as a result of lapse of time. However, the Constitutional Court set aside the Court of First Instance’s decision and ruled that the prolonged trial violated Ms. Kaya’s right to access justice. The Constitutional Court held that Turkey must hold a speedy trial to abide by its constitutional obligation to effectively investigate claims related to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. This case is important, because it concluded that an insufficient investigation may itself be inhuman treatment. This case should constitute a precedent for the future cases where women are harmed as a result of insufficient and ineffective investigation.

Members of Freedom and Roam Uganda (“FARUG”) sued the Attorney General and Minister of Ethics and Integrity Simon Lokodo for violating their constitutional rights to freedom of assembly, right to participate in peaceful civil society activity, and right to equal treatment before the law. In February 2012, Minister Lokodo personally appeared at and ordered closed down a FARUG-hosted “project planning, advocacy, human rights, leadership, and business skills” workshop in 2012 on the grounds that the workshop was an “illegal gathering of [h]omosexuals.” The respondents argued that Uganda Penal Code (sec. 148) prohibits homosexual acts, which includes the prohibition of direct or indirect encouragement, incitement, and conspiracy to commit the offense. Citing the Uganda Penal Code, Constitution of Uganda, and African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court held that individual human rights are not absolute and may be restricted in the public interest as long as the restrictions do not amount to political persecution. Calling the workshops “a pretext for human rights advocacy to promote homosexual acts which are prohibited by the Ugandan laws,” the Court rejected Applicants’ freedom of expression arguments because their activities constituted “offenses against morality” and “prejudicial to the public interest.” In response to Applicants’ use of international human rights law, the Court held that Uganda’s “different laws and moral values” require different definitions and protections of the public interest than those cited in precedent from the UN, South Africa, the European Court of Human Rights, Hong Kong, etc. The Court also rejected the suit against the Minister of Ethics and Integrity in his individual capacity because he was acting in his official capacity, meaning the Attorney General was the only proper respondent.

The petitioners sued the defendants for operating “mehadrin” bus lines for orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jews. Petitioners argue that these bus lines discriminate based on gender by allowing men to board and sit in the front of the bus while requiring that women board by the rear door, sit in the back, and dress modestly. Petitioners claim these restrictions violate their fundamental and constitutional rights to equality, dignity, freedom of religion, and freedom of conscience. Petitioners refused to comply with the gender restrictions, which respondents claimed were not compulsory but voluntary and thus legal. Petitioners, however, countered that the gender separation on mehadrin lines is not voluntary and that they were subjected to verbal harassment, threatened with physical violence, humiliated, and forced to leave the bus when they declined to observe the gender separation. After the respondents agreed to an examination of public transportation arrangements on lines serving the ultra-orthodox sector by an independent committee and the committee delivered its analysis, the Court ordered respondent 1 to instruct respondent 2 to publicize the cancellation of the separation arrangements (within 10 days of the date on which the judgment was rendered), and ordered respondent 2 to carry out its instructions within 30 days of the judgment. Within that period of time, respondents 2 and 3 were to post signs regarding the cancellation in all buses formerly subject to “mehadrin” arrangements, without exception.

In 2014, the Supreme Court of Namibia (“Supreme Court”) affirmed the High Court of Namibia’s (“High Court”) decision in LM and Others v. Government of the Republic of Namibia that sterilization procedures require informed consent. The three respondents sued the Namibian government, alleging that doctors at state hospitals forcibly sterilized them without their consent in violation of their constitutional rights. They claimed that the forced sterilizations left them unable to bear children, ruined their marriage prospects, constituted discrimination against them based on their HIV status, and caused ongoing pain and suffering. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ claims lacked merit because they consented to the procedures. The court found that the alleged “consent” was deficient because the defendants failed to prove that they adequately informed the plaintiffs of the consequences of sterilization, or that the plaintiffs clearly and knowingly consented to the procedures before they went into labor. However, the Court found no evidence that the complainants were sterilized because of their HIV status and dismissed that claim. Emphasizing the serious personal nature of the decision, the Supreme Court stated that the decision to be sterilized “must be made with informed consent, as opposed to merely written consent” (¶ 3). The Supreme Court stated that the choice to undergo a sterilization procedure must lie solely with the patient noting that “there can be no place in this day and age for medical paternalism when it comes to the important moment of deciding whether or not to undergo a sterilisation procedure.” (¶ 106). The Supreme Court also denounced the practice of obtaining “consent” for sterilization during labor noting that patients may not fully appreciate the consequences of giving their consent when experiencing the immense pain involved in labour. The Supreme Court also agreed with the lower court that plaintiff-respondents did not provide any evidence that they were sterilized because of their HIV status.

After a restructuring of the Austrian Armed Forces, the petitioner lost her position, which was instead awarded to an older male with comparable experience but without the petitioner’s special training. Representatives from the Austrian Armed Forces (“AAF”) claimed that for reasons of economy, efficiency, and expediency, the reorganization sought to retain employees who were above age 50 and with presumably the shortest period of service remaining. The Equal Treatment Commission found this to be a violation of Section 4 no. 5 of Austria’s Federal Equal Treatment Act (Bundesgleichbehandlungsgesetz), which prohibits direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex in the context of professional advancement. In addition, the AAF did not conduct an assessment of technical competencies and personal suitability. Furthermore, the AAF focused solely on avoiding additional costs, but did not take into account the principles of equal treatment and the statutory imperative to advance women.

Nach einer Reform in der Organisation des Österreichischen Bundesheeres hat die Antragstellerin ihre Arbeitsstelle verloren. Anstelle der Antragstellerin wurde ein älterer männlicher Bediensteter mit ähnlicher Berufserfahrung - allerdings ohne die speziellen Anforderungen, welche die Antragstellerin erfüllt - auf diese Stelle berufen. Die Vertreter des Bundesheeres haben angegeben, dass die Reform aus Gründen von Wirtschaftlichkeit, Effizienz und Zweckmäßigkeit bezweckt, Angestellte zu erhalten, die älter als 50 Jahre alt sind und daher voraussichtlich die kürzeste Dienstzeit, bis zum Renteneintrittsalter haben. Die Gleichbehandlungskommission erachtete diese Entscheidung als Verletzung von § 4 Ziff. 5 des Österreichischen Bundesgleichbehandlungsgesetzes, das die unmittelbare und/oder mittelbare Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts im Rahmen des beruflichen Fortkommens verbietet. Des Weiteren hat das Bundesheer keine Beurteilung der Fachkompetenz und persönlicher Geeignetheit durchgeführt. Vielmehr hat es sich nur auf die Vermeidung zusätzlicher Kosten konzentriert, ohne die Gleichbehandlungsprinzipien sowie das gesetzliche Frauenförderungsgebot einzubeziehen.

The Plaintiff interviewed with the education officers of the Education Office of the Hulu Langat District to become an untrained teacher. During the interview, the Plaintiff was asked questions pertaining to her general knowledge, personal details, problem solving skills and residential address. She was not asked about her pregnancy status. The Plaintiff was accepted for the position and presented herself at an instructional meeting as instructed. At the meeting, she was told to report for duty immediately. Subsequently, an education officer asked whether anyone at the meeting was pregnant. Once the Plaintiff admitted that she was pregnant, her placement memorandum was withdrawn. The High Court held that it was not relevant whether or not there was a binding contract, as the the Defendants’ decision interfered with the Plaintiff’s right to be employed, which is contrary to Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution, which provides that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of gender in the appointment of any office or employment under a public authority. This Article of the Federal Constitution was adopted to comply with Malaysia’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The High Court declared that using pregnancy as a factor in employment is a form of gender discrimination under the Malaysian Constitution, applying CEDAW in interpreting Article 8(2) of the Constitution, because of the basic biological fact that only a woman has capacity to become pregnant.

Petitioner, an Indonesian male, challenged the constitutionality of a marriage law requiring monogamy with an exception that allows polygamy only with the consent of the wife and the permission of the court (Law Number 1 Year 1974 regarding Marriage). The law requires the husband to submit an application to the court of his domicile with his wife’s consent in order to engage in polygamy. Petitioner argued that because the law required the husband to obtain consent from his wife and the court before engaging in polygamy, it violated his right to freely exercise his religion because the teachings of Islam allow polygamy. The government argued that Islamic principles encourage monogamy and only allow polygamy when a wife allows her husband to re-marry for the benefit of their marriage. The court held that the practice of polygamy historically had degraded the status of women and the teachings of Islam required the preservation of the dignity of women. In addition, since the purpose of marriage is to “achieve peacefulness (sakinah),” men are required to first obtain their wives’ consent before engaging in polygamy, thus respecting their wives as legally equal partners. Therefore, the Court rejected petitioner’s claims and held the laws constitutional as they guarantee the recognition of women’s rights and allow husbands to exercise polygamy in accordance with the teachings of Islam.

This early case established the precedent that a married woman may own and convey property independent of her husband. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision denying ownership of a half-acre of land. Ms. Dlyon bought the property from a sheriff’s auction after it was repossessed for the payment of the owner’s debts. The Lamberts argued both that the previous possessor of the land never gained title of the property because he failed to obtain a fee simple deed so could not be used to pay his debts, and that even if he did have title, a married woman could not purchase land. On the first point, the court held that while the previous possessor did not have perfect title to the land, it could still be reached by creditors. On the second point, the court unambiguously declared that Ms. Dlyon had the right to purchase the property: “Under the Constitution, a femme couverte [married woman] may convey property she is possessed of otherwise than through her husband and this fact admits the inference that she may also bargain and buy property independent of her husband.”

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus of the petitioner, upholding the constitutionality of Article 224(a) of the Penal Code which establishes a presumption of violence in sex crimes against minors. The petitioner was convicted of rape and child abuse, and was sentenced to a prison term of eight years for rape and one year and ten months for child abuse. In his appeal and writ, the petitioner argued he had committed no violence and that the presumption of violence set forth in Article 224(a) of the Penal Code was unconstitutional. The Court first noted that the provision in question predated Brazil’s 1988 Constitution and could not be found “unconstitutional” with respect to its construction. Rather, the Court examined its compatibility with the 1988 Constitution and found that the purpose of the presumption – to protect minors who legally are incapable of offering consent – was consistent with and expressed by the broad statement in Article 227 § 4 of the Constitution that “[t]he law shall severely punish abuse, violence and sexual exploitation of children and adolescents.” The STF held that the presumption did not violate constitutional principles, even when the presumption embraced what otherwise would be a factual matter requiring evidentiary proof.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF denegou o habeas corpus do paciente, afirmando a constitucionalidade do artigo 224, alínea “a” do Código Penal, o qual estabelece a presunção de violência nos casos de crimes sexuais praticados contra menores de idades. O paciente foi condenado por estupro e abuso infantil, sentenciado a uma pena de prisão de oito anos por estupro e um ano e dez meses por abuso infantil. Em sua recurso, o paciente alegou não ter cometido nenhuma violência e que a presunção de violência estabelecida no Artigo 224, alínea “a” do Código Penal era inconstitucional. A Corte primeiro observou que a disposição em questão era anterior à Constituição brasileira de 1988 e não podia ser considerada "inconstitucional" com relação à sua construção. Ao contrário, o Tribunal examinou sua compatibilidade com a Constituição de 1988 e considerou que o objetivo da presunção - proteger menores legalmente incapazes de oferecer consentimento - era consistente com e expresso pela ampla declaração do artigo 227 § 4 da Constituição de que "a lei punirá severamente o abuso, a violência e a exploração sexual de crianças e adolescentes". O STF sustentou que a presunção não violava os princípios constitucionais, mesmo quando a presunção abraçava o que de outra forma seria um assunto factual exigindo prova probatória.

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) reviewed the constitutionality of the 1998 Amendment 20 of the Federal Social Security Law. The amendment imposed a maximum value on the amount of social security benefits that could be paid to a beneficiary under the general social security system at R$1,200 per month. On its face, the R$1,200 maximum applied equally to a number of eligible benefit categories, including maternity or pregnancy-related leave. The amendment was challenged on the grounds that, when read together with Article 7, Section XVIII, of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the amendment had a discriminatory effect on women. This provision essentially guarantees that an employee is paid her full salary during maternity leave. By imposing a cap on social security coverage during maternity leave, Amendment 20 would require the employer to cover the difference between the R$1,200 cap and the employee’s full pay. The party challenging the amendment argued that this created a negative incentive to employers who would discriminate in hiring women or in setting women’s salary by paying women less in order to stay under the R$1,200 cap. The Court agreed that Amendment 20 was discriminatory in its effect. In a unanimous decision, the STF held that the effect of Amendment 20 conflicted with the Brazilian Constitution’s equal protection provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court therefore ordered that Amendment 20 be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Article 7 of the Constitution such that implementation of the social security cap does not extend to maternity and pregnancy-related leave.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, ao analisar a constitucionalidade da Emenda Constitucional n. 20/1998 que modificou as regras da previdência social brasileira. Referida Emenda Constitucional estabeleceu um limite máximo para os benefícios da previdência social em R$ 1.200,00 por mês. Nesse sentido, o teto de R$ 1.200,00 se aplicava igualmente a várias categorias de benefícios elegíveis, incluindo licença maternidade ou relacionadas à gravidez. A emenda foi contestada com base no fato de que, lida em conjunto com o artigo 7, inciso XVIII, da Constituição Brasileira de 1988, a emenda teve um efeito discriminatório sobre as mulheres. Esta disposição garante essencialmente que uma funcionária receba seu salário integral durante a licença-maternidade. Ao impor um teto à cobertura da seguridade social durante a licença-maternidade, a Emenda 20/98 exigiria que o empregador cobrisse a diferença entre o teto de R$ 1.200 e o salário integral da empregada. A parte que contesta a emenda argumentou que isto criou um incentivo negativo para empregadores que discriminariam na contratação de mulheres ou na fixação do salário das mulheres, pagando às mulheres menos para permanecerem abaixo do teto de R$ 1.200. O Tribunal concordou que a Emenda 20/98 era discriminatória em seu efeito. Em uma decisão unânime, o STF considerou que o efeito da Emenda 20/98 conflitava com as disposições de proteção igualitária da Constituição brasileira, que proíbe a discriminação com base no gênero. Portanto, o STF determinou que a Emenda 20/98 fosse interpretada de forma coerente com o artigo 7 da Constituição, de modo que a imposição do teto da previdência social não se estendesse à licença maternidade e à licença relacionada à gravidez.

The sons of Lerionka Ole Ntutu filed to prevent Ntutu’s married daughters from receiving their inheritance of his estate Section 82(4) (b) of the Kenyan Constitution. Under Kikuyu customary law, only unmarried daughters were allowed an inheritance. The presiding judge held that this claim was illegitimate, stating that the law cannot deprive a person of their rights only on the basis of sex and marital status. The judge followed the precedent set by the ruling in Rono v. Rono, Kenya Court of Appeal, 2005, in circumscribing customary law to prevent violations of justice, morality, and other written law. This case marked another important step in upholding women’s rights and human rights law over harmful customary practices towards women.

The Women, Law and Development Forum of Nepal won a petition calling for the Supreme Court to order revision of a law setting the legal age for marriage at 18 years for women and 22 years for men. The Court held that this law promoted gender inequality in contradiction of Article 11 of the Constitution and acknowledged that it can cause significant harm in a country where female literacy rates are low and there are high levels of gender discrimination. The Court also ordered for better enforcement of these laws in light of the continued prevalence of child marriage. Here the Supreme Court of Nepal has once again heeded a petition from a civilian organization and privileged gender equality in reformulating laws, showing a willingness to uphold women’s rights, promote social change, and respond to activism from groups such as the Women, Law, and Development Forum.

The petitioners are eleven minors and the non-governmental organization that shelters, educates, and cares for the eleven minors. Each child claims to have been subjected to child abuse and defilement in Meru County, where police "neglected...or otherwise failed" to investigate or protect the children in any way. The High Court of Kenya held that the police have a duty to investigate allegations of sexual abuse made by female complainants, stating that “by failing to enforce existing defilement laws, the police have contributed to the development of a culture of tolerance for pervasive sexual violence against girl children and impunity.”

Mrs. I.G., Mrs. R.H., and Mrs. M.K. (the claimants of Roma ethnicity) were sterilized while giving birth to their children. The claimants initiated criminal proceedings on the grounds of unlawful sterilization, claiming that their consent (or informed consent in the case of R.H.) was not given. Criminal proceedings were stopped by the regional prosecutor with the conclusion that no unlawful act had been committed. The claimants filed a formal complaint against the decision, in part claiming that the investigation did not examine the substantive material issue, the lack of consent to sterilization. This formal complaint was dismissed by the regional prosecutor. The claimants petitioned the Constitutional Court to address the decision to discontinue criminal proceedings by the regional prosecutor; they claimed among other things the breach of their right to private and family life and of their right to privacy. The Constitutional Court held that sterilization was not a “life-saving” procedure, as claimed by the regional prosecutor and the hospital. Therefore, the explanation given by the regional prosecutor for the discontinuation of criminal proceedings on these grounds was unfounded. The Constitutional Court further held that the investigation did not exhaust all possible avenues, and completely ignored the issue of consent. This and the subsequent dismissal of the complaint amounted to inhumane or degrading treatment of the claimants affecting their private and family lives. The Constitutional Court awarded each claimant 50,000 SK (EUR 1,659.70) in damages and ordered the regional prosecutor to re-examine the issue.

The Supreme Court declared the Organic Law on Women's Right to a Life Without Violence approved by the National Assembly on 25 November 2006 constitutional. The Court found that the Law develops the constitutional protection referred to in article 21.2 of the Constitution for the benefit of women, a traditionally vulnerable social group.

Article 1089 of the Civil Code, which stipulates that in situations of parental disagreement in exercising parental rights over a minor, the father has the right of final decision, is in violation of both Article 7 of the Constitution (stating that both sexes are equal under the law) and Article 9 of the Amendment (eliminating sexual discrimination). Therefore, Article 1089 should be examined and amended. The current Article is void within two years of this interpretation.

民法第1089條規定，在父母對未成年人行使親權有分歧的情況下，父親有最終決定權。該規定既違反了憲法第7條（兩性在法律上平等），也違反了憲法增修條文第9條（消除性別歧視）規定。 因此，民法第1089條應進行檢驗並修正，並應自本解釋公布之日起至遲於二年屆滿時，失其效力。

In the case of protection orders involving monetary payment, the Domestic Violence Prevention Act explicitly authorizes the agency empowered to execute such orders and sets forth procedures and methods or doing so, in keeping with Constitutional requirements. However, for protection orders not involving monetary payment, the Act provides only general authorization of police agencies without procedures and methods, so the Act must be amended to fulfill the Constitutional requirement of specific and explicit authorization by law.

對於涉及金錢給付的保護令，家庭暴力防治法明確授權有權執行此種保護令機構相關程序和方法，以符合憲法要求。然而，關於不涉及金錢給付的保護令，該法僅有對於警察機構的一般授權，而沒有規定程序和方法，因此該法必須進行修正，以滿足憲法對於法律授權明確性的要求。

Two men convicted of child rape challenged the constitutionality of the Sexual Offenses Act's amendments to the existing Criminal Procedure Act (CPA). The amendments permit child victims and witnesses of sexual offenses to participate in modified court proceedings to facilitate testimony. The lower court declared the amendments to the CPA constitutionally invalid. The Constitutional Court reversed the ruling, holding that (1) courts must inquire into the need to appoint an intermediary in sexual offense trials whenever children are expected to testify, regardless of whether the state raises the issue; (2) courts may exercise discretion whether to hold proceedings in camera; and (3) courts must give reasons for refusing to allow the use of intermediaries or other safeguards.

Twee mans wat skuldig bevind is aan verkragting van kinders het die grondwetlikheid van die wysigings van die Wet op Seksuele Misdrywe betwis teen die bestaande Strafproseswet (CPA). Met die wysigings kan kinderslagoffers en getuies van seksuele misdrywe deelneem aan gewysigde hofverrigtinge om getuienis te vergemaklik. Die laer hof het die wysigings aan die CPA konstitusioneel ongeldig verklaar. Die konstitusionele hof het die beslissing omgekeer en gesê dat (1) howe moet ondersoek instel na die behoefte om 'n tussenganger in seksuele misdrywe aan te stel wanneer daar van kinders verwag word om te getuig, ongeag of die staat die saak aan die order stel; (2) howe mag diskresie uitoefen of hulle verrigtinge in camera moet hou; en (3) howe moet redes gee vir die weiering om die gebruik van tussengangers of ander voorsorgmaatreëls, toe te laat.

The respondent made comments at a political rally regarding the consent of the complainant in Jacob Zuma's rape trial. Specifically, he opined that a rape victim would leave early in the morning, but the complainant in this case had stayed for breakfast and requested money for a taxi. The plaintiff, a gender justice organization, sued him for hate speech, unfair discrimination, and harassment of women. The court found that the respondent's comments were based on prohibited grounds as outlined in South Africa's Equality Act, specifically sex and gender. The court also found the comments expressed by the respondent constituted "generalizations about women, rape, and consent which reinforce[d] rape myths." Moreover, the respondent's words suggested "that men need not obtain explicit [sexual] consent from women." The court found the respondent liable for hate speech and harassment. For these reasons, the court concluded the respondent infringed the rights of women and ordered him to pay a fine and make a public apology.

Die respondent het tydens 'n politieke saamtrek kommentaar gelewer rakende die toestemming van die klaer in die verkragtingsverhoor van Jacob Zuma. Spesifiek het hy gesê dat 'n verkragtingslagoffer vroegoggend sou vertrek, maar die klaer het in hierdie geval vir ontbyt gebly en geld gevra vir 'n taxi. Die eiser, 'n organisasie vir geslagsregverdigheid, het hom gedagvaar vir haatspraak, onbillike diskriminasie en teistering van vroue. Die hof het bevind dat die kommentaar van die respondent gebaseer is op verbode gronde soos uiteengesit in die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Gelykheid, spesifiek seks en geslag. Die hof het ook bevind dat die opmerkings deur die respondent uitgespreek 'veralgemenings oor vroue, verkragting en toestemming wat verkragtingsmites versterk'. Verder het die respondent se woorde voorgestel "dat mans nie eksplisiete [seksuele] toestemming van vroue hoef te verkry nie." Die hof het bevind dat die respondent aanspreeklik is vir haatspraak en teistering. Om hierdie redes het die hof tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die respondent die regte van vroue geskend het en hom beveel het om 'n boete te betaal en 'n openbare verskoning te doen.

The appellant was charged and convicted of three counts of robbery with violence and one count of rape, with the charge of rape stating that the appellant "jointly with another not before the court" had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The trial court sentenced him to death for robbery with violence, which is a capital offense. He appealed on the grounds that the rape charge was defective and that the police violated his constitutional rights because they held him for 24 days without bringing him to court. The High Court dismissed his first appeal. However, hearing his second appeal, the Court of Appeal held that multiple men cannot jointly commit the offense of rape against one woman, so the offenders cannot be charged jointly. The Court quashed the appellant's conviction for rape because each offender should have been charged on a separate individual count of rape. The Court also quashed the robbery with violence conviction and sentence because the Constitution (sec. 72(3)) requires police to bring detainees accused of a capital offense to court within 14 days, but in this case police improperly held the appellant for 24 days without cause before bringing him to court. The Court dismissed the state counsel's arguments that the length of the appellant's detention was a moot issue because he failed to raise it in earlier proceedings. The Court stated that it is the responsibility of the prosecuting authorities to justify any delay and a judge's duty to raise issues of unlawful detention if the defendant does not.

The respondent, Ms. Unity Dow, brought a case to the High Court of Botswana asserting that sections 4 and 5 of the Citizenship Act violated her right to equal protection of the law and protection from discrimination on the basis of sex because the sections of the Citizenship Act treated children differently depending on whether they were born to citizen mothers or to citizen fathers. The respondent had one child with an American man prior to their marriage and two children after. Botswana's citizenship requirements allowed only children born outside of marriage to inherit their mother's citizenship, so the respondent's first child was a citizen of Botswana while the two born during her marriage were not. Though not the central issue of the case, the Court noted that an immediate effect of the law could be the expulsion of the husband and non-citizen children from Botswana. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's decision in finding that the Citizenship Act discriminated on the basis of gender under both the Botswana Constitution and the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women because it punishes a female citizen for marrying a non-citizen male. In addition, the Court considered similar cases in different countries in reaching its opinion. (High Court decision available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/sites/www.law.cornell.edu/files/women-and-ju...)

The applicant married Mr. S. in 1994, and had a daughter with him in 1995. Since that time, the applicant and Mr. S. never lived in a common household. In 1996, the District Court pronounced the dissolution of marriage, which became final in 1997, and gave custody to the applicant. Mr. S. was ordered to contribute to child maintenance. In 1996, the applicant brought an action against Mr. S. with the District Court, seeking an order that he contribute to her maintenance as his spouse. After multiple hearings, appeals, and remittance to the District Court, the District Court finally ruled in 2002 that during the relevant period, Mr. S. had been obliged to contribute to the applicant’s maintenance. The Regional Court dismissed both parties’ appeals. In 1997, the applicant lodged an action with the District Court seeking an order that Mr. S. contribute to her post-divorce maintenance, as she was unable to provide for herself alone. After another lengthy process of hearings, appeals, remittance, and re-examination, the District Court ruled in 2002 that Mr. S. had been obliged to contribute to the applicant’s maintenance. Upon Mr. S.’s appeal, the Regional Court modified the judgement in 2003 and detailed new amounts Mr. S. must pay. In 2000, the applicant lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court complaining of undue delays in the above two sets of proceedings and two other sets of proceedings. The court found that the District Court had violated her right to a hearing without unjustified delay in the above actions. However, at that time, the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to draw legal consequences from the finding. The applicant then argued the above proceedings violated her right to the “reasonable time” requirement in Article 6 Section 1 of the European Convention. The Government admitted that this right had been violated. The court held that there had been a violation of this requirement, and that the respondent State must pay the applicant damages.

In 1984, a married Italian woman decided to have an abortion despite her husband’s, the applicant, opposition. The applicant initiated a suit against his wife claiming that the termination deprived him of his right to be a potential father and the unborn child of its right to life. He also challenged the constitutionality of Italian legislation which provided that women could unilaterally decide whether to have an abortion. The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the decision to grant the mother full responsibility on the abortion was logical given the effects of pregnancy, both physical and mental, on pregnant women. The applicant’s appeal to the Venice District Court alleging violations of the Italian Constitution and of the European Convention on Human Rights was also dismissed. The applicant’s appeal to the Court of Cassation, again on constitutional and convention grounds, was similarly dismissed. Finally, the applicant brought the case before the European Court of Human Rights. The Court dismissed the complaint, which alleged that the termination of a pregnancy by the applicant’s wife violated the right to life under the Convention and also his rights under Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention, as “manifestly unfounded.”

Nel 1984, la Sig.ra Boso, una cittadina italiana sposata, decideva di abortire nonostante l’opposizione del marito. Il Sig. Boso iniziava un procedimento contro la moglie ritenendo che l’aborto lo avesse privato del diritto a diventare padre e avesse privato il nascituro del diritto alla vita. Il Sig. Boso contestava inoltre la costituzionalità della legge italiana che prevedeva che la donna potesse unilateralmente decidere se abortire. La Corte Costituzionale rigettava il ricorso in quanto riteneva che dare alla madre piena responsabilità sulla possibilità di abortire era logico in quanto è sulla donna incinta che ricadono gli effetti della gravidanza, sia fisici che mentali. L’impugnazione del Sig. Boso di fronte al Tribunale distrettuale di Venezia, nella quale veniva contestata la violazione della Costituzione italiana e della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, veniva rigettata. Anche l’impugnazione di fronte alla Corte di Cassazione, di nuovo basta su violazioni della Costituzione e della Convenzione, veniva respinta. Infine, il Sig. Boso adiva la Corte Europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Quest’ultima rigettava il ricorso nel quale si contestava il fatto che l’aborto da parte della moglie del ricorrente violava il diritto alla vita e i diritti di cui agli articoli 2, 8 e 12 della Convenzione.