Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn

In this case, the Supreme Court is deciding whether testimony of coworkers who complain of discrimination similar to that claimed by the plaintiff, but at the hands of a different supervisors, is admissible.� The testimony was excluded by the trial court, but the court of appeals ordered it admitted. �Mendelsohn v Sprint/United Management Company , 433 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court's analysis of this question will have to be done in two parts: first by evaluating relevance under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and second, if it finds the testimony admissible under 401, by balancing its probative value against possible delay, waste of time, confusion of the issues or prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.�

Relevance Under Rule 401

Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove a "fact" which is important to the dispute.� Federal Rule of Evidence 401.� Evidence that is relevant is generally admissible (meaning it can be presented at trial as proof), unless there is an independent reason to exclude it.� Federal Rule of Evidence 402. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Id. The trial court found that the key issue in the case was whether Mendelsohn's supervisor acted with a discriminatory intent.� Mendelsohn, 433 F.3d at 1225. Since the experiences of Sprint employees under other supervisors had no tendency to prove that fact, the district court found the testimony inadmissible. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that limiting testimony of other employees to those who shared a supervisor excluded testimony which was relevant to proving that an atmosphere of discrimination existed and that the given reasons for Mendelsohn's firing were merely pretext.� Id. at 1230.�

Sprint argues that the Court of Appeals should be reversed, because the trial court was correct in finding the proper issue to be the motivation of the decisionmaker - in this case Mendelsohn's supervisor.� Brief for Petitioner, at 11-19. Since the testimony of the other employees relates to their supervisors rather than Mendelsohn's, in Sprint's view (and the district court's) the testimony is not relevant. Id., at 10. In a number of employment discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has pointed to the state of mind of the supervisor as the determining factor.� See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 520 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).

However, the court has never held that the critical nature of the supervisor's state of mind makes evidence that tends to show a discriminatory atmosphere irrelevant.� Mendelsohn argues that to be admissible evidence need not be conclusive, and that relevance is a low bar to meet.� Brief for Respondent, at 15-17. Mendelsohn would like the Court to adopt the court of appeals' view that the evidence, while not conclusive proof of age discrimination, is "the kind of fact which could cause a reasonable trier of fact to raise an eyebrow." Id. at 51, quoting Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1230. �Mendelsohn believes that this 'reasonable trier of fact standard' articulated by the court of appeals is the correct standard.� Brief for Respondent at 51. Sprint, however, would like the court to hold that evidence of this sort is inadmissible per se because it has no connection to the person who actually decided to terminate the employee bringing the suit.� Brief for Petitioner, at 9.

Balancing Under Rule 403

If the Court finds the testimony relevant under Rule 401, it will next have to decided if is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.� Rule 403 states that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Sprint argues for exclusion under three of the reasons in this rule: waste of time, confusion of the issues, and unfair prejudice.� Brief for Petitioner, at 39-45.

Sprint points out that if Mendelsohn had been allowed to present her witnesses, they would have been entitled to call witnesses to rebut their version of events, thus creating "numerous trials-within-a-trial."� Brief for Petitioner, at 40. Sprint argues that this would have amounted to a waste of time which outweighs whatever slight probative value the testimony had to help Mendelsohn's case.� Id., at 41. Mendelsohn disputes this, noting that at the time of trial, Sprint had already decided not to call extra witnesses even if Mendelsohn's witnesses were allowed to take the stand and that the disputed testimony would only have lengthened the trial by two days.� Brief for Respondent, at 59-60.��

Sprint also argues that the disputed testimony would have confused the issues.� Brief for Petitioner, at 41-42. Sprint thinks a jury could be confused by the shift of focus away from Mendelsohn's firing towards a number of other disputed narratives.� Id. However, Mendelsohn points out that juries have long be trusted to sort out complex cases, and if this had been a case with six plaintiffs, instead of a case with one plaintiff and five supporting witnesses, the jury would have been considered competent to hear that case.� Brief for Respondent, at 60-61.��

Finally, Sprint argues the testimony would cause unfair prejudice against it by presenting a string of witnesses with sympathetic stories.� Brief for Petitioner, at 41-42. Here, as above, Mendelsohn responds by stating that juries are expected to be able to hear emotional testimony while remaining impartial.� Brief for Respondent, at 61. When the Court evaluates all of these arguments, it will be weighing them against the probative value of the evidence. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 22. Thus, its characterization of the importance of the testimony to Mendelsohn's claim will likely be crucial. Id.