Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick

Section 411(a) of the United States Copyright Act states that no copyright infringement action can be “instituted” until pre-registration or registration of the copyright claim. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) denies district courts jurisdiction to approve settlements if some of the claims in the class arise from alleged infringement of unregistered copyrights. See In re: Literary Works in Electronic Databases Litigation, 509 F.3d 116, 19-20 (2d Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court will review the Second Circuit’s decision and address this jurisdictional question.

First, the Court will decide whether § 411(a) restricts the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over copyright infringement actions. See Question Presented. Second, the Court will consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) is an alternative source of jurisdiction over claims arising from unregistered work. See Id. Finally, the Court will resolve whether § 411(a) eliminates the power of lower courts to approve comprehensive settlements releasing claims that are outside their subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate. See id.

Does 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) Restrict the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts?

The biggest point of contention in this case involves the language and intent of § 411(a). Petitioners, Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al. (“Reed Elsevier”), insist that the registration requirement of § 411(a), though mandatory, is not jurisdictional. See Brief for Petitioners, Reed Elsevier Inc., et al. at 12. In support of their argument, Reed Elsevier notes that in § 411(a) Congress did not phrase the registration requirement for instituting claims in jurisdictional terms. See id. at 22-23. They explain that the omission of the word “jurisdiction” in the registration provision of § 411(a) confirms that the provision is not meant to restrict federal courts’ jurisdiction over unregistered copyrights. See id. at 19. Instead, they argue Congress merely intended § 411(a) to be a precondition to instituting a copyright claim and not a limit on federal courts’ ability to settle claims relating to unregistered copyrights. See id. at 23.

Reed Elsevier explains that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a) are the district courts’ source of jurisdiction over unregistered copyright claims. See Brief for Petitioners at 23. These statutes, according to Reed Elsevier, grant federal courts general jurisdiction over copyright cases. See Id. Section 1338(a) specifically grants original subject matter jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights.” 28 U.S.C § 1338(a). Bolstering Reed Elsevier argument, Respondents, Letty Cotton Pogrebin, et al. (“Pogrebin”), state that § 411(a) does not restrict the original subject matter jurisdiction granted by § 1338(a). See Brief for Pogrebin Respondents, Letty Cotton Pogrebin, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 7. They assert that the intent of § 411(a) is to facilitate the registration and enforcement of U.S. copyrights and not to restrict subject matter jurisdiction. See Id. at 14.

The Second Circuit ruled that §§ 1331 and 1338(a) grant district courts original subject matter jurisdiction over copyright claims. See In re: Literary Works, 509 F.3d at 9. However, the Second Circuit held that § 411(a) limits the jurisdiction granted by §§ 1331 and 1338(a). See id. It found that district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is limited to claims arising from registered copyrights. See id. at 10. In support of its interpretation of § 411(a), the Second Circuit cited its own binding authority as well as persuasive decisions from other circuits. See Id. at 9-10. The Second Circuit found that, in addition to imposing a jurisdictional requirement, § 411(a) also demands that each claim within the certified class satisfy the jurisdiction requirement. See id. at 10, 19.

The Court Appointed Attorney, arguing for affirmation of the Second Circuit’s judgment, maintains that the language of § 411(a) is jurisdictional. See Brief of Court Appointed Attorney Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment at 18. She points to the last sentence of § 411(a), which states that the “Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction.” See Id. This use of the word “jurisdiction” in the last sentence of § 411(a) is proof, according to her, that Congress intended district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction to be contingent upon registration. See Id. The Court Appointed Attorney insists that § 508 of the Copyright Act, which requires district courts to supply the registration number of each work involved in a copyright dispute, is further proof that § 411(a) serves jurisdictional purposes. See Id. at 24-25. She believes that, together, §§ 508 and 411(a) confirm “Congress’s intent to limit infringement suits to claims based on registered works.” See Id. at 25.

Do District Courts Alternatively Have Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims Relating to Unregistered Work?

Pogrebin states that the district court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims related to unregistered work pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See Brief for Pogrebin Respondents at 18-19. According to § 1367(a), “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C § 1367(a). This group of respondents contends that claims relating to unregistered work involve the same “case or controversy” as the claims for registered work. See Id. at 21.

Pogrebin also argues that, though supplemental jurisdiction exists in this case, it is not necessary. They explain that because the district court had original jurisdiction over claims relating to registered work, the district court had jurisdiction over the entire civil action. See Brief for Pogrebin Respondents at 19. Contrary to the Second Circuit’s opinion, Pogrebin contends that the district court does not need original subject matter jurisdiction over every freelance author's claim. See In re: Literary Works, 509 F.3d at 16.

The Second Circuit held that the district court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over unregistered copyright claims nor does it have jurisdiction to certify a class containing claims arising from unregistered copyrights. See In re: Literary Works, 509 F.3d at 18-19. The Second Circuit found that § 1367(a) is not a way around § 411(a)’s registration requirement. See Id. at 20-21. The court explained that the District Court has supplemental jurisdiction over related claims “except as . . . expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute” and, in this case, § 411(a) expressly restricts jurisdiction over unregistered claims. See id. at 19, 21.

The Court Appointed Attorney argues that the district court did not have supplemental jurisdiction to approve the settlement. See Brief of Court Appointed Attorney at 65-68. She asserts that, though claims involving unregistered and registered work raise similar legal issues and involve common facts, they are not tied to the same single controversy as required by § 1367(a). See id. at 67-68.

Does § 411(a) Eliminate District Courts’ Power to Approve Settlements That Release Claims That Are Normally Outside Their Jurisdiction?

Reed Elsevier argues that even if § 411(a) restricts district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, it does not limit the district court’s ability to approve settlements releasing claims involving unregistered works. See Brief for Petitioners at 45. They assert that Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein gave courts the power to “approve settlements that release claims they could not have tried for want of jurisdiction.” 516 U.S. 367 (1996); seeBrief for Muchnick Respondents, Irvin Muchnick, et al. at 44. Thus, according to Reed Elsevier, § 411(a)’s mandatory requirement of copyright registration as a precondition to instituting a claim is not a precondition to certifying a class for settlement. See Brief for Petitioner at 45.

Reed Elsevier argues that the Second Circuit’s finding that § 411(a) prevents the inclusion of unregistered works in settlements like in this case is in conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Tasini. See Brief for Petitioner at 2-3. Petitioners also note that prior to rendering the judgment below, the Second Circuit had held that “not all members of a settlement-only class need to possess a valid cause of action.” See id. at 9. Thus, they contend, the Second Circuit is in conflict with its own previous judgments. See id.

In response, the Court Appointed Attorney argues that Petitioners, Muchnick, and Pegrobin misconstrue § 411(a) as it relates to the power to approve settlements. See Brief of Court Appointed Attorney at 66. She asserts that class action settlements require the court to issue a final judgment terminating the claims of absent class members and binding others. See id. The Court Appointed Attorney then infers that Congress did not intend to give district courts the power to terminate claims that they did not have the power to adjudicate. See id.