Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, LTD

Subsection 1920(6) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code authorizes federal courts to award costs covering the compensation of interpreters to prevailing parties. See28 U.S.C. § 1920(6). The Ninth Circuit held that the term “interpreter” encompasses document translators. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 633 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court must now determine whether to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, or whether to adopt Taniguchi’s contention that the term “interpreters” should be limited to oral translators of spoken language. See Question Presented.

The Plain Meaning of “Interpreters”

Taniguchi argues that the plain meaning of “interpreters” does not encompass written document translators. See Brief for Petitioner at 12. Taniguchi contends that both ordinary and legal dictionaries define “interpreters” as oral translators of languages, and that many dictionaries explicitly render obsolete the application of the term “interpreters” to document translators. See id. at 13–15. Taniguchi asserts that professional court interpreters, as well as interpreting and translating organizations, collectively recognize a distinction between “interpreters” and “translators.” See id. at 17, 20–21. For example, the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators has explained that “translators” work exclusively with written documents, while “interpreters” work exclusively with speech. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators in Support of Petitioner at 5–6. Further, Taniguchi contends that many government agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AOUSC”), have also recognized the same distinction between “interpreters” and “translators” in legislative guidance materials. See id. at 23–24. Taniguchi also asserts that the other U.S. Code sections containing the term “interpreters” recognize this distinction, and that applying the term to document translators would therefore violate the U.S. Code's consistency. See id. at 30, 32.

In contrast, Kan Pacific argues that the plain meaning of "interpreters" does encompass written document translators. SeeBrief for Respondent, Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd. at 11. Kan Pacific points outthatmany ordinary and legal dictionaries, such as Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (“Webster’s”), define “interpreters” as language translators, especially those who translate orally. See id. at 12. Kan Pacific argues that “especially” is not synonymous with “only,” and that the definition is therefore not limited to oral translators. See id. at 13. Kan Pacific also contends that other dictionary entries cited by Taniguchi are either well out of date or are abridged editions of Webster’s. See id. at 15. Kan Pacific also points out that the word “interpreters” has been commonly used in opinions by courts, including the Supreme Court, to interchangeably describe oral and written document translators. See id. at 17–18. Further, Kan Pacific contends that, following the enactment of the Court Interpreter’s Act (“Act”) - part of which became 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) - the Director of the AOUSC published notices detailing interpreters’ duties under the Act, which included translating documents. See id. at 39–40.

Statutory Structure

Taniguchi argues that the Act’s structure confirms that the plain meaning of "interpreters" should be limited to oral translators. See Brief for Petitioner at 25. Taniguchi points out that section 2 of the Act contained the Act’s major substantive provisions, and that section 7 is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6). See id. at 26, 27. Taniguchi asserts that section 2 addressed interpreters’ roles in federal courts, specifying that interpreters’ services must be conducted “simultaneously” or “consecutively” with spoken language during live proceedings. See id. at 26. Taniguchi argues that, when Congress uses identical words throughout multiple provisions of a statute, the words are intended to have identical meanings. See id. at 27. Thus, Taniguchi contends that “interpreters” in section 7 should carry the same meaning as it does in section 2, limiting compensation to services conducted “simultaneously” or “consecutively” with spoken language during live proceedings. See id. at 27.

In contrast, Kan Pacific argues that the Act’s statutory structure does not confirm that the plain meaning of "interpreters" should be limited to oral translators. SeeBrief for Respondent at 35. Kan Pacific points out that section 2 and section 7 of the Act use different language. See id. at 37. Kan Pacific argues that, when Congress uses different language in different parts of the same statute, it is assumed that different meanings are intended. See id. Kan Pacific points out that section 2 discusses “interpreters in the courts of the United States,” while section 7 covers “interpreters” generally. See id. at 37. Kan Pacific argues that the “courts of the United States” qualifier in section 2 demonstrates that Congress intended “interpreters” in section 7 to have a broader meaning. See id. at 37–38.

Legislative History

Taniguchi argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)’s legislative history confirms that the plain meaning of "interpreters" should be limited to oral translators. SeeBrief for Petitionerat 33. Taniguchi points out that several Congressional reports prior to enactment demonstrate that the Act was passed to address problems regarding the oral interpretation of legal proceedings, and to ensure that non-English speaking defendants are able to comprehend courtroom dialogue. See id. Taniguchi also points out that Congress rejected a draft of the Act that required compensation for “limited document translation” after hearing arguments detailing the costs of such written translation. See id. at 34. Taniguchi asserts that the draft required Spanish-language portions of court records in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to be translated into English for purposes of appeals. See id. at 34–35. Taniguchi contends that Congress could not have intended to implement Kan Pacific’s expansive definition of “interpreter” after rejecting a much more limited proposal for being too costly. See id. at 35. Taniguchi also points out that no statement in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) to apply to document translators. See id. at 36.

In contrast, Kan Pacific argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)’s legislative history does not confirm that the plain meaning of "interpreters" should be limited to oral translators. See Brief for Respondent at 41. Kan Pacific points out that Congress used “interpreter” and “translator” interchangeably in the Act’s legislative history documents referenced by Taniguchi. See id. at 44. Kan Pacific contends that, even if the Congressional reports referenced by Taniguchi triggered the statute’s enactment, they only prove that the Act was intended to include oral interpretation, not that the Act was intended to exclude written translation. See id. at 41–42. Kan Pacific argues that Taniguchi’s reference to the rejected draft permitting compensation for written translation costs in Puerto Rico is irrelevant. See id. at 43. Kan Pacific contends that the rejected provision mandated written translations that the parties might not have otherwise requested, potentially imposing unnecessary expenses on the parties. See id. Kan Pacific points out that, in the circumstances of this case, the prevailing party has voluntarily requested the written translation, and the court is therefore allocating necessary costs that have already been expended. See id. Kan Pacific also points out that no statement in the legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) to apply to document translators. See id.