Tibbals v. Carter

The issues before the Supreme Court are whether, under Rees v. Peyton, death row inmates have a right to competence in federal habeas proceedings challenging their sentences, and whether a federal district court has the discretion to indefinitely stay a habeas proceeding if an inmate is incompetent. In Rees, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to determine whether Rees had the mental competence to abandon his habeas action. 384 U.S. at 314. Here, the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court acted properly by holding a competence hearing and in finding Carter incompetent, but remanded the case to the district court, explaining that it should stay only Carter’s claims that require his assistance. Carter, 644 F.3d at 331, 337.

Petitioner Tibbals argues that death row inmates do not have a right to competence in federal habeas proceedings and that district courts cannot grant an indefinite stay because of an inmate’s incompetence.Brief for Petitioner at 3–4. Respondent Sean Carter contends that the Supreme Court need not address the right to competence argument because it can decide the case on a narrower ground: district courts’ inherent discretion to grant stays because of a prisoner’s incompetence. Brief for Respondent at 12.

RIGHT TO COMPETENCE IN FEDERAL HABEAS ACTIONS

Tibbals argues that death row inmates do not have a statutory right to competence in federal habeas proceedings, and that the Sixth Circuit disregarded the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 in reaching its decision. See Brief for Petitioner at 14–18. Tibbals maintains that the statute cannot apply to habeas proceedings because, by definition, habeas proceedings are civil actions against the government, not criminal actions against a defendant. See Id. at 18. Moreover, Tibbals emphasizes that section 4241 applies only to federal criminal defendants, and more narrowly, to defendants at trial or on probation. See Id. at 17. Carter does not satisfy any of these criteria, Tibbals claims, because Carter was a state criminal defendant convicted of a capital offense in state court, and is now a plaintiff in a federal civil action. See Id.

Carter counters that the real issue is not the right to competence, but whether a district court has inherent authority to grant stays because of incompetence. See Brief for Respondent at 16. To support that authority, Carter asserts that the American legal tradition has long recognized the importance of a criminal defendant’s competence, from arraignment to execution, and that at common law, a defendant’s competence was a requirement at every stage of a case. See Id. at 12, 15. The requirement, Carter asserts, is based on the moral principle that individuals should not lose their ability to assert viable defenses, even up to execution, simply because they happen to suffer from a mental illness. See Id. at 12, 19–20. He argues that the requirement recognizes the possibility that a defendant, if not for his incompetence, might assert a valid defense. See Id. at 20.

Tibbals responds that after years of asserting a statutory right to competence, Carter, in the eleventh hour, now argues that district courts have the inherent discretion to indefinitely stay cases. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, Terry Tibbals at 1. Contrary to Carter’s assertions, Tibbals claims that habeas courts, at common law, lacked authority to stay a prisoner’s sentence because of incompetence and that only trial courts had that duty and discretion. See Id. at 2–3. Moreover, he asserts that the incompetency rule existed at common law because execution occurred within days of judgment, unlike the extended delays that are now common. See Id. at 3.

DISTRICT COURTS’ POWER UNDER REES V. PEYTON

Tibbals asserts that the Sixth Circuit misinterpreted Rees by applying section 4241 to habeas actions. See Brief for Petitionerat 18; 384 U.S. 312. Rees, Tibbals contends, does not recognize a right to competence, but instead applies to the scenario where a death row inmate seeks to terminate his habeas proceedings, but not when an inmate seeks to assist his counsel. See Brief for Petitionerat 20. He cites the Court’s one-sentence order in Rees as evidence of its narrow applicability and points out that the Court did not perform any statutory analysis in that case because it was careful to avoid recognizing a right to competence. See Id. at 19–20. Moreover, Tibbals claims that between 1966 and 2011, no lower court has invoked Rees or Section 4241 to stay a capital habeas action. See Id. at 22.

Carter responds that Rees confirms district courts’ inherent power to stay habeas cases, and not just the scenario when a defendant seeks to terminate his rights. See Brief for Respondent at 25. He points out that after the district court found Rees incompetent, the Supreme Court ordered the case to be stayed, and the stay remained in effect for almost thirty years until Rees died and the case was dismissed. Id. Carter reasons that if the Supreme Court was only concerned with Rees’s ability to terminate his proceedings, and not with his ability to proceed, then it would have adjudicated the case once Rees was found incompetent. Id. at 27. Thus, Carter insists, Rees reflects a longstanding concern for a defendant’s mental competence and recognizes district courts’ authority to halt a habeas action where a defendant is incompetent to proceed. See Id.

DISTRICT COURTS’ DISCRETION UNDER AEDPA

Tibbals argues that without a statute or Supreme Court precedent mandating a stay of habeas proceedings on incompetency grounds, the remaining question is whether the district court had the discretion to grant a stay in Carter’s case. See Brief for Petitioner at 24. Tibbals answers in the negative because of AEDPA, which permits a federal court to grant habeas relief to a state defendant only where the state’s denial of the defendant’s claims was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or was “an unreasonable determination of the facts . . . in the State court proceeding.” See Id. at 24–25; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Citing the Supreme Court’s analysis of AEDPA in Cullen v. Pinholster, Tibbals asserts that when deciding a defendant’s federal habeas case, federal courts may only consider the state record. See Brief for Petitioner at 25–26; 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). As a result, Tibbals claims that even if Carter were found competent, any new information he might add to the proceeding would be irrelevant because the federal court in a habeas action is limited to the state court record. See Brief for Petitioner at 26. Thus, Tibbals insists that Carter’s mental condition, and any new information he might add, have no bearing on the habeas action, and therefore, the district court cannot order a stay because of Carter’s incompetence. See Id. at 26–27.

Carter counters that the Supreme Court can decide this case solely on district courts’ inherent discretion to stay habeas cases because of a habeas petitioner’s incompetence. See Brief for Respondent at 15–16. He argues that the Supreme Court has recognized instances, as in Rhines v. Weber, where a defendant’s interest in obtaining federal review of his claims outweighs the interest in finality, and thus, district courts can stay habeas cases to preserve a defendant’s ability to pursue claims. See Id. at 17; 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). Further, Carter insists that district courts’ power to stay habeas cases is rooted in a legal tradition that recognizes the importance of a defendant’s competence at all stages. See Brief for Respondent at 18.

Moreover, Carter maintains that AEDPA is consistent with granting a stay here because the statute should be interpreted in terms of its effects, especially when a prisoner is at risk of losing all future review of his claims. See Brief for Respondent at 16, 27–28. Pinholster, he argues, did not interpret AEDPA as a categorical bar to presenting new evidence in federal habeas cases. See Id. 38–39; 131 S. Ct. 1388. Rather, Carter contends that Pinholster restricts federal courts to the state record only when deciding whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable, but that evidence outside the state record could still be relevant to resolving a federal habeas case. See Brief for Respondent at 38; 131 S. Ct. 1388. He notes that in Pinholster, the Supreme Court recognized that state prisoners can still raise claims in a habeas action that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court, and for those claims prisoners could submit new evidence. See Brief for Respondent at 38; 131 S. Ct. 1388. Thus, for those claims where Carter’s assistance is necessary, he argues that granting a stay due to incompetence is proper because he would otherwise be losing those claims through no fault of his own. See Brief for Respondent at 30.