Byrd v. United States

DOES A NON-RENTER DRIVER OF A RENTAL CAR HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY?

Byrd asserts that the Fourth Amendment gives him a reasonable expectation of privacy because he possessed and controlled a closed space: the rental car that Byrd’s fiancée allowed Byrd to drive. In fact, Byrd argues that this reasonable expectation of privacy does not depend on whether one has a property right in the space. Indeed, Byrd contends that ample precedent illustrates that a person who lawfully possess and controls a closed space has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the person can prevent others from accessing the space; for example, a person reasonably expects privacy in a public telephone booth, a shared office space, and in parts of a taxi within the passenger’s control. Moreover, Byrd argues that one’s possession and control over a space does not need to be exclusive or absolute for one to have a reasonable expectation of privacy: limited possession and the ability to control and exclude strangers from the space suffices. Indeed, Byrd contends that because he was permitted to drive the rented car, drove the car as a family member, and could exclude others from the car, Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment.

The United States counters that a person’s possession and control over a closed space is not enough to create a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the United States contends that there are no precedents that support the proposition that a person’s possession and control over a closed space create a reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed, the United States asserts that the possession and control must be legitimate. In other words, a reasonable expectation of privacy depends upon whether a person had a legally recognized right to control and possess the closed space. According to the United States, A person who has not expressly been included in the car’s rental agreement does not have legitimate possession nor control of the car. Additionally, the United States contends that extending Fourth Amendment protections to persons in a relationship like that of Byrd and his fiancée, an engaged couple, requires a statutorily-provided showing of a close relationship or a showing of exceptional circumstances; neither of which Byrd, the United States argues, made in this case.

WHETHER BREACH OF THE RENTAL CONTRACT RENDERS AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY UNREASONABLE?

Byrd argues that breaching the car’s rental agreement—which occurred when Byrd’s fiancée permitted Byrd, who was not expressly included as an authorized driver, to drive the rental car—does not transform a person’s otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy into an unreasonable one. In fact, Byrd contends that commercial contracts, like rental car agreements, do not generally interfere with constitutional issues of privacy because commercial contracts are entered for business purposes and not privacy considerations. As an example, Byrd points out that a tenant is constitutionally protected against unreasonable searches and seizures even if the rental agreement allows the landlord to access the tenant’s room. Moreover, Byrd asserts that the specific rental provision at issue, the “authorized-driver provision,” is not a provision that relates to privacy; instead, authorized-driver provisions involve allocating risk between the renter and the rental company. In fact, Byrd argues that authorized-driver provisions are used because rental companies expect that rental cars will be driven by unlisted drivers and those provisions mitigate the rental company’s risk. Indeed, Byrd contends that a breach of a rental agreement does not end a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy because a driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy is derived from societal expectations of privacy, and not derived from the performance or non-performance of contractual provisions.

The United States counters by claiming that Byrd’s use of the rental car constituted an unjustified breach of contract that does not entitle Byrd to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Car rental agreements, the United States concedes, are indeed commercial agreements, but they are agreements for specific customers for specific transactions; rental companies are particularly thorough with regards to who is permitted to drive the rental car because of the magnitude of risk involved. Indeed, car rental agreements, the United States argues, only include non-renters who are legally connected through, for example, a spousal relationship. In sum, the United States asserts that a non-renter with no legally cognizable connection to the renter, like Byrd, is essentially a “stranger” to the contract and cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy while driving the rental car.

DOES A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST EXIST?

Byrd argues that, regardless of whether he had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, he had a constitutionally protected property interest in the rental car that was violated by the officers’ search. Byrd asserts that his fiancée became a bailee when she took possession of the car from the bailor, the rental company; this relationship, among other things, gave Byrd’s fiancée certain property interests, including the right to exclude others from the car. . Indeed, Byrd argues that third parties to the bailor-bailee relationship, like Byrd, may also become a kind of bailee, sometimes referred to as a sub-bailee, when a bailee transfers and the sub-bailee receives the property; importantly, Byrd claims that this relationship can be established even when the bailor does not permit the bailee to transfer the property. In fact, Byrd contends that all that is required to establish a sub-bailee relationship is that the third party must knowingly accept the bailed property, as Byrd did when he accepted the car from his fiancée. A sub-bailee, Byrd asserts, has the property rights of a bailee, including the right to possess the car, the right to exclude others from the car, and the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches of a person’s property.

The United States counters by arguing that the rental agreement, while indeed a bailment, is a particular type of personal bailment that does not permit the bailee to transfer the property to Byrd and create a sub-bailee relationship. Indeed, the United States contends that, as a general matter, bailees cannot transfer their rights to another person absent an understanding or agreement; in fact, the United States argues that the rental agreement clearly follows this general rule by forbidding any unauthorized drivers from using the rental car at three separate places in the contract. Moreover, the rental agreement, the United States asserts, created a bailment “personal to the bailee,” because of the highly-individualized nature of the rental agreement: the rental company permitted the rental only after investigating Byrd’s fiancée’s driving record and criminal background. Because Byrd’s fiancée was not authorized to transfer the rental car to third parties, the United States claims, Byrd could not become a sub-bailee of the rental car. Indeed, the United States asserts that the unauthorized transfer may actually constitute conversion or theft and be a tortious or criminal act.