Culley v. Marshall

HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND APPLICABILITY OF PRECEDENT

Halima Tariffa Culley et al. argue that when evaluating whether existing civil proceeding procedures comport with the Fourteenth Amendment, (1) the balancing test in Mathews generally applies, and (2) precedent does not require applying Barker v. Wingo. Brief for Petitioners, Halima Tariffa Culley et al. (“Culley”) at 17–18, 37. First, according to Culley, the Supreme Court has consistently applied the Mathews framework to questions implicating the sufficiency of procedure in civil suits. Id. at 17–21. Culley contends that the Court consolidated its pre-Mathews cases’ analytical framework into Mathews’s three-prong inquiry: considering (1) private interests affected by the action (2) the risk of the procedure erroneously depriving such interests; (3) the government’s interest. Id. at 17, 21–24. Further, Culley asserts the Mathews test embodies the flexibility of case-by-case determinations due process requires. Id. at 18, 24–25. Lastly, Culley posits that civil forfeiture proceedings pose a risk to the guarantee of procedural due process that Mathews is equipped to evaluate, since due process requires a retention hearing to guard against deprivation of property contemporaneous with forfeiture proceedings. Id. at 25–28.

Second, Culley disputes the authority of $8,850 and United States v. Von Neumann. Brief for Petitioners at 37–44. Culley claims $8,850 did not establish Barker’s applicability to the question presented. Id. at 37. According to Culley, $8,850 narrowly employed Barker in considering the due process implications of the government’s speed in initiating post-seizure forfeiture proceedings because the Sixth Amendment’s protection against undue delay in criminal cases paralleled the 18-month interim at issue. Id. at 37–38. However, Culley emphasizes, a delay in rendering final judgment on ultimate ownership at issue in $8,850 is distinct from the issue at hand, a lack of procedural safeguards protecting against post-seizure deprivation pending ultimate ownership determination. Id. at 38–39. Similarly, Culley maintains Von Nuemann did not decisively address which due process framework applies here because Von Nuemann concerned delay in addressing an existing procedure, not the availability of additional procedures. Id. at 42–44.

In opposition, Steven T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama et al. (“Marshall”) assert that the Court’s decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann speak to the due process guarantee in this case. Brief for Respondents, Steven T. Marshall et al. at 16–17. According to Marshall, when process is delayed after seizure, the guarantee is timeliness of post-seizure proceedings—an inquiry guided by Barker’s speedy-trial test. Id. Marshall disputes that Mathews is universally applicable to due process claims, maintaining that the Court previously rejected its applicability in Dusenbery v. United States and Medina v. California, and that where the Court has historically or traditionally opted for another test, the precedent will override Mathews’s “general approach.” Id. at 26–28. Marshall contends that, since $8,850 deemed Barker the appropriate standard and Von Nuemann followed $8,850 by applying Barker to a civil forfeiture due process question, the Court would neglect authoritative precedent if it adopted Mathews here. Id. at 25–28.

Marshall disagrees with Culley’s readings of $8,850 and Von Nuemann. Brief for Respondents at 18–25. Marshall acknowledges that, like Culley, the $8,850 claimant argued for an additional and improved procedure: a “prompt decision” on a petition. Id. Marshall concludes that $8,850’s application of Barker on this additional procedure claim supports applicability to the question here. Id. at 19–20. Additionally, Marshall disputes that Von Nuemann considered merely the issue of delay, arguing that the Court denied anotherclaim for an additional hearing immediately post-seizure. Id. at 22–24. Marshall further posits that the Court’s denial to require prompt resolution of an existing procedure suggests that due process does not require additional procedural safeguards. Id. at 24.

APPROPRIATE DUE PROCESS FRAMEWORK

Culley asserts Mathews is the proper due process standard, arguing that Barker is inadequate to address questions regarding sufficiency of process in a civil case. Brief for Petitioners at 28–30. Culley maintains that the Barker framework exclusively focuses on the timeliness of existing criminal processes and cannot address civil actions. Id. at 30–32. Further, Culley argues that Barker fails to accommodate established due process principles: (1) the balancing of private and governmental interests and (2) the flexible nature of due process. Id. at 34–36. First, Culley claims that Barker does not account for property interests that receive varying degrees of due process protection—particularly those associated with temporary deprivation. Id. at 34–35. Similarly, Culley asserts Barker is limited in evaluating governmental interest because its analysis merely produces the government’s justification for delay, not the government’s interest in conducting a civil proceeding absent additional processes. Id. at 35. Second, Culley notes that, unlike Mathews, Barker’s application will never lead to a due process determination requiring a retention hearing because a precedent applying Barker holds that due process is satisfied when the forfeiture hearing is timely. Id. at 36.

On the other hand, Marshall contends that Barker is the proper framework, even if $8,850 and Von Nuemann do not command its application, because a timely civil forfeiture proceeding satisfies due process where pre-seizure process is not required. Brief for Respondents at 28–29. Marshall further argues that Mathews is less equipped to address remedy and the due process principles cited by Culley. Id. at 32–37. First, Marshall contends that Mathews improperly diagnoses the procedural problem as a lack of procedure rather than timeliness, and its application may further delay resolution by adding procedure. Id. at 35. Marshall elaborates that alleged harms incurred from property deprivation are instead attributable to the length of the delay, and the possibility of “error” (second Mathews factor) could be ameliorated by an earlier hearing. Id. Marshall concludes that Barker balances interests more aptly by considering the length of delay. Id. at 37. Moreover, Marshall cautions that, if Mathews requires a retention hearing, the government’s interests in protecting forfeitable property from removal, destruction, or concealment would be unduly contravened. Id. at 29–34. Lastly, Marshall refutes that Barker is inflexible due to its demand of case-by-case review focused on the cause of delay. Id. at 36–37.

APPLYING FRAMEWORK: OUTCOME OF DUE PROCESS EVALUATION

Under Mathews, Culley contends that Alabama failed to provide a retention hearing and thus violated due process. Brief for Petitioners at 45. Culley argues that the first Mathews factor favors Petitioners because the Court has traditionally recognized the harm and significance of depriving an individual of their vehicle as it relates to maintaining their livelihood. Id. at 45–46. Culley states Alabama’s statute does not realize property rights for innocent owners if the state deprives them of possession during forfeiture proceedings. Id. at 46. Culley argues the second factor favors Petitioners as well; Culley maintains Alabama erroneously deprived both Sutton and Culley of their vehicles for over a year, while repeatedly denying release requests as innocent owners. Id. at 46–47. Additionally, Culley asserts that Alabama’s option to post bond for double the vehicle’s value was “excessive” and therefore did not release Alabama from its failure to provide a retention hearing. Id. at 47–49. Lastly, Culley argues Alabama’s governmental interest (the third Mathews factor) is weak, weighing in favor of Petitioners, again. Id. at 48. Culley contends that Alabama’s interest in preventing destruction or concealment of the property, as well as against its involvement in perpetuating criminal activity, is not convincing here because the owners are innocent—which a retention hearing could have established. Id. at 49.

Marshall instead argues neither Barker nor Mathews establishes a due process violation. Brief for Respondents at 48–53. Under Barker, Marshall claims all factors weigh in favor of the State. Id. at 48. Marshall asserts there was (1) no lengthy delay because Alabama initiated processes within two weeks post-seizure, distinguishing duration of deprivation from delay; (2) the delay was due to Sutton’s and Culley’s failure to advance the proceedings by using existing procedures; (3) Sutton and Culley failed to assert their procedural rights—e.g., challenge the seizure, post bond, and/or promptly file for summary judgment; and (4) the delay did not prejudice Sutton nor Culley in asserting their defense as innocent owners. Id. at 48–49. Marshall disputes that Mathews factors favor Sutton and Culley. Id. First, Marshall emphasizes Sutton and Culley’s private interest must be discounted because they failed to use existing procedures. Id. at 50. Second, Marshall maintains that Alabama’s current procedures present a low risk of erroneous deprivation and that law enforcement’s release request denials do not amount to an error. Id. at 50–51. Third, Marshall contends that Sutton’s and Culley’s ultimate innocence does not negate Alabama’s initial interest in preventing criminal activity. Id. at 52. Even where all procedural protections fail, Marshall argues due process is satisfied by common-law tort post-deprivation actions, which Alabama provides as a tort claim for conversion for money damages calculated by the harm caused by unlawful deprivation. Id. at 47–48.