City of Grants Pass, Oregon v.

Issues

Do fines for camping on public land constitute cruel and unusual punishment of homeless people?

Oral argument:

April 22, 2024

Court below:

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute between the City of Grants Pass, Oregon, and a class of homeless residents of Grants Pass represented by Gloria Johnson. Petitioner Grants Pass contends that its anti-camping ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent Johnson argues that the city’s ordinances amount to criminalization of the status of homelessness, contravening the Eighth Amendment. This case could impact the balance of power between federal, state, and local government and may clarify the limits on criminalizing conduct like camping outside at night.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

Facts

The homeless population in Grants Pass, Oregon exceeds the available shelter for homeless people. Johnson v. City of Grants Pass at 874–75, 878–79. After amendments in January 2019, the Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibited in relevant parts: (1) sleeping in public streets, alleyways, and sidewalks or in adjoining areas; (2) camping on all public property, and (3) parking vehicles overnight in Grants Pass parks. Id. at 876–78. As a result, a homeless person who could not find shelter was permitted to sleep in Grants Pass parks but was not permitted to camp or maintain a vehicle overnight in the parks. Id. at 877–78.

The Grants Pass Municipal Code’s definition of camping included “any place [containing] material used for bedding purposes . . . for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live”; camping did not require a “tent . . . or any other structure.” Id. at 876. Violators were subject to fines. Id. at 876. Repeat violators of park regulations could be “bar[red] . . . from all city parks for 30 days” lest they be charged with criminal trespass. Id.

In 2018, Debra Blake filed a complaint challenging the above Grants Pass Municipal Code provisions in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Id. at 877–78. Shortly after Grants Pass’s January 2019 amendments, Blake moved to certify involuntarily homeless people living in Grants Pass as a class. Id. The district court certified the class. Id. at 878. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded in relevant part that “[Grants Pass’s] anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause” of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 878–79. The district court issued a permanent injunction which provided, among other relief, that the anti-camping provisions could only be enforced (1) during daylight hours and (2) with 24 hours’ warning from law enforcement. Id. at 879–80.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited its 2018 decision in Martin v. City of Boise, which held that the “Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter,” but which also notes that governments may impose some limits on activities like sleeping in public. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Grants Pass’s anti-camping ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment because Martin affords homeless people the right to “take . . . rudimentary precautions to protect themselves from the elements.” Id. at 891, quoting Martin, 920 F.3d at 1049. The district court had also made findings about the Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive fines and the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights, but the Ninth Circuit declined to decide those issues. Id. at 880–81, 895–96. The Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to narrow its injunction such that it only enjoined the anti-camping ordinances, and only to the extent necessary for involuntarily homeless people to “protect themselves from the elements when there is no shelter space available.” Id. at 896.

Debra Blake passed away while the case was on appeal; the current class representatives are Gloria Johnson and John Logan. Id. at 883–84.

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Id. at 874. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Grants Pass certiorari on January 12, 2024.

Analysis

SCOPE OF “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL” IN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The City of Grants Pass argues that its ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment because the Eighth Amendment does not limit the conduct that can be punished. Brief of Petitioner City of Grants Pass at 16. Grants Pass emphasizes that the text of the Eighth Amendment limits only punishments for offenses, not the scope of punishable conduct itself. Id. at 16-17. Grants Pass further argues that the original public meaning of “punishment” at the time of the ratification of the Eighth Amendment implied a concern with sentencing, rather than “substantive criminal responsibility.” Id. at 17. Grants Pass notes that this original public meaning was also reflected in the ratification debates at the Founding, with many founders expressing concern for punishment rather than broad criminalization. Id. at 20-21. Grants Pass also points out that the Eighth Amendment was based on the English Declaration of Rights, which also reflected a concern with the nature of punishments, rather than criminalization itself. Id. at 19-20. Additionally, Grants Pass argues that its ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment because the punishments for violating the ordinances—fines and jail terms—are not “cruel and unusual.” Id. at 24-25. Grants Pass urges that fines and imprisonment are “standard punishments” with roots that predate the Eighth Amendment and which continue to be valid under the Supreme Court’s precedents. Id. at 25-26. Grants Pass also notes that while Johnson did not challenge the amount of the fines under the ordinances, the structure of the Constitution implies their propriety because the Eighth Amendment explicitly contemplates fining as a method of punishment. Id. at 27-28.

Johnson argues that the ordinances violate the Eighth Amendment by criminalizing homeless people’s “continued physical existence” in Grants Pass. Brief of Respondents Gloria Johnson et al. at 15-16. Johnson notes that the ordinances reach beyond the ordinary meaning of the word “camping” and criminalizes common methods necessary to living as a homeless person in Grants Pass. Id. at 16. Johnson further argues that the ordinances apply to all public property at all times, thereby making it impossible for homeless people in Grants Pass to comply with the law in the absence of accessible shelter. Id. at 16-17. Johnson concedes that fines and jail time for homeless persons who “decline accessible shelter options” are not at issue in this case. Id. at 17-18. Even so, Johnson asserts that the Supreme Court has routinely struck down criminal statutes not because of “barbarity” in punishment but rather because punishments were disproportionate to the alleged crime committed. Id. at 44-45, 47-48. Additionally, the United States, in support of neither party, concurs, arguing that the Eighth Amendment does impose “substantive limits on what can be made criminal.” Brief of the United States, in Support of Neither Party at 17. The United States argues that while the Eighth Amendment’s concern with the substantive limitations on punishment is limited, it applies in these “narrow” circumstances where homeless people have no other option but to sleep outside and be subject to criminal punishment. Id. at 18-19.

STATUS OFFENSES, INVOLUNTARY CONDUCT, AND PRECEDENT

The City of Grants Pass argues that its ordinances do not criminalize a person’s status. Brief of Petitioner City of Grants Pass at 29-30. Grants Pass contends that Robinson v. California does not forbid punishment of involuntary conduct. Id. at 31-32. Grants Pass instead contends that Robinson and Powell v. Texas allow states to punish acts but not status, even where those acts may be involuntary. Id. at 34-35. Grants Pass asserts that while the Powell opinion did not garner a majority, the Ninth Circuit erred by using the dissent to determine the scope of the majority opinion. Id. at 36-37. Grants Pass further asserts that its ordinances do not criminalize the status of homelessness and instead criminalize “specific acts.” Id. at 37. Grants Pass maintains that the Robinson reasoning should not be “extended” here because the Robinson decision is an “outlier in reasoning and result.” Id. at 38. Grants Pass notes that Robinson relied extensively on medical science and relatively little on the Court’s Eighth Amendment precedents. Id. at 38-39.

Johnson argues that the ordinances criminalize the status of being homeless and conduct that homeless people cannot avoid. Brief of Respondents Gloria Johnson et al. at 18-19. Johnson asserts that Robinson v. California “forbids governments from punishing someone for living with a status” and that the same reasoning renders the ordinances unconstitutional. Id. at 19-20. Johnson contends that the ordinances do not permissibly regulate public health or safety and instead criminalize the “biological imperative of resting while avoiding hypothermia.” Id. at 20-21. Johnson urges that no “extension” of Robinson is needed to invalidate the ordinances as the ordinances criminalize a lack of access to shelter and are thus a “status-based punishment.” Id. at 22-23. Johnson submits that the conduct the city purports to criminalize “has no gravity as an offense at all” because homelessness is an involuntary state. Id. at 29. Johnson thus reasons that the punishment of jail time or fines creates ongoing guilt for the status of being homeless, while leaving homeless people without improving outcomes or serving legitimate “penological purpose[s].” Id. at 29-31.

HISTORY AND TRADITION, DUE PROCESS, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Grants Pass argues that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is inapplicable in this case because Johnson dismissed the claim with prejudice. Brief of Petitioner City of Grants Pass at 41. Even so, Grants Pass contends that there is no “old, venerable, and entrenched prohibition” on punishment of involuntary conduct that results from a person’s status. Id. at 42. Further, Grants Pass asserts that the right to camp on public land is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” as required to sustain a substantive due process claim. Id. at 42. In fact, Grants Pass maintains that regulation of public places has been a part of public law since before the Founding. Id. at 42-43. The United States, in support of neither party, adds that the Constitution permits all levels of government—federal, state, and local—to impose “reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions” on using public property, which would include regulations on camping, but that punishment which amounts to “banishment” has been rejected in the history and traditions of the United States. Brief of the United States, in Support of Neither Party at 21, 23.

Johnson argues that the ordinances “would have been abhorrent to” the founders. Brief of Respondents Gloria Johnson et al. at 34. Johnson contends that early “poor laws” were much more favorable than the City’s ordinances because they required cities to offer employment, housing, and other relief to poor people. Id. at 34-35. Johnson further contends that involuntary homelessness was not punished at the time of the Founding and was instead relieved through municipal support. Id. at 35-36. Furthermore, Johnson asserts that the ordinances “offend modern standards of decency.” Id. at 38. Johnson points out that the overwhelming majority of other cities do not have ordinances that make it “physically impossible for homeless people to avoid punishment.” Id. at 40. Additionally, Johnson notes that only four states have laws that criminalize sleeping with a blanket, and some appear to be unenforced. Id. at 41-42. Finally, Johnson observes that the federal government does not impose criminal liability for the status of homelessness, which she maintains demonstrates a policy against criminalizing homelessness. Id. at 43.

Discussion

FEDERALISM

Twenty-four States, in support of Grants Pass, argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in this case and Martin v. City of Boise infringe on States’ sovereignty. Brief of Idaho, Montana, and 22 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 13. The twenty-four States contend that State governments have been empowered to determine criminal penalties, including penalties for “wandering about the streets without a house,” since the Founding. Id. at 14–17. The twenty-four States add that State governments are better suited to write criminal codes because they are “more local and more accountable” than the federal government. Id. at 14. The twenty-four States assert that the Ninth Circuit’s opinions in Martin and Grants Pass circumvent the States’ historic deliberative role in the evolution of criminal law. Id. at 17–23.

Thirteen California cities, in support of Grants Pass, contend that the Ninth Circuit’s opinions in Martin and Grants Pass are unworkable because they support multiple conflicting interpretations. Brief of Amici Curiae Thirteen California Cities, in Support of Petitioner, at 28–33. The cities argue that, because they cannot predict how courts will apply Martin and Grants Pass, they must either risk Eighth Amendment lawsuits or decline to enforce any regulations on sleeping in public. Id. at 33–37.

Six States, in support of Johnson, argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Martin and Grants Pass are well within the federal government’s authority. Brief of the States of Maryland, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Vermont as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 11–18. The six States contend that the Ninth Circuit’s rulings merely “remove[d] one narrow option” for addressing homelessness, and Grants Pass is free to try alternatives to punishment such as resettling homeless people into permanent residences. Id. The six States submit that Martin and Grants Pass preserve States’ power “to punish conduct that they traditionally have treated as criminal” because the Ninth Circuit’s opinions only clarify that the act of sleeping is not criminal conduct. Id. at 21–22.

The Southern Poverty Law Center and other nonprofit poverty law organizations (“SPLC et al.”), in support of Johnson, contend that the Ninth Circuit’s test is workable because similar applications of Robinson did not “create mayhem in the lower courts.” Brief of Amici Curiae The Southern Poverty Law Center, et al., in Support of Respondents, at 7–18. SPLC et al. also argue that the historical fact of vagrancy laws does not support Grants Pass’s position because vagrancy laws are unconstitutional after the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville. Id. at 19–21. SPLC et al. argue that, like vagrancy laws, anti-camping laws run afoul of the Supreme Court’s contemporary view that “special penalties for people because they are experiencing poverty” are impermissible. Id. at 22, 23–30.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND DIGNITY FOR HOMELESS PEOPLE

The League of Oregon Cities and four other organizations related to Washington, Idaho, and Oregon municipalities (“The League of Oregon Cities et al.”), in support of Grants Pass, argue that homeless encampments on public land, which are “increas[ing] dramatically” in the Ninth Circuit, significantly strain governmental resources. Brief of Amici Curiae League of Oregon Cities, City of Portland, Special Districts Association of Oregon, Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, and Association of Idaho Cities in Support of Petitioner, at 8–10. The League of Oregon Cities et al. contend that local governments often lack the resources to support homeless people directly while also contending with the public safety concerns that may accompany homeless encampments, such as drug use, domestic violence, unsanitary waste, weapons, and environmental impacts like fires and riverbank erosion. Id. at 10–20.

Fifty-seven social scientists, in support of Johnson, argue that enforcement of anti-camping measures exacerbate negative health conditions like sleep deprivation and infectious disease by depriving homeless people of the property they rely on or forcing homeless people to seek out more hazardous circumstances. Brief of 57 Social Scientists with Published Research on Homelessness as Amici Curiae, in Support of Respondents, at 5–13. The social scientists add that enforcement of anti-camping measures perpetuate homelessness because incarceration and fines leave homeless people in further poverty and with less access to support systems. Id. at 13–20.