Though the Supreme Court has recognized unique attributes of broadcast radio and television that justify more relaxed First Amendment scrutiny,1 most media lack these attributes and therefore are not entitled to broadcast’s more permissive standards.2 Courts will typically apply ordinary First Amendment principles to analyze restrictions on non-broadcast media, such as the concepts of traditional and designated public forums3

, >https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-7-2/ALDE_00013543/. and the use of “strict” and “intermediate” scrutiny for content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech.4 The court has applied these principles in cases involving such new media as movies,5 video games,6 and the internet.7 As discussed in other essays, the unique characteristics of each medium remain relevant in applying these principles.8

Footnotes

1

See generally Broadcast Radio and Television.

2

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–69 (1997) (holding that the internet was not subject to First Amendment standards applicable to broadcast media).

3

See

Public and Nonpublic Forums

, >https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-7-2/ALDE_00013543/.

4

E.g.,

Reno

, 521 U.S. at 871–72 (analyzing restriction on certain internet communications as a content-based restriction on speech). See generally

Overview of Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech

, >https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-3-1/ALDE_00013695.

5

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) ( “Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. . . . But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary.” ).

6

Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503).

7

Reno, 521 U.S. at 868–69.

8

E.g., id. (assessing impacts of an internet regulation with reference to characteristics of the internet as a medium); cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994) (noting that although cable television was not subject to more relaxed First Amendment treatment, “[t]his is not to say that the unique physical characteristics of cable transmission should be ignored when determining the constitutionality of regulations affecting cable speech” ).