Thirteenth Amendment, Section 1

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

In addition to interpreting the scope of the term “slavery” in the Thirteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has also examined the meaning of the Amendment’s prohibition on “involuntary servitude.” This form of servitude generally involves compulsion of a person’s labor through the use of physical force, legal action, or threats thereof.1 Even after the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification, some states subjected African Americans and other racial groups to involuntary servitude by enacting peonage laws.2 These laws often used the threat of force or legal action to compel individuals to perform services to satisfy a real or concocted debt or obligation.3 The Court had acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited peonage4 and, in the 1905 case Clyatt v. United States, it later held that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to prohibit this practice.5 In doing so, the Court distinguished peonage from the legally permissible situation in which a person voluntarily performs services to pay off a debt, which does not involve the use of law or force to compel “performance or a continuance of the service.” 6

In the 1911 case Bailey v. Alabama, the Supreme Court clarified that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits states from compelling a person to perform a contract for personal services through the use of criminal sanctions.7 In Bailey, an Alabama law created a statutory presumption that a worker intended to commit criminal fraud if he did not perform a labor contract and did not return property he had already received as compensation to his employer.8 Under the statute, fraud was punishable by a fine or, alternatively, “hard labor.” 9 The Court held that the law indirectly compelled workers to perform labor in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude and federal laws prohibiting peonage.10

Much later in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether the use of psychological coercion to compel work could constitute prohibited “involuntary servitude.” 11

. In United States v. Kozminksi, the operators of a dairy farm were indicted for allegedly using physical and psychological coercion to compel two persons with mental disabilities to perform work on the farm.12 The alleged means of psychological coercion included subjecting the individuals to “substandard living conditions” and “isolation from others.” 13 The district court instructed the jury that a person could be kept in a condition of involuntary servitude through the use of physical, legal, or “other coercion.” 14

On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the concept of “involuntary servitude” in relevant provisions of federal criminal law encompassed the use of psychological coercion to compel labor.15 Because one of these statutes— 18 U.S.C. § 241—prohibited “conspiracy to interfere with an individual’s Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude,” the Court examined the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude under the Court’s precedents.16 The Court had never adopted the view that a person could be subject to involuntary servitude through the use of psychological coercion.17 However, the Court suggested that Congress could legislatively expand the definition of “involuntary servitude” to include psychological coercion.18 Because Congress had not done so at the time of its decision in 1988, the Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.19

After the Supreme Court decided Kozminski, Congress enacted legislation to broaden the definition of “involuntary servitude” for purposes of federal criminal law.20 In the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Congress referenced Kozminski and clarified that “involuntary servitude” included servitude maintained through nonviolent coercion.21 Congress’s legislative response to the Kozminksi decision is an example of the exercise of its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers.22

Footnotes

1

See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942–44 (1988), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).

2

See, e.g., Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 673–74, 682 (M.D. Ala. 1903).

3

See id.

4

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). In these cases, the Supreme Court also indicated that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude when imposed on people of any racial group. Id. Congress also enacted several laws prohibiting peonage and activities in support thereof pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1581; id. § 1584; 42 U.S.C. § 1994. See also United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 527–28 (1944).

5

Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 218.

6

Id. at 215–16.

7

219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911) ( “The State may impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one man to labor for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the debt.” ).

8

Id. at 227. The Court also noted that, under the Alabama Rules of Evidence, the accused worker was unable to rebut this presumption by testifying about his “uncommunicated motives, purpose or intention.” Id. at 228.

9

Id. at 231.

10

Id. at 243–45. The Court defined a “peon” as “one who is compelled to work for his creditor until his debt is paid” and stated that the “fact that [the worker] contracted to perform the labor which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the [peonage laws].” Id. at 242. See also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7, 25 (1944) (holding unconstitutional and in violation of federal peonage laws a Florida law that considered a worker’s failure to perform labor after obtaining an advance prima facie evidence of intent to defraud); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 26, 29 (1942) (holding violative of the Thirteenth Amendment a Georgia law that punished a person who had received an advance on a contract for services, did not repay the advance, and was “bound by the threat of penal sanction to remain at his employment until the debt [had] been discharged” ); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914) (holding that a person convicted of a crime is held in a condition of peonage when he faces arrest for violating a contract to perform services for a surety that payed fines resulting from his conviction to the state).

11

United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 935–36 (1988), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589

.

12

Id. at 934.

13

Id. at 936.

14

Id. at 937 (explaining that the district court had instructed the jury that “[involuntary servitude] may also include situations involving either physical and other coercion, or a combination thereof, used to detain persons in employment” ).

15

Id. at 939.

16

Id. at 934, 941 (internal quotation marks omitted). The other provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1584, criminalized knowingly and willfully holding another person “to involuntary servitude” but did not specifically mention the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. at 934.

17

Id. at 944 ( “The guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude has never been interpreted specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological coercion. We draw no conclusions from this historical survey about the potential scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.” ).

18

Id. at 952.

19

Id. at 952–53 ( “The District Court’s instruction on involuntary servitude, which encompassed other means of coercion, may have caused the Kozminskis to be convicted for conduct that does not violate either statute. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the convictions must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.” ).

20

22 U.S.C. § 7102(8).

21

Id. §§ 7101(b)(13), 7102(8).

22

For additional examples, see Amdt13.S2.1 Overview of Enforcement Clause of Thirteenth Amendment.