In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
The right to a jury trial entails the “right to have a jury make the ultimate determination of guilt.” 1 As such, the criminal jury is not a “mere factfinder,” but instead an adjudicative body that decides “guilt or innocence on every issue, which includes application of the law to the facts.” 2 The trial court may not usurp the jury’s function by directing a guilty verdict, “no matter how conclusive the evidence;” 3 nor may the trial court “attempt[ ] to override or interfere with the jurors’ independent judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of the accused.” 4 In modern doctrine, these foundational principles regarding the scope of the jury function have had perhaps their most significant ramifications in due process jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court has addressed claims that particular types of jury instructions unconstitutionally impinge upon or skew the jury’s adjudicative task.5 The Court’s Sixth Amendment doctrine, on the other hand, has taken up three central issues of jury structure and operation: size, unanimity, and juncture (i.e., the stage of the proceedings at which the jury participates).
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Footnotes
- 1
- United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
- 2
- Id. at 513–14; see also id. at 514 ( “[T]he jury’s constitutional responsibility is not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence.” ).
- 3
- United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) ( “[A]lthough a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence.” ); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516 n.5 (1979) ( “[V]erdicts may not be directed against defendants in criminal cases.” ).
- 4
- United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573 (1977).
- 5
- See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523 (holding that jury instruction that “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” violated due process because the “jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find against defendant on the element of intent” and “[t]he State was thus not forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged” ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 (1991) (rejecting under due process analysis the claim that a “conviction under [jury] instructions that did not require the jury to agree on one of the alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder is unconstitutional” ); Amdt5.5.1 Overview of Due Process through Amdt5.5.2 Historical Background on Due Process. Although the Court has tended to address them in the due process context, erroneous jury instructions may implicate both the right to due process and the right to jury trial. The Supreme Court has noted that “the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated,” such that a jury instruction that misstates the burden of proof as something less than the reasonable doubt standard violates both constitutional requirements and constitutes a structural error not subject to harmless error analysis. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278, 281 ( “[T]he jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ).