Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 finding constitutional deficiencies in the manner in which the death penalty was applied, but not holding the death penalty unconstitutional per se, was a watershed in capital punishment jurisprudence. The ruling effectively constitutionalized capital sentencing law and involved federal courts in extensive review of capital sentences.2
Prior to 1972, constitutional law governing capital punishment was relatively simple and straightforward. Capital punishment was constitutional, and there were few grounds for constitutional review.3 In Furman and the five 1976 cases that followed, in which the Court reviewed laws4 that states had revised in response to Furman, the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of capital punishment per se, but also opened up several avenues for constitutional review.
Since 1976, the Court has issued many decisions on applying and reconciling the principles it has identified for applying the death penalty. In particular, the Court has held that sentencing discretion must be limited to preventing courts from arbitrarily imposing the death penalty. Accordingly, the Court has established that courts should follow guidelines that narrow and define the category of death-eligible defendants. Jury discretion, however, must be preserved in order for jurors to weigh the mitigating circumstances of individual defendants who fall within the death-eligible class.
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Footnotes
- 1
- 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
- 2
- See Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355 (1995).
- 3
- See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971) ( “[W]e find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.” ). Justice William O. Douglas in his opinion in support of the Furman per curiam decision, observed, “We are now imprisoned in the McGautha holding . . . [that] [j]uries . . . have practically untrammeled [unguided] discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 248.
- 4
- Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v, Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).