Article I, Section 3, Clause 1:

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

The allocation of voting rights, often referred to as suffrage, in the two Houses of Congress was among the most contentious issues the Framers had to resolve at the Constitutional Convention.1 Under the Articles of Confederation, each state had a single vote in a unicameral Congress.2 Smaller states viewed this arrangement as essential to maintaining their autonomy from wealthier, more populated states. The concern of small states that the Constitutional Convention would eliminate Articles of Confederation language providing for equal suffrage among states was such that Delaware, in commissioning its delegates to the Convention, prohibited them from agreeing to any deviation from the principle of state equal suffrage.3

More populated states, however, viewed the Articles of Confederation’s provision of equal suffrage among the states to be unjust because people in less populated states had relatively more influence in the U.S. legislature than people in more populated states. Accordingly, delegates from more populated states argued that state representation in Congress should reflect the relative sizes of state populations. For example, the Virginia delegates to the Constitutional Convention proposed, among other things, a bicameral Congress in which votes in both houses would be allocated among states in accordance with “the Quotas of contribution or to the number of free inhabitants, or to both.” 4 After a proposal for proportional representation in the Senate won initial approval at the Constitutional Convention by a vote of six to five,5 New Jersey proposed to retain the Articles of Confederation provision of equal suffrage among states.6

After further debate on congressional representation and equal suffrage among the states, the Constitutional Convention ground to a “standstill,” at which point a committee, often referred to as the Committee of Eleven, was formed to develop a compromise.7 The Committee of Eleven proposed that (1) representatives would be allocated in the House in proportion to the number of inhabitants and (2) each state would have an equal vote in the Senate.8 After further debate and modification, the Great Compromise was adopted by a vote of 5-4 with Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina in favor; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia against; Massachusetts divided; and New York absent, its delegation having left the Convention “because of their dissatisfaction with the way things were tending and because of their belief that they were unwarranted in supporting action taken in excess of their instructions.” 9 Key to the Constitution’s adoption,10 equal suffrage among the states in the Senate ensured that the new American government would remain a federation of states.11

The importance of equal suffrage among the states set forth at Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 to the Constitution’s adoption and ratification is further underscored by Article V of the Constitution. Article V, which provides for amending the Constitution, distinguishes equal suffrage among the states from the rest of the Constitution by making it unamendable, stating: “[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate.” 12 According to James Madison, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who was one of the architects of the Great Compromise, raised this issue during debate on Article V. Madison stated:

After some debate, Gouverneur Morris proposed the language that the Convention ultimately adopted.14

Footnotes

1

Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 692 (1833). See also Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 93 (1913) (referring to “'the most fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches.’” ) (quotation retained).

2

The Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. V, reprinted in Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution app. I (1913) ( “In determining questions in the united states, in Congress assembled, each state shall have one vote.” ). The Articles of Confederation further provided that each state legislature would determine how its delegates would be appointed; appointments would be on an annual basis; and that states could recall their delegates and replace them at any time during the year. Id. Finally, the Articles provided that states could send between two to seven delegates to Congress, limited delegates to serving no more than three terms in any six-year period, and proscribed delegates from holding any office in the United States “for which he, or another for his benefit receives any salary, fees or emoluments of any kind.” Id.

3

Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 24 (1913) (noting that the Delaware commission provided “that such Alterations or further Provisions, or any of them, do not extend to that part of the Fifth Article of the Confederation . . . which declares that ‘In determining Questions in the United States Congress Assembled each State shall have one Vote’” ).

4

The Virginia Plan, reprinted in Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution app. II, arts. 2 & 4 (1913). Article 2 of the Virginia Plan circulated by Edmund Randolph of Virginia on May 29, 1787, provided: “[T]he rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contributions, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.” Id. See also Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 69 (1913). The “Quotas of contributions” to which the Virginia Plan referred were the shares or taxes that the states were to contribute to pay the expenses of the U.S. Government. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states’ shares were determined generally “in proportion to the value of surveyed land within their borders.” From the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution, the Roots of American Constitutionalism xliii (C.J. Friedrich & Robert G. McCloskey eds., 1954). Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation stated:

All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled from time to time direct and appoint.

The Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VIII, reprinted in Max Farrand, Framing of the Federal Constitution, app. I (1913) (emphasis added).

Rufus King of Massachusetts objected to the Virginia Plan’s use of “Quotas of contribution” on the grounds that the amounts for which each state would be responsible would constantly fluctuate. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 36 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) ( “Mr. King observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone remain as the measure of representation, would not answer; because waiving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the general Govt. that the sums respectively drawn from the States would [not] appear; and would besides be continually varying.” ). In light of King’s concerns, the “Quotas of contribution” language was removed. Id. ( “Mr. Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some better rule ought to be found. Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read ‘that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants.’ Mr. Saight 2ded. the motion.” ). Notwithstanding, debate over the role that wealth should play in how states were represented in the National Government continued. See, e.g., id. at 541–542, 567 (James Madison’s notes, July 6, 1787; James Madison’s notes, July 10, 1787).

5

Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 75 (1913).

6

1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 242–245 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (James Madison’s notes, June 15, 1787).

7

Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 97 (1913). The Committee of Eleven was comprised of Gerry, Ellsworth, Yates, Paterson, Franklin Bedford, Martin, Mason, Davie, Rutledge, and Baldwin. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 509 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Journal, July 2, 1787).

8

See ArtI.S1.2.3 The Great Compromise of the Constitutional Convention. See also Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 99 (1913).

9

Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 105 (1913).

10

See ArtI.S1.2.3 The Great Compromise of the Constitutional Convention. The Great Compromise is also referred to as the Connecticut Compromise because of the Connecticut delegation’s role in its adoption. Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 106–107 (1913). See also id. at 146 ( “The great compromise had provided that direct taxation should be proportioned to population . . . .” ).

11

Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 134 (1913).

12

U.S. Const. art. V.

13

2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 629 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (James Madison’s notes, Sept. 15, 1787).

14

Id. at 631.