CEDAW Committee
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is a United Nations treaty adopted in 1979 which sets international standards for eliminating discrimination against women. The CEDAW obligates States’ parties to condemn discrimination in all forms, ensure equality under law, and amend or repeal discriminatory laws, regulations, customs, and practices. The Convention stresses the elimination of stereotyped roles for men and women, particularly in education, and establishes a framework for advancing gender equality across civil, political, economic, social, and cultural life.
Article 1 defines discrimination against women as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based on sex that impairs or nullifies the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise of women’s human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 2 requires States pursue a comprehensive policy to eliminate such discrimination through legislative, judicial, and administrative measures. The Convention emphasizes three broad areas: the legal status and civil rights of women, reproductive health and family life, and the impact of cultural and traditional practices on women’s equality.
Part V establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), a treaty body of independent experts who monitor implementation of policies. States’ parties are required to submit periodic reports of steps taken to fulfill their obligations. The CEDAW Committee issues recommendations and general comments to guide compliance. Below are case summaries which demonstrate how the CEDAW Committee has admitted, dismissed, or upheld complaints against States, with justifications and recommended next steps.
C.O.E. v. Switzerland, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2025.
Trafficking, LGBTIQ, asylum, non-refoulement.
A Nigerian lesbian woman, recognized as a potential trafficking victim in Switzerland, faced transfer to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation. If returned to Italy without guaranteed accommodation and specialized psychiatric support, she alleged acute mental-health risks, re-traumatization, and renewed exposure to trafficking and gender-based violence. The Committee found that removal would breach Articles 2(d) and 6 of CEDAW, as Switzerland failed to conduct an individualized, gender-sensitive risk assessment reflecting her extreme vulnerability. The Committee recommended reopening her asylum claim, refraining from transfer while reassessing, providing specialized care, and adopting safeguards to ensure trafficking victims are not returned without protections.
C.S.F. v. Argentina, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2025.
Reproductive healthcare, obstetric violence, informed consent.
An Argentine woman underwent the Kristeller maneuver and an amniotomy, without informed consent. She also was subjected to degrading comments during childbirth at a private clinic. After a criminal inquiry, the equality body (INADI) confirmed obstetric violence, but did not grant redress. The Committee held Argentina violated Articles 2, 3, 5, 12 and 24 for failing to: 1) prevent and oversee such practices in private facilities, 2) investigate with a gender-sensitive lens, and 3) provide an adequate judicial mechanism and reparation. The Committee ordered the private clinic compensate the woman and provide her with medical and psychological care. In addition, the Committee held that the clinic must train practitioners on respectful maternity care, and the importance of informed consent.
Y.S. v. Turkmenistan, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2024.
Gender discrimination, expropriation, threats of sexual violence.
A dual Turkmen–Russian national alleged she was forced to surrender valuable Akhal-Teke horses and her business interests after her husband fell out of political favor. Subsequently, she faced discriminatory remarks that a Jewish woman should not direct a horse-breeding company, as well as threats of sexual violence and reprisals from prosecutors. She claimed violations of Articles 1, 2, 5, 13, 15 and 24 of CEDAW. The Committee found the complaint unsubstantiated under Article 4(1) of the Optional Protocol because she had not attempted to pursue domestic remedies in Turkmenistan. In addition, the Committee reasoned that mere doubts about the effectiveness of domestic remedies did not absolve her of that procedural obligation.
A.F. v. Italy, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2022.
Sexual violence and rape, gender discrimination, access to justice.
A woman was raped by a police officer, who was initially convicted based upon forensic and testimonial evidence. However, the judgment was overturned on appeal using gendered myths about how “real” victims behave. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. The Committee found that the courts’ reasoning relied on stereotypes that undermined impartial evaluation of the evidence, violating Articles 2(b)–(d),(f), 3, 5(a), and 15(1). As a result, the Court recommended compensation for the victim, and structural measures – including consent-based legal reforms, training of justice actors, and strategies – to eliminate judicial stereotyping.
R.G. v. Kyrgyzstan, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2020.
Custodial violence, gender-based violence, right to privacy, human dignity.
A woman prisoner was held for years in facilities staffed primarily by male guards who had visual access to showers/toilets. In addition, the facilities lacked hygiene supplies. Women prisoners were consistently subjected to sexual harassment, and degrading treatment. The Committee held the prison conditions reflected gender-insensitive detention, discrimination and gender-based violence in breach of Articles 1, 2(a),(b),(d)–(f), 3 and 5(a). The Committee urged Kyrgyzstan to provide reparations, ensure gender-appropriate staffing, privacy, health services, oversight, and training across women’s prisons.
S.N., E.R. v. North Macedonia, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2020.
Reproductive healthcare, Roma women, forced eviction, housing.
Two young pregnant Roma women were evicted when authorities bulldozed a riverside settlement in Skopje, North Macedonia, to “clean up” the settlement. The women were left homeless, and without access to essential services, including prenatal care. The Committee found discrimination based on sex and ethnic origin. In addition, the Committee found that North Macedonia violated Articles 2(d),(f) and 12(2) (read with Article 4 obligations), and ordered subsequent remedies, including: compensation, measures to secure housing, water and health care, and policies addressing discrimination against Roma women.
S.F.M. v. Spain, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2020.
Reproductive healthcare, obstetric violence, informed consent, maternity care.
A woman in childbirth in a public hospital was treated without adequate information or informed consent. She underwent 10 vaginal examinations, was administered oxytocin, and had an instrumental delivery and episiotomy. Immediately after childbirth, her newborn was separated from her and developed an E. coli infection in the neonatal unit. Her partner was not allowed to accompany the child, and her placenta was manually removed. The Committee found that such mistreatment during childbirth amounted to discrimination and gender-based violence, in violation of Articles 2(b),(c),(d),(f), 3, 5 and 12. The Committee ordered the hospital to compensate the woman, and recommended adoption of new systemic policies, such as ensuring informed consent at every stage of childbirth, training health and justice personnel, enhanced research on obstetric violence, and effective remedies.
A.S. v. Denmark, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2018.
LGBTIQ, asylum.
A.S., a Uganda national, applied for asylum in Denmark. She claimed that she was wanted in Uganda, and was at risk of being killed there because she was a lesbian. She was forced to marry a man and had three children, and when he died, she made a living working in a bar frequented by lesbians. After she turned down three men who made advances on her in the bar, they became aggressive. Her home was subsequently ransacked and burned, her belongings stolen, and police looked for her. She left, traveling with a visa obtained in Kampala. Danish authorities rejected her asylum application on the basis that the visa contained the wrong name. A.S. filed a complaint with CEDAW, alleging that deportation to Uganda would violate her rights under Articles 1-3 of the Convention because her life would be in danger a due to her sexual orientation. She argued that the Refugee Appeals Board did not properly investigate her case. The Committee noted that the Danish authorities found A.S.’ account lacked credibility due to factual inconsistencies, and lack of support related to the bar incident and her sexual orientation identification. The Committee also noted that the authorities did consider the treatment of gay people in Uganda, and found that, notwithstanding the fact “homosexuality” is prohibited under the Penal Code, the ban has not been enforced. The Committee deemed the complaint inadmissible under Article 4 (2)(c), concluding that A.S. failed to support a finding of gender-based discrimination. The Committee also held there was no procedural defect or arbitrariness in the decision-making process, or any breach of due to the initial error related to A.S.’ name in the visa.
S.F.A. v. Denmark, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2018.
Female genital mutilation, forced and early marriage, asylum.
S.F.A., a Somali national, applied for asylum in Denmark for herself and her young son. S.F.A. was subjected to female genital mutilation as a child, and her father wanted to forcibly marry her off to an older man. Against her family’s wishes, S.F.A. had a relationship with H., became pregnant, and had an abortion. Her family learned about the abortion, and threatened to hand her over to Al-Shabaab. She left Somalia, and went to Italy where she and H. got married. S.F.A. subsequently got pregnant again. H. died, and S.F.A. and her son then traveled to Denmark and applied for asylum. Denmark rejected her asylum application, and dismissed her claim. S.F.A. filed a complaint with CEDAW claiming that, if she and her son were deported to Somalia, she would be personally exposed to serious forms of gender-based violence, as defined by Articles 2, 12, 15 and 16 of the Convention. The Committee noted that the Danish authorities found that S.F.A.’s account lacked credibility due to factual inconsistencies, and lack of substantiation. The Committee rejected her claim that a single woman constitutes a supplementary risk factor. Based on the record, the Commission deemed the communication inadmissible under Article 4(2)(c) of the Optional Protocol, finding that the Danish authorities did not fail to give sufficient consideration to the application, nor that there was any procedural defect.
M.W. v. Denmark, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2016.
Gender discrimination, domestic violence, custody, best interests of the child, state responsibility.
M.W., an Austrian national, was married to S., a Danish national. The the couple had a child (O.W.) in Denmark. S. subjected M.W. to verbal and physical violence, harassment, and stalking. In addition, M.W. received discriminatory treatment from Danish authorities, and was unlawfully arrested. M.W. and S. separated, upon which M.W. gained sole custody of O.W. and relocated to Austria. However, once in Austria, S. kidnapped O.W. and brought the child back to Denmark. Danish authorities did not undertake any actions to protect M.W.’s custody rights, nor provide any assistance for O.W.’s severe trauma following his kidnapping. M.W. applied to the Austrian Supreme Court to enforce the custody order, but was denied by the Bailiff’s Court of Helsingør (which noted that S. had been awarded custody by Danish court order). M.W. filed several unsuccessful applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and reported several officials for abuse of office, defamation, and discrimination. M.W. made a complaint against Denmark to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, claiming that her rights under Articles 1, 2(a) to (f), 3, 4, 5(a) and (b), 9, 15(1) and (4), and 16(d) to (g) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women were violated. Danish authorities found no violations of the Convention, instead holding this case represented a situation where two legal systems had made contradictory custody decisions. The Committee acknowledged the Danish authority’s systematic failure to protect M.W.’s custody rights and O.W.’s best interests. The Committee recommended that Danish authorities take steps to ensure that Denmark’s central judicial authority promptly collaborates with the Austrian central authority in order to ensure the immediate return of O.W. to M.W. in Austria, where new proceedings concerning custody and visitation may be conducted in the best interests of the child.
N.P. v. Ukraine, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2017.
Employment discrimination, sexual harassment.
N.P., a Ukrainian, worked as an obstetrician-gynecologist at a hospital in Ichnya, Ukraine, between 1997 and 2000. N.P. managed the hospital’s family planning department, without commensurate remuneration. She was reprimanded and sanctioned for for failing to perform certain work in the family planning department, including delegating junior staff members to examine patients, and negligence in examining a pregnant woman. In response, N.P. refused to perform managerial duties she claimed were voluntary. As a result, N.P. was dismissed for failure to perform her professional duties. She unsuccessfully challenged her dismissal in the Ichnya District court, and in appeals to the Chernihiv Regional Court, the Supreme Court, the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court, and the Kyiv Appeal Administrative. In appealing to CEDAW, N.P. claimed the real reason for her termination were interpersonal conflicts with colleagues, and her refusal to have sexual relations with the head of the hospital. She claimed the courts gave preference to the hospital’s arguments, falsified evidence presented by the hospital, and unlawfully dismissed her claims. The Optional Protocol was ratified in Ukraine on December 26, 2003. The Committee concluded that the alleged violations took place before the Optional Protocol was in force in Ukraine, and it did not have authority to examine the communication.
O.G. v. Russian Federation, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2017.
Domestic violence.
O.G. was in a civil partnership with K., who used drugs, alcohol, and had a gambling addiction. After O.G. left K., he sent her harassing texts, attempted to visit her, and hit her. She reported the events to a Crisis Center for Women. K. was sentenced to four months of labor, which was suspended to six-months probation, and a $50 fine. After his release, he continued to send texts to O.G., threatening to kill her. She filed seven criminal complaints with the police, who took no action claiming there was nothing to do since K. was not acting on his threats. O.G. filed a complaint with CEDAW, alleging that the Russian Federation failed to fully implement the Convention by not introducing legislation on domestic violence. O.G. also alleged that the authorities violated her rights under the Convention by not responding adequately to her claims, implementing protective orders to ensure her safety, providing any effective remedy or psychological support, conducting a meaningful investigation, and time-barring prosecution to a two-year statute of limitation. The Committee decided in O.G.’s favor, rejecting the Russian authority’s argument that O.G. was not a domestic violence victim since K. was not a member of O.G.’s family at the time of the alleged violence. In addition, the Committee held that there is no statutory time limit for how long after a relationship ends, a partner can bring a claim of violence. The Committee determined that Russia had not adopted legislation to prevent and address violence against women, citing recent amendments to national legislation that decriminalized battery – an offense under which many domestic violence cases are traditionally prosecuted due to the absence of a definition of “domestic violence.” The Committee determined Russia violated O.G.’s rights under Articles 1, 2 (b)-(g), 3 and 5 (a) of the Convention, recommending Russia provide financial compensation to O.G., adopt comprehensive legislation to prevent and address (domestic) violence against women, reinstate criminal prosecution of domestic violence, introduce a protocol for handling domestic violence complaints at the police station level to ensure adequate protection, renounce private prosecution in domestic violence cases, ratify the Istanbul Convention, provide mandatory training for judges, lawyers and law enforcement personnel on the Conventions, investigate allegations of gender-based violence against women promptly, provide safe and prompt access to justice, provide rehabilitation programs to offenders, and address stereotypes that promote domestic violence. Russia was required to provide the Committee with a written response and report on actions taken within six months.
S.J.A. v. Denmark, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2017.
Forced and early marriage, asylum.
S.J.A., a Somali national, traveled to Denmark to escape a forced marriage to A.H., a member of Al-Shabaab. A.H. threatened to kill S.J.A. if she did not marry him. After S.J.A. said she would consider it, her parents arranged for her departure from Somalia. Denmark rejected her asylum application. S.J.A. filed a complaint with CEDAW, claiming that her deportation from Denmark to Somalia would violate her rights under Articles 3, 5 and 16 (b) of the CEDAW Convention. Denmark granted the Committee’s request to suspend S.J.A.’s departure, pending consideration of her case. The Committee stated that S.J.A. provided limited information to the authorities, which corroborated their finding that her claims lacked support. The Committee also noted that S.J.A. did not sufficiently link the facts to a violation of the Convention. Finally, the Committee observed that the Danish authorities considered the general situation in Somalia, as well as the fact S.J.A. had a family network, including parents and three siblings in her village. Based on the record, the Commission deemed the communication inadmissible under Article 4(2)(c) of the Optional Protocol, holding that the Danish authorities gave sufficient consideration to S.J.A.’s claims, and that there were no procedural defects.
Anna Belousova v. Kazakhstan, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2015.
Sexual harassment, gender discrimination, employment discrimination, state responsibility.
B., a Kazakh national, lived in a rural area and worked as a technical staff member in a cloakroom at a primary school in Pertsevka, Kazakhstan. A. became the new director of the school, and routinely harassed B. into having a sexual relationship. B. refused ,and A. terminated her employment. B. made several unsuccessful complaints to domestic education and law enforcement authorities. She also gave an interview to a local newspaper to describe her situation, which resulted in A. initiating a defamation suit. After exhausting all domestic remedies, B. filed a complaint with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, claiming Kazakhstan violated her rights under Articles 2(e), 5(a), 11, and 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Kazakhstan objected to the complaint, noting that there was insufficient evidence supporting B’s claims and that B. did not exhaust all available domestic remedies. The Committee reviewed the case, concluding that domestic remedies would not bring effective relief In addition, the Committee expressed its concern regarding the lack national laws prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, finding that that Kazakh authorities failed to give due consideration to B’s complaint of gender-based violence. The Committee recommended that Kazakhstan provide financial compensation to B for moral and material damages,, and recommended Kazakhstan adopt comprehensive legislation to combat sexual harassment in the workplace.
X and Y v. Georgia, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2015.
Sexual violence and rape, domestic violence, child abuse, state responsibility.
X, a woman living in Georgia, was raped by a Georgian man after a party. Due to conservative Georgian values, X was forced to marry the man. During the marriage, X’s husband routinely used violence and force against X and their children (including her daughter, Y), and engaged in inappropriate behavior with Y. X made several complaints to local police, however the police failed to intervene. After an unsuccessful complaint to the local District Prosecutor’s Office, X filed unsuccessful appeals. After exhausting all remedies at the national level, X and Y brought a complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, alleging Georgia violated their rights under Articles 1, 2(b) - 2(f), and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Georgia initially offered X and Y an amicable settlement, and X and Y confirmed their willingness to settle. However, the settlement discussions stalled, leading X and Y to file a claim with the European Court of Human Rights. The claim focused on Y’s personal suffering at the hands of her father, as well as X’s suffering as being unable to protect her children, rather than gender-based discrimination. The Committee compared the claims filed with them, and the claim submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. The Committee concluded that the two claims were “fairly similar, given that the Articles relied upon in both cases are substantively similar” but did not relate to the same substantive rights. Therefore, the claim to the Committee was admissible. Georgia argued that X and Y failed to provide valid arguments to support their allegations concerning the violations. The Committee concluded that the Georgian State party had failed to fulfill its duty to adopt legislation to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct, and violated the rights of X and Y. The Committee recommended that Georgia provide adequate financial compensation to X and Y, commensurate with the gravity of the violations of their rights.
de Blok, et al. v. The Netherlands, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2014.
Gender discrimination, employment discrimination.
B. and five other women are Netherlands’ nationals who are self-employed, and gave birth between 2005 and 2006. Until July 31, 2004, under the Incapacity Insurance Act, self-employed individuals were compulsorily insured against the risk of loss of income, as a result of incapacity to work.. Under the Work and Care Act, self-employed women were also entitled to State maternity benefits. However, on August 1, 2004, the Discontinuation of Access to Incapacity Insurance Act was passed, ending the entitlement of self-employed women to maternity benefits. The six self-employed women brought action, claiming that the State should have ensured an adequate maternity benefit scheme, as required under Article 11(2)(b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women. The District Court declared the claim unfounded. The Court of Appeal of The Hague upheld the judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the provisions of Article 11(2)(b) of the Convention were insufficiently precise, and unsuitable for direct application by national courts. In a subsequent complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the six women argued that the State party violated their rights under Article 11(2)(b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women by removing the existing maternity leave scheme applicable to self-employed women up to 2004. The Committee held that Article 11(2)(b) is applicable to self-employed women, and not exclusively to female employees. Further, the Committee held that, contrary to the State party's view, the provision was directly applicable. The Committee concluded that the State party's failure to provide maternity benefits affected pregnant women adversely, constituting sex and gender-based discrimination against women. The Committee recommended that the State party provide reparation, including monetary compensation, for the loss of maternity benefits to the six women. The Committee noted that the State party amended its legislation in June 2008 to ensure that a maternity leave scheme is available to self-employed women. However, the Committee invited the State party to re-evaluate monetary compensation for women who are similarly situated to the plaintiffs: self-employed and gave birth between 1 August 1, 2004, and June 4, 2008 (no compensation scheme for self-employed women was in place).
González Carreño v. Spain, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2014.
Child abuse, child protection, domestic violence, protection order, state accountability, supervised visitation, restraining order, parental visitation.
In 2003, a father, F., murdered his seven-year-old daughter, A., during a court-approved parental visitation. After killing A., F. committed suicide. A.’s mother had previously reported physical abuse to the police, and sought court-ordered restraining orders against F., and petitioned for supervised visits between F. and A. However, F. refused to accept supervised visits with his daughter. The mother brought suit against Spanish authorities. In April 2011, the Court ruled against her, finding that the supervised visit regime was sound. As a result, the mother brought another complaint to the CEDAW Committee. The Committee found for the mother, stating that Spanish authorities should have taken into account the prevalence of domestic violence i when determining parental visitation rights. Instead, the Spanish authorities made a routine decision about a visitation scheme, without considering specific facts of the case. The Committee held that the Spanish authorities failed to account for the best interest of the child. The Committee has found that a State can be responsible for acts of individuals, if the State fails to exercise necessary diligence in order to prevent violations of the CEDAW Convention. Specifically, Spain violated Articles 2 a), d), e) and f), 5 a) and 16 paragraph 1 of CEDAW. Additionally, CEDAW imposed that Spain must provide training to judges and other professionals to protect children in gender violence cases in the future, such as requiring judges to exercise precautions .
R.P.B. v. The Philippines, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2014.
Gender discrimination, sexual violence and rape, women with disabilities.
In 2006, R.P.B., a Filipina national who is deaf and non-verbal, was raped by her 19-year-old neighbor. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City acquitted the defendant in 2011, without providing any interpretation of their decision to R.P.B.. Similar to a previous case from the Philippines heard by the CEDAW Committee, Karen Tayag Vetrido v. Philippines (2008), the Court again declined to apply Filipino Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the Court relied on gender-based myths and stereotypes about rape and rape victims, finding that the victim should have used every opportunity to escape or resist her attacker. In her complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, R.P.B. argued that the Court's actions violated Article 1, and Article 2(c), (d), and (f) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In addition to relying on gender based myths and stereotypes, R.P.B. also argued that the Court failed to provide her with accessibility to the court, on an equal basis with other victims. The Committee held that under Article 2(c) and 2(d) of the Convention, sign language interpretation was essential to ensure R.P.B's full and equal participation in the proceedings. Further, the Committee also held that the State party erred in multiple ways, including: 1) relying on gender-based stereotyping, which resulted in sex and gender-based discrimination, and 2) disregarding individual facts of the case, such as R.P.B's disability and age. The Committee recommended that the State provide R.P.B. with compensation and free-of-charge counseling. In addition, the Committee imposed several next steps for the Committee to take, including removing any requirement in existing laws that sexual assault be committed by force or violence, guaranteeing the free and adequate assistance of interpreters, ensuring that all criminal proceedings involving rape and other sexual offenses are conducted in an impartial and fair manner,, and providing regular training sessions on the Convention, the Optional Protocol, and the Committee's general recommendations.
Jallow v. Bulgaria, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2012.
Domestic violence, access to justice, child custody, migrant women.
A Gambian woman (J) married A.P. and they moved to Bulgaria together. However, A.P. was physically, psychologically, and sexually abusive toward J and her daughter, M.A.P. Social workers learned of the abuse, called police, and told J to seek refuge. J briefly stayed in an NGO shelter before A.P. found her and forced her to return home. Prosecutors discontinued the case for “insufficient evidence.” However, J was never interviewed. A.P. obtained an ex parte emergency protection order and temporary custody based solely on his statement. Although a permanent order was later denied, the emergency order remained in force. J ultimately accepted an unfavorable divorce agreement to regain custody. The Committee found Bulgaria violated Articles 1, 2, 3, 5 and 16(1)(c),(d),(f),(g) for failing to protect and investigate domestic violence, not ensuring migrant women’s effective access to justice, and not factoring violence into custody decisions. It recommended compensation be paid to J and M.A.P., effective protection and support services (shelters, legal aid, interpretation) offered to them. More generally, the Committee held that Bulgaria instate regular training on CEDAW/Optional Protocol, and implement legal reforms ensuring domestic violence is considered in custody determinations.
Kell v. Canada, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2012.
Gender discrimination, property and inheritance rights.
K, an Aboriginal woman from the Northwest Territories (N.W.T.) of Canada, bought a house with S, her common law partner. K and S were co-owners of the property. Over a three-year period, S subjected K to domestic violence, including economic abuse. S was a board member of the Housing Authority, who requested that N.W.T Housing Corporation remove K’s name from the Assignment of Lease. S subsequently became the sole owner of the property, without K’s knowledge. S then evicted K from the property. While she sought protection in a shelter, K filed against S in the N.W.T. Supreme Court for compensation on account of domestic violence, and for loss of use of her home (which was fraudulently obtained by S, and aided and abetted by the N.W.T. Government). Upon S’s death, K's lawyer initiated proceedings against his estate and the N.W.T. Housing Corporation. K declined a monetary settlement, as her main objective was regaining the property. The Supreme Court dismissed both proceedings for "want of prosecution." Costs were imposed against K, and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful. K filed a third action related to her right to the leasehold title, and possession of the property. The Court dismissed the third action, as the property had then been sold. K brought a communication to the CEDAW, alleging Canada, by way of its agents, violated Articles 1, 2(d), 2(e), 14(2)(h), 15(1)-15(4), 16(1)(h) of CEDAW. K argued that the N.W.T. Housing Corporation and the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority discriminated against her on the grounds of sex, marital status, and cultural heritage, and failed to ensure women and men were afforded equal rights to ownership and enjoyment of property. The Committee found that Canada was responsible for K losing ownership of the property, in violation of Articles 2(d), 2(e), and 16(1)(h) of CEDAW. However, it found that Canada had not violated Articles 14(2)(h) or 15(4), as there was no evidence K had been discriminated against as a rural woman, or prevented from residing in another property in the community. The Committee recommended that Canada compensate K, and provide her with appropriate housing. In addition, the Committee recommended Canada train more members of the legal aid system to ensure Aboriginal women who are victims of domestic violence have effective access to justice.
R.K.B. v. Turkey, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2012.
Gender discrimination, employment discrimination.
R.K.B. was accused of having an affair with a male colleague, which were subsequently dismissed. However, the male colleague threatened to "spread rumours about her relationships with other men" to pressure her to sign a document, attesting that she had been paid all her benefits upon termination. R.K.B. filed a claim against her employer in the Kocali 3rd Labour Court, alleging unfair termination based on gender stereotypes. The Court decided that the termination of her contract was unjustified, but not dismissing the male colleague was permissible. R.K.B. appealed to the Court of Cassation, which dismissed the appeal without reference to gender discrimination. The CEDAW Committee determined that the Court of Cassation violated Articles 5(a), 11(1a) and 11(1d) by basing their decisions on gender stereotypes, and tolerating allegations of extramarital relationships by male employees, but not by female employees. The Committee recommended adequate compensation be paid to R.K.B., the State implement laws on gender equality in the workplace, and training be provided to judges, lawyers, and law enforcement on women's rights and gender-based stereotypes. In Turkey almost 80% of women are unemployed, and women's participation in the labor force has been declining. As a result, the decision stresses that mere adoption of laws is insufficient; implementation and enforcement is critical.
S.V.P. v. Bulgaria, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2012.
Defilement and statutory rape, sexual violence.
S filed a complaint on behalf of her seven-year-old daughter, V, who was sexually assaulted by a neighbor. The perpetrator, B, was indicted for sexual molestation, which at the time, was not a 'serious crime' under the State's criminal code. B entered into a plea agreement, where he admitted guilt and received a three-year suspended sentence. S brought a civil tort claim on behalf of V, and received a judgment of approximately EUR 15,000 for moral damages. However, a state actor was not required to enforce the judgment, and S only recouped EUR 500. B continued to live near V, and she repeatedly expressed fear of further harm. After the assault, V was diagnosed “as a person with disability." S brought a communication before the CEDAW, alleging Bulgaria violated Articles 1, 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g), 3, 5, 12 and 15 of CEDAW by failing to effectively protect V against sexual violence and compensation, ensure V's rights to reproductive health care and education, provide V with proper rehabilitative services, and guarantee V's right against re-victimization by B. The Committee upheld all of S's claims, ordered the State to provide V with appropriate reparations, and implement amendments in their laws to provide effective protection from re-victimization. In addition, the Committee called for the State to provide support and financial compensation to victims, and enact new health care protocols and hospital procedures to treat sexual violence victims.
Alyne da Silva v. Brazil, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2011.
Women's health negligence, pregnancy complications, reproductive healthcare, gender discrimination.
A, a 28-year-old Afro-Brazilian woman, died of pregnancy complications, after a local health center misdiagnosed her symptoms and delayed providing emergency care. A's death is not an isolated case. Brazil's maternal mortality rates are disproportionately high for a country of its economic status, and the chances of dying in pregnancy and childbirth are greatest among indigenous, low-income, and Afro-descendant women. The Center for Reproductive Rights and Brazilian partner, Advocacia, filed a communication before the CEDAW Committee (the “Committee”), alleging violations Articles 2 and 12 of CEDAW. The Committee affirmed the violations, despite Brazil's claims that it had made "qualified obstetric care" a priority in its National Plan for Women's Policies. The Committee also highlighted that "the State is directly responsible for the action of private institutions when it outsources its medical services, and that furthermore, the State always maintains the duty to regulate and monitor private health-care institutions". The Committee recommended Brazil ensure all women have affordable access to emergency obstetric care, and to effective judicial remedies. In addition, the Committee held that the State should implement policies to reduce preventable maternal deaths, such as providing professional training to health workers, and ensure private facilities comply with international standards in reproductive healthcare. Alyne de Silva v. Brazil was the first case about maternal mortality to be brought before CEDAW. The Committee explicitly identified factors affecting A’s access to health services, such as poverty and race, evolving the understanding of women’s economic, social, and cultural rights.
L.C. v. Peru, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2011.
Defilement and statutory rape, sexual violence and rape.
An 11-year-old girl (“L.C.”) was repeatedly raped by a 34-year-old man. As a result, she became pregnant and attempted to commit suicide by jumping from a building. She survived the suicide attempt, but sustained serious injuries which required emergency surgery. The hospital declined to perform the surgery based on the risk posed to the pregnancy. Despite abortions being legal in Peru when the pregnancy poses a danger to the women’s physical or mental health, the hospital refused to perform an abortion. Consequently, L.C. was left paralyzed from the neck down. The Center for Reproductive Rights and the Center for the Promotion and Defense of Sexual and Reproductive Rights filed a human rights petition on behalf of V, alleging Peru violated of Articles 1, 2 (c) and (f), 3, 5, 12 and 16 (e) of CEDAW by failing to implement measures that guarantee a woman's ability to obtain essential reproductive health services in a timely manner. The Committee upheld the claim, and asked Peru to provide L.C. reparation, including physical and mental rehabilitation, and issue necessary measures so that no other woman is denied the right to comprehensive healthcare and therapeutic abortion. This decision demonstrates the CEDAW's perspective that denial of reproductive rights is a discrimination.
Abramova v. Belarus, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2011.
Sexual harassment, gender discrimination.
A., a citizen of Belarus, was a journalist who was arrested for her activism on behalf of the "For Freedom" movement. A. was held in a temporary detention facility for five days, where she shared a small, unheated cell with an unenclosed toilet area in open view of the all-male staff. During her detention, the male prison staff directed numerous humiliating comments at A. Male detainees at the facility were not subjected to the same humiliation. Upon her release, A. submitted a complaint to the Interior Department, alleging that her rights were violated while in detention. However, the Interior Department dismissed her complaint, stating that her allegations had not been verified. A. then filed a complaint with the Prosecutor's Office, who again found that her claims were unconfirmed. Next, A. filed an application in the District Court, but was rejected on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction. The Judicial Board rejected her appeal. After unsuccessfully attempting to refile in District Court, A. submitted a complaint to the CEDAW Committee, alleging that the conditions under which the State detained her were inhuman, degrading, and amounted to discrimination on the basis of gender. The Committee found that A.'s temporary detention in poor, unhygienic conditions, in a facility staffed exclusively by men, constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, and discrimination on the basis of her gender. Further, the Committee found that the State was in violation of its obligations under the CEDAW.
Teixeira v. Brazil, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2011.
Reproductive health, gender discrimination., maternal care.
T., a Brazilian national of African origin, suffered a high-risk pregnancy and was repeatedly denied timely care at a public health facility. T. died of a digestive hemorrhage following delivery of her stillborn fetus. T.’s husband filed a civil claim for material and moral damages, and twice requested the judicial mechanism of tutela antecipada, which requests the judge to anticipate the protective effects of a decision. The first request was ignored, and the second denied. T.’s mother submitted a complaint to the CEDAW Committee, alleging that the State violated her daughter's right to life and health under the CEDAW. The State contended that the evidence offered no link between the deceased's gender and the possible errors committed, and that such errors therefore did not fall within the definition of discrimination set out in the CEDAW. The Committee found that T. was denied appropriate services in connection with her pregnancy, and the State's lack of appropriate maternal health services has a differential impact on a women’s right to life. The Committee directed the State to take the following steps: compensate T.’s family, ensure women have the right to safe motherhood and affordable access to adequate emergency obstetric care, provide health workers with professional training, ensure private health care facilities comply with national and international standards on reproductive health care, and impose sanctions on health professionals who violate women's reproductive health rights.
V.K. v. Bulgaria, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2011.
Domestic and intimate partner violence, gender discrimination, divorce and dissolution of marriage.
V.K., a Bulgarian citizen residing in Poland, sought a divorce from her husband after years of physical, emotional, and economic abuse. V.K. took her children and moved to Bulgaria to hide from her husband. Once in Bulgaria, V.K. filed an application pursuant to the State's Law on Protection against Domestic Violence, requesting an immediate order of protection against her husband. V.K. substantiated her filing by invoking the Convention (CEDAW) and other human rights treaties. The District Court issued the order for immediate protection, but rejected V.K.'s application for a permanent protection order. On appeal, the Regional Court affirmed. After exhausting all available domestic remedies, V.K. filed a complaint with the CEDAW Committee, alleging that Bulgaria violated the Convention by failing to provide her with effective protection against instances of domestic violence. She also argued that the absence of a special law regarding the equality of women and men in the State, and the lack of recognition of violence against women as a form of discrimination, interfered with her human rights. The Committee found that the State's courts refusal to issue a permanent protection order was based on discriminatory notions of what constituted domestic violence. As a result, the State violated their CEDAW obligations by not imposing a permanent protective order, and for failing to maintain shelters for battered women.
Karen Tayag Vertido v. The Philippines, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2008.
Gender discrimination, sexual violence and rape.
In 1996, V., an employee of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Chamber), was raped by a former Chamber President. The defendant was acquitted in 2005. The Court scrutinized V.'s testimony with "extreme caution," and challenged her credibility on the ground that "an accusation of rape can be made with facility." The Court declined to apply Filipino Supreme Court precedent cases, establishing that failure to escape does not negate the existence of rape. Instead, the Court stated that V. had ample opportunities to escape her attacker. In her complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, V. argued that the Court's actions subjected her to revictimization, and violated Articles 2(c), 2(f), and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and CEDAW General Recommendation 19, which obliges a State to modify or abolish laws or practices that constitute discrimination against women. The Committee held that the State Court erred in relying on gender-based myths and stereotypes about rape and rape victims. The Committee emphasized that there is no presumption of consent, even if a woman does not physically resist unwanted sexual conduct,. The Committee recommended that the State provide V. with compensation, ensure that lack of consent is an essential element of the crime of rape, remove a requirement that sexual violence be committed by violence or force, and require judges, lawyers, and law enforcement be trained in understanding rape and other sexual offenses.
Goekce v. Austria, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2007.
Domestic and intimate partner violence.
In 2002, G.'s husband killed her in front of their daughters i. Before her death, G. had obtained three expulsion and prohibition-to-return orders against her husband in response to repeated episodes of domestic violence. The Vienna Public Prosecutor denied police requests to detain G.’s husband, and stopped the prosecution against him, on the basis of insufficient grounds of prosecution, two days before G.'s death. Police reports show that law enforcement failed to respond in a timely manner to the dispute that led to G's death. A complaint was filed to the Committee, on G’s behalf, alleging that Austria's Federal Act for the Protection against Violence within the Family provides ineffective protection for victims of repeated, severe spousal abuse. and women are disproportionately affected by the State's failure to prosecute and take domestic violence reports seriously. The Committee found that although Austria has a comprehensive model to address domestic violence, State actors are required to diligently investigate domestic violence reports, and provide protection. The Committee concluded that the police knew or should have known that G was in serious danger, and failed to exercise due diligence in protecting her. By allowing the perpetrator's rights to supersede G's rights to life, physical, and mental integrity, Austria violated its Article 2 obligation to end gender discrimination, and its Article 3 obligation to guarantee women's exercise of human rights, and right to equal freedoms as men. The Committee recommended that Austria strengthen its implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the Protection against Violence within the Family, respond to complaints of domestic violence with due diligence, and provide adequate sanctions for failure to do so.
N. S. F. v. United Kingdom, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2007.
Domestic and intimate partner violence, divorce and dissolution of marriage, asylum.
N.S.F., a Pakistani national, experienced repeated spousal abuse, including marital rape, until they divorced in 2002. Although N.S.F.'s husband continued to harass her after she moved to a nearby village, the police did not offer her any protection. When her ex-husband came to her new home with other armed men and threatened to kill her, N.S.F. fled to the United Kingdom and applied for asylum. N.S.F. claimed that her forced return to Pakistan would violate the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office dismissed her application for asylum. N.S.F. appealed, and was subsequently denied asylum on the basis that t N.S.F. could relocate further away from her husband in Pakistan, and that she would receive protection in Pakistan on account of her divorced status. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal rejected N.S.F.'s application for permission to appeal, and the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, Administrative Court affirmed. N.S.F. alleged that the asylum and human rights-based procedures were unfair, and that her life and children’s education was at risk if deported to Pakistan. Although the Committee found the complaint inadmissible because N.S.F. did not exhaust all domestic remedies, the Committee noted that the complaint raised concern for women who have fled their country out of fear of domestic violence. The Committee cited General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women, and concluded that Pakistan should reconsider its position that N.S.F.'s claims do not constitute an allegation of sex discrimination. The Committee suggested that N.S.F. apply to the High Court for judicial review of her asylum application, and that the Court consider her allegations of sex discrimination.
Salgado v. United Kingdom, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2007.
Gender discrimination, international law, citizenship.
S., a British citizen, moved to Colombia with her husband, a Colombian national, and gave birth to a son. S. attempted to obtain British nationality for her son, but the British Consul in Bogotá stated that British nationality passed through the paternal line. Although the British Nationality Act of 1981 amended British law to confer equal rights to men and women, S.'s son did not qualify because he was over 18 years old. In 2002, the Legislation passed the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, which allowed children born to British mothers between 1961 and 1983 to register as British nationals, contingent upon several other conditions. S alleged sex-based discrimination under the British Nationality Act of 1948, which restricted nationality descent to British fathers. S. argued to the Committee that the British Acts violated Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which proposes that all discriminatory laws be eliminated,, and Article 9 which requires State parties grant women and men equal rights with respect to the nationality of their children. S. claimed discrimination on the basis that her son failed to qualify for citizenship under the various amendments to the Act. Although the Committee held that the complaint was inadmissible because the events occurred before the Convention's entry into force in the United Kingdom, it reasoned that S.'s son had reached the age of majority, so he could apply for British nationality on his own. The Committee noted that the United Kingdom had enacted the challenged legislation prior to the Optional Protocol's entry into force. For next steps, the Committee recommended that S. seek judicial review by the British High Court, before turning to the Committee for further redress.
Yildirim v. Austria, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2007.
Domestic and intimate partner violence, divorce, international law.
Y. sought to divorce her husband who threatened to kill her, and her children, if she ever initiated divorce proceedings. In response to Y.'s numerous reports of assault and dangerous criminal threats, the Austrian police issued an expulsion and prohibition-to-return order against her husband. The police also recommended that her husband be detained, but the Vienna Public Prosecutor denied the request twice. Y. appealed to the Vienna Intervention Center after her husband repeatedly came to her workplace to harass and threaten her. The Center asked the police to closely monitor Y.'s case. After Y. filed a petition for divorce at the Vienna District Court of Hernals, her husband followed her home from work and fatally stabbed her. The complaint to the Committee alleged that the State's action violated Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), since the Austrian criminal justice system negatively impacted women through the public prosecutors' repeated failure to treat domestic violence seriously. The complaint also cited violation of Article 2 and 3 of CEDAW, which require that laws, customs, and regulations be eliminated that adversely affect women. Austrian judicial officials and law enforcement’s failure to collect data on domestic violence instances denied Y the opportunity to enjoy her human rights. Finally, the complaint stated an Article 5 violation of the Convention, due to the failure of the State to treat domestic violence as a serious crime, rather than a social or domestic problem. The Committee held that the Austrian police force's failure to detain Y.'s husband breached the State's due diligence obligation to protect Y, noting that a perpetrator's rights cannot supersede women's human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity. The Committee also took note of the correlation between lenient attitudes towards women's cultural subordination and domestic violence. Although Austria prosecuted Y.'s husband to the fullest extent for her death, the Committee found violations of Articles 2, 3, and 5, recommended that Austria strengthen its implementation of the Federal Act for the Prevention against Violence within the Family, and ensure enhanced coordination between police and judicial officers to protect women victims of gender-based violence.
Zhen Zhen Zheng v. The Netherlands, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2007.
Trafficking, asylum, exhaustion of remedies.
The petitioner was trafficked into the Netherlands, and her request for asylum was denied because she could not provide details about her trip from China, and lacked identification documents. Although the Committee found the petitioner’s appeal inadmissible since she had not exhausted domestic remedies, the dissent argued that the complaint should be admissible due to the vulnerability of human trafficking victims. In addition, the dissent noted that the State failed to exercise due diligence by not acknowledging that the petitioner recognized that she may have been a victim of trafficking.
A.S. v. Hungary, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2006.
Forced sterilization, international law.
A.S. was sterilized, without her informed consent, by a Hungarian hospital during an emergency cesarean section. While in a state of shock due to blood loss, A.S. was asked to provide her written consent to tubal ligation, and sign an illegible handwritten note describing the procedure in terms she did not understand. A.S. charged the hospital with negligence in failing to obtain her full and informed consent to the coerced sterilization. Both the town and county courts held that the hospital was at least partially negligent in its legal duties to A.S., but rejected her claim and appeal for failure to prove a lasting handicap. In addition, the courts found no causal relationship between permanent loss of reproductive capacity, and the conduct of the hospital's doctors. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women held that Hungary violated A.S.'s rights under Article 10(h) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on access to information on family planning, Article 12 guaranteeing women appropriate medical services in connection with pregnancy, and Article 16, paragraph 1(e), on a woman's right to freely choose the number and spacing of her children. The Committee recognized the serious consequences of forced sterilization under General Recommendation No. 21, and held that Hungary violated A.S.'s right to information on family planning and the sterilization procedure. The Committee also held that lack of informed consent constituted a breach of the obligation under Article 12, and General Recommendation No. 24, which requires the delivery of acceptable medical services in a manner that respects a woman's dignity. Accordingly, the Committee recommended the State compensate A.S., and amend the Public Health Act allowing doctors' discretion to administer sterilization procedures when "appropriate in given circumstances."
Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen v. The Netherlands, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2006.
Employment discrimination.
The petitioner worked part-time as a salaried employee with her husband, for his business. Under the terms of her salaried position, the petitioner was insured under the Sickness Benefits Act (ZW). She was insured for work at her husband's business under the Invalidity Insurance (Self-Employed Person) Act (WAZ). When the petitioner applied for maternity leave, she received benefits from her ZW insurance, but her WAZ insurance denied her coverage because of an "anti-accumulation clause" –payment of benefits permissible only to the extent they exceed benefits payable under the ZW policy. The petitioner objected to the withholding of her benefits and applied for review with the Breda District Court, who dismissed the complaint. The Central Appeals Tribunal affirmed, stating that the WAZ insurance policy did not result in unfavorable treatment of women, as compared to men. The petitioner's complaint to the Committee cited a violation of Article 11, paragraph 2 (b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which obligates the State party to provide maternity leave with pay or comparable social benefits, without loss of former employment, seniority, or social allowance. The Committee held that there was no violation, as the state has discretion to determine the appropriate maternity benefits within the meaning of Article 11 for employed women, and separate rules for self-employed women apply. By contrast, the dissent argued that the Netherlands law, which provides for financially compensated maternity leave for women who are both salaried and self-employed, does not account for situations where self-employed women work more hours per week than a full-time salaried employee, who is entitled to full maternity benefits. Therefore, the anti-accumulation clause constitutes indirect sex-discrimination because the policy assumes that mainly women work as part-time salaried employees, in addition to working as family helpers in their husband's businesses.
A.T. v. Hungary, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2005.
Domestic and intimate partner violence, international law, gender discrimination.
A.T.’s husband subjected her to continued domestic violence, resulting in her hospitalization and ten medical certificates documenting separate incidents of abuse. Hungarian law did not provide a mechanism for A.T. to obtain a protection order against her husband. Accordingly, A.T. submitted a motion for injunctive relief for her exclusive right to the family apartment. The Budapest Regional Court denied the motion, holding that A.T.'s husband had a right to return and use the apartment since he has a right to property, and A.T.'s battery claims lacked substantiation. A.T.’s complaint to the Committee called for the introduction of effective and immediate protection for victims of domestic violence in Hungary, as well as interim measures to prevent irreparable damage to A.T.'s personal safety, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of CEDAW's Optional Protocol. The Committee held that Hungary's domestic violence jurisprudence was deeply entrenched in gender stereotypes, which constituted a violation of Hungary's obligation under Article 2 of CEDAW to promote gender equality through appropriate legislation. Hungary's lack of specific legislation to combat domestic and sexual violence led the Committee to conclude that the State had violated its Article 5 obligation to eliminate prejudices and customs grounded in female inferiority, and Article 16 obligation to end discrimination against women in matters relating to marriage and the family. The Committee recommended that Hungary enact domestic and sexual violence legislation, and allow victims to apply for protection and exclusion orders which forbid the abuser from occupying the family home.
[Last reviewed in October of 2025]