habeas corpus

Banister v. Davis

Issues

Does a Rule 59(e) motion, which asks a court to alter or amend a judgment, constitute a second or successive habeas application under Gonzalez v. Crosby, which is prohibited by Section 2244(b) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a petitioner may not obtain habeas relief for a state court’s decision on a claim unless the decision clearly runs counter to the Constitution or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Section 2244(b) of AEDPA requires a court to dismiss a claim, if it presents a second or successive habeas corpus application that was presented in a prior application. Banister argues that a Rule 59(e) motion, which mandates that a motion to alter or amend a judgment be filed within 28 days of the judgment, does not constitute a “second or successive habeas application” under Section 2244(b) because it is part of a habeas applicant’s first habeas proceeding. Although Gonzalez held that a Rule 60(b) motion, which asks a court to relieve the movant from a final judgment, can constitute a second or successive habeas application, Banister contends that a Rule 59(e) motion does not similarly apply to Section 2244(b)’s restrictions because it is distinct from a Rule 60(b) motion. In response, Davis argues that so long as a Rule 59(e) motion is made after a final adjudicated judgment, it constitutes a second or successive habeas application subject to Section 2244(b)’s restrictions. Davis further asserts that Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions are similar enough to warrant the same treatment under Section 2244(b)’s restrictions. The outcome of this case will affect the timing for filing Rule 59(e) motions. This case will also have important implications for the limitations placed on federal habeas corpus review and on courts’ ability to correct or clarify previous rulings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).

Petitioner, Gregory Dean Banister, was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years in prison in a Texas state court. Banister v.

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The authors would like to thank Professors John Blume and Keir Weyble for their guidance and insight into this case.

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Beard v. Kindler

 

Joseph Kindler was convicted and sentenced to death by a Pennsylvania court for murder. While Kindler’s post-conviction motions were pending, he escaped and remained at large for years. The court then decided on the basis of a discretionally applied fugitive forfeiture rule that Kindler had waived his rights to make these motions when he fled. After Kindler was returned, he moved to reinstate his motions. The Pennsylvania courts denied this motion and Kindler subsequently petitioned the federal court for habeas review, which the district court granted and the circuit court affirmed. In this case the Supreme Court will decide if a federal court may grant a habeas petition when Pennsylvania’s highest court declared that Kindler forfeited his relief claims when he fled. Pennsylvania argues that its fugitive forfeiture rule is an adequate state ground that bars federal review. Kindler, however, claims the discretionally applied fugitive forfeiture rule was not applied with sufficient consistency in Pennsylvania courts to preclude habeas review.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

After murdering a witness against him and receiving a sentence of death, respondent broke out of prison, twice. Prior to his recapture in Canada years later, the trial court exercised its discretion under state forfeiture law to dismiss respondent's post-verdict motions, resulting in default of most appellate claims. On federal habeas corpus review, the court of appeals refused to honor the state court's procedural bar, ruling that, because “the state court . . . had discretion” in applying the rule, it was not “firmly established” and was therefore “inadequate.” 

Is a state procedural rule automatically “inadequate” under the adequate-state-grounds doctrine - and therefore unenforceable on federal habeas corpus review - because the state rule is discretionary rather than mandatory?

While released on bail and facing burglary charges in 1982, Joseph Kindler murdered one of the accomplices to the burglary, David Bernstein, because he was cooperating with the police and had been granted immunity to testify against Kindler. See Kindler v.

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·         Criminal Justice Crime Blog: Critical discussion of Kindler’s basis for federal habeas review

·         ABC News: High Court to Rule in Pennsylvania Death Penalty Case

·         Capital Defense Weekly Blog: Justice Alito excuses himself from case

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Bell v. Kelly

Issues

Must federal courts defer to the decisions of state courts on a constitutional claim when a criminal defendant attacks a state court decision in a federal court with a claim backed by evidence that was not developed in state court?

 

Petitioner Edward Bell claims that he is entitled to habeas relief from his death sentence for the murder of a police officer because his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. Bell’s court-appointed attorneys did not introduce mitigating evidence to show that he did not pose a threat of future violent acts. Bell sought habeas relief in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which denied both an evidentiary hearing and habeas relief. Upon Bell’s petition for habeas corpus at the federal level, the district court granted an evidentiary hearing and held that Bell’s counsel acted unreasonably but that Bell was not prejudiced by this action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that § 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) required deference to Virginia’s summary rejection of Bell’s ineffective assistance claim, even though certain evidence supporting Bell’s claim was introduced for the first time in his federal habeas proceeding. This case could clarify the boundaries of deference toward claims “adjudicated on the merits” under the AEDPA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and the district court found that he had diligently attempted to develop and present the factual basis of this claim in state court, on habeas, but that the state court’s fact-finding procedures were inadequate to afford a full and fair hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found deficient performance but no prejudice and denied relief. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The question presented is:

Did the Fourth Circuit err when, in conflict with decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, it applied the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which is reserved for claims “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, to evaluate a claim predicated on evidence of prejudice the state court refused to consider and that was properly received for the first time in a federal evidentiary hearing?

On October 29, 1999 in Winchester, Virginia, Sergeant Ricky Timbrook and two probation officers encountered Petitioner Edward Bell and another man while searching for a wanted parolee. See Bell v. Kelly, No. 06-22 at 10 (4th Cir. Jan.

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Berghuis v. Smith

Issues

Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that the Michigan Supreme Court failed to apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent for evaluating whether the jury was comprised of a fair cross-section of the  community,  and whether the Sixth Circuit erred in adopting the comparative-disparity test for evaluating the difference between the number of African Americans in the community as compared to the venires.

 

In 1993, an all-white jury convicted Diapolis Smith of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during a felony. A 1990 Census showed that African-Americans comprised 7.8% of eligible jurors in the relevant county and 18.1% of eligible jurors in the relevant city. Smith challenged the county's system of jury selection, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair-cross-section of the community. The Sixth Circuit ruled in his favor, rejecting Petitioner Mary Berghuis’ proposed “absolute-disparity test,” which subtracts the percentage of adult members of a distinct group in the venire from the percentage of eligible jurors of that distinct group in the population. It instead applied the “comparative-disparity test,” which divides the absolute-disparity by the percentage of the distinct group in the community. The Supreme Court’s decision may impact the composition of juries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Duren v. Missouri, this Court established a three-prong standard for determining whether a defendant was able to demonstrate a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. The circuits have split on the issue about the proper test for determining what constitutes a fair and reasonable representation of a distinct group from the community within the venires (jury pool) under the second prong of Duren. The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the small disparities at issue here for African Americans (7.28% in the community as against 6% in the venires during the time period measured) did not give rise to a constitutional violation. The question presented is:

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that the Michigan Supreme Court failed to apply "clearly established" Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the issue of the fair cross-section requirement under Duren where the Sixth Circuit adopted the comparative-disparity test (for evaluating the difference between the numbers of African Americans in the community as compared to the venires), which this Court has never applied and which four circuits have specifically rejected.

On February 12, 1992, Michigan police arrested Diapolis Smith (“Smith”), an African-American man, in relation to a shooting death at a nightclub in Grand Rapids, Michigan. See Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 329–330 (2008). Smith’s case proceeded to jury trial in Kent County Circuit Court. See

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Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States

Issues

Does the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA") preclude federal jurisdiction over all habeas corpus petitions filed by non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and if so, does the MCA violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which states that habeas cannot be suspended except in times of rebellion or invasion?

Regardless of whether the detainees have rights under the Suspension Clause or the Constitution, are the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and D.C. Circuit Court review (as established by the Detainee Treatment Act) an adequate and effective substitute for the constitutional right to habeas corpus?

 

Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States come to the Supreme Court as the latest chapter in the ongoing battle over the scope of rights that detainees at Guantanamo Bay have.�� In early 2002, six humanitarian workers were arrested in Bosnia and transported to Guantanamo Bay.� They, along with other non-citizen detainees, seek to exercise the constitutional right of habeas corpus to appear before a federal court to contest their detention. Currently, a military tribunal determines whether a detainee is properly detained at Guantanamo as an "enemy combatant." The D.C. Circuit found that the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which precludes federal jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas claims, applies to the detainees, and that detainees are not entitled to the constitutional writ of habeas corpus because they are "without presence or property within the U.S."

On appeal before the Supreme Court are several important constitutional issues, including whether the MCA's suspension of habeas corpus for non-citizen Guantanamo detainees is consistent with the Constitution.� Additionally, the Court will likely examine whether Combatant Status Review Tribunals and D.C. Circuit review constitute an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.� Finally, the Court may delimit the scope of constitutional rights possessed by non-citizen Guantanamo detainees. The Court's decision will significantly impact both detainee rights and limits to the military's wartime powers, as well as clarify the judiciary's position in the system of checks and balances with the executive and legislative branches.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Boumediene v. Bush:

1. Whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, validly stripped federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by foreign citizens imprisoned indefinitely at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay.

2. Whether Petitioners' habeas corpus petitions, which establish that the United States government has imprisoned Petitioners for over five years, demonstrate unlawful confinement requiring the grant of habeas relief or, at least, a hearing on the merits.

Al Odah v. United States:

1. Did the D.C. Circuit err in relying again on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), to dismiss these petitions and to hold that petitioners have no common law right to habeas protected by the Suspension Clause and no constitutional rights whatsoever, despite this Court's ruling in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), that these petitioners are in a fundamentally different position from those in Eisentrager, that their access to the writ is consistent with the historical reach of the writ at common law, and that they are confined within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States?

2. Given that the Court in Rasul concluded that the writ at common law would have extended to persons detained at Guantanamo, did the D.C. Circuit err in holding that petitioners' right to the writ was not protected by the Suspension Clause because they supposedly would not have been entitled to the writ at common law?

3. Are petitioners, who have been detained without charge or trial for more than five years in the exclusive custody of the United States at Guantanamo, a territory under the plenary and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva Conventions?

4. Should section 7(b) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which does not explicitly mention habeas corpus, be construed to eliminate the courts' jurisdiction over petitioners' pending habeas cases, thereby creating serious constitutional issues?

These consolidated cases involve federal court jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by foreign nationals detained at the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay. The writ of habeas corpus allows a detained person to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in court.

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The authors would like to thank Professor Sital Kalantry and Professor David Wippman for their insights into this case.

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Bowe v. United States

Issues

Does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate the bar on second or successive applications in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), thereby preventing federal prisoners from filing repeat motions to vacate? When a court of appeals denies authorization for a successive § 2255 motion, does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court review, making the courts of appeals the court of last resort for such prisoners?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide two questions about the interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). First, does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s restrictions on second or successive motions to federal prisoners? Second, are the courts of appeals the final forum for federal prisoners seeking authorization to file such motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e), or can the Supreme Court review these gatekeeping decisions? The Petitioner, Michael Bowe, argues that extending both the restrictions on second or successive motions and the bar on Supreme Court review to federal prisoners goes against congressional intent and creates an unnecessary roadblock to federal prisoner’s claims to be fairly adjudicated by the courts. Kasdin Mitchell, whom the Supreme Court appointed to defend the judgment below because the United States declined to do so, argues that allowing for second or successive motions will burden the courts with unnecessarily and largely erroneous filings. For its part, the United States argues that the bar on Supreme Court review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) should extend to federal prisoners because they have other avenues, beyond AEDPA, to appeal their convictions. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the fairness of habeas procedures and judicial economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (2) whether § 2244 (b)(3)(E) deprives this court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under § 2255.

Habeas corpus proceedings allow prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention, but habeas procedures differ for state and federal prisoners. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.

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Bradshaw v. Stumpf

 

John Stumpf and his accomplice, Clyde Wesley, were convicted of the murder of Mary Jane Stout. Stumpf, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, argues that the prosecutor unfairly used inconsistent theories to prove that both he and Wesley were guilty for the murder – -- even though a single shot was used to kill Stout. Stumpf thus claims his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution were violated. Stumpf also argues that his guilty plea at trial was entered unknowingly and involuntarily because he did not understand the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court, in making its decisions, will have to address the role of the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding, the rights of the defendant under the Due Process Clause, and the extent to which a defendant can later invalidate his earlier plea of guilty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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Brown v. Davenport

Issues

May a federal court grant a defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon finding a trial error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the defendant; or, must the court also determine that the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a difference in judicial opinion among several federal courts of appeal regarding which standard is appropriate for granting federal habeas relief. Petitioner Ervine Lee Davenport (“Davenport”) contends that the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in Brecht v. Abrahamson, which requires that a defendant experience a “substantial and injurious effect” due to a trial error, is satisfactory. Respondent Mike Brown (“Brown”), Acting Warden, argues that the standard invoked by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in Chapman v. California should instead apply. For a federal court to grant relief under Chapman v. California, a trial error must not be “harmless,” and the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California must be “unreasonable” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The outcome of this case will affect how much deference federal courts give to state courts’ interpretations of AEDPA, as well as the ability of defendants to successfully obtain relief in federal habeas proceedings. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal habeas court may grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the test from Brecht v. Abrahamson is satisfied, or whether the court must also find that the state court’s application of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

On January 13, 2007, Ervine Lee Davenport and Annette White were drinking alcohol and using cocaine at a friend’s house when White began acting belligerently. Davenport v. MacLaren at 2.  Several of White’s friends asked her to leave, and Davenport offered to drive White home. Id. Davenport testified that during the drive, White grabbed the steering wheel and sliced his arm with a box cutter. Id.

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The authors would like to thank Professor Keir Weyble for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Brumfield v. Cain

Issues

Are indigent prisoners entitled to government funds to present new claims of mental incompetency in post-conviction proceedings in state court?

The Supreme Court will determine the extent to which indigent prisoners sitting on death row are entitled to government resources in order to present new claims of mental incompetency in post-conviction proceedings. Brumfield argues that the Louisiana state court violated federal law by interfering with his due process rights. In contrast, Cain argues that the state court did not violate any of Brumfield’s clearly established rights under federal law. This case raises questions about the extent to which federal courts may rely on states’ pre-Atkins proceedings to uphold death sentences imposed on prisoners now offering evidence that they were mentally incompetent. Determining this question implicates the extent to which a state’s quality or reliability of review should factor into the federal courts’ deference to the previous state court determination. This case will have implications for indigent prisoners sentenced to death prior to the Court’s decision in Atkins. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Has a state court that considers the evidence presented at a petitioner’s penalty phase proceeding as determinative of the petitioner’s claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), based its decision on an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)?
  2. Has a state court that denies funding to an indigent petitioner who has no other means of obtaining evidence of his mental retardation has denied petitioner his “opportunity to be heard,” contrary to Atkins and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and his constitutional right to be provided with “basic tools” for an adequate defense, contrary to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 69 (1985)?

This case arises from Kevan Brumfield’s 1993 conviction for the murder of a Baton Rouge police officer and an attempted armed robbery. See Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371 (M.D. La. 2012). On January 5, 1993, Brumfield and an associate went to a self-described psychic counselor for a reading. See State of Louisiana ex rel. Cain v. Brumfield, 737 So. 2d 660, 662 (La.

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The authors would like to thank Professors Keir Weyble, Michael Dorf, and John Blume for their help.

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Buck v. Davis

Issues

Did the Fifth Circuit use an improper standard to deny Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on his motion to reopen the judgment against him?

This case addresses the correct standard to be applied in granting a Certificate of Appealability
(“COA”) on a motion to reopen a judgment. As per the standard, Petitioner Duane Buck argues that he deserved a COA, as a reasonable juror could consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be valid, as well as debate the validity of the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In opposition, Respondent Lorie Davis, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, contends that Buck’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritless and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. This case will settle the correct standard for granting a COA, while also addressing issues of implicit racial biases against African American defendants. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Duane Buck’s death penalty case raises a pressing issue of national importance: whether and to what extent the criminal justice system tolerates racial bias and discrimination. Specifically, did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit impose an improper and unduly burdensome Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard that contravenes this Court’s precedent and deepens two circuit splits when it denied Mr. Buck a COA on his motion to reopen the judgment and obtain merits review of his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at sentencing?

Petitioner Duane Buck was convicted of capital murder for the July 1995 deaths of his ex-girlfriend Debra Gardner and her friend Kenneth Butler. See Buck v. Stephens, No.14-70030 at *2 (5th Cir., filed Aug 20, 2015). During the sentencing phase, Buck’s counsel called Walter Quijano, a clinical psychologist, to testify regarding Buck’s future dangerousness.

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