SORNA

Issues

Billy Joe Reynolds, a registered sex offender, was convicted for failing to update his registration upon moving from Missouri to Pennsylvania. Under the newly enacted Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), sex offenders are required to update the federal registry within three days of a change of residence. An Interim Rule issued by the Attorney General applied the statute retroactively to all sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s enactment, including Reynolds. Reynolds challenged the legality of the Interim Rule but the circuit court dismissed his case for lack of standing. In the current suit, Reynolds argues that SORNA’s registration requirements are not applicable to individuals with pre-SORNA convictions. Reynolds adds that the Interim Rule made SORNA’s registration requirements applicable to him, thus giving him standing to challenge the Rule. The Supreme Court's decision will determine whether pre-SORNA sex offenders can state a claim against the Interim Rule, thus potentially delaying the government’s efforts in creating an effective national sex offender registry system. The decision may also prevent the government from issuing harsh new registration requirements without notice to individuals in Reynolds’s situation.

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Issues

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Congress, in passing the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act (“SORNA”), violated the non-delegation doctrine in allowing the Attorney General to define and implement how the Act applies to sex offenders who committed offenses prior to SORNA’s implementation. The United States argues that Congress’s grant of power to the Executive is constitutional if Congress provides a guiding principle explaining SORNA’s general policy and guidelines for its implementation. The United States contends that Congress did provide these requirements when it explained that SORNA requires sex offenders to register “to the maximum extent feasible.” Gundy, however, argues that Congress gave the Executive no direction on how to apply SORNA to sex offenders who committed acts prior to the implementation of SORNA. It contends that Congress granted the Executive unconstrained power to define when and how SORNA applies to these “pre-SORNA” sex offenders. A decision for the United States could promote public safety and ensure a more comprehensive national sex offender registration system. A decision for Gundy could ensure Congress does not overdelegate its authority nor threaten individual liberties.

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While serving in the Air Force in 1999, a military tribunal convicted twenty-one-year-old Anthony Kebodeaux of statutory rape for having consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old girl.  Following a three-month sentence and bad-conduct discharge, Kebodeaux moved to Texas, where he became subject to strict lifetime registration requirements that include annual in-person registration and registration updates upon intrastate movement.  Seven years later, in 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), which imposes registration requirements on sex offenders convicted under state or federal law, and additionally prescribes penalties for failure to register. After failing to update his registration following an intrastate move in 2008, Kebodeaux was convicted under SORNA in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas and sentenced to one year and one day in prison, plus five years of supervised release. Kebodeaux appealed this conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that Congress did not have jurisdiction to criminalize his intrastate movements. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the District Court’s conviction, holding that as applied to Kebodeaux, SORNA’s registration requirements were unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Article I powers. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States argues that SORNA did not constitute overreaching by the federal government because Kebodeaux was consistently subject to federal jurisdiction, having committed a federal offense under military law. In response, Kebodeaux contends that his release from prison pre-SORNA was unconditional, meaning that he is bound only by state registration requirements and any reassertion of federal jurisdiction over him through SORNA would be unconstitutional.  This case will also examine the balance between the benefits of uniformity in a comprehensive registration system against considerations of state sovereignty.

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