Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2005
CONGRESSIONAL POWER SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SECTION 5, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, STATE PRISONS
Tony Goodman, a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia correctional system, sued the state of Georgia under Title II of the ADA for disability discrimination. He alleges that the state held him for 23 hours a day in a narrow cell in which he could not adequately move his wheelchair, failed to make bathing and toileting facilities accessible, and excluded him from services and programs because of his disability. Georgia maintains that Goodman's claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The district court agreed and granted the state's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Americans with Disabilities Act is a proper exercise of Congress's power as applied to the administration of prison systems and, if so, whether disabled prisoners can sue states for disability discrimination under the Act. If the Court affirms the decision below, the caseload of federal courts will be reduced, states will not have to worry about disability discrimination lawsuits brought against them, and taxpayers will not have to put their dollars into revamping prisons. But if proponents of abolishing state immunity are right, an affirmation might allow the alleged inhumane treatment of disabled prisoners to continue.
[Question(s) presented] | [Issue(s)] | [Facts] | [Discussion] | [Analysis]
Questions Presented
Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. ?? 12131–12165, is a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems.
Whether, and to what extent, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. ? 12131 et seq., validly abrogates state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state-operated prisons.
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Issues
Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act is a proper exercise of Congress's power as applied to the administration of prison systems, and, if so, whether disabled prisoners can sue state prisons for disability discrimination under the Act.
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Facts
Tony Goodman, a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia correctional system, alleges that the state: (1) held him for more than 23 hours a day in a twelve by three foot cell – too narrow for him to even turn his wheelchair; (2) failed to make toilet and bathing facilities accessible to him to the extent that he has had to sit in his own waste; (3) denied him access to mental counselors and medical treatment for catheters and bedsores; and (4) excluded him from religious services, classes, and other programs because of his disability. See Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168, slip op. at 2–9 (11th Cir. September 16, 2004). Goodman was in prison because of convictions of aggravated assault, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and was serving a term of years in the Georgia State Prison. See Brief for Respondents at 2, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2005).
Goodman filed suit in 1999, claiming that these acts constitute discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. at 3. Goodman sought monetary and injunctive relief. Id. at 4. The State of Georgia denied the allegations and asserted sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which prevents Congress from passing laws that give citizens the right to sue an unconsenting state for damages except in certain circumstances. Id. at 12. The district court agreed and granted the state's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 13. The court also held that Goodman's claims for injunctive relief were moot because he had been transferred to another prison. Id.
Goodman appealed to the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals. Id. at 14. The circuit court affirmed the summary judgment with regard to the monetary claims. Id. at 15. It reversed the district court, however, on the claims for injunctive relief. Id. at 22. The circuit court reasoned that injunctive relief is appropriate for violations that could be repeated and cited prison reports which indicated that Goodman might be transferred back to Georgia State Prison. Id.
While the case was pending in the Eleventh Circuit, the United States intervened by filing a law suit against Georgia. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Intervenor, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. June 25, 2004). The United States argued that Title II of the ADA was intended to abolish sovereign immunity from monetary claims in disability discrimination suits and that Congress has the power to grant such exceptions under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Id. at 5–7. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, maintaining that the Eleventh Amendment barred Goodman's claims. See Goodman, No. 02-10168, slip op. at 15. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether states have sovereign immunity from discriminatory suits brought under the ADA by prisoners with disabilities.
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Discussion
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by state and local government agencies; the purpose of the law is to ensure equal treatment for the disabled in various areas of life. In broad language, Title II states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. ?? 12131–12165 (2000). Accordingly, public officials may be sued for discrimination in their individual (as opposed to official) capacities. See Goodman, No. 02-10168, slip op. at 16–18. The Eleventh Amendment, however, provides that states may not be sued for damages unless they have waived their sovereign immunity or unless Congress has specifically legislated otherwise.
This case has major implications for states, taxpayers, and for inmates with disabilities being held in state prisons. If the Supreme Court reverses and holds that states can be sued for disability discrimination, taxpayers could wind up spending astronomical sums renovating state prisons and revamping rehabilitation programs to accommodate disabled inmates. While surely many prisoners have legitimate discrimination claims suffer needlessly, if the Supreme Court allows such suits against the states, they could also be opening up the door to significant expense related to frivolous lawsuits brought by some prisoners who are insincere about their claims.
Nevertheless, proponents of abolishing state immunity for ADA claims maintain that the benefits to disabled prisoners suffering discrimination greatly outweigh this inconvenience and expense. Proponents point out that there has been an extensive record of discrimination against disabled prisoners, as prison officials frequently fail to attend to the basic needs of prisoners with mobility impairments. See Brief for American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. July 29, 2005). For instance, in 1987, the Fourth Circuit found that North Carolina prison officials deliberately failed to provide rehabilitation therapy and toilet facilities to a paralyzed inmate who had to drag his body across the floor to use the toilet. See Id. at 12, citing LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1987). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has found systemic constitutional violations of prisoners' rights in the Alabama prison system, including the death of a quadriplegic inmate who spent many months in the hospital confined to a bed and ridden with bedsores and maggots from lack of care. See Id.
Inmates with mental disabilities have also suffered mistreatment by prison officials. See Brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation et al. in Support of Petitioners at 14, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. July 29, 2005). A prison's deliberate indifference to needed habilitation for inmates with substantial developmental disabilities can cause enduring, sometimes permanent harm. Id. at 17. Studies have found that, for all incarcerated mentally ill persons, there is an increased risk of suicide and of decomposition and deterioration. See Id. at 15. If this is true, shouldn't the prison systems be required to adequately and appropriately respond to the needs of these inmates?
Proponents of allowing states to be sued for disability discrimination argue that Congress meant to address such mistreatment in prisons by abolishing state sovereign immunity to disability discrimination lawsuits brought under the ADA. See Brief for American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8–10, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168. They also contend that the threat of monetary damages is needed to force states to change their ways. "There's nothing like damages for getting people's attention," observed Chai Feldblum, a Georgetown University civil rights law professor who helped draft Title II. See Gina Holland, Court to Review Rights of Disabled Inmates (May 16, 2005). In addition, proponents argue the federal government, by holding states liable for such horrendous discrimination against the disabled, will gain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, especially given awful stories of prisoner abuse in the media.
If the Supreme Court instead agrees with the circuit court and holds that states are immune from disability discrimination lawsuits, federal courts will have less congested dockets and less responsibility to filter out illegitimate lawsuits. States will not have to worry about disability discrimination lawsuits brought against them, and taxpayers will not have to pay to revamp prisons to make them accessible to the disabled. Proponents of immunity also point out that, instead of taking the drastic step of abolishing immunity, the federal government can address the concerns of prisoners and their advocates by heightening prison regulations. If proponents of abolishing state immunity are right, however, anything short of a reversal of the decision below will allow the inhumane treatment of disabled prisoners to continue.
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Analysis
Congruence and Proportionality Analysis
The Supreme Court granted Goodman's petition to decide whether Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state-operated prisons. The Court has held that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity when it enacts legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief for the Petitioner at 11, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. July 29, 2005). The Court has further held that valid Section 5 legislation may be prophylactic – meaning that the legislation may prohibit conduct which is not itself unconstitutional – but only if there is a "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 520 (1997)). When analyzing questions of congruence and proportionality, the Supreme Court will proceed as follows:
Step 1: Identification of Constitutional Rights
The first step of the congruence and proportionality inquiry is "to identify the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce when it enacted Title II." Id. at 12 (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004)).
Accommodating Inmates with Disabilities
Goodman argues that Title II was enacted pursuant to the principle that "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." Id. at 14 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). Goodman points to two places in the Constitution that impose these affirmative obligations on the States to accommodate inmates with disabilities.
First, Goodman argues that Courts have held that the Eighth Amendment requires prisons to reasonably accommodate disabled inmates in circumstances similar to this case where the requested accommodation relates to issues of basic mobility and access to hygienic facilities. Id. at 15. But Georgia contends that Congress could not have intended Title II to be any kind of remedy for Eighth Amendment violations, as there is no pre-ADA record of discrimination against disabled inmates by "cruel and unusual punishment." See Brief for Respondents at 28, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2005).
Second, Goodman argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates states to provide adequate procedures before "impos[ing] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" or otherwise depriving the inmate of a protected liberty or property interest. See Brief for the Petitioner at 18, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. July 29, 2005) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). These procedures include notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Enforcing Other Constitutional Rights
Goodman also argues that Title II was meant to enforce other constitutional rights – such as equal protection – that prohibit discrimination against inmates with disabilities. Id. at 19. Goodman argues that the Court's recent recognition that the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on invidious discrimination "is not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison administration" and thus applies fully in the prison context. Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149 (2005)).
Step 2: History and Pattern of Constitutional Violations
After identifying the Constitutional rights that Congress sought to enforce, the Court must determine whether Congress validly exercised its Section 5 power by examining the "history and pattern" of constitutional violations by the State; where Congress responds to a history and pattern of constitutional violations by states, its power to enact prophylactic legislation is at its strongest. Id. at 20 (quoting Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)).
Goodman argues that large body of case law and the actual evidence before Congress reveal a long history of states' violations of the constitutional rights of inmates with disabilities. Id. at 21, 26. But Georgia contends that most of Goodman's cases postdate the enactment of the ADA, and thus could not have contributed to Congress' deliberations leading up to Title II. See Brief for Respondents at 30, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2005). Georgia also argues that, of the cases that predate the ADA, only few involve the kind of discrimination alleged in this case. Id.
Step 3: Whether Title II Is a Congruent and Proportional Response to the History of Violations
Lastly, the Court must determine whether Title II is "an appropriate response to the history and pattern of unequal treatment." Lane, 541 U.S. at 530. Goodman argues that Title II is appropriate legislation because it focuses on state conduct that poses a significant threat to inmates' constitutional rights, while limiting its intrusion on state prerogatives. See Brief for the Petitioner at 37, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. July 29, 2005). On the other hand, Georgia argues that Title II is too sweeping, as Congress has effectively changed the law to provide disabled persons with substantially greater legal rights and remedies than the Constitution actually affords them. See Brief for Respondents at 39, Goodman v. Georgia, No. 02-10168 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2005).
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Conclusion
Tennessee v. Lane narrowly held that one can sue states for money damages when denied access to a courthouse. But courts have been split over whether or not a person can sue the state for money damages in other contexts under Title II of the ADA. The issue before the Court in this case is whether the ADA validly abrogated state sovereignty as it applies to state prisons. If the Court agrees with Goodman and holds that disabled inmates can sue the state for disability discrimination, federal courts will likely face increased caseload and states will have to renovate prisons to accommodate disabled inmates. On the other hand, a decision adverse to Goodman may call into question whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact ADA Title II at all and would allow the allegedly inhumane treatment of disabled prisoners to continue.
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Authors
Prepared by: Thomas F. Lavery IV and Vi T. Vu
Additional Sources
- LII Law about... Prisoners' rights, Disability law
- Amicus Briefs
- News Articles
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