Robertson v. United States, ex rel. Watson

This case turns on whether an action for criminal contempt must be brought in the name of a private person as opposed to in the name of the sovereign power of the United States. Contempt actions can be either civil or criminal. Actions for civil contempt are those to enforce rights of private parties, while actions for criminal contempt are those meant to punish violations of court orders. See Brief for Petitioner, John Robertson, at 37–38. Actions for criminal contempt are punishable by fine or imprisonment (as in this case where Robertson was sentenced to imprisonment). See Id. at 36.

Petitioner John Robertson argues that all criminal prosecutions, including actions for criminal contempt, must be brought by the sovereign because of the long-standing principle that crimes are public wrongs against the public good. See Brief for Petitioner at 15–16. Robertson points out that the sovereign has historically brought criminal prosecutions. See Id. at 18. Robertson emphasizes that the Constitution focuses on the power to prosecute and punish crimes, providing clear evidence of the Founders’ belief that criminal prosecutions could only be brought in the name of the government. See Id. at 27. Robertson contends that this principle has also been echoed in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. See Id. at 30. Robertson further notes that the Court has repeatedly stated that a private person has no judicially recognizable interest in criminal prosecutions. See Id. at 34.

Respondent Wykenna Watson maintains that there is no constitutional or common law requirement that either criminal or criminal contempt proceedings must be brought in the name of the sovereign. See Brief for Respondent, Wykenna Watson, at 17–18. Watson asserts that, contrary to Robertson’s argument, it was a common practice for private persons to serve as prosecutors of a crime. See Id. at 38–39. Indeed, Watson emphasizes that it is still an accepted practice in several states to allow private criminal prosecutions. See Id. at 41.

Robertson contends that criminal contempt should be treated as any other crime and treated as a public wrong. See Brief for Petitioner at 36. Robertson insists that actions for criminal contempt, in particular, should only be brought by the government because of the nature of criminal contempt as a crime against the dignity and authority of the courts. See Id. at 37. The incidental benefit that a private person will receive from an action for criminal contempt that enforces a private order, such as the one at issue here, is not a reason to change the fundamental principle that prosecution must be on behalf of the government. See Id. at 39. Robertson underscores the fact that the Supreme Court has previously held that one main consideration in whether an action is civil or criminal is the penalty imposed and in this case, Robertson’s imprisonment punishment was unambiguously criminal. See Id. at 41–42. Robertson points to the Court’s decisions clarifying that the party to a criminal contempt prosecution in federal court is the United States, regardless of whether the case is privately prosecuted. See Id. at 43.

In contrast, Watson argues that criminal contempt has never been considered an actual “crime” as referred to in the Constitution because contempt was a petty offense while “crimes” were defined as those involving more serious offenses. See Brief for Respondent at 23–24. Watson emphasizes a series of cases in which the Court has recognized that criminal contempt proceedings differ from ordinary criminal cases in several significant ways regarding the procedures by which contempt cases may be handled by courts. See Id. at 26–27. Watson also points to the fact that many state courts have held that actions for criminal contempt do not need to be brought in the name of the sovereign. See Id. at 28–29. Watson also asserts that there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that dictates that actions for criminal contempt must always be brought in the name of a sovereign. See Id. at 32.

Robertson maintains that criminal contempt is rooted in the doctrine of necessity, allowing a court’s limited intrusion on the separation of powers only as much as is necessary to give courts power to compel obedience to their mandates. See Brief for Petitioner at 13. However, Robertson insists that the doctrine of necessity does not cover criminal contempt actions brought by a private person. SeeId. at 46–47. Robertson argues that the intrusion into the separation of powers entailed in a contempt proceeding, as well as the lower requirements for due process, is only justified by the doctrine of necessity. See Id. at 47. According to Robertson, a prosecution for criminal contempt intrudes on the separation of powers in two ways. See Id. at 48. First, it allows for judicial encroachment on the legislative power. See Id. Second, it allows judicial encroachment into the Executive’s powers because the courts would have the power to prosecute contempt even when the Executive chooses not to. See Id. Robertson also contends that the doctrine of necessity limits the contempt power, giving the courts discretion so that the courts do not intrude on the Executive function more than necessary. See Id. at 49. In this case, Robertson emphasizes that Watson’s private decision to prosecute was not limited by either necessity or the principle of restraint. See Id. at 51.

Watson insists that, as the constitutional issues of separation of powers or due process were not properly presented to the lower court, they should not properly be considered by the Supreme Court. See Brief for Respondent at 50. Watson also asserts that separation of powers principles were intended only to apply to the branches of the federal government and, therefore, do not apply to the District of Columbia. See Id. at 52. Instead, Watson emphasizes, Congress is given the exclusive authority of government over the District, which encompasses both the executive and judicial powers, as well as the legislative. See Id. at 53. Even so, however, Watson maintains that separation of powers would not require criminal contempt actions to be brought in the sovereign’s name. See Id. at 55. Watson points to the fact that the Court has previously held that a private contempt prosecutor does not encroach on the executive branch because the court’s power in a contempt case is necessarily limited only to those parties that have appeared before it. See Id. at 56. Furthermore, Watson underscores that the Executive authority over prosecutions is not unlimited because of the Grand Jury clause of the Constitution as well as other limitations on the Executive’s discretion dictated by Congress. See Id. at 56–58.

Robertson also argues that due process requires that criminal contempt proceedings only be brought by the government. See Brief for Petitioner at 57. Robertson maintains that the fact that the prosecutor represents the sovereign is particularly important in ensuring that the prosecutor have an interest not in the immediate outcome so much as that justice be done. See Id. at 57–58. Robertson emphasizes that due process requires that prosecutors serve the public interest due to the fact that prosecutors have the power to deprive people of their constitutional rights. See Id. at 58. Robertson insists that neither due process nor the public interest is served if the party bringing the criminal action is not controlled by the government and there is no justification that might otherwise permit a criminal action to be brought by a private person. See Id. at 59.

Watson, on the other hand, maintains that there is no due process requirement that actions for criminal contempt be brought in the name of the sovereign. See Brief for Respondent at 58–59. Watson asserts that Robertson received the full range of procedural rights required by due process and, moreover, that Robertson has no due process right to be prosecuted by the government in a criminal contempt case. See Id. at 59–60. Furthermore, Watson emphasizes that the Supreme Court has already held that a contempt prosecution does not have to be controlled by the government. See Id. at 61.