Maryland v. Shatzer

The Fifth Amendment prohibits a state from compelling a criminal defendant “to be a witness against himself.” To ensure police compliance with this prohibition, the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule under which the police must inform a suspect of certain rights that he or she may exercise, including the right to counsel. Accordingly, a suspect’s statements are inadmissible if the police fail to inform that suspect of his or her Miranda rights. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court created a second layer of protection to prevent law enforcement from badgering a suspect into waiving his or her right to counsel. Under this rule, if a criminal suspect requests counsel, that suspect cannot be interrogated unless or until he or she obtains counsel or independently approaches authorities to confess or make incriminating statements. This creates an irrebuttable presumption of coercion, i.e. the court assumes that any statements that that suspect makes are the result of coercive pressures inherent to the interrogation process. Lower courts are split as to whether or not a break in physical custody or the passage of time terminates this presumption. Some courts hold that such a break or passage terminates the presumption while others hold that the presumption applies regardless. In this case, the Supreme Court will resolve this split and decide if a break in physical custody or a significant lapse of time terminates Edwards’ presumption of coercion.

Effect of a Break in Custody on Terminating the Presumption of Coercion

Petitioner, the State of Maryland (“Maryland”), argues that the presumption of coercion should not apply when its application does not further Edwards’ goal of preventing police from badgering a suspect until he or she confesses. Maryland argues that, because a break in custody creates a significant change in environment, it signifies an absence of police badgering. Maryland argues that the coercive pressure of interrogation is largely due to an unspoken understanding between a suspect and his or her interrogator that the questioning will continue until that suspect confesses. In cases in which there is a break in custody, however, the suspect is clearly not under that same pressure, because the first interrogation did, indeed, end without a confession. Consequently, Shatzer’s release back into the prison population created a break in custody and, thereby, a termination of the presumption of coercion. Additionally, Maryland argues that the fact that Shatzer was released back into a confined situation, prison, is irrelevant, because an incarcerated individual grows accustomed to the prison system’s restraints and is no longer affected by them.

Amicus curiae, the United States, adds that most lower courts hold that a break in custody terminates the presumption of coercion, allowing the police to approach a suspect again. The United States argues further that the majority position is consistent with Miranda’s underlying goal of minimizing pressure that is likely to coerce a suspect into confessing. Additionally, the United States distinguishes this case from prior case law, which suggests that, once triggered, the Edwards presumptions lasts indefinitely, on the basis that all such cases involved suspects, who were in continuous police custody until re-approached.The United States points out that, if a suspect still feels that he or she cannot participate in an interrogation without the assistance, he or she may simply re-invoke her right to counsel.Finally, the United States argues that, for purposes of Miranda, a person serving a prison sentence is not in custody unless he or she is subject to additional restraints that surpass those of normal incarceration.

Conversely, respondent, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), rejoins that Edwards’ bright-line rule dictates that, if a suspect requests counsel, his or her interrogation must cease until counsel is present. Shatzer argues further that a break in custody should not limit Edwards’ presumption, because a suspect’s request for counsel is effectively a request for assistance in his or her interaction with law enforcement.A suspect’s intermittent release from custody does not alter or revoke this request for assistance. Shatzer contends that recognizing a break in custody as a termination of Edwards’ presumption would effectively nullify the presumption for most defendants, because most cases involve multiple interrogations and a break in custody.

Additionally, Shatzer argues that he did not experience an actual break in custody, because the factors that Miranda identifies as contributing to compulsion, including societal isolation, confinement in an unfamiliar setting, physical discomfort, lack of control, fear, and confusion, are ever-present in the prison setting. Shatzer also argues that he had no meaningful opportunity to seek counsel in prison, a factor that many lower courts, including the Maryland Court of Appeals, consider significant in determining whether a suspect has been afforded his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Finally, Shatzer argues that a prisoner often experiences additional fears that coerce him or her into confessing, including fear that a failure to cooperate or confess will negatively affect his or her release or lead to the imposition of harsher conditions.

Effect of a Significant Lapse of Time on Terminating the Presumption of Coercion

Maryland argues that Edwards’ additional layer of protection is unnecessary when police honor a suspect’s request for counsel over a significant length of time. Maryland argues that a court should not presume that coercion exists when re-interrogation is so far removed in time from a suspect’s initial invocation of his or her right to counsel; instead, a court should assess each case separately to determine if the police overreached. According to Maryland, if a significant break in time occurs, such as the more than two and a half year break in this case, Edwards’ presumption is inapplicable, because such a lapse does not remotely resemble the “‘persistent attempts by officials to persuade [a suspect] to waive his [or her] rights’ that the Edwards rule is designed to protect.”

Similarly, the United States argues that it is the combination of interrogation and custody that create the pressure that Miranda aims to counteract. Accordingly, if a person knows he or she will be incarcerated irrespective of confession, a prolonged period without investigation serves to diffuse such pressure.

Conversely, Shatzer argues that a lapse of time should not terminate Edwards’ presumption, because it would be impossible to identify a non-arbitrary time after which Edwards’ protections would not apply. Furthermore, even if the Court were to draw a line, Shatzer argues that for some defendants, including Shatzer, obtaining advice to re-invoke their right to counsel after a specified period of time would be cost prohibitive. In response, Maryland counters that a break in custody or the passage of a fixed period of time, determined by the Court, could serve as a clear breaking point.