Wood v. Allen

Petitioner Holly Wood petitioned the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama for habeas corpus relief on the grounds that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance a defendant must first prove that defense counsel’s performance fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Second, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing that there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

Although the district court granted relief to Wood, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state court’s decision to deny Wood’s appeal was reasonable. Wood asserts several reasons the Supreme Court should reverse the Eleventh Circuit by granting his petition of habeas corpus and overturning his death sentence. Respondent Richard Allen, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. (“Alabama”) argues that the Eleventh Circuit properly deferred to the reasonable determinations made by the state court, as required by the AEDPA.

Prong 1– Ineffective Assistance and the AEDPA

The U.S. Supreme Court will review this case through the lens of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA articulates a deferential standard of review for habeas corpus proceedings, prohibiting federal courts from overturning state court factual or legal determinations unless they are objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Wood’s first argument is that the state court unreasonably applied federal law by denying his claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance during his sentencing. See Brief for Petitioner, Holly Wood at 21–25. He claims his attorney acted incompetently by failing to investigate his mental deficiencies as mitigating evidence to present at sentencing. See id. Wood argues that his defense team was aware of a psychological report (“Kirkland Report”) that indicated he was mentally impaired. See id.A court appointed psychologist, Dr. Kirkland, evaluated Wood and produced the report five months prior to his trial, and should have spurred defense counsel to further investigate his mental deficiencies. See id. Wood claims that any competent counsel would have requested psychological and mental testing, as well as secured school records as evidence of mental disabilities. See id. at 24–25, 49–50. According to Wood, the failure to pursue this avenue of mitigating evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective representation as clearly established by Strickland. See id. at 21, 24. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684).

Alabama disputes Wood’s contention that any reasonable attorney would have further investigated his client’s mental deficiencies. It argues that defense counsel is not required to allocate limited resources pursuing defense strategies that are not promising. See Brief for Respondent, Richard Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. at 22–24. According to Alabama, Wood’s attorney made a reasonable decision that further investigation of Wood’s mental deficiencies would be fruitless. See Id. at 49–52. Alabama claims that the Kirkland Report merely suggested that he had below average intellect, but was functionally unimpaired and was capable of logical and moral thinking. See Id. at 24. Furthermore, Alabama argues that presenting the psychological report would have opened the door to testimony about a previous attempted murder conviction and other damaging evidence that his defense counsel was intentionally trying to suppress. See Id. at 50–52.

Second, Wood alleges that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See Brief for Petitioner at 35. He argues that, based on the record available from the state court proceeding, it was unreasonable for the court to conclude that defense counsel fully explored mitigating evidence as required by law. See id. at 35–36. Wood disputes the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the AEDPA, arguing that the court incorrectly conflated distinct standards mandated by §§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254 (e)(1). See id. at 37–38. He claims that the Eleventh Circuit erroneously held him to the higher presumption-of-correctness standard applied in §2254(e)(1), See Id. at 42–43. Wood argues §2254(d)(2) applies during federal habeas corpus proceedings where the defendant challenges factual determinations only using the evidence adduced in the state court proceeding, whereas §2254(e)(1) only applies when the defendant is challenging state court factual determinations based on evidence that was extrinsic to the state court proceeding. See id. at 37–39. Because Wood was only challenging the state court determination based on evidence adduced during the state court proceeding, he argues that he should not have been required to establish that the state courts factual determinations were objectively unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 42–44.

Alternatively, Wood argues that even under a clear and convincing evidence standard, the record below is sufficient to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably determined that his counsel represented him competently in the state court proceeding. See id. at 43.

Alabama counters that it does not matter if Wood’s attorney failed to investigate his mental deficiencies because the state court determined that deciding not to further investigate was reasonable. See Brief for Respondent at 40–43. It argues that the Eleventh Circuit applied the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. See Id. at 35. Alabama asserts that all circuits except the Ninth Circuit agree with the standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit. See Id.According toAlabama, §§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254 (e)(1) are different standards, but they complement each other. See Id. at 35–37. Alabama disputes the idea that the two sections apply based on whether or not the evidence being considered was intrinsic or extrinsic to the state court proceeding. See Id. at 29. Alabama argues that § 2254(e)(1) serves as a threshold standard applied to all habeas corpus proceedings. See Id. at 35–37. If the defendant disputes a state court determination, then he has a minimum burden of overcoming a presumption of correctness by establishing that the determination was incorrect by clear and convincing proof. See Id. Only once the presumption of correctness has been rebutted by clear and convincing proof should the federal court consider the objective reasonableness of the state court determination under § 2254(d)(2). See Id. Alabama contends that proving the determination must be the threshold showing because a correct determination is not unreasonable. See Id.

Prong 2 – Prejudice

To satisfy the second prong of Strickland, Wood argues that ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced him during sentencing. See Brief for Petitioner at 51. He asserts that in order for a jury to properly assess the individual circumstances of the defendant and render an individualized decision, they must be able to consider all of the mitigating evidence. See id. at 51–52. Wood argues that those who are mentally deficient are not as morally culpable for their crimes. See id. at 53–55. Because his counsel failed to provide the jury evidence of his mental deficiency, Wood claims that they were denied a “vehicle through which to express its ‘reasoned moral response.’” See id. at 54–55. He asserts that in order to establish prejudice he only needs to show that one juror would likely have decided differently, given that only ten jurors voted for a recommendation of death, the minimum required by Alabama state law for a death sentence recommendation. See id. at 54–55. Given its potentially compelling nature, Wood contends that it is likely that at least one juror would have changed their mind if presented with evidence of his mental disabilities. See id. at 54–55.

Alabama disputes the standard for showing prejudice articulated by Wood. See Brief for Respondent at 55. Alabama argues that the proper test is whether there is “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. Alabama argues that Wood’s one juror standard is erroneous because it fails to consider the nuances of Alabama law. See Id. at 55–56. Under Alabama law the judge makes the final decision on sentencing and the jury does not provide a binding recommendation. See Id. Even if the jury returns a recommendation for death, the judge merely views this as a mitigating factor in their own determination. See Id. at 55.