J.D.B. v. North Carolina

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that in order for law enforcement officers to ensure that statements taken during custodial interrogation are admissible at trial, they must first issue Miranda warnings. To determine whether Miranda warnings were necessary, a court must determine whether the suspect was in custody at the time of the interrogation. The Supreme Court has held that the test for whether a suspect is in custody assesses the objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation and asks whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was in custody, or felt subject to an arrest, or the equivalent restrictions of an arrest.

Age as Part of the Custody Analysis

J.D.B. argues that a person’s age is an objective factor and it should be considered among the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. J.D.B. relies on the Supreme Court’s statement that a fourteen-year-old boy did not have the same ability as an adult to safeguard his interests during a police interrogation. J.D.B. argues that the correct question when determining whether a juvenile was in custody is not whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was in custody, but rather whether a reasonable juvenile would have felt he or she was in custody. J.D.B. maintains that including age in the factors considered is properly part of the objective inquiry. J.D.B. contends that there are obvious and well-documented differences between juveniles and adults, and that, because of this, age represents an objective factor that will be relevant to whether the subject perceives he is in custody.

On the other hand, the State of North Carolina maintains that age is not a relevant factor in determining whether a suspect is in custody. North Carolina contends that the Court has never considered a suspect’s personal characteristics in determining whether that suspect was in custody. North Carolina emphasizes that the important factors to the custody inquiry are objective and do not require significant investigation by law enforcement, contending that a law enforcement officer's perception of the subject is irrelevant to the custody analysis. North Carolina maintains that the effect a person’s age will have on her perception of whether she is in custody is a subjective factor, and should not be taken into account.

J.D.B. also states that the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether age may be taken into account as an objective factor, but argues that lower state and federal courts and state legislatures have addressed the issue. J.D.B. contends that, thus far, those jurisdictions have found that it is indeed appropriate to consider age to be a factor in determining whether a suspect is in custody.

In contrast, North Carolina explains that, although other legislatures have provided more protections for juvenile suspects in custody, these extra protections only apply once it is determined that the suspect is in custody. North Carolina further notes that these additional protections are legislative determinations, not constitutional requirements. Noting that Supreme Court precedent currently factors age into the Miranda voluntariness test, North Carolina argues that age is already properly included in Miranda, and that there is no need to turn the custody test “into something it is not.”

J.D.B. maintains that because age is considered an objective factor in other legal questions, it should also be considered in custody determinations. He asserts that age has been considered as an objective factor by various courts in assessing whether there has been a Fourth Amendment seizure, in determining the viability of a self-defense claim, and in determining whether certain behavior qualifies as reckless disregard for life. Similarly, J.D.B. notes that the age of a suspect is considered as an objective factor in other inquiries, including whether the suspect was being interrogated, whether a suspect had waived his or her rights under Miranda, and whether the suspect had voluntarily provided a statement to the police.

In contrast, North Carolina maintains that there is a fundamental difference between the use of the reasonable person inquiry in questions of custody, and in other civil and criminal inquiries. North Carolina asserts that what makes the custody inquiry different is the fact that it is an “on the spot determination,” whereas other inquiries involve a “deliberative after-the-fact assessment of the person’s actions.” North Carolina warns that allowing age into the custody analysis would permit other characteristics specific to an individual (and therefore subjective factors) to be taken into account.

Policy Goals of Miranda

J.D.B. also argues that considering age as an objective factor will advance Miranda’s policy goals.J.D.B. maintains that the Supreme Court issued the decision in Miranda to ensure that suspects were not precluded from asserting their constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination. J.D.B. maintains that the purpose of Miranda is to prevent the state from placing too much pressure on a suspect undergoing custodial interrogation, effectively precluding him from exercising his constitutional rights. J.D.B. maintains that lower courts requiring age to be added to the custody analysis have not placed an increased burden on law enforcement (even though they must assess whether they need to issue Miranda warnings).

In contrast, North Carolina contends that requiring courts to take account of a suspect’s age will undermine the policy goals of the Miranda decision. North Carolina emphasizes the fact that the Miranda warnings were implemented both to ensure that interrogations were not unduly coercive and to provide law enforcement officers with a way to determine whether a situation amounted to custodial interrogation. North Carolina argues that forcing officers to take account of a suspect’s age in determining whether he or she is in custody blurs the clear guidelines for determining when a suspect is in custody.