Snyder v. Phelps

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Petitioner Albert Snyder’s interest in recovering in tort is outweighed by the First Amendment freedom of speech rights of Respondents Fred W. Phelps et al. (“the Phelpses”). The Phelpses argue that their statements should be protected under the First Amendment because Snyder is a public figure and because their statements relate to matters of public concern. Snyder argues that the Phelpses should be subject to tort liability because Snyder is a private figure and because the Phelpses’ statements are personally directed at Snyder, as opposed to concerning public matters.

Snyder as a Public or Private Figure

An individual’s status as a public or private figure affects the amount of legal protection the individual will receive against harmful statements made by others. Individuals classified as “public figures” are generally afforded less protection than private individuals because the status of being a public figure in most cases permits and actually invites criticism, parody, and negative discussion of those figures. Thus, a public official can only recover damages for the tort of defamation by proving that a false statement was made with “actual malice,” in other words, “with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Private individuals, however, are generally more vulnerable than public figures, and the Court has refused to extend the “actual malice” requirement to private individuals suing in tort for defamation. )

An individual determined to have “pervasive fame or notoriety” becomes a public figure for all issues and contexts. Contrastingly, a plaintiff who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy becomes a public figure for a “limited range of issues.” Applying this standard, the Phelpses claim that Snyder’s deliberate and intentional actions drew him into the public spotlight and caused him to become a public figure. The Phelpses argue that Petitioner’s decision to publish the specific date, time, and location of his son’s funeral “ensured the funeral itself was public,” and that his decision to contact the media immediately after the services to discuss his son, the funeral, and the WBC’s picketing of the event constituted Snyder’s voluntary injection into public controversy. Further, the Phelpses claim that Snyder enjoyed community, national and even international attention in support of what the Phelpses’ characterize as Snyder’s “efforts to silence” the WBC.

Snyder, on the other hand, denies he is a public figure, arguing that he never ran for any public or political office, maintained minimal contact with the media, and only received publicity due to the Phelpses’ actions. Thus, Snyder argues that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly required Snyder to show that the Phelpses acted with “actual malice,” a requirement applicable only to public figures.

Respondents’ Speech and its Relation to “Matters of Public Concern”

The Court has stated that “freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment.” The Court has since elaborated that speech acts involving “matters of public concern” are constitutionally protected, regardless of whether the individuals involved are private or public. Whether speech addresses a matter of public concern is determined on a case-by-case basis, in the context of the entire record of a case.

The Phelpses characterize the messages expressed by the picketers at the funeral as “quintessential public speech.” The Phelpses highlight the fact that the signs carried by the demonstrators displayed messages such as “God Hates Fags,” “Pope in Hell,” Thank God for IEDs,” and “Priests Rape Boys” in efforts to convince the Court that the demonstration was merely in furtherance of the opinions and viewpoints of the WBC. The Phelpses claim that the WBC members act out of a “love for God, the Bible, and their fellow citizens,” and that because these messages were about their viewpoints on controversial topics including divorce, homosexuality, and child molestation, the speech is therefore protected as “public issue” speech.

The Phelpses also argue that the “epic” poem posted on their website addresses matters of public concern. The Phelpses highlight the fact that many of the topics discussed in the poem, including homosexuality and priests molesting children, were expressed on many of the signs and similarly concerned with public issues.

Snyder, on the other hand, insists that he, members of his family, and his dead son were the targets of the WBC’s picket signs. Snyder highlights that the Fourth Circuit recognized that much of the Phelpses’ speech was “intended to spark debate about issues with which the defendants were concerned.” Further, Snyder claims that the Fourth Circuit’s incorrectly associated arguably impersonal signs like “God Hates Fags” with other signs, such as “God Hates You,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “You’re Going to Hell,” which Snyder and members of his family interpreted as directly aimed at them.

Regarding the Phelpses’ “epic” poem, Snyder points out particular lines from the poem (including one indicating that the Snyders had raised their son to commit adultery) were not only “divorced” from the context of the funeral protest, but were provably false. Snyder argues that because the signs were targeted at private individuals, the Phelpses should not be immune from tort liability.

Invasion of Privacy

Snyder insists that he and the other attendees of the funeral were a “captive audience” to the Phelpses’ tortious conduct, and he is therefore entitled to redress, whether or not that conduct involved protected speech.

The privacy interests of “captive audiences” who are powerless to avoid offensive and intrusive speech may take priority over First Amendment protection of that speech. Application of the “captive audience” doctrine applies if (1) a sufficient privacy interest of a listener is at stake, and (2) when the speaker’s conduct interferes with the listener’s privacy in an intolerable manner.

Snyder argues that his interest in mourning his son’s death without interruption is recognizable, and that he and other funeral attendees were powerless to avoid seeing the funeral picketers’ messages. Snyder additionally asserts that the messages on the signs and on the Internet were made in an “intolerable” manner because the Phelpses intentionally interfered with the funeral and consequently caused great psychological and emotional harm to Snyder. The Phelpses, in contrast, maintain that a distance of several hundred feet separated the groups, that the protestor’s signs were not even visible, and that Mr. Petitioner himself sought out WBC’s website on his own, and therefore that the funeral attendees were not “captive” and no privacy interest was violated.