Skinner v. Switzer

This case attempts to determine when the Heck exception should apply to federal petitions for relief. The Heck exception attempts to separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits from habeas corpus suits. Section 1983 allows an individual to sue for violations of his civil rights. The Heck exception prevents a prisoner from suing under Section 1983 if the successful suit would necessarily imply that the prisoner's conviction is unlawful, and thus should be property brought as a habeas corpus claim. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Petitioner Henry Skinner claims that the Heck exception does not apply because the actual immediate consequence of his successful suit would not involve the invalidity of his conviction. In contrast, Lynn Switzer argues that the Heck exception should apply because necessary components of Skinner’s successful suit would imply the invalidity of his prison sentence.

Does the Heck Exception Preclude a Section 1983 Claim in this Case?

The Heck exception prevents a prisoner from suing under Section 1983 if the successful suit would "necessarily imply" that the prisoner's conviction is unlawful. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Skinner argues that Heck does not apply. See Brief for Petitioner at 16. He explains that because he does not know the results of testing the requested DNA evidence it is impossible to know whether such access would help or hinder any attempt to challenge his conviction. See Id. at 19. He notes, therefore, that access to DNA evidence does not "necessarily imply" that he is challenging his conviction. See Id.Skinner's interpretation of "necessarily imply" comes from his reading of Wilkinson v. Dotson, in which the Heck exception did not prevent two prisoners from challenging Ohio's parole eligibility guidelines. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005). In Dotson, the immediate consequences of the prisoners' suits would not have implied that their extended sentences were invalid. See Brief for Petitioner at 14–15. Skinner’s argument is supported in every circuit court of appeals that has considered this issue, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit. See Id. at 21. Skinner also argues that the Fifth Circuit's reading of Heck contradicts the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Dotson. See Id. at 24. He asserts that the Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue is clear and that a claim asserting a due process right to access to evidence does not necessarily imply the validity of the claimant's sentence or conviction. See Id.

Switzer presents a different interpretation of Heck's "necessarily imply" test. See Brief for Respondentat 21. Switzer argues that the test does not hinge on the desired relief. See Id.Instead, the analysis turns on "the connection between the claim asserted and release from confinement." See id.Switzer argues that if any "necessary component or allegation of the claim implies that the underlying conviction is invalid" then the claim cannot proceed as a Section 1983 claim and must be filed under habeas corpus. See id. at 22.

Does Skinner's Section 1983 Claim Challenge the Validity of his Conviction?

Skinner argues that his requested relief is merely access to the DNA evidence. See Brief for Petitioner at 17. Skinner asserts that if his suit is successful, Switzer would only be forced to hand over DNA evidence. See Id. The DNA evidence may not provide any exculpable proof that would affect Skinner's sentence. See Id. at 18. Even if the DNA shows that Skinner is innocent, Skinner would still be forced to file more legal proceedings. See Id. Finally, those legal proceedings have a high threshold of proof and would not necessarily result in a change to Skinner's sentence. See Id.

Switzer asserts that Skinner's claim "inextricably" attacks his conviction. See Brief for Respondent at 26. Switzer argues that Skinner’s innocence is a necessary component of Skinner’s claim because a court, in order to grant Skinner access to the DNA evidence, would have to assume that the evidence would prove exculpable. See id. at 26–27. She explains that Skinner is essentially attacking his conviction because the Section 1983 claim asserts his liberty interest in proving his innocence. See id. at 26. Switzer, referring to District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, argues that because the DNA evidence sought by Skinner has "material bearing" on his conviction, it therefore falls within the confines of habeas corpus, not Section 1983. 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2325 (2009); see id.Switzer contends that Osborne established that a claimant does "not have a freestanding postconviction federal right to access DNA evidence." See Brief for Respondent at 27. Furthermore, Switzer argues that the district court reviewed the evidence supporting Skinner's conviction and determined that the requested DNA evidence would not cast doubt on his conviction. See id. at 33. Thus, in giving Skinner access to the DNA evidence, it would imply that the district court was wrong and that doubt exists in the evidence supporting Skinner's conviction. See Id. at 33.

Would a Ruling for Skinner Violate Principles of Comity or Stare Decisis?

Skinner asserts that his Section 1983 claim does not violate principles of comity, under which the decisions of a court in one jurisdiction are respected by a court in another jurisdiction. See Brief for Petitioner at 33. He explains that Osborne protects principles of comity by requiring that any claimant that is asserting a federal due process right to access to evidence must first invoke state procedures. See Id. at 34. Thus, Skinner reasons, that there is no threat that a Section 1983 claim would violate principles of comity by bypassing state courts. See Id. at 35.

Switzer argues that a ruling for Skinner would violate principles of comity. See Brief for Respondent at 18. Switzer contends that a comity issue exists because using Section 1983 claims to obtain access to DNA evidence may require federal courts to intervene in state criminal proceedings. See Id. She argues that Skinner's Section 1983 civil rights claim amounts to a collateral attack on state courts' requirement that DNA testing not have the potential to prove a claimant's innocence. See Id. at 42. Switzer explains that Skinner's claim will evade the "exhaustion requirement" by alleging in federal court that Texas's evidence procedure violated his due process rights without first raising this issue in a Texas court. See Id. Switzer admits that federal habeas corpus proceedings also interfere with state criminal proceedings but they have a number of restrictions designed to limit federal interference. See Id. at 18.

Skinner also asserts that an affirmation of the Fifth Circuit's decision would violate principles of stare decisis. See Brief for Petitioner at 35. He explains that stare decisis demands that the precedents established by the Court be respected. See Id.He argues that historically the Supreme Court "has been careful not to impose limitations on prisoner claims under § 1983." See Id. at 36. Skinner contends that to deviate from the Heck doctrine to prevent Section 1983 claims seeking DNA testing "would amount to unwarranted judicial intrusion into an area best left to the political process." See Id.He argues that to deny Section 1983 claims in this context would also eliminate a vital avenue for asserting constitutional rights. See Id.

Switzer, unlike Skinner, believes that a Section 1983 claim here would violate precedent by undermining the legal principles established in Osborne. See Brief for Respondent at 43. Switzer explains Skinner's request for access for DNA evidence should not be adjudicated in federal court. See Id. She argues that the Supreme Court in Osborne declared that "state legislatures should be allowed to take the lead in developing systems and procedures to deal with the power of DNA testing." See Id.