Holt v. Hobbs

In this case, the Court will address whether the ADC’s beard policy violates RLUIPA by barring a prisoner from growing a religiously motivated half-inch beard. RLUIPA states: “No government shall impose . . . a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person” unless it “(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Though the parties agree that the no-beard policy imposes a substantial burden on Holt’s religious exercise, they disagree on whether the policy furthers a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive way possible. In clarifying these issues, the Court will also have the opportunity to clarify what deference—if any—courts should give to the judgment of prison officials.

COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST

The ADC officers argue that the grooming policy serves a compelling government interest. Specifically, they contend that the no-beard policy aids prisons in identifying inmates and further, takes away a place where inmates can conceal contraband, thereby promoting prison security and safety. The ADC officers note that beards can conceal contraband, such as drugs or needles, which could pose a security threat to the prison. Additionally, they suggest that a prisoner can rapidly change his appearance through shaving a heard, and thus the no-beard policy helps curb this possibility. Also, though the ADC grooming policy does not provide an exception for prisoners who wish to grow a beard for religious reasons, it does provide an exception for prisoners with certain diagnosed dermatological problems to grow a quarter-inch beard. The ADC officers argue that the medical exception has a far smaller impact than the proposed religious exception and that the medical needs of inmates results in a different balancing of interests. Consequently, the ADC officers contend that the more relaxed restrictions for inmates with diagnosed dermatological conditions do not render unreasonable the belief that longer beards pose security concerns.

On the other hand, Holt argues that the ADC does not have a compelling interest in prohibiting inmates from growing beads because at least forty-four American prison systems allow inmates to maintain beards. Holt contends that in the past, the Court has noted that the policies at other prisons are relevant to determining whether a challenged policy further a compelling government interest. Thus, Holt argues that the ADC officers must show that the half-inch beards allowed by other prisons caused pertinent safety and security issues. Moreover, Holt maintains that, given other hiding places available to prisoners, permitting a religiously motivated half-inch beard would not increase the risk of contraband. Finally, Holt contends that if medical beards override the ADC’s interest in prison safety and security, then a religious half-inch beard should too.

LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS

Assuming that prison safety and security are compelling government interests, Holt notes that the ADC must next prove that it chose the least restrictive means to further that interest. Holt argues that to do so, the ADC must establish that prior to implementing the beard policy at issue, the ADC “considered and rejected” other less restrictive policies. Holt argues that there are several less restrictive alternatives including: mandatory searches of inmates’ beards, forcing inmates to shave if contraband is found in their beards, and compelling inmates to take new photos any time his appearance is altered.

On the contrary, the ADC officers argue that the no-beard policy is the least restrictive means to achieving a compelling government interest because there are no feasible means that would be as effective in achieving the policy’s purposes. They maintain that Holt’s proposed half-inch beard policy would create issues with concealing contraband within hair—something the no-beard policy adequately addresses. Finally, the ADC officers assert that allowing half-inch beards would also give rise to identification problems not remediable by multiple photographs because the policy would create administrative problems, which exacerbates the issue of limited resources.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND DEFERENCE TO PRISON OFFICIALS

Holt notes that the legislative history of RLUIPA indicates that the statutory standard of a compelling interest and least restrictive means should be administered with appropriate deference to prison official’s expertise and experience. Nonetheless, Holt argues that this cannot overrule statutory text and that no deference is due to the ADC officers. Further, Holt contends that the legislative history does not stipulate how much deference is due and does not nullify the ADC officers’ burden to demonstrate a compelling interest or that the current policy is the least restrictive means.

The ADC officers disagree, asserting that courts should defer to the judgment of prison officials. They note that deference does not equate to “rubber stamping.” Rather, the ADC officers contend that reviewing courts should understand that hard examples and data may not be available for assessing how a policy works in prison, and that sometimes prison official must enact prophylactic bans to avoid problems preemptively. Additionally, they argue that courts should permit prisons to make judgment calls even if the policy only fixes part of an issue. The ADC officials further maintain that courts should realize that policies that work at one prison may not necessarily work at another prison. Lastly, the ADC officials assert that prisons should not be subject to a “consider-and-reject” requirement for prison policies because RLUIPA does not impose such conditions.