Ocasio v. United States

The issue before the Court is whether a conspiracy to commit extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, requires that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. See Brief for Petitioner, Samuel Ocasio at i. The Hobbs Act defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, . . . under color of official right.” See id. Ocasio asserts that the government must prove that a defendant conspired to obtain property from a person outside the conspiracy. Id. at 21. But the United States maintains that the conspirators in an extortion scheme need to agree only that the public official will obtain property from another person, and that the other person may be one of the co-conspirators. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 15.

DOES THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE HOBBS ACT REQUIRE THAT CONSPIRATORS COMMITTING EXTORTION AGREE TO OBTAIN PROPERTY FROM SOMEONE OUTSIDE OF THE CONSPIRACY?

Ocasio argues that the plain text of the Hobbs Act eliminates the possibility that a public official and a briber could conspire together to commit extortion. See Brief for Petitioner at 21. Examining the definitions of the specific phrases used in 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), Ocasio argues that because the word “another” means one more person in addition to those already identified, and because “to conspire” is the action of two or more people agreeing to break the law, the text of the Hobbs Act requires that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone other than themselves. See id. at 22. Ocasio contends that a party cannot be both a victim of a conspiracy to commit extortion and a conspirator to the extortion. Id. at 23–24. Rather, Ocasio argues, because the Hobbs Act seeks to punish “‘whoever’ conspires to obtain property from ‘another,’” the “whoever” and the “another” cannot be the same person. Id. at 24. Ocasio also argues that the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the phrase “from another” is only meant to reflect that a public official cannot extort herself is illogical, because it is impossible for a public official to pay herself a bribe with her own money. Id. at 29. Ocasio maintains that the text of the Hobbs Act is clear and that because courts must presume that the legislature means what the language of a statute says, the Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit’s decision on textual grounds alone. See id. at 31.

The United States asserts that Ocasio ignores the language of the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“§ 371”), altogether. See Brief for Respondent at 20. The United States asserts that § 371 provides that two or more persons who conspire to commit any crime against the United States are guilty of conspiracy even if only one of them physically does the necessary act. See id. at 16. Thus, the United States argues, Ocasio and the repair shop owners in this case could conspire together, even though the repair shop owners could not physically commit the acts of public-official extortion. See id. at 23. The United States asserts that in order to satisfy the elements of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, the conspirators need not agree that both parties will obtain the property, but only that a public official will obtain the property with the consent of the other conspiring party. See id. at 24. The United States contends that Ocasio misreads the Hobbs Act, and that while “whoever” refers to the public official, “property from another” merely refers to property belonging to anyone other than that official. See id. at 21. Furthermore, the United States argues that Ocasio’s claim that the “whoever” and the “another” must be different people is a result of Ocasio’s “cobbling together” the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Id. The United States maintains that “whoever” the government prosecutes for conspiracy to commit extortion does not necessarily have to be the same person who obtains the property. Id. at 25. In addition, the United States argues that Ocasio’s interpretation entails that only public officials could be the “whoever” who could be prosecuted as conspirators, but that the Hobbs Act does not indicate that private parties who participate in extortion are immune from conspiracy liability. See id.

WOULD AFFIRMING THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BRIBERY AND CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT EXTORTION?

Ocasio argues that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the Hobbs Act imposes criminal liability on both public officials who take bribes and private citizens who pay them, and thus turns the act into a broader bribery statute. See Brief for Petitioner at 31–32. Ocasio asserts that if the Court does not require the government to prove that conspirators agreed to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy, then every payment of a bribe would also be a conspiracy to commit extortion, and hence the private citizen paying the bribe could be convicted of conspiracy. Id. at 32–33. Ocasio argues, however, that the Court has never interpreted the Hobbs Act to impose liability on a bribe-payor. Id. at 32. But Ocasio contends that if the Court affirms the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the government will be able to add conspiracy to almost every indictment alleging substantive extortion under the Hobbs Act. See id. at 37. Ocasio maintains that the Court has consistently recognized the distinction between substantive offenses and conspiracy to commit those offenses, and that if Congress intended to allow the government to prosecute the same conduct as both offenses, it would have clearly stated that in the language of the Hobbs Act. See id. at 38–39.

But the United States maintains that the Fourth Circuit’s decision does not necessarily impose criminal liability on bribe-payors, because bribe-payors who merely acquiesce “to an official demand,” rather than those who actively participate in a conspiracy with a public official, will not be prosecuted as conspirators. See Brief for Respondent at 33. The United States argues that principles of common law support prosecution of a bribe-payor who actively participates in a conspiracy to commit extortion under the conspiratorial provisions of the Hobbs Act. See id. at 37. And the United States contends that Ocasio has not provided any evidence that judges or juries have struggled with the distinction between a bribe-payor who merely consents to paying a bribe to a public official, and one who actively participates in a conspiracy to commit extortion with the public official. See id. at 38.

DO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM AND LENITY REQUIRE THAT THE COURT INTERPRET THE HOBBS ACT NARROWLY?

Ocasio contends that the Fourth Circuit’s decision displaces existing state laws that punish bribery by transforming payments of bribes to public officials into federal conspiracies to commit extortion. See Brief for Petitioner at 43–44. Ocasio argues that principles of federalism require that the Court apply a narrow interpretation to the Hobbs Act as to prevent the government from extending into the states’ legal territory. See id. at 43. Ocasio maintains that the Hobbs Act does not reflect a clear congressional intent to extend into the states’ territory and that the Court should thus prevent a shift in the existing balance between federal and state law. See id. at 44. Ocasio also maintains that the rule of lenity calls for resolving any ambiguity in favor of his position. Id. According to Ocasio, the rule of lenity encourages the Court to choose the less harsh of two possible readings of a criminal statute unless Congress has clearly intended otherwise. Id. at 44–45. Ocasio notes that the Court has already expressed disfavor toward the government’s attempts to broaden the realm of conspiracy prosecutions. See id. at 45.

The United States emphasizes that its interpretation of the Hobbs Act would not displace existing state laws, because it would not turn the statute into a general federal prohibition on paying bribes. See Brief for Respondent at 42. Furthermore, the United States contends that Congress expressly intended to apply the Hobbes Act to certain conspiracies to commit extortion and that it would punish the participating conspirators. See id. And the United States disputes Ocasio’s application of the rule of lenity, which it maintains only applies to criminal statutes that contain a “grievous ambiguity.” Id. The United States contends that the possibility of both broad and narrow interpretations of the Hobbs Act, and the existence of some ambiguity in the text of the statute, are insufficient reasons to apply the rule of lenity in this case. See id.