Manrique v. United States

FILING BEFORE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT: FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 4(b)(2) AND THE MATURATION OF AN APPEAL

Litigants in federal court can obtain appellate review in a court of appeals “only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1). The resolution of this case hinges on the interpretation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), as the parties disagree, in particular, over the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(2).

Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(i) requires defendants in a criminal case to file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the entry of the judgment or order being appealed. Rule 4(b)(2) states that “a notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, sentence, or order—but before the entry of the judgment or order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.”Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(2). Federal district courts under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) can sentence a criminal defendant and order restitution but wait to determine the amount of the restitution award until a later date.

Manrique contends that Rule 4(b)(2) applies to his single notice of appeal. Thus, according to Manrique, when a defendant files a single appeal after sentencing but before the court specifies a restitution amount, Rule 4(b)(2) causes the single appeal to mature to perfect an appeal of the amended judgment, rendering the filing of a second appeal unnecessary. Manrique’s argument follows several steps. First, Manrique claims that, in deferred-restitution cases, “judgment” as used in Rule 4(b)(2) refers to a combination of the initial judgment ordering restitution and the amended judgment specifying the restitution amount. Therefore, Manrique claims that he filed his appeal after a “decision, sentence, or order” but before the entry of the judgment, because, under his analysis, the judgment was not final until the court issued the amended judgment. Manrique argues that it follows that, because of Rule 4(b)(2), his appeal matured to perfect his appeal, meaning that his single appeal extends to also appeal the restitution amount.

The United States, however, asserts that Manrique’s interpretation of Rule 4(b)(2) contradicts the Rule’s text and purpose. The United States argues that Rule 4(b)(2) applies when a defendant files a notice of appeal after a “decision, sentence, or order” that the defendant wants to appeal. The United States claims that the decision Manrique wanted to appeal was the restitution amount of $4,500, which the Court awarded two months after Manrique filed his notice of appeal. Further, the United States argues that Manrique had no basis to appeal the Court’s first judgment, the imposition of restitution, as he pled guilty to an offense requiring restitution by statute, meaning that Manrique had no basis of appeal until the amended judgment.

Additionally, according to the United States, the purpose of Rule 4(b)(2) is to protect a litigant who files an appeal without realizing that the court has not formally entered the judgment into the docket. The United States claims that Rule 4(b)(2) is the criminal equivalent to civil Rule 4(a)(2), which is intended to serve the same purpose. The United States argues that the Rule’s purpose makes sense, given that a docket “merely memorializes” a decision that a court previously made and announced. The United States argues that the Rule is only meant to mature an appeal when the entry of judgment simply memorializes a prior decision; thus, the United States contends that an amended judgment specifying a restitution amount greatly exceeds the scope of the Rule.

THE IMPACT OF DOLAN AND THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

Manrique claims that the application of Rule 4(b)(2) to his single appeal is consistent with the Court’s decision in Dolan v. United States, and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. The issue in Dolan was whether the district court could award restitution even though the district court exceeded the time allotted by the MVRA to award restitution. Nonetheless, Manrique claims that the combination of the initial judgment with the amended judgment to form the final judgment is consistent with the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) as applied and interpreted in Dolan.

Moreover, in Dolan, Dolan argued that a sentencing judgment lacks finality until restitution is determined. Manrique argues that the court in Dolan held that the initial sentencing judgment could be final enough to be appealed, even though it was not necessarily the final judgment. Manrique contends that this holding is also consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. While generally, according to the Restatement, finality is lacking if an issue of fact or law “essential to the adjudication of the claim has been reserved for future determination,” Manrique argues that the Restatement has exceptions that allow for appeal without finality in certain circumstances. Manrique argues that the initial judgment ordering restitution is final enough for appeal per Dolan, which noted that there are strong arguments for the appealability of an initial judgment, even when the restitution amount is undetermined.

The United States contends, however, that Dolan indicates the proper procedure for obtaining appellate review in deferred-restitution cases. The court in Dolan, while not addressing the exact scenario at issue in this case, noted that it is not unlikely for a defendant to appeal from both the initial judgment containing the defendant’s prison sentence and from the “later order setting forth the final amount of restitution.” The United States claims that this indicates that a defendant should appeal from both the initial judgment and from the amended judgment containing the restitution amount.

The United States also takes issue with Manrique’s claim that “the judgment” under Rule 4(b)(2) consists of a combination of the initial judgment and the amendment judgment. The United States contends that Dolan held that an initial sentence including a fine, term of imprisonment, or supervised release constitutes a final judgment. In addition, the United States claims that the Court in Dolan held that a delayed restitution award also constitutes a final judgment that must be appealed separately. The United States questions the finality of and the ability to appeal the initial judgment of restitution and argues that the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides no support for Manrique’s finality argument. The United States claims that the Restatement merely states that finality for appellate review differs from finality for purposes of res judicata.

THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 4(b)(3)

Manrique argues that Rule 4(b)(3) does not demonstrate that Rule 4(b)(2) is inapplicable to his single appeal. Rule 4(b)(3) states that a notice of appeal is effective without amendment “to appeal from an order disposing of” a motion for judgment of acquittal, a new trial, or arrest of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(3). Manrique takes the silence of the rules governing criminal appeals regarding certain amended judgments to demonstrate that a second notice of appeal is not required for amended criminal judgments. Manrique notes that, in contrast to the rules governing criminal appeals, the rules governing civil appeals clearly state that an amended appeal is required after an amended judgment, indicating that such a procedure is not necessary in criminal cases.

Conversely, the United States contends that Rule 4(b)(3) demonstrates that Rule 4(b)(2) does not apply to Manrique’s single appeal. Because Rule 4(b)(3) states that a notice of appeal is effective without amendment for certain orders, the United States claims that this Rule implies that such leniency is not permitted for other kinds of orders, including orders designating a restitution amount.