Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian

CERCLA SECTION 113 AND STATE-LAW RESTORATION DAMAGES

Petitioner ARCO argues that CERCLA Section 113 bars the landowners from seeking restoration damages in Montana State Court. Brief for Petitioner, Atlantic Richfield Co. at 26. ARCO notes that the text of Section 113(b) grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts over “controversies arising under” CERCLA. Id. at 27. ARCO posits that the word controversies includes any claim that would challenge the EPA’s remedial plan for a Superfund. Id. at 28­–29. ARCO contends that the Landowners’ claim for restoration damages is a clear challenge to the EPA’s plan for the Anaconda Superfund, because the Landowners’ plan for cleaning the site—including lower soil-action levels, greater excavation depths, and the digging of groundwater trenches—goes well beyond what the EPA has required ARCO to do. Id. at 29. Accordingly, ARCO argues, only a federal court could entertain the Landowners’ lawsuit, not the Montana state courts. Id. at 29–30.

ARCO further maintains that Section 113 prevents a challenge to a PRP like ARCO in the same way that it prevents a challenge to the EPA itself. Id. at 31. ARCO argues that the meaning of “challenges” does not depend on who actually carries out a cleanup remedy—otherwise, litigants could “circumvent” Section 113 by suing private parties like ARCO rather than the EPA. Id. at 31. Similarly, it contends that Section 113’s broad language bars state-law claims even after the EPA’s remediation plan is completed because undoing any EPA-authorized work would constitute a “challenge” no matter how much time passes. Id. at 31–32.

The Respondent Landowners counter that Section 113 permits their state-law claims. Brief for Respondents, Gregory A. Christian et al. at 21. The Landowners point to the text of Section 113(h), which they contend only limits the claims that federal courts—not state courts—may hear. Id. at 22. They also highlight Section 113(b)’s coverage of cases “arising under” CERCLA, noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted this same language to implicate federal-question jurisdiction. Id. at 24. Under that jurisdictional standard, the Landowners argue that their state-law restoration claims do not create a federal question, and the possibility that ARCO will raise its CERCLA obligations as a defense is not sufficient to implicate Section 113. Id. at 24–25. Instead, the Landowners assert that Section 113 specifically exempts diversity jurisdiction—which would include their state-law claims—from exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id. at 28–29. The Landowners point to legislative history—where officials stated that CERLCA was designed to preserve private nuisance claims—to reinforce this argument that Congress never intended for CERCLA to bar state-law actions in state courts. Id. at 29–30.

The Landowners also reject the notion that their restoration lawsuit challenges the EPA’s cleanup plan; thus, Section 113 would not be implicated in the first place. Id. at 31. They explain that a “challenge” would require the Landowners to claim that the EPA’s plan was somehow illegal under CERCLA standards. Id. at 32–33. Instead, the Landowners contend that their lawsuit is based on a different remedy standard, where Montana law permits damages to further restore a property to its pre-injury condition after ARCO completes the EPA’s plan. Id. at 34. Accordingly, the Landowners argue that nothing in Section 113 prevents their state-law claim from going forward to trial. Id. at 35.

LANDOWNERS’ STATUS UNDER CERCLA SECTION 122(e)(6)

ARCO argues that the Landowners’ status under CERCLA ​Section 122(e)(6) prevents them from taking any action to contradict the EPA’s remediation plan. Brief for Petitioner at 32. ARCO claims that the Landowners—just like ARCO—fit squarely within Section 122(e)(6)’s definition of potentially responsible parties, which includes owners of polluted land within the Superfund site. Id. at 32–33. ARCO argues that both the Supreme Court and the EPA have interpreted the definition of PRPs to include private landowners, because to do otherwise would create a “huge statutory void” where landowners on a Superfund site could pursue their own cleanup goals without EPA approval. Id. at 32–34. ARCO contends that the Montana Supreme Court conflated potential liability with actual liability, when in fact Landowners should still be deemed potentially liable under Section 122(e)(6) even if they will never ultimately be deemed responsible for polluting the Superfund site. Id. at 35–36. ARCO claims that a broad designation of PRPs ensures that all parties implicated by CERCLA will continue working together even after the polluting parties settle with the EPA. Id. at 37.

Furthermore, ARCO argues that CERCLA’s six-year statute of limitations—which begins when EPA-designated cleanup begins—only applies to lawsuits regarding cleanup costs, so CERCLA does not create a time period within which PRPs must be designated. Id. at 38. ARCO argues that actual liability may be determined after cleanup has begun, and to interpret CERCLA otherwise would force the EPA to delay cleanup until after it identifies and settles with all potential PRPs, many of whom the EPA would otherwise never target. Id. at 39.

The Landowners dispute their characterization as PRPs. Brief for Respondents at 36. The Landowners argue that the Supreme Court has yet to directly address the scope of PRP in Section 122(e)(6) because the Court’s prior decisions concerned the distinct phrase “covered persons” which is used in a different section of CERCLA. Id. at 37–38. The Landowners note that, even if the “covered persons” standard included all PRPs, the Landowners would qualify for an exception where their properties were polluted by no fault of their own. Id. at 47–48.

Instead, the Landowners argue that the Court should interpret the word “potentially” in PRP as encompassing only those parties that face actual risk of liability, such as ARCO. Id. at 39­–40. The Landowners note that CERCLA’s procedures are designed to assign responsibility for environmental pollution and to facilitate settlements, so Section 122(e)(6) does not contemplate including innocent parties within those procedures. Id. Additionally, the Landowners note that they cannot face actual liability as PRPs because the statute of limitations has passed. Id. at 36. The Landowners assert that Congress used the limited language of PRP in order to prevent the EPA from controlling how residential landowners use their property forever, which would raise concerns about unconstitutional government takings. Id. at 41–42. Ultimately, the Landowners contend that, regardless of their status, the EPA can always seek judicial intervention if the Landowners’ cleanup threatens to worsen the Superfund’s environmental health. Id. at 46.

CERCLA AND STATE-LAW PREEMPTION

ARCO argues that its federal obligations under CERCLA preempt the state-law restoration remedy that the Landowners seek. Brief for Petitioner at 41. ARCO notes that the Supreme Court has held that requiring a party to choose between violating federal law and paying state law damages is “logically incompatible,” and that a party’s federal obligations must always prevail under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 42. ARCO argues that the Landowners’ restoration remedy would saddle ARCO with a state-law duty to complete the Landowners’ requested cleanup or pay money damages for that specific cleanup. Id. at 43. But because Section 122(e)(6) prevents PRPs like ARCO from undertaking any remedial action without EPA approval, ARCO claims that paying damages to the Landowners for other cleanup will force ARCO to defy federal law under CERCLA. Id. at 44. In fact, ARCO notes that the EPA already blocked a tentative ARCO plan to remediate the Landowners’ properties because it went beyond the EPA’s plan. Id. at 45.

Further, ARCO emphasizes that CERCLA’s “savings” clauses are limited in nature, and do not create a preemption exception for state common-law claims. Brief for Petitioner at 51. ARCO argues that the clauses in CERCLA Section 114(a) and Section 302(d) are written generically, and that the Supreme Court has previously cautioned against reading “savings” clauses too broadly so as not to disturb carefully established federal regulations. Id. at 52. ARCO concedes that the “savings” clauses might preserve a state’s ability to impose supplemental liability on PRPs, but that the Landowners’ plan would disturb—not supplement—the EPA’s established cleanup plan, so CERCLA still preempts the Landowners’ plan. Id. at 54–55.

The Landowners respond that CERCLA does not preempt their lawsuit for restoration damages because ARCO would not be saddled with any duty that would conflict with the EPA plan. Brief for Respondent at 50. The Landowners emphasize that preemption by “impossibility” is a demanding standard for ARCO to meet, and that nothing in CERCLA makes it physically impossible for ARCO to pay damages to the Landowners so that they can restore their own properties. Id. at 50–54. The Landowners note that the mere possibility that the EPA might deny ARCO’s request to conduct further cleanup work is not a sufficient showing of total impossibility for preemption. Id. at 54. And in any event, the Landowners argue, it is highly unlikely that ARCO would require EPA approval or oversight before conducting additional restoration work for the Landowners, because ARCO has already completed all of the EPA-ordered remediation on the Landowners’ properties. Id. at 56.

The Landowners also argue that CERCLA’s “savings” clauses make it clear that the Act does not preempt state common-law claims. Id. at 62. The Landowners note that these two “savings” clauses contain “plain language” stating that “nothing” in CERCLA shall affect the traditional common-law liability of polluters. Id. at 62–63. The Landowners argue that these repeated clauses demonstrate that Congress intended for CERCLA to leave room for plaintiffs to bring Superfund-related lawsuits in state court. Id. at 64. Furthermore, the Landowners argue that CERCLA allows the EPA to bring actions to stop any plans by plaintiffs that might endanger the environment. Id. at 65.