Stokeling v. United States

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Stokeling contends that the Florida robbery statute does not satisfy the ACCA’s elements clause—particularly, the use of “physical force” requirement. Specifically, Stokeling asserts that the Court has previously interpreted “physical force” in the ACCA statute to mean “violent force.” Stokeling further maintains that the Court has held that “violent force” implies a substantial degree of force, not just offensive touching. Additionally, Stokeling argues that the Government’s interpretation of violent force as “any conduct potentially ‘capable’ of causing pain or injury” conflicts with prior precedent and does not contain a limiting principle—even the most subtle contact is capable of causing pain or injury under particular circumstances. Instead, Stokeling maintains that “violent force” should be interpreted to mean force that is “reasonably expected to cause pain or injury” because this reading is a more “contextual and sensible reading” than the Government’s interpretation. Stokeling also asserts that the Court has previously reaffirmed that “violent force ‘connotes a substantial degree of force’” and that a “minor” use of force, “like a squeeze of the arm that causes a bruise,” is not “violent force” as contemplated by the ACCA.

Stokeling also contends that Congress’s purpose in passing the ACCA was to target offenders likely to commit gun violence, with a particular emphasis on violent felons or drug traffickers and impose enhanced sentencing for those individuals. Moreover, Stokeling notes that the Court has previously interpreted Congress’ intent in passing the ACCA as supporting the application of enhanced sentencing only where the increased likelihood of committing a violent crime with a gun exists. In this case, Stokeling asserts, there is no increased likelihood that the offender might commit an act of gun violence because the elements of the Florida robbery statute may be fulfilled without the perpetrator engaging in any conduct that is designed to cause harm. Stokeling maintains that interpreting the ACCA to cover Florida robbery would result in numerous “garden-variety, petty criminal [offenses]” receiving mandatory enhanced sentences.

The Government counters that the ACCA’s elements clause provides that a “violent felony,” for purposes of the ACCA, is any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and “has as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another[.]” The Government argues that the Court has previously defined “physical force” to mean “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” Additionally, the Government contends that Court precedent focuses on the capability to cause pain or injury—“physical force” focuses on the criminal acts themselves, not the result of those acts. Further, the Government asserts that this distinction would not cause the ACCA’s elements clause to have a limitless reach because precedent still demands that an element of the crime in question be the capability to cause pain or injury. In addition, the Government asserts that the language Stokeling cites as defining “physical force” is inapplicable because the Court has never used or endorsed that language in precedent.

Furthermore, the Government argues that the evolution of the ACCA indicates that robbery offenses, like the one at issue in this case, necessarily include the “use of physical force” as defined under the ACCA. Specifically, the Government notes that common-law robbery was used as a model for the type of offense that was meant to be covered by the elements clause of the ACCA.The Government asserts that the original version of the ACCA explicitly stated that the statute applied to “robbery or burglary” and called those offenses “violent street crimes.” Additionally, the Government argues that in enacting the ACCA, Congress sought to draw the line between sufficient and insufficient force at the point where crimes like pickpocketing or removing property from an unconscious person would be excluded from enhanced sentencing under the statute but crimes like burglary would be included. Even after enacting the elements clause component of the ACCA, the Government claims that Congress still intended to retain this original dividing line. The Government maintains that if the ACCA were to be interpreted to require more violence than was necessary to commit common-law robbery, the ACCA would no longer relate to its preexisting legal framework.

WHETHER FLORIDA ROBBERY TRIGGERS THE ACCA

Stokeling argues that the Florida robbery statute does not satisfy the ACCA’s elements clause—particularly the use of “physical force” requirement.Specifically, Stokeling contends that “violent force” and “physical force” are not elements of the Florida robbery statute because only a slight degree of force is required to meet the statute’s requirements. Stokeling asserts that robbery under Florida law can be committed with any degree of force as long as the perpetrator overcomes some resistance.Furthermore, Stokeling notes that any degree of force may be sufficient to overcome victim resistance if the victim resistance itself is very slight—that is, there is no threshold extent of resistance that a victim must exert in order for that resistance to be overcome by the offender. Therefore, Stokeling maintains that this is not the violent struggle contemplated by the ACCA’s “violent force” requirement, as demonstrated by several cases in Florida. Finally, Stokeling notes that the Government admits that three other states have robbery statutes that would not trigger the elements clause of the ACCA and the conduct considered in those statutes is materially indistinguishable from—or, in some cases, more forceful than—the conduct criminalized as robbery in Florida.

The Government counters that the amount of force required under the Florida robbery statute, “force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance,” satisfies the ACCA’s elements clause.Specifically, the Government argues that precedent only requires that the force used be capable of causing pain or physical injury. The Government contends that the force required to commit Florida robbery is by definition always capable of causing such pain of physical injury, and it often does. Indeed, the Government claims that if a person in Florida does not employ force capable of causing pain or physical injury—for example, in pickpocketing or purse-snatching scenarios—then that person cannot be guilty of robbery under the Florida statute. Additionally, the Government notes that the Florida Supreme Court has differentiated between “snatching” and robbery by stating that “snatching” only amounts to robbery if the perpetrator employed more force than is necessary to remove the property from that person. The Government asserts that because Florida distinguishes between robbery and other, lesser theft offenses, “slight offensive touching” would not satisfy the Florida robbery statute. Further, the Government maintains that the Florida robbery statute requires a level of force that satisfies the standard set forth in Court precedent.Finally, the Government argues that in each of the Florida cases that Stokeling cites in support of his interpretation, the evidence in those cases shows that those defendants used force that was capable of causing physical pain or injury.