Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido

THE ADEA’S PLAIN MEANING

Petitioner Mount Lemmon maintains that § 630(b)’s definition of “employer” is ambiguous. Given the statute’s context, Mount Lemmon argues that the best interpretation of the phrase “also means” is “includes.” Mount Lemmon then asserts that because the term ‘person,’ as defined in § 630(a) includes state and local government employers, those same employers must fall under the scope of § 630(b). In addition to the definition of “person” in § 630(a), Mount Lemmon notes that both Congress and the Court have historically interpreted the term “person” to include these employers. Mount Lemmon also points to § 630(a)’s references to “corporations,” “associations,” and “any organized group of persons as evidence that government employers count as persons. According to Mount Lemmon, the Ninth Circuit erred in overlooking the the term “person” as defined by § 630(a), because the word is essential to understanding how the ADEA treats state political subdivisions. Mount Lemmon then argues that the phrase “also means” clarifies § 630(b)’s definition of employers with twenty or less employees, rather than adding a new and separate group of employers that are not subject to a numerosity requirement. This must be the case, Mount Lemmon asserts, because the second sentence of § 630(b) merely explains which governmental employers are included in the first sentence and which are not. Mount Lemmon looks to the structure and syntax of the clause to support this assertion, highlighting the inconsistency that would result from adopting Guido and Rankin’s reading. Specifically, Mount Lemmon explains it is unlikely that Congress would have introduced the second sentence of § 630(b) just to expand the coverage of the first sentence and that the clause in fact defines entities that have no numerosity requirement as well those that do. Mount Lemmon also points out that dictionaries give several definitions for the term “also,” and often categorize it as a clarifying term. Finally, Mount Lemmon observes that the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court to hold that the ADEA contains no numerosity requirement for state and local government employers.

On the other hand, Respondents Guido and Rankin claim that § 630(b) is clear on its face, and that the term “also” in the phrase “also means” is equivalent to “in addition”. Guido and Rankin support this interpretation by pointing to the usual use and definition of “also” in ordinary language and in dictionaries. Furthermore, Guido and Rankin contend that Mount Lemmon’s analysis of the term “person” in § 630(a) is unnecessary because the statute’s definition of employer is unambiguous. In fact, Guido and Rankin argue that the term “person” in § 630(a) does not encompass state and local governments. To support this assertion, Guido and Rankin refer first to a fundamental rule of statutory construction that bars applying the general language of a statute to a specific matter in another part of the same statute. Accordingly, Guido and Rankin argue that the definition given for “person” in § 630(a) cannot be applied to the use of the term “person” in § 630(b) because “person” is defined generally in § 630(a) and is used specifically to refer to state and local employers in § 630(b). Second, Guido and Rankin point out that Congress would not have amended the ADEA in 1974 to include state and local employers as a separate group of employers if the term “person” had already entailed state and local employers. Consequently, Guido and Rankin contend that “person” cannot be used to clarify the definition of employers in § 630(b).Additionally, Guido and Rankin point out that Congress has used the term “also means” in place of “in addition” throughout the United States Code. Guido and Rankin add that the Court has referred to employers with greater than twenty employees and government employers as two separate groups in past cases involving the ADEA’s application to state agencies. Lastly, Guido and Rankin point out that the EEOC compliance manual interprets § 630(b) as applying to state and local government employers regardless of size.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND STATUTORY CONTEXT

Mount Lemmon points out that Congress’s stated intent was to put private and public employers on equal footing and harmonize the ADEA with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Title VII. In this context, Mount Lemmon asserts that the ADEA is anomalous if it has no numerosity requirement for state and local government employers. Mount Lemmon points out that the ADA and Title VII both contain a numerosity requirement for state and local government employers. Additionally, Mount Lemmon notes that a statute cannot be read to interfere with state government in the absence of a clear statement from Congress. Mount Lemmon contends that Guido and Rankin’s interpretation of the statute interferes with state governments. Furthermore, Mount Lemmon argues that there is no clear statement from Congress for the ADEA to interfere with state and local governments because of the strong disagreement between the circuit courts and the parties in this case regarding the ADEA’s plain meaning.

Guido and Rankin contend that their interpretation of the ADEA is not as anomalous as Mount Lemmon suggests. Guido and Rankin point out that several states have anti-discrimination statutes that apply to government employers regardless of size. In fact, Guido and Rankin assert that the ADEA is more aligned with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) than with Title VII or the ADA. Guido and Rankin argue that the definitions, procedures, and structure of the ADEA derive from the FLSA.Accordingly, because the FLSA has no numerosity requirement for state and local employers, Guido and Rankin maintain that it is consistent for the ADEA also to have no numerosity requirement for state and local employers.They add that it is not proper for a court to revise legislation because of an apparent anomaly. Moreover, Guido and Rankin suggest that a clear statement from Congress is not necessary here because the statute is not ambiguous in the first place. Lastly, Guido and Rankin claim that even if the statute was ambiguous, the clear statement rule does not apply here because a statute preventing states from discrimination does not trigger the rule.

Commerce Clause Violation

Mount Lemmon asserts that Guido and Rankin’s interpretation of § 630(b) would violate the Commerce Clause. According to Mount Lemmon, Congress cannot apply statutory authority over a state and local employer without a qualifying phrase like “affecting commerce” that links the statute to the constitutional power embodied in the Commerce Clause. Thus, Mount Lemmon argues that Guido and Rankin’s interpretation of § 630(b) raises constitutional issues because the statute would potentially apply to state and local government employers that do not affect commerce.

In contrast, Guido and Rankin argue that their interpretation of the ADEA statute does not stretch Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, because the Court has already established that economic activity falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause when it substantially affects interstate commerce. Guido and Rankin contend that aggregate employment activity under the ADEA substantially affects interstate commerce. Accordingly, Guido and Rankin conclude that the ADEA’s employment activity is well within the Commerce Clause’s scope. Lastly, Guido and Rankin point out that Mount Lemmon has not cited any case showing that the ADEA must include a qualifying phrase to invoke the Commerce Clause.