McDonough v. Smith

THE ROLE OF ANALOGOUS COMMON-LAW TORT CLAIMS

McDonough argues that, although a § 1983 claim is a federal cause of action, the claim will depend on state law—including the state’s statute of limitations. However, McDonough attests that federal common-law tort principles will determine when the statute of limitations begins to run. According to McDonough, although the statute of limitations traditionally runs once a plaintiff’s claims are satisfied, courts will take exception to this general rule in § 1983 claims. McDonough maintains that sometimes courts should adopt the limitations rule that would apply in an analogous tort claim. Here, McDonough argues, the analogous tort claim is malicious prosecution because of the wrongfulness of prosecution and the focus on the criminal process itself. McDonough contends that courts have upheld malicious prosecution actions that were based on fabricated evidence akin to the type of fabrication here. As a result, McDonough posits that the Court should rule that the statute of limitations does not begin until a favorable termination is given. The reason for the rule, McDonough contends, is that courts can shield criminal proceedings from collateral attack or duplicitous proceedings.

Smith counters that McDonough relies too heavily on the significance of analogies to common tort laws. Indeed, Smith asserts that such common-law principles are meant to serve as a guide rather than a strict requirement. Smith continues by asserting that McDonough—despite having his malicious prosecution claim dismissed for absolute immunity—is trying to relate the remaining claim as if it were a malicious prosecution claim, even though a fabrication claim is in fact completely separate. Unlike malicious prosecution, Smith contends, a fabrication claim does not require an acquittal or other favorable termination because such a claim can be brought against the Government. Thus, argues Smith, the accrual period should begin when the wrong happened, not when the proceedings ended. Smith further argues that malicious prosecution is viewed as a Fourth Amendment issue by the courts and the accrual period, under Fourth Amendment claims, can start during criminal proceedings. Smith also contends that McDonough’s surviving claim does not assert a lack of probable cause, making his constitutional-violation claims unclear unless the claim is categorized as a substantive due process claim. Under such a claim, argues Smith, the conclusion of proceedings is irrelevant, the claim is available to any defendant, and the claim can thus be brought at any time.

LIMITATIONS ON BRINGING SECTION 1983 SUITS

McDonough also argues that in the event the court adopts the standard rule for statute-of-limitations accrual, the claim is still timely. McDonough contends that the accrual period cannot start until a plaintiff is eligible or permitted to file suit. McDonough maintains that he was unable to file suit until the acquittal because of the rules established in Preiser v. Rodriguez and Heck v. Humphrey. The court in Preiser, McDonough asserts, established a rule that when an individual is in custody and wants to challenge the facts or duration of his custody, the sole remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, McDonough explains, because the court considers custody to apply broadly––like being released on recognizance––he was barred from bringing suit until acquittal. Additionally, McDonough argues that, under Heck, the court applied the rule to a seeking of monetary damages in relation to criminal confinement, so that the plaintiff’s claim does not accrue until favorable termination. McDonough also maintains that the Court should adopt favorable termination as an element of McDonough’s claim because it would prevent collateral attack, duplicitous or parallel litigation, and because the liberty of the individual is severely affected and often public.

Smith counters that McDonough inappropriately applies Heck as a bar to his claims despite Heck’s inapplicability to his claims. That is, Smith maintains that Wallace v. Kato provided the limits of Heck, which only applies where a suit would challenge an outstanding criminal judgment and not to anticipate future convictions. Additionally, Smith contends that a district court holds the authority to stay civil proceedings if there are ongoing criminal proceedings but there posed no obstacle for Smith to bring his § 1983 claims. Concerning McDonough’s pretrial custody, Smith argues that McDonough’s remaining claim involves fabrication of evidence and not his pretrial custody, and therefore should be dismissed. Also, Smith cautions that McDonough’s reliance on Preiser and his reading would expand the doctrine and would require any claimant to seek a writ of habeas corpus regardless of whether the custody stems from a conviction. Smith also maintains that Wallace renders McDonough’s Preiser argument moot, arguing that Wallace establishes that an individual can file suit immediately upon false arrest.

APPLICATION OF CONTINUING VIOLATION TO SECTION 1983 CLAIM

McDonough argues that the suit is also timely because the criminal proceedings represented a continuous violation as opposed to a singular, discrete act. McDonough explains that a claim does not accrue until the end of the violation. He contends that the Court has applied the same doctrine to Title VII cases involving racial discrimination. McDonough argues that a legal proceeding constitutes a continuous wrong—which does not end until the complaining party ceases prosecution of the proceedings—and not an isolated harm. McDonough further maintains that Smith’s forgery and falsifications did not only occur at the beginning of the proceedings, but were continuous throughout the trial including false testimonies and forged witness affidavits. Additionally, McDonough explains that the forgeries and false evidence not only occurred in the first litigation, but also in the subsequent litigation, where the later use of such evidence is not irrelevant, and thus an individual has a right to remedy those wrongs.

Smith counters that the continuous-violation doctrine does not apply to McDonough’s claim. Smith cites Wallace once more where the court, in that case, determined that the limitations period of the plaintiff who sued under § 1983 began when the plaintiff could first file suit which was as soon as the wrongful act took place. Furthermore, argues Smith, the rule dictates that, although harm can continue due to wrongful prosecution, it is not the full extent of damages that is required for the limitation period to begin to run. Smith further contends that even if the statute of limitations were to run on the last cognizable harm, McDonough’s claim would still be untimely because the last harm did not occur within three years of the filing of his current § 1983 claim. That is, Smith asserts that McDonough’s identified harms—the presentation of fabricated evidence to the grand jury and the use of fabricated evidence during the trial—both of which occurred before December 18, 2012. Smith also maintains that the acquittal itself does not constitute a harm because it is not a deprivation of an individual’s liberty.