Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SECTION 355?

Petitioner Salinas argues that Congress intended for finality to attach to the Board’s decisions and provided judicial review via Section 355(f) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (“RUIA”) as a “safety valve.” Brief for Petitioner, Manfredo M. Salinas at 25, 27. Salinas contends that under a plain text analysis of Section 355(f), “any final decision” directly translates to “all final decisions,” including decisions to deny reopening requests. Id. at 19–20. Salinas asserts that given more language specifically limiting judicial review elsewhere in the RUIA, Congress’s choice of language in 355(f) indicates that Congress intended Board decisions to be broadly reviewable. Id. Salinas maintains that Section 231g, the Railroad Retirement Act’s (“RRA”) equivalent to Section 355(f), is nearly identical in structure and wording to 355(f), and that the Supreme Court has already interpreted its language to have a broadly encompassing reach. Id. at 20–21. Salinas contends that a one-size-fits-all rule for actions reviewed by regulatory agencies is misguided, and that neither the Board nor the Court should draw comparisons between the Social Security Act’s (“SSA”) judicial review provisions and the review provisions under the RRA and RUIA. Id. at 40–41. Salinas asserts that the SSA and RUIA have crucial textual differences. Id. at 42.

Respondent Board argues that, under both the RRA and the RUIA, judicial review is not available for the Board’s decision to decline to reopen an application. Brief for Respondent, United States Railroad Retirement Board at 17. The Board asserts that only decisions made under Section 355(c) of the RUIA are subject to judicial review. Id. The Board contends Salinas falls outside Section 355(f)’s scope because Section 355(f) only refers to four kinds of parties that may seek judicial review: (1)“‘[a]ny claimant’”; (2) a qualifying “‘railway labor organization[s]’”; (3) a “‘base-year employer of the claimant’”; or (4) “‘any other party aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c).’” Id. at 18. The Board argues that the word “other” means that all parties mentioned in Section 355(f) must be aggrieved by a final decision under Section 355(c). Id. The Board maintains that under Salinas’s reading of the statute, any listed party can challenge any of the Board’s final decisions even if it does not aggrieve them. Id. at 19. Finally, the Board contends that the design of the SSA and RUIA statutes are similar enough that it is safe to analogize between them to limit judicial review here. Id. at 36.

HOW DOES SECTION 355(c) AFFECT THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 355(f)?

Salinas argues that the best way to interpret Section 355(f)’s list of litigants entitled to judicial review is to not exclude litigants whose claims fall outside Section 355(c). Brief for Petitioner at 30–31. Salinas proposes that 355(f) should be read in accordance with the “last-antecedent rule,” which limits the final modifier to only the immediately preceding subject; this, Salinas argues, is in consonance with the general understanding of the other modifiers in Section 355. Id. at 32. Salinas further contends that if the Court interpreted Section 355(f) according to the Board’s favored reading, Section 355(f) would give both meaningless and overinclusive effect to Section 355(c). Id. at 33. Furthermore, Salinas asserts that certain claims under Section 355(g) would be unreviewable if the Court narrowly interpreted Section 355(f) as limited by Section 355(c), as Section 355(g) claims can only be reviewed through Section 355(f). Id. at 34–36. Finally, Salinas argues that limiting judicial review to the types of claims provided for solely under Sections 355(c) and (g) by constricting Section 355(f) would break with the Court’s statutory interpretation precedents. Id. at 36–37. Salinas expounds that the text of the statute, with its many modifiers and intentional complexity, clearly supports applying the last-antecedent rule. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 15.

The Board contends that the requirement of being aggrieved does not just apply to the fourth-listed party in Section 355(f), but that there are other ways to interpret the last-antecedent rule to apply only to the phrase that “it immediately follows.” Brief for Respondent at 24. The Board argues that the structure and actual language of Section 355 are more important than that rule—here the word “other” in Section 355(f) means that the last item in the list has the same characteristics as the preceding items, which takes precedent over the last-antecedent rule. Id. at 24–26. The Board argues that the RRA’s Section 231g supports the Board’s claim that decisions about reopening applications cannot be reviewed by courts because Section 231g’s language—allowing courts to review decisions about “rights or liabilities”—matches Section 355(c)’s intended purpose; that language, according to the Board, does not allow for judicial review of all of the Board’s final decisions. Id. at 29. The Board claims that a decision not to reopen a case is not about “rights or liabilities,” but is a refusal to decide something new. Id.

IS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE BOARD’S DETERMINATIONS LIMITED?

Salinas argues that it interprets Section 355(f) to be self-limiting to claims under the Act. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 2–3. Salinas contends that his preferred reading of Section 355(f) would not open the door to parties outside the scope of either the RRA or RUIA. Id. This, Salinas maintains, is because Article III of the United States Constitution only affords judicial review to aggrieved parties. Id. Further, Salinas proposes that the exhaustion and judicial review provisions scattered throughout Section 355’s subsections work together, allowing the Board to appreciably consider certain decisions for more complex or important types of claims while leaving ultimate review to the federal courts on all matters. Id. at 6–7. Salinas argues that the presumption of judicial review, in the absence of textual or contextual evidence showing otherwise, militates in favor of reviewing the Board’s denial to reopen. Brief for Petitioner at 24–25. Salinas further objects that the Board fails to meet its burden to rebut the presumption clearly and convincingly for judicial review on reopening claims. Id. at 41­–42.

The Board argues that the structure of Section 355 makes clear that judicial review is limited to decisions made under Section 355(c). Brief for Respondent at 20. The Board posits that this means that certain categories of Board decisions will therefore have to undergo an internal review, as opposed to judicial review, as required by Sections 355(c), (f), and (g). Id. at 20–21. The Board asserts that Section 355’s complex structure preserves judicial review for the “most important” Board determinations, while permitting the Board's greater discretion over routine decisions to remove “any and all” determinations from the burdensome review process. Id. at 21. The Board contends that Section 355(c) works together with Section 355(f) because 355(f) requires an aggrieved party to follow the procedures in Section 355(c), and therefore they must be read together. Id. at 21–22. The Board maintains that since Congress gave the Board permission to decide whether to reopen a case, courts should not review those decisions. Id. at 34. Finally, the Board argues that judicial review only applies to the merits of the claim, not the Board’s decision as to whether it should be reopened. Id. at 41.