Garland v. Gonzalez

NECESSITY OF BOND HEARINGS BEFORE NEUTRAL IMMIGRATION JUDGES

Garland argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not require that noncitizens receive adversarial bond hearings before immigration judges (“IJs”) after six months of detention, unless release or removal is imminent. Brief for Petitioner, Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al. (“Garland”) at 33–34. Garland asserts that such a bond hearing requirement has no basis in the statutory text, as §1231(a)(6) makes no mention of six-month detention cutoffs, bond hearings, or adjudications by IJs. Id. at 34. Furthermore, Garland notes that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(h) forbids courts from construing statutory language to create procedural rights. Id. at 34. To interpret the statute as imposing a bond hearing requirement after six months of detention, Garland thus asserts, the Supreme Court would have to impermissibly rewrite the statutory language and create new procedural rights. Id. at 34–37. Additionally, Garland argues that imposing a bond hearing regime would conflict with precedent, which generally requires that substantive administrative procedures are created by agencies, not reviewing courts. Id. at 38–40.

Gonzalez counters that §1231(a)(6) requires a bond hearing before a neutral IJ to authorize the detention of a noncitizen beyond six months. Brief for Respondent, Esteban Aleman Gonzalez, et al. (“Gonzalez”) at 18. Gonzalez argues that this requirement is rooted in §1231(a)(6)’s text, structure, and regulatory construction. Id. at 22. Gonzalez asserts that the statutory language indicates that Congress intended to create a process similar to custody hearings before IJs, contemplating that an official must determine whether a noncitizen is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community. Id. To support this position, Gonzalez cites to the government’s longstanding interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), a statute governing detention prior to a final removal order that was both enacted at the same time and contains similar language as §1231(a)(6). Id. Gonzalez asserts that the government interprets §1226(a) to provide for an adversarial hearing before a neutral adjudicator, even though the statutory language does not explicitly require a hearing or specify who must make the custody determination. Id. at 23–24. As the Supreme Court normally presumes that the same language in related statutes carries the same meanings, Gonzalez claims that the Supreme Court must likewise construe §1231(a)(6) to require custody hearings. Id. at 24.

CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND DUE PROCESS

Garland maintains that the lower courts should not have applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine to justify imposing a bond hearing regime. Id. at 40. Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, Garland asserts that a court may avoid addressing “serious doubts” about a statute’s constitutionality if the court can instead use a “plausible” statutory interpretation that does not implicate constitutional concerns. Id. at 40–41. Garland asserts that the courts below did not “plausibly” construe §1231(a)(6) to require bond hearings, because it was implausible for the lower courts to effectively rewrite the statutory text. Id. at 41. Garland further argues that the government’s procedures under §1231(a)(6) do not raise “serious” due process concerns. Id. at 48. Garland claims that detainee interviews with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents satisfy the Due Process Clause because ICE agents qualify as neutral administrative adjudicators. Id. at 44. Thus, Garland maintains that neutral IJs need not adjudicate disputes. Id. at 41–44. Garland points out that any claim of bias must overcome an adjudicator’s presumption of honesty and integrity with a specific reason why the adjudicator should be disqualified. Id. Garland asserts that Gonzalez has not overcome this presumption, because he failed to provide specific reasons to categorically impute bias on ICE agents. Id. In Garland’s view, combining an agency’s investigative and adjudicative functions does not establish bias. Id.

Gonzalez responds that the lower courts should not have applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine. Id. at 22. Long-term detention, Gonzalez maintains, raises due process concerns. Id. at 33. Gonzalez counters that it is plausible to construe §1231(a)(6) to prohibit prolonged detention without a hearing. Id. at 29. Gonzalez points out that modern civil detention precedent provides noncitizens with due process rights. Id. at 30. Supreme Court precedent, Gonzalez claims, holds statutes that are silent as to the permissible length of detention contain a presumptive six-month limit. Id. at 32–33. Gonzalez further asserts that the government’s existing custody review procedures, which require neither adversarial hearings nor neutral decisionmakers, lack the protections required by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 37. Gonzalez claims that interviews with ICE agents do not qualify as adversarial hearings, as noncitizens cannot present witnesses or challenge the government’s evidence. Id. at 41–43. According to Gonzalez, construing the statute to require an adversarial hearing before an IJ is a plausible reading that would avoid raising serious due process concerns. Id. at 46.

PERMISSIBILITY OF GRANTING CLASSWIDE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Garland maintains that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) bars courts from granting classwide injunctive relief for noncitizens detained under §1231 for over six months without a bond hearing. Brief for Petitioner at 15. Garland argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) establishes a general rule that courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin “the operation of” §1231. Under §1252(f)(1), Garland asserts that cases that apply §1231 to “individual” noncitizens are exempt from this general jurisdictional bar. Id. Garland contends that the statute’s plain language bars injunctions that direct the Executive Branch to comply with a court’s reading of statutory language. Id. at 17–19. Garland contends that the broad framing of §1252(f)(1)’s first phrase, which states that the provision applies “[r]egardless of the nature of the action or claim,” indicates that the general jurisdictional bar is not limited to challenges to the statutes themselves. Id. at 19. Further, Garland asserts that Congress intended to limit judicial review of immigration proceedings when Congress promulgated the statute. Id. at 23. Garland also argues that the injunctions granted in this case did not fall under §1252(f)(1)’s exception for “individual” applications because Gonzalez sought classwide, not individual, relief. Id. at 25. Consequently, Garland maintains that the lower courts were barred from issuing classwide injunctive relief. See id. at 15.

Gonzalez counters that §1252(f)(1) does not bar courts from enjoining the unlawful implementation of a statute by the Executive Branch through a classwide injunction. Brief for Respondent at 46. As an initial matter, Gonzalez maintains that Garland forfeited his argument that classwide injunctions exceeded the lower courts’ statutory authority by failing to raise it previously. Id. at 46–47. In the alternative, Gonzalez asserts that the plain text of §1252(f)(1) does not bar courts from issuing injunctions that compel agencies to follow statutes’ terms, as properly interpreted by the courts. Id. at 49. Rather, Gonzalez claims that §1252(f)(1) merely prohibits lower courts from restraining an agency’s enforcement of §1231. Id. at 49–50. Therefore, Gonzalez argues that Garland’s reading of §1252(f)(1)’s “regardless of the nature of the action or claim” clause is too expansive. Id. at 52. Gonzalez contends that the injunction granted here fell under §1252(f)(1)’s exception to the general prohibition against injunctive relief, because he asserts it is unlikely that Congress intended to block all class actions and other cases involving two or more plaintiffs and instead only permit individual litigants to seek injunctions. Id. at 55–57. Gonzalez further argues that the statute does not bar classwide injunctive relief for persons already in removal proceedings—rather, Congress intended to restrict pre-enforcement challenges by persons and organizations not involved in removal proceedings. Id. at 55. Gonzalez thus asserts that the lower courts permissibly granted classwide injunctive relief. See id. at 46.