Cruz v. Arizona

COMPATIBILITY WITH FEDERAL LAW

Cruz argues that Rule 32.1(g) cannot apply because it conflicts with federal law. Brief for Petitioner, John Montenegro Cruz at 18. Cruz argues that, because Lynch merely applied Simmons, federal law required Arizona to apply Lynch to Cruz’s postconviction proceedings. Id. at 21–22. The Supremacy Clause, Cruz contends, prohibits state courts from applying state laws contrary to federal law. Id. at 18. Cruz maintains that, under Teague v. Lane, courts must apply constitutional rules of criminal procedure as they existed at the time a conviction becomes final. Id. at 19. This, Cruz asserts, includes abiding by subsequent Supreme Court decisions that only apply, rather than modify or expand upon, settled rules. Id. Cruz posits that this premise underlies Supreme Court decisions not to apply new rules on collateral review. Id. at 21. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Yates v. Aiken, Danforth v. Minnesota, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, Cruz maintains that the Supreme Court previously dismissed attempts to frame failure to apply settled rules as an adequate and independent state ground. Id. at 23–27. Cruz contends that, because Arizona provides postconviction review and allows defendants to raise federal constitutional issues during postconviction review, it must decide those claims according to “the law as it stood when the case was on direct review.” Id. at 27. Cruz maintains that, by misinterpreting Simmons, Arizona failed to do so. Id.

Additionally, Cruz contends that the application of Rule 32.1(g) is not independent of federal law because it involved “interwoven” questions of federal law. Id. at 44. Cruz argues that, to decide whether there was a significant change in law, the Arizona Supreme Court had to consider the state of federal law at the time Cruz was sentenced. Id. at 45–46. Cruz notes that the court’s analysis hinged entirely on its interpretations of Simmons and Lynch—decisions of the United States Supreme Court applying federal law. Id. at 46. Thus, Cruz concludes that the Supreme Court has the power to correct errors in Arizona’s interpretation of federal law. Id. at 46–47.

Arizona responds that, while it has opened its postconviction process to federal constitutional claims, it has not opened it to all such claims, but only to claims that meet threshold requirements of its postconviction process, including Rule 32.1(g). Brief for Respondent, State of Arizona at 33. Arizona contends that federal retroactivity law dictates only “what law a state court must apply when adjudicating a claim on its merits,” not whether states can dismiss claims on procedural grounds without deciding them. Id. at 34. Thus, Arizona maintains that because Rule 32.1(g) dictates whether claims can be heard, not what law will apply if claims are heard, it is consistent with federal law. Id. at 31–32. Arizona asserts that if federal law were to require state courts to hear particular claims in collateral proceedings, there would be “effectively no limits on a criminal defendant’s ability to continue to bring claims” and finality would be eroded. Id. at 32. Arizona argues that it is entitled to require defendants to bring particular claims on direct appeal or in the first round of postconviction proceedings, or else forfeit them. Id. at 32–33. Arizona claims that Yates, Danforth, and Montgomery do not apply because in each of them, the state court rejected the claims on the merits, rather than deciding that the claim could not be heard at all. Id. at 34–36.

Further, Arizona argues that the application of Rule 32.1(g) to Cruz’s case was independent of federal law because it did not involve deciding the merits of Cruz’s claim. Id. at 15–19. Arizona contends that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart v. Smith, a state court’s consideration of federal law to categorize a claim for purposes of a state procedural rule does not render its decision dependent on federal law. Id. at 16. Arizona asserts that the Arizona Supreme Court’s consideration of Simmons and Lynch served only to categorize Cruz’s claim as not stemming from a significant change in law, rather than to decide whether he had a meritorious claim. Id. at 16. Arizona notes that the Arizona Supreme Court did not need to consider whether Simmons or Lynch applied to Cruz’s case, only whether Lynch was a significant change from Simmons. Id. at 18.

TREATMENT OF FEDERAL RIGHTS

Cruz argues that Rule 32.1(g) is not an adequate state ground because it treats federal rights less favorably than state rights. Brief for Petitioner at 28. Cruz notes that the Arizona Rule places defendants who seek to assert their federal rights in a “Catch-22.” Id. at 29. Cruz contends that, to have their claim heard, they must show that it stems from “a significant change in the law,” however, that same showing defeats the claim on the merits because a significant change will not apply retroactively under Teague, which bars application of constitutional rules of criminal procedure established after final conviction. Id. Additionally, Cruz asserts that the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule gives greater effect to its own decisions than to United States Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 30. Cruz notes that, when the Arizona Supreme Court overrules itself, it treats that decision as a significant change in the law but does not treat Lynch as a significant change even though the United States Supreme Court overruled the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 30–31. Cruz argues that these discriminations deny him his constitutional right to “one full and fair opportunity” to litigate his constitutional claims. Id. at 32. Furthermore, he accuses the Arizona Supreme Court of evincing a “purpose or pattern to evade” Simmons. Id. at 33.

Arizona counters that its rule does not exclude claims because they are based on federal rights, but because they could have been brought at an earlier stage. Brief for Respondent at 28. Thus, Arizona claims, its bar on bringing particular claims is a “neutral procedural rule.” Id. Rule 32.1(g), Arizona contends, was designed as a safety valve for “extraordinary” cases where the defendant could not bring a claim earlier because it is based on a rule that did not yet exist. Id. at 26. Arizona maintains that, since the Simmons rule existed at the time of Cruz’s trial (and since Lynch did not modify Simmons), Cruz’s claim does not fall in that category. Id. at 26. Arizona argues that, even before Lynch, Cruz had a reasonable opportunity to raise his Simmons claim on direct appeal. Id. at 25. Arizona disputes Cruz’s characterization of its courts as “hostile” to Simmons, pointing to cases after Lynch where its courts applied Simmons. Id. at 26–27. Arizona asserts that even if its courts attempted to evade Simmons, Cruz’s remedy was to petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Arizona Supreme Court’s judgment. Id. at 30.

CONSISTENT APPLICATION

Lastly, Cruz argues that the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is not an adequate state ground—that is, it is not substantial enough to preclude federal review—because Arizona has inconsistently applied it. Brief for Petitioner at 39. Cruz contends that the Arizona Supreme Court has held since 1989 that overruling binding precedent constitutes “a significant change.” Id. at 40. Cruz notes that this rule has extended to situations where the prior decision is overruled by the court that issued it as well as a higher court. Id. at 41. In particular, Cruz points to State v. Poblete, where an Arizona appellate court held that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky was a significant change in law because it overruled Arizona caselaw. Id. Cruz argues that the Arizona Supreme Court reversed its longstanding interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) when it decided in his case that Lynch was not a significant change in law even though Lynch overruled Arizona precedent. Id. at 42. Cruz asserts that, even if the Arizona Supreme Court’s new interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is technically compatible with its previous decisions, it nevertheless has been inconsistently applied. Id. at 43–44.

Arizona counters that the significant change in law requirement is an adequate ground because Arizona courts have consistently applied it. Brief for Respondent at 19–20. Arizona argues that a “mere change in precedent” is not a significant change in law when it changes only the interpretation or application of the legal rule, rather than the rule itself. Id. at 21. Poblete, Arizona claims, is consistent with this rule because Padilla changed the legal rule that Arizona courts applied. Id. Arizona maintains that Lynch did not change the legal rule of Simmons, but its application. Id. at 22. In other words, Arizona contends, what Lynch changed was not the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law, but its interpretation of Arizona’s sentencing law. Id. at 23. Thus, Arizona argues that Lynch was not a change in law “even if, between Simmons and Lynch, Arizona courts reached the wrong outcome in some cases.” Id. at 22.