Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

OVERRULING CHEVRON

Petitioner Loper argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which set a principle—referred to as Chevron deference—for courts to defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of unclear statutes, undermines the separation of powers and should be overturned. Brief of Petitioner, Loper Bright Enterprises, et al. at 15. Loper contends that the principle of stare decisis, which suggests that courts should uphold past decisions, should provide limited protection to the Court's ruling in Chevron. Id. at 18. Loper acknowledges that stare decisis is robust when a court directly interprets a statute, as the legislature has a clear opportunity to override the court's interpretation if it desires. Id. Loper argues, however, that portion of Chevron establishing the Chevron deference did not directly interpret a statute; instead, it established the court’s methodology for interpreting an unclear statute—deferring to the administrative agency in charge of executing the statute. Id. at 18-19. Loper suggests that a separate portion of Chevron contains a direct interpretation of the statute in question and would be protected by stare decisis. Id. Thus, Loper contends that methodologies like Chevron deference have not been and should not be granted the full protective umbrella of stare decisis. Id. at 19-20.

Loper asserts that, absent stare decisis, the Court should clearly overrule Chevron because it removes too much power from the courts and gives it to the executive branch, harming the constitutional balance between the two. Id. 22-23. Loper maintains that, although stare decisis does not protect Chevron, the three key criteria for overturning stare decisis-protected precedents, as outlined in Ramos v. Louisiana, all support breaking with Chevron. Id. First, Loper claims that Chevron inadequately justifies its deference rule and contradicts constitutional principles by improperly assigning judicial interpretation to administrative agencies, which makes it “egregiously wrong.” Id. at 23-25, 32. Second, Loper argues that Chevron has caused significant negative impacts both in the real world and in jurisprudence, by leading to inconsistent and disruptive rulings that erode individual rights and judicial clarity. Id. at 33-36. Third, Loper posits that preserving Chevron is unnecessary due to the absence of significant reliance on it. Id. at 40. Loper contends that reconsidering Chevron is essential and will not affect legitimate interests adversely; rather, a reconsideration is necessary for stability, as it can mitigate Chevron's unpredictability by granting courts the power to interpret statutes directly. Id. at 41-43. Loper also finds that other precedents can mitigate the risks associated with overturning Chevron. Id.

Respondent Raimondo counters that abruptly overturning Chevron, a cornerstone of administrative law, would be unnecessary, detrimental, and legally wrong. Brief of Respondent, Raimondo at 9-10. Raimondo contends that Chevron's 40-year history and the multitude of decisions incorporating it merit the complete protection granted by the principle of stare decisis. Id. at 10. Furthermore, Raimondo articulates that denying Chevron stare decisis would conflict with the Court’s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie which upheld Auer deference—a methodology similar to the Chevron deference which states that court should interpret unclear regulations by deferring to the administrative agency that wrote them. Id. Raimondo argues that Chevron deference is akin to the upheld Auer deference, noting that both remain amendable by legislative action. Id. at 10-11. Raimondo emphasizes that Chevron’s framework has been clearly established by past judicial precedents and affords a reasonable amount of power to the three branches of government. Id. at 12- 16. Thus, Raimondo concludes that granting statutory flexibility to highly specialized administrative agencies is a practical response to legislative oversights, representing both a sound precedent and a principle safeguarded by stare decisis. Id. at 16, 26.

Additionally, Raimondo contends that Chevron can endure the Ramos criteria for assessing the validity of stare decisis claims. Id. at 27. First, Raimondo argues that Chevron assumes that Congress expects agencies to interpret ambiguous statutes, a principle integrated into legislation for over 40 years. Id. at 28-30. Raimondo asserts that Congress, aware of Chevron's significance, has legislated with Chevron deference in mind and has chosen to not alter it, reinforcing its place in federal law. Id. at 30-32. Second, Raimondo holds that overturning Chevron deference, a principle integral to thousands of decisions and fundamental to private parties' decision making with regard to agency actions, would introduce significant legal instability and disrupt numerous interpretations made by nearly every administrative agency. Id. at 32-33. Third, Raimondo argues that Chevron has been a workable and familiar framework applied consistently in most cases since 1984, despite petitioners' claims of variability in finding ambiguity and concerns over its limits. Id. at 35. Raimondo concludes that overruling Chevron would exacerbate the problems caused by unclear statues, undermining the benefits of providing expertise, uniformity, and political accountability in regulatory policy. Id. at 36-37.

LIMITING CHEVRON

Loper argues that Chevron alternatively should have a narrower scope and asserts that it should not be automatically applied to cases where a statute remains silent on a specific issue. Brief of Petitioner, at 43. Loper contends that statutory silence should not mean an automatic delegation to the agency enforcing the statute, and that this stance does not conflict with stare decisis since the Court has previously refined Chevron's scope. Id. at 44-45. According to Loper, interpreting silence as delegation contradicts the principle that agencies only have authority expressly provided by Congress, and delegating legislative powers to the agencies is contrary to the Constitution's design. Id. Loper alleges that its interpretation aligns with the Court’s other principles for statutory analysis, such as avoiding interpretations that render parts of a statute superfluous or contradictory. Id. Loper concludes that, particularly in cases involving significant powers like imposing taxes or prohibitive regulations, silence in a statute should be interpreted as a lack of delegation rather than invoking Chevron deference. Id. at 45-46.

Raimondo responds that Loper’s proposal to narrow Chevron conflicts with Chevron's principle that courts review agency interpretations for reasonableness “if the statute is silent or ambiguous.” Brief of Respondent, Raimondo at 45. Raimondo asserts that, instead of automatically interpreting statutory silence as delegation as Loper alleges, Chevron has typically applied only when Congress has authorized an agency to implement a statute through rulemaking or adjudication. Id. Raimondo contends that Loper cannot draw a clear distinction between statutory silence and ambiguity, as illustrated in the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Id. at 46. Furthermore, Raimondo argues that the Magnuson-Stevens Act's provisions and the court's interpretation show that the statute is not silent but speaks to agency authority. Raimondo holds that the courts have already considered and rejected the argument that an express grant of power in certain provisions implies a limitation on agency authority in other contexts. Id. at 46-47. Raimondo further argues that it is neither an unusual nor unreasonable expectation that fisheries bear the cost of compliance, such as paying for observers; rather, it is in line with the established norm of federal agencies, exemplifying that this is a case of expected and reasonable agency power. Id. at 46-47.

REVERSING OR REMANDING

Loper advocates that the Court should reverse, not remand, the decision below, emphasizing the need for of a clear, definitive approach to statutory interpretation in a post-Chevron framework. Brief of Petitioner, Loper Bright Enterprises, et al. at 47. Loper contends that the text of the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not explicitly grant the power the NMFS claims it has. Id. Thus, Loper suggests that, in the absence or with a restricted application of Chevron, the Court should decisively reverse the case to establish a clear boundary for interpreting the breadth of power offered by a statute. Id. at 47-49.

Raimondo counters that if the Court opts to revise Chevron, remanding the case would be suitable for reevaluation under any new standards. Brief of Respondent, Raimondo at 47-48. Raimondo notes that the lower court's decision, aligned with established precedents, found the agency's interpretation reasonable and warranting Chevron deference. Id. Raimondo maintains that, given the Court's focus on the narrow question of Chevron's validity alone, it should refrain from examining the separate issue of whether the NMFS’s interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act constitutes a valid statutory interpretation and remand it to the lower court. Id.