Issues
May a plaintiff bring a § 1983 suit alleging malicious prosecution on account of baseless charges, even if one or more of the charges was supported by probable cause?
In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether Jascha Chiaverini’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the City of Napoleon, Ohio may proceed, although some of the charges filed against Chiaverini were based on probable cause. Jascha Chiaverini argues that state common law governs his lawsuit, and that as such the charge-specific rule, in which any baseless charge allows a § 1983 to proceed, applies. The City of Napoleon argues that Petitioner presents a false binary between the “any-crime” rule and the charge-specific rule that leads to a framework that is incompatible with the intent and meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This case has implications for the viability of malicious prosecution suits filed under § 1983 and the reach of Fourth Amendment protections against baseless charges.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, under which a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause, or by the “any-crime” rule, under which probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.
Facts
Plaintiff Jascha Chiaverini is the manager of Diamond and Gold Outlet, a jewelry store owned by co-plaintiff Chiaverini, Inc. and located in Napoleon, Ohio. Jascha Chiaverini, et al. v. City of Napoleon, et al. at 2. On November 16, 2016, Chiaverini purchased jewelry items from Brent Burns but was later contacted by David and Christina Hill, who claimed the jewelry was stolen. Id. at 3. After David Hill refused to file a police report, both the Hills and Chiaverini called the Napoleon Police Department, which dispatched defendants Officers Nicholas Evanoff and David Steward to the scene. Id.
Officers Evanoff and Steward took statements from both Chiaverini and David Hill. Id. at 4. Chiaverini told Officer Evanoff that while Burns sometimes sold fake jewelry, he had claimed to have genuine items today. Id. Officer Steward wrote the narrative supplement for the dispatch that day, but later updated it to include a statement from Chiaverini “that the reason he bought the jewelry and kept records regarding the purchase, was because he suspected that it was in fact stolen.” Id. Chiaverini denies having ever said this and claims it was improperly added to the report. Id.
The next day, the police department issued a “hold letter” ordering Chiaverini to hold onto the jewelry for the time being and to return the jewelry to the Hills. Id. at 4–5. When the Hills arrived later that day to ask that the jewelry be returned, Chiaverini refused. Id. at 5. Officer Steward wrote in his report that Chiaverini refused to do so because he felt the jewelry was “his property,” while Chiaverini, though conceding that he made statements to the effect of what Steward reported, asserts that he refused to return the jewelry due to the letter and advice of counsel. Id.
Chiaverini confronted defendant Chief of Police Robert Weitzel about the confusing language of the hold letter, asserting that he would not release the jewelry to the Hills. Id. Chiaverini also suggested during the conversation that he did not have a precious metal dealer license. Id. Chief Weitzel ordered an investigation, which confirmed that Chiaverini’s license had been canceled in 2013. Id. at 5–6. Chief Weitzel obtained a search warrant for the Diamond and Gold Outlet, and the police seized the jewelry as well as documents and computers. Id. at 6–7. Chiaverini was charged with money laundering, licensure violations, and receiving stolen property, and he was arrested and held from December 2 to December 5, 2016. Id. at 7. The case was later dismissed without prejudice due to not having been presented to a grand jury in a timely manner. Id. at 8.
Chiaverini sued the City of Napoleon and the involved officers for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court on November 17, 2017, which was then removed to federal court in the Northern District of Ohio. Id. at 1. The defendants filed for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Id. at 24. Chiaverini appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision. Jascha Chiaverini, et al. v. City of Napoleon, et al. at 1. The Sixth Circuit held that only at least one charge against Chiaverini had to have probable cause for the defendants to prevail on Chiaverini’s § 1983 claims. Id. at 8. The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district court’s decision, accordingly only analyzed and found probable cause for Chiaverini’s license violation and receiving stolen property charges. Id. at 9. Chiaverini then appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Supreme Court, which granted cert on December 13, 2023. Brief for Petitioner, Jascha Chiaverini at 1.
Analysis
APPLICABILITY OF 19TH CENTURY COMMON LAW
Chiaverini argues that the Court should adopt the “charge-specific” approach, whereby the question in a malicious prosecution case is whether any one specific charge lacked probable cause, regardless of whether any other crimes the defendant was charged with were supported by independently valid probable cause. Brief for Petitioners, Jascha Chiaverini, et al. at 17–18. Chiaverini claims that the City supports an “any-crime” approach to malicious prosecution claims, where valid probable cause for any of several charges defeats a malicious prosecution claim even if one of the charges did lack probable cause. Id. at 25. Chiaverini argues that, according to the controlling case Thompson v. Clark, the standards for malicious prosecution claims are governed by the common law of 1871, when 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute that enables malicious prosecution suits, was enacted. Id. at 17. The only exception, Chiaverini explains, is if the common law rules are inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s values and purposes. Id. Furthermore, Chiaverini urges, the consensus of the common law in 1871 supports the charge-specific approach. Id. at 17–18. Chiaverini references multiple 19th-century legal treatises, arguing that they all considered the charge-specific rule to be black-letter law. Id. at 19. Chiaverini also argues that the availability of damages for reputational harms in malicious prosecution suits in 1871 supports the charge-specific rule, since reputational harm from a false accusation is no less when it accompanies a valid charge. Id. at 19–20.
The City of Napoleon argues that Chiaverini’s appeal to 1871 common law is misguided, and that Chiaverini oversimplifies the issue by presenting a binary choice between a charge-specific and “any-crime” approach. Brief for Respondents, City of Napoleon, Ohio, et al. at 27–28. The City contends that, since the first element in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution,” the proper inquiry must be grounded in constitutional law, while common law principles of the time merely serve as guidance. Id. at 28. The City argues that Thompson stands for the proposition that the malicious prosecution occurs when a baseless charge caused an unlawful seizure, and that if a seizure occurred lawfully due to a different charge with probable cause, then there is no harm under Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 29. The City further claims that Chiaverini improperly considers malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 to be exactly the same as the common law claims because the Fourth Amendment only protects against harms caused by improperly seizing someone. Id. at 30. Before § 1983, the City continues, common law malicious prosecution claims concerned more than just unlawful seizures. Id. The City asserts that the fact that common law suits before 1871 included reputational harms and were treated like libel suits actually supports the City’s view, since it shows that the harms were different and unmoored from the Fourth Amendment before § 1983’s enactment. Id.
PURPOSES AND VALUES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Chiaverini argues that the Court must adopt the 1871 common law charge-specific rule unless it is inconsistent with the values and purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Brief for Petitioners at 24. Furthermore, Chiaverini contends that there is a strong presumption in favor of the common law view since the Court has always used common law to outline the scope of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Id. Chiaverini argues that, according to Thompson, the two “values and purposes” of the Fourth Amendment that decide whether it incorporates a common law tort rule are the avoidance of arbitrary results and protection of law enforcement interests. Id. Chiaverini argues that, considering prosecutors have total discretion in choosing how many charges to bring or whether to bring several charges together or as separate prosecutions, adopting the any-crime rule instead of the charge-specific approach would lead to arbitrary results since the success of a malicious prosecution suit would depend on how the prosecutor groups the claims. Id. at 25. Chiaverini also contends that the police could probably always find some minor charge to accompany a fabricated charge to arbitrarily insulate themselves from liability under the any-crime rule. Id. at 25–26. Chiaverini assures that the charge-specific rule would not hamper law enforcement interests, since it only affects police liability and will not impede the prosecution of the criminal case in any way. Id. at 26.
The City counters that the charge-specific rule is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s purposes and values, and that their seizure-based rule does not result in harms that Chiaverini warns of. Brief for Respondents at 33. The City argues that the seizure-based rule does not cause arbitrary results dependent on the “fortuity” of prosecutorial decisions of how to group charges, as long as the particular charge that directly caused an unreasonable seizure had a probable cause. Id. The City also contends that the charge-specific rule would lead to unwarranted civil suits; without an objective metric of whether an unreasonable seizure occurred, plaintiffs can try cases like this one based only on an allegation about an officer’s subjective motivations. Id. at 34. The City argues that, since the charge-specific approach exceeds the scope of the Fourth Amendment, any lawsuit where the improper charge did not cause a seizure is an unwarranted civil suit, particularly if the seizure is already supported by other proper charges. Id. at 36–37. The City contends that the Court should not expand the Fourth Amendment beyond unreasonable seizures just because Chiaverini can identify a harm the Fourth Amendment fails to prevent. Id. The City also argues that Chiaverini overstates the risk of police layering charges intentionally, prevented by existing incentives such as the risk of departmental discipline, perjury prosecution, and broader state tort statutes for malicious prosecution that are not limited to Fourth Amendment seizure requirements. Id.
CRITERIA FOR A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURE
Chiaverini argues that a seizure based on a warrant that was granted due to misrepresentations is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether some of the charges involved were supported by probable cause. Brief for Petitioners at 33. Chiaverini cites supporting Founding-era tort law that stated that, where “legal process” was required to make a seizure reasonable, the process could not be based on a misrepresentation whether or not that misrepresentation was essential for the seizure to go forward. Id. As such, Chiaverini argues that the charge-specific rule better comports with the Fourth Amendment as it was interpreted at the Founding. Id. at 35. Chiaverini continues that being seized for multiple charges is not the same as being seized for just one charge, since the number and severity of the charges are used to calculate bail, impact the complexity of trial preparation, and influence whether the defendant is detained at all. Id. at 38. As such, Chiaverini claims that the inquiry about unreasonable seizures is more complicated than which charge caused an arrest, since having more than one charge can meaningfully influence one’s seizure and detention. Id.
The City counters that the text of the Fourth Amendment only supports a guarantee against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and not any non-seizure harms. Brief for Respondents at 32. Criminal charges that do not result in a seizure are thus not Fourth Amendment violations, the City argues, and so the charge-specific rule is improper. Id. The City explains that if there existed probable cause to arrest someone for one charge, the lack of probable cause for a different charge does not make a seizure improper because the suspect would have been seized anyway. Id. The City argues that it does not matter how multiple charges influence detention unless Chiaverini makes a specific showing that the unfounded charge caused or prolonged the duration of the seizure. Id. at 41. Absent that, the City argues that the Court should just apply the any-crime rule and rule against Chiaverini. Id.
Discussion
REDRESS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”), in support of Chiaverini, warns that adopting the any-crime rule will bar redress for prolonged seizures. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in Support of Petitioners at 7. As an example, the NACDL raises the case of Williams v. Aguirre, in which a defendant was held for 16 months on baseless attempted murder charges, for which recovery would be barred due to the existence of a legitimate concealed firearm charge. Id. The NACDL further argues that a criminal charge imposes significant restrictions on one’s liberty even after pretrial release, which can be made more burdensome by additional baseless charges. Id. at 8–9. The NACDL suggests that such a bar to recovery will encourage officials to overcharge, confident that they will be shielded from consequences so long as there is probable cause for at least one of the charges. Id. at 15.
The Local Government Legal Center (“LGLC”) and other local government organizations, in support of the City of Napoleon, argue that state law malicious prosecution claims would still provide sufficient redress to deter Fourth Amendment violations. Brief of Amici Curiae Local Government Legal Center et al., in Support of Respondents at 17. As the LGLC points out, every state recognizes malicious prosecution as a cause of action. Id. The LGLC warns that malicious prosecution as a cause of action must strike a delicate balance between penalizing genuinely baseless charges and avoiding a chilling effect on law enforcement efforts, which they allege Petitioner’s framework and reading of the Fourth Amendment fail to do. Id. at 18. As the City of Napoleon argues, police officers are already strongly disincentivized against pursuing baseless charges by the threat of evidence exclusion, departmental discipline, and even perjury prosecution. Brief for Respondents, City of Napoleon et al. at 37.
POSSIBILITY OF FRIVOLOUS SUITS
The National Police Accountability Project (“NPAP”), in support of Chiaverini, argues that existing doctrines will protect against a flood of frivolous malicious prosecution suits even if the any-crime rule is rejected. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Police Accountability Project, in Support of Petitioners at 16. As the NPAP raises, qualified immunity already protects officers from such suits unless not only was there no probable cause but the officer also believed there to be no probable cause. Id. at 16–17. Such a high standard makes prevailing on malicious prosecution claims against the state and its officers sufficiently challenging even without the any-crime rule. Id. at 17. Furthermore, the NPAP adds that even when malicious prosecution suits are sustained, damages are limited only to harms traceable to the baseless charges because damages under § 1983 are governed by tort principles. Id. at 18. As the NPAP points out, the standard for punitive damages is even higher, and cities are immune to punitive damages under § 1983. Id. at 19. The NPAP argues that due to these restrictions, plaintiffs will not have a sufficient financial incentive to bring baseless malicious prosecution claims even without the any-crime rule. Id. at 20.
Iowa and eighteen other states (collectively, “Iowa”), in support of the City of Napoleon, warn that adopting the charge-specific rule will open the gates to a flood of frivolous malicious prosecution suits. Brief of Amici Curiae Iowa et al., in Support of Respondents at 12. The LGLC, in support of the City of Napoleon, warns that allowing frivolous § 1983 suits to proceed could impose costly litigation expenses that further strain the budgets of already cash-strapped municipalities, many of which must contend with balanced budget requirements. Brief of LGLC et al. at 23. The LGLC contends that many municipalities are still recovering financially from the COVID recession, pointing to budget shortfalls plaguing even major cities such as New York City and Chicago. Id. at 25. The LGLC suggests that such unexpected expenses could result in sweeping cuts to public services or the imposition of burdensome taxes on the general public. Id. at 26–27. Finally, the LGLC argues that § 1988’s shifting of attorney fees already incentivizes § 1983 suits, and that adopting the charge-specific rule will only make matters worse for municipalities already struggling to balance their budgets. Id. at 29.
Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Additional Resources
- Lydia Wheeler, High Court Will Hear Dispute Over Malicious Prosecution Claims, Bloomberg Law (December 13, 2023).
- John A. Wall et al., Malicious Prosecution at the Federal Level, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins Law (January 15, 2024).
- Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Report: Volume 31, Issue 5, National Association of Attorneys General (December 18, 2023).
- Cert Alert in Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon: Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claims and the “Any-Crime” Rule, Nahmod Law (February 1, 2024).