Moyle v. United States

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Nos. 23–726 and 23–727

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Mike Moyle, Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives, et al., PETITIONERS

23–726 v.

United States

Idaho, PETITIONER

23–727 v.

UNITED STATES

on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

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 Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, and with whom Justice Gorsuch joins as to Parts I and II, dissenting.

 This case presents an important and unsettled question of federal statutory law: whether the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U. S. C. §1395dd, sometimes demands that hospitals perform abortions and thereby preempts Idaho’s recently adopted Defense of Life Act, Idaho Code Ann. §18–622 (Supp. 2023). Enacted nearly 40 years ago, EMTALA requires hospitals participating in Medicare to “scree[n]” and “stabilize” “any individual” who comes to an emergency room with an “emergency medical condition” that jeopardizes the patient’s “health.” §§1395dd(a), (b)(1)(A), (e)(1)(A). And if the patient is a pregnant woman, the hospital must stabilize both “the woman” and “her unborn child.” §1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i).

 After this Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215 (2022), Idaho and other  States enacted new laws restricting the performance of abortions. To protect both “maternal health and safety” and “ ‘the life of preborn children,’ ” Planned Parenthood Great Northwest v. State, 171 Idaho 374, 438, 522 P. 3d 1132, 1196 (2023) (quoting Idaho Code Ann. §18–601), Idaho’s law permits an abortion only when “necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman,” §18–622(2)(a)(i).

 Shortly before Idaho’s law took effect, President Biden instructed members of his administration to find ways to limit Dobbs’s reach. Protecting Access to Reproductive Healthcare Services, Exec. Order No. 14076, 87 Fed. Reg. 42053 (2022). In response, Government lawyers hit upon the novel argument that, under EMTALA, all Medicare-funded hospitals—that is, the vast majority of hospitals¹—must perform abortions on request when the “health” of a pregnant woman is in serious jeopardy. §1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i). In the Government’s view, EMTALA trumps laws like Idaho’s, which allow abortions only to preserve the life of the pregnant woman. See Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (HHS), Reinforcement of EMTALA Obligations Specific to Patients Who Are Pregnant or Are Experiencing Pregnancy Loss 1 (QSO–22–22–Hospitals, July 11, 2022). The Government sued Idaho on this preemption theory and obtained a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the state law “to the extent it conflicts with EMTALA.” 623 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1117 (Idaho 2022).

 The Government’s preemption theory is plainly unsound. Far from requiring hospitals to perform abortions, EMTALA’s text unambiguously demands that Medicare-funded hospitals protect the health of both a pregnant woman and her “unborn child.” §1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i). And  even if there were some ambiguity in the statutory text, we would be obligated to resolve that ambiguity in favor of the State because EMTALA was enacted under the Spending Clause, and as we have held time and again, conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds must be unambiguous. Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 296 (2006); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). Here, no one who has any respect for statutory language can plausibly say that the Government’s interpretation is unambiguously correct. And in any event, Idaho never consented to any conditions imposed by EMTALA and certainly did not surrender control of the practice of medicine and the regulation of abortions within its territory.

 Recognizing the flaws in the Government’s theory and Idaho’s “strong” likelihood of success, this Court stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal on January 5. And, wisely or not, the Court also took the unusual step of granting certiorari before Idaho’s appeal was heard by the Ninth Circuit. See this Court’s Rule 11. Now the Court dismisses the writ and, what is worse, vacates the stay.

 This about-face is baffling. Nothing legally relevant has occurred since January 5. And the underlying issue in this case—whether EMTALA requires hospitals to perform abortions in some circumstances—is a straightforward question of statutory interpretation. It is squarely presented by the decision below, and it has been exhaustively briefed and argued. In addition to the parties’ briefs, we received 46 amicus briefs, including briefs submitted by 44 States and the District of Columbia; briefs expressing the views of 379 Members of Congress; and briefs from prominent medical organizations. Altogether, we have more than 1,300 pages of briefing to assist us, and we heard nearly two hours of argument. Everything there is to say about the statutory interpretation question has probably been said many times over. That question is as ripe for decision as it  ever will be. Apparently, the Court has simply lost the will to decide the easy but emotional and highly politicized question that the case presents. That is regrettable.

 Having already taken the extraordinary step of granting certiorari before judgment in order to decide whether the Government’s new interpretation of EMTALA is correct, we have no good reason to change course now. This is especially so because the Court’s decision to reexamine the stay issued in January makes it necessary to reassess whether Idaho showed a likelihood of success on the merits, a question that is closely related to the question whether Idaho or the Government has correctly interpreted EMTALA. I will therefore proceed to analyze what EMTALA means.

I

A

 The text of EMTALA shows clearly that it does not require hospitals to perform abortions in violation of Idaho law. To the contrary, EMTALA obligates Medicare-funded hospitals to treat, not abort, an “unborn child.”

 EMTALA imposes two main obligations on covered hospitals. First, a hospital must, within its “capabilit[ies],” “screen” “any individual” arriving at the emergency room without regard to the individual’s ability to pay. §§1395dd(a), (h). The purpose of this screening is to determine whether the individual has an “emergency medical condition,” which EMTALA defines as follows:

 “a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in—

 “(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,

 “(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or

 “(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or  part.”  §1395dd(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).²

 When a hospital determines that an “emergency medical condition” exists, it has two options. It may provide “treatment” within the capability of its “staff and facilities.” §1395dd(b)(1)(A). Or it may “transfer . . . the individual” to another hospital that “has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment” as long as the transfer would effect a net benefit for the patient. §§1395dd(b)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B)(i).

 At no point in its elaboration of the screening, stabilization, and transfer requirements does EMTALA mention abortion. Just the opposite is true: EMTALA requires the hospital at every stage to protect an “unborn child” from harm.

 Begin with the screening provision, which requires a hospital “to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(1)) exists.” §1395dd(a). “[W]ith respect to a pregnant woman,” subsection (e)(1) defines an emergency medical condition as one that is sufficiently serious to “plac[e] . . . the health of the woman or her unborn child . . . in serious jeopardy.” §1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Thus, if the hospital identifies an emergency medical condition threatening the child, it must “stabilize” that condition to ensure that the child’s health does not remain in “jeopardy.” §§1395dd(b)(1)(A), (e)(1)(A)(i). It goes without saying that aborting an “unborn child” does not protect it from jeopardy.

 Similarly, if a hospital wants to transfer a pregnant woman to another facility, it may not do so unless, among other things, a physician certifies directly or through an intermediary that the medical benefits of transfer outweigh  any “increased risks” to the woman “and, in the case of labor, to the unborn child.” §§1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii), (e)(1)(B). Thus, regardless of whether a hospital chooses to treat or transfer a pregnant woman, it must strive to protect her “unborn child” from harm.

 The Government struggles mightily—but unsuccessfully—to get around this language. First, the Government argues that EMTALA’s repeated use of the term “individual,” coupled with the Dictionary Act’s definition of that term, which does not include an “unborn child,”³ shows that “[a]ll of EMTALA’s duties—screening, stabilization, and transfer—run to the ‘individual’ seeking care.” Brief for United States 41. That assertion falls flat in light of EMTALA’s express protection of the unborn child.

 Besides, there is a simple explanation for EMTALA’s repeated use of the term “individual,” and it provides no support for the Government’s interpretation. Most of those references involve conduct in which only the pregnant woman can engage, such as going to an emergency room,⁴ receiving medical information,⁵ consenting to or refusing treatment,⁶ or filing suit.⁷ Many references concern transfer to another facility,⁸ and when a pregnant woman is transferred, her “unborn child” obviously goes with her. Another reference concerns a woman’s “emergency medical condition,” which, as noted, includes conditions that jeopardize her “unborn  child.”⁹ And some references expressly mention both the “individual” and “the unborn child.”¹⁰ No use of the term “individual” supports the Government’s interpretation.

 Second, based on a provision stating that an individual may not be treated without consent, §1395dd(b)(2), the Government infers that “it is for the pregnant woman, not state law, to decide how to proceed” when her health is at risk. Brief for United States 43. The Government’s logic is faulty. The right to withhold consent does not necessarily carry with it the right to demand whatever cannot be done without consent. X may withhold consent to a contract with Y, but that does not mean that X may demand to enter into such a contract. A person may not be forced to assume the duties of the Presidency without consent, but it does not follow that this person may demand to be sworn in as President.

 Or, to provide an example that is more closely related to the matter at hand, the right to refuse medical treatment without consent does not entail the right to demand treatment that is prohibited by law. Cancer patients have the right to refuse treatment that their doctors recommend, but they do not have a right to obtain whatever treatment they want, such as the administration of a drug that cannot legally be used in this country. Cf. 21 U. S. C. §360bbb–0a (granting terminal patients the right to try experimental drugs). Likewise here, a woman’s right to withhold consent to treatment related to her pregnancy does not mean that she can demand an abortion.

 For these reasons, the text of EMTALA conclusively shows that it does not require hospitals to perform abortions.

 B

 For those who find it appropriate to look beyond the statutory text, the context in which EMTALA was enacted reinforces what the text makes clear. Congress designed EMTALA to solve a particular problem—preventing private hospitals from turning away patients who are unable to pay for medical care. H. R. Rep. No. 99–241(I), pt. 1, p. 27 (1985); K. Treiger, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA’s Fangs, 61 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1186, 1188 (1986). And none of many briefs submitted in this suit has found any suggestion in the proceedings leading up to EMTALA’s passage that the Act might also use the carrot of federal funds to entice hospitals to perform abortions. To the contrary, EMTALA garnered broad support in both Houses of Congress, including the support of Members such as Representative Henry Hyde who adamantly opposed the use of federal funds to abet abortion.¹¹

 It is also telling that the Congress that initially enacted EMTALA in 1986 and the one that amended it in 1989 also passed appropriations riders under what is now known as the Hyde Amendment (named after Representative Hyde) to prevent federal funds from facilitating abortions, except in limited circumstances. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 302 (1980). Between 1981 and 1993—the very period when EMTALA was enacted and amended—the Hyde Amendment contained only one exception: for abortions necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman. Congressional Research Service, E. Liu & W. Shen, The Hyde Amendment: An Overview 1 (2022); see §204, 99 Stat. 1119 (1986 Hyde Amendment). The Hyde Amendment thus prohibited federal funds from paying for the health-related  abortions that the Government says EMTALA mandates. It would have been strange indeed if a Congress that repeatedly sought to prevent federal funding of abortions simultaneously enacted a law that, as interpreted by the Government, requires hospitals and physicians to perform that very same procedure.

 The Government’s reading of EMTALA is doubly strange given that the President who signed that law repeatedly promised not to use federal funds to subsidize or require the provision of abortions. Less than three months before signing EMTALA, President Reagan told participants in the annual March for Life that “the resources of government are not [to be] used to promote or perform abortions.” The American Presidency Project, Remarks to Participants in the March for Life Rally (Jan. 22, 1986). The next year, he touted his administration’s work “to restrict the use of Federal funds to perform abortions.” Id., Remarks to Participants in the March for Life Rally (Jan. 22, 1987). In another 1987 speech, he promised that his administration would “oppose any legislation that would require individuals or institutions, public or private, to finance or perform abortions.” Id., Remarks at a White House Briefing for Right to Life Activists (July 30, 1987). And his 1986 and 1987 messages to Congress repeated that promise. See id., Message to the Congress on “A Quest for Excellence” (Jan. 27, 1987); id., Message to the Congress on America’s Agenda for the Future (Feb. 6, 1986).

 Around the same time, President Reagan’s HHS Secretary testified before Congress that “the Administration steadfastly opposes [the] creation of [a] program which would encourage, promote or finance the performance of abortions.” Statement of the Hon. Margaret M. Heckler, in Budget Reconciliation: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 273 (1985). It beggars belief that President Reagan would have happily  signed EMTALA into law if it did what he “steadfastly oppose[d].” Ibid.

C

 Desperate to find some crumb of support for its interpretation, the Government scrapes together a handful of sources that it says evidence a general understanding that EMTALA requires hospitals to perform health-related abortions prohibited by Idaho law. None of these sources stands for that proposition.

 First, the Government searched a vast database of HHS enforcement decisions and located six occurring between 2010 and 2023 that it finds helpful. It is not obvious why those enforcement decisions—which postdate EMTALA by more than 20 years—shed light on its original meaning. And it is even less clear why they justify the Government’s claim that EMTALA preempts Idaho law. Five of the six cases involved ectopic pregnancies, which the Idaho law does not cover. See Idaho Code Ann. §18–604(1)(c) (excluding ectopic pregnancies from the definition of “abortion”). In the remaining case, the hospital was faulted, not for failing to perform an abortion, but for discharging a sick pregnant woman without calling for an ambulance to transport her to another hospital.¹²

 The Government also seizes upon a provision in the Affordable Care Act stating that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to relieve any health care provider from providing emergency services as required by State or Fed eral law, including . . . EMTALA.” 42 U. S. C. §18023(d) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because this provision was placed in a section of the Act concerning abortion, the Government infers that it reflects a congressional understanding that EMTALA sometimes requires abortions. Brief for United States 19–20. That inference is totally unwarranted. The provision in question refers to the entire massive Affordable Care Act, not just the relatively few provisions concerning abortion. Compare §18023(d), with §18023(c) (referring more narrowly to “this subsection”). It reaffirms the duty of participating hospitals to comply with EMTALA, but it does not expand what the text of EMTALA requires.¹³ So this provision cannot support the Government’s interpretation of EMTALA either.

II

 As the previous Part shows, EMTALA’s text and context decisively refute the Government’s interpretation. But there is a third strike against the Government’s position: EMTALA is an exercise of Congress’s spending power. And when Congress relies on its authority to attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds, special rules apply.

 Spending Clause legislation operates “much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17. These conditions do not bind unless and until they are accepted, and private parties “can opt out of spending programs” at will, “completely nullifying whatever force the spending conditions once had.” Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, 599 U. S. 166, 201 (2023) (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord, Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 292 (1971) (Burger, C. J., concurring in result) (“[A]herence to [Spending  Clause] provisions . . . is in no way mandatory”). “[T]he ‘legitimacy of Congress’ power’ ” to enforce conditions tied to federal funds depends on whether the parties who accepted federal funds also “ ‘voluntarily and knowingly’ ” accepted the conditions. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, 596 U. S. 212, 219 (2022) (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 186 (2002)).

 Because the enforcement of conditions attached to the receipt of federal money depends on a recipient’s knowing and voluntary consent, “the conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.’ ” Arlington Central, 548 U. S., at 296 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17). And recipients must be given a “legitimate choice whether to accept the federal conditions.” National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519, 578 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.); accord, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 590 (1937). The Government’s interpretation founders at both points.

 First, consider the requirement that EMTALA speak unambiguously. Even if it were possible to read EMTALA as requiring abortions prohibited by Idaho law, it is beyond dispute that such a requirement is not unambiguously clear. The statute does not mention abortion, let alone expressly bind hospitals to perform abortions contrary to state law.

 The need for clear statutory language is especially important in this suit because the Government’s interpretation would intrude on an area traditionally left to state control, namely, the practice of medicine. We typically expect Congress to “ ‘make its intention “clear and manifest” if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.’ ” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461 (1991) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 274 (2006) (“[T]he background principles of our federal system also belie the notion that Congress would use such an obscure grant of  authority to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the States’ police power”).

 Second, consider the requirement that parties be given a choice before being bound by Spending Clause conditions. The Government’s interpretation purports to limit Idaho’s choices about what conduct to criminalize. But Idaho never “agree[d]” to be bound by EMTALA,¹⁴ Cummings, 596 U. S., at 219, let alone to surrender its historic power to regulate the practice of medicine or the performance of abortions within its borders.

 The Idaho Legislature takes its argument against preemption even further. It contends that EMTALA cannot preempt the State’s abortion regulations because Idaho is not a party to the agreement between the Federal Government and the hospitals that take Medicare funds. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 23–726, pp. 50–51. As it explains, States cannot be bound by terms that they never accepted, so it is hard to see how a third party’s agreement with the Federal Government can deprive a State of the ability to enforce its criminal laws. Accord, Talevski, 599 U. S., at 212 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven those who held the broadest conception of the spending power recognized that it was only a power to spend, not a power to impose binding requirements with the force of federal law”).

 The potential implications of permitting preemption here are far-reaching. Under the Government’s view, Congress could apparently pay doctors to perform not only emergency abortions but also third-trimester elective abortions or eugenic abortions. It could condition Medicare funds on hospitals’ offering assisted suicide even in the vast majority of States that ban the practice. It could authorize the practice of medicine by any doctor who accepts Medicare payments  even if he or she does not meet the State’s licensing requirements.

 While the Government is not troubled by the potential consequences of its preemption argument, Congress was sensitive to state prerogatives. The Medicare Act, in which EMTALA is situated, disclaims any construction that would “authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided” in a particular State. 42 U. S. C. §1395. This disclaimer evidences a desire to “minimize federal intrusion” into state healthcare regulation. Massachusetts Medical Soc. v. Dukakis, 815 F. 2d 790, 791 (CA1 1987) (opinion of Breyer, J.). EMTALA’s narrow preemption clause also respects core state powers by providing that the Act “do[es] not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section.” §1395dd(f ). This phrasing signals that EMTALA’s default position is coexistence with state law.

 In response to the Legislature’s argument, the Government claims that a handful of our cases have held that Spending Clause statutes can preempt the laws of non-consenting States, but those cases do not begin to settle the question at hand. Two are entirely inapposite.¹⁵ And the remaining cases simply upheld the Federal Government’s ability to prevent the use of federal money for purposes  other than those intended by Congress.¹⁶ The Government has not identified any decision holding that a federal law enacted under the Spending Clause preempts a state criminal law or public health regulation.

 For present purposes, it is not necessary to decide whether the Legislature’s theory is correct. At a minimum, however, it provides yet another reason to be wary about interpreting EMTALA to displace the core powers of a non-consenting State without unmistakable clarity regarding the meaning of the federal law.

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 In sum, the Government’s new interpretation of EMTALA is refuted by the statutory text, the context in which the law was enacted, and the rules of interpretation that we apply to Spending Clause legislation. We should reject the Government’s interpretation and put that matter to rest.¹⁷

 III

 Even if the Court is unwilling to decide the statutory interpretation question, there is no excuse for vacating the stay of the preliminary injunction. In order to obtain that injunction, the Government was required to make a strong showing that it was likely to prevail on the merits. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674, 690 (2008). And as I have explained, its argument was almost certain to lose. That in itself is sufficient to preclude continuation of the preliminary injunction.

 Why then have six Justices voted to vacate the stay? The per curiam itself provides no explanation. In separate opinions, three of the six agree with the Government’s interpretation of EMTALA, see supra, at 15, n. 17, and that at least is an explanation that would make sense if the premise (the correctness of the Government’s interpretation) were sound. As for the remaining three, their only explanation is that “the injunction will not stop Idaho from enforcing its law in the vast majority of circumstances” and that therefore Idaho cannot show that it will be irreparably harmed by allowing the injunction to remain in place during the pendency of the appeal. Ante, at 7 (Barrett, J., joined by Roberts, C. J., and Kavanaugh, J., concurring). That justification is patently unsound. “ ‘[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.’ ” Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C. J., in chambers). And in this case, Idaho’s injury is not abstract. As I will explain, it is very likely that  the preliminary injunction will lead to more abortions, including in at least some cases where the fetus is viable. The State of Idaho wants to prevent that; the preliminary injunction stands in its way. Isn’t that enough to constitute irreparable harm?

 The Justices who have joined Justice Barrett’s concurrence claim that the parties’ briefs and oral arguments seem to have narrowed the degree to which EMTALA, as interpreted by the Government, conflicts with the Idaho law, ante, at 7–8, but all the parties continue to insist that the laws conflict. The Solicitor General argued that EMTALA’s focus on a pregnant woman’s health is broader than Idaho’s life-of-the-mother exception. In forceful terms, she told us: “In Idaho, doctors have to shut their eyes to everything except death,” whereas under EMTALA, a physician is supposed to think about serious threats to a pregnant woman’s health. Tr. of Oral Arg. 102. In light of this perceived conflict, the Solicitor General said it was “gravely mistaken” to suggest that “there really isn’t in operation a difference between” EMTALA and Idaho law. Id., at 101–102.

 Idaho agreed that the Government’s interpretation of EMTALA conflicts with state law. In particular, the State worried that “the United States’ novel theory” would “authorize emergency-room doctors to perform abortions” for mental-health reasons and would thus “turn emergency rooms into federal abortion enclaves governed not by state law but by subjective physician judgment.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 23–727, p. 30; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 45–46.

 Thus, whatever narrowing may have occurred during briefing and argument in this Court, both the Government and the State of Idaho fervently maintain that it matters whether the Idaho law is enforced. Do any Justices in the majority seriously disagree? Do any of them think that the parties, not to mention their armies of amici, are fighting about nothing?

  Three of the six Justices in the majority also agree that there is a conflict—and judging from their fiery rhetoric, a big one. See ante, at 1 (Kagan, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., and by Jackson, J., as to Part II, concurring); ante, at 7 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And they are correct to this extent: there is a real conflict.

A

 I begin with the Government’s argument that “there are numerous conditions” that may afflict a pregnant woman “where a doctor’s immediate concern is not death.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 103. In those cases, the Government explains, a doctor might be worried about serious risks to the woman’s “health.” Ibid. In the Government’s telling, EMTALA requires hospitals to perform an abortion on demand in these circumstances.

 Idaho law says otherwise. An Idaho doctor may not perform an abortion unless the doctor “determine[s], in his good faith medical judgment . . . , that the abortion [is] necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman.” Idaho Code Ann. §18–622(2)(a)(i). And even then, the doctor must “attemp[t] to perform the abortion in the manner that . . . provide[s] the best opportunity for the unborn child to survive,” unless doing so “would . . . pos[e] a greater risk of the death of the pregnant woman.” §622(2)(a)(ii).

 These standards do not require a doctor to be “objective[ly] certai[n]” that the abortion is “ ‘necessary’ to save the woman’s life.” Planned Parenthood, 171 Idaho, at 445, 522 P. 3d, at 1203 (emphasis deleted). Nor does Idaho law require that the risk of death be particularly immediate. Ibid. Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the law “leaves wide room for the physician’s ‘good faith medical judgment’ on whether [an] abortion was ‘necessary.’ ” Ibid.; accord, id., at 446, 522 P. 3d, at 1203 (noting that the Act “imposes a subjective standard based on the individual physician’s good faith medical judgment”). And  any latitude, it said, “ ‘operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.’ ” Id., at 445–446, 522 P. 3d, at 1203–1204. Even so, Idaho’s law is focused on “death,” and a doctor must be able to say in “good faith” that he or she was acting to preserve the woman’s life, not simply her health. Idaho Code Ann. §18–622(2)(a)(i).

 These different considerations—health versus life—may lead to different outcomes. For instance, consider the situation of a woman who experiences a condition that was discussed in the briefs and at argument: preterm prelabor rupture of membranes (PPROM), which occurs when a woman’s amniotic sac breaks before the 37th week of pregnancy. 1 App. 295. The Members of this Court are not physicians and should therefore be wary about expressing conclusions about medical issues. But guidance provided by prominent medical institutions is sufficient to show how Idaho law and EMTALA, as interpreted by the Government, may conflict in such cases.

 If a woman experiences PPROM between the 34th and 37th week of pregnancy and does not go into labor, her physician is likely to recommend that labor be induced.¹⁸ In that situation, it does not appear that the risk of conflict is high.

 On the other hand, when PPROM occurs earlier than that, the chances of conflict are greatly increased. If PPROM occurs before the 34th week and the woman’s pregnancy continues, she may experience conditions such as an infection of the amniotic fluid, inflammation of the uterine lining, hemorrhage, or sepsis.¹⁹ However, life-threatening  complications are not inevitable, and according to the PPROM Foundation, death is “extremely rare.”²⁰ A physician may try to delay labor by putting the woman on bed rest and administering steroids to help the baby’s lungs grow and antibiotics to prevent infection.²¹

 When PPROM occurs before the 24th week of pregnancy, the potential for conflict appears to be even higher. But in that situation, it may still be possible to manage the situation until the baby can be delivered,²² and there is a chance of a good outcome for both the mother and child, although studies have yielded different results.²³ Thus, when  PPROM occurs before the 34th week of pregnancy, there is a risk to the health of both the woman and her unborn child.

 In these situations, the Defense of Life Act requires doctors to consider whether performing an abortion is necessary to prevent the woman’s death. Because this is a “subjective” standard, Planned Parenthood, 171 Idaho, at 446, 522 P. 3d, at 1204, different doctors may reach different conclusions about when PPROM endangers the woman’s life. At least some may conclude in some cases of PPROM occurring before the 34th week of pregnancy that the woman’s life is not endangered since she may never develop a serious infection, let alone life-threatening sepsis or any other potentially fatal condition, if she receives proper treatment. See 1 App. 306–307. Rather, those doctors may believe that Idaho law requires them to try to delay delivery long enough to save the child’s life, unless PPROM becomes sufficiently “severe” to cause “infection and serious risk of sepsis.” See, e.g., 2 id., at 547. ²⁴

 According to the Government’s experts, however, EMTALA requires a hospital to perform an abortion at the woman’s request whenever PPROM is diagnosed, even if the woman has not yet developed an infection or any other health complications. That is because, they assert, it can  be “reasonably expected” that, in “the absence of immediate medical attention,” PPROM would “plac[e] the health” of the pregnant woman “in serious jeopardy” or cause “serious dysfunction” to her reproductive organs. §§1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii), (e)(1)(A)(i) and (iii); see, e.g., 2 App. 594 (“Providing stabilizing treatment in the form of termination of pregnancy at the point of diagnosis would be an appropriate means to preserve the patient’s reproductive organs at that time”). Thus, in PPROM cases, there may be an important conflict between what Idaho law permits and what EMTALA, as interpreted by the Government, demands. And the same may be true with respect to other conditions that a pregnant woman may experience.

 This gap between the Idaho law and the Government’s interpretation of EMTALA matters. Idaho has always permitted abortions that are necessary to preserve the life of a pregnant woman, but it has not allowed abortions for other non-life-threatening medical conditions. Planned Parenthood, 171 Idaho, at 391–394, 522 P. 3d, at 1149–1152 (summarizing Idaho’s historical restrictions); see also Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 302–330 (compiling other state statutes with identical exceptions). This balance reflects Idaho’s judgment about a difficult and important moral question. See Planned Parenthood, 171 Idaho, at 437–438, 522 P. 3d, at 1195–1196. By requiring Idaho hospitals to strike a different balance, the preliminary injunction thwarts the will of the people of Idaho as expressed in law by their elected representatives.

B

 I now turn to Idaho’s claim that the Government’s reading of EMTALA would authorize abortions for mental-health reasons. My colleagues dismiss this concern because at argument, the Solicitor General “emphatically disavowed the notion that an abortion is ever required as stabilizing treatment for mental health conditions.” Ante, at 5  (Barrett, J., concurring). But it is hard to see how the Government could reach that conclusion. At oral argument, the Solicitor General conceded that the term “health” in EMTALA includes mental health, Tr. of Oral Arg. 77–78, and if that is so, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the Government’s interpretation of EMTALA could require an abortion.

 Suppose, for example, that a woman in the 10th week of gestation experiences serious depression due to her pregnancy. If she asks emergency medical professionals for treatment, her medical care providers might conclude that her continued pregnancy could “reasonably be expected” to seriously jeopardize the woman’s mental health. §1395dd(e)(1)(A). Under the Government’s reading of EMTALA, the woman would then have the right to “make an informed decision” about the treatment she received. Brief for United States 41. If the woman preferred to abort rather than manage her depression alongside her pregnancy, it is not apparent why the Government’s reading of EMTALA would not require that abortion.

 We have seen where a rule permitting abortions to protect the psychological health of pregnant women may lead. In Roe, the Court held that a woman had the right to obtain a post-viability abortion that was deemed “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 165 (1973). In the companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), the Court wrote that a doctor, in judging whether an abortion was needed to preserve a pregnant woman’s health, could consider “all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.” Id., at 192. That decision was viewed by many as essentially preventing States from restricting post-viability abortions.²⁵ As Harvard  Law School Professor Mary Ann Glendon put it: “[W]hen Roe is read with Doe, third-trimester restrictions are effectively ruled out as well—for Roe’s dictum that such restrictions might be permissible if they did not interfere with the mother’s health was negated by Doe’s definition of ‘health’ as ‘well-being.’ ” The Women of Roe v. Wade (2003).

 The Solicitor General tried to explain why the Government’s interpretation would not lead down this path, but her explanation is hard to understand. She said that mental-health emergencies “could never lead to pregnancy termination” because abortion “is not the accepted standard of practice to treat any mental health emergency.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 77–78; accord, Brief for United States 26, n. 5.

 That assertion appears to be inconsistent with the position taken by prominent medical associations that endorse abortion for mental-health reasons as an accepted standard of practice. See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Abortion and Women’s Reproductive Healthcare Rights (Mar. 2023) (“Freedom to act to interrupt pregnancy must be considered a mental health imperative”); American Psychological Association, Resolution Affirming and Building on APA’s History of Support for Reproductive Rights (Feb. 2022).

 For these reasons, there is a real potential for conflict between the Idaho law and the Government’s interpretation of EMTALA, and in my judgment, the Court seriously errs by vacating the stay we issued earlier this year.

 *  *  *

 Today’s decision is puzzling. Having taken the unusual step of granting certiorari before Idaho’s appeal could be heard by the Ninth Circuit, the Court decides it does not want to tackle this case after all and thus returns the appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which will have to decide the issue that this Court now ducks. What is more, the Court vacates the stay it issued earlier this year even though the majority fails to provide any facially plausible explanation for doing so.

 I cannot endorse this turn of events and therefore respectfully dissent.