Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, is a U.S. Supreme Court case which ruled that First Amendment free speech protections require public figures to show that a publication contained a false statement of fact made with actual malice to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from parody.
Overview:
In this case, Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Hustler Magazine published a parody advertisement depicting Falwell as drunk, immoral, and hypocritical, along with a disclaimer that the advertisement was parody and “not to be taken seriously.” In the Western District of Virginia, a court granted a directed verdict for Hustler Magazine on the invasion of privacy claim and held that Falwell was a public figure. The jury found against Falwell on the libel claim but for Falwell on the IIED claim, despite also finding that the ad could not be reasonably understood to describe actual facts about Falwell.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment below, rejecting Hustler Magazine’s contention that the actual malice standard must be met before Falwell could recover for IIED. Hustler Magazine appealed to the Supreme Court.
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution prohibited a public figure from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, by reason of a magazine's publication of a parody, without showing that the publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with actual malice. Even if the speech was offensive and intended to inflict emotional injury, if it could not be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure, then it is still entitled to First Amendment protections. The court rejected Falwell’s argument that an IIED claim should only have to prove a standard of “outrageousness,” as such a standard would be inherently subjective and run against traditional protections for shocking and offensive speech. Since the disputed conduct in the case was the publication of protected caricature, it could not form the basis of Falwell’s IIED claim.
Implications:
For later treatment of this case, see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990), Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991), Snyder v. Phelps (2011), United States v. Alvarez (2012).
[Last updated in June of 2023 by the Wex Definitions Team]