Women and Justice: Keywords

This law serves as the basis for the Colombian Criminal Code, it enumerates conducts that constitute crimes and their sanctions. The code sets forth several gender-related crimes. Article 104A criminalizes femicide, meaning the killing of women because they are female. Article 123 sanctions people who forcibly terminate a pregnancy. Article 187 prohibits forcing in-vitro treatments on women against their will. Article 229 regulates domestic violence offenses. Articles 208 and following criminalize rape and establish aggravating circumstances including, among others, if the victim is under 14 years old, if the victim is incapable of defending him or herself, if the abuser used violence and if the abuse was held within the household. Article 116 A prohibits the use of chemical agents or corrosive substances that cause injuries or harm when they come into contact with human tissue. Finally, for some crimes, the code treats as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victim is a woman. Law 1719 of June 18, 2014 modified and expanded these provisions.

Esta ley que contiene el Código Penal colombiano enumera las conductas que constituyen delitos y sus sanciones. El código establece varios delitos relacionados con el género. El artículo 104A tipifica como delito el feminicidio, es decir, el asesinato de mujeres solo por el hecho de ser mujeres. El artículo 123 sanciona a las personas que obligan a la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo. El artículo 187 prohíbe realizar tratamientos in vitro a mujeres en contra de su voluntad. El artículo 229 regula el delito de violencia doméstica. Los artículos 208 y siguientes tipifican como delito la violación y establecen circunstancias agravantes que incluyen, entre otras, que la víctima sea menor de 14 años, que sea incapaz de defenderse por sí misma, si el abusador usó violencia y si el abuso se llevó a cabo dentro del hogar. El artículo 116 A prohíbe el uso de agentes químicos o sustancias corrosivas que causen lesiones o daños cuando entren en contacto con tejidos humanos. Finalmente, para algunos delitos, el código trata como circunstancia agravante el hecho de que la víctima sea mujer. La Ley 1719 de junio 18, 2014 modificó y amplió algunas de estas disposiciones.

The plaintiff discovered she was pregnant and sought an abortion. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion due to a Texas law that criminalized all abortions except those necessary to protect the life of the mother. The plaintiff alleged that the Texas law violated her constitutional right to privacy. The Court invalidated the law, finding that the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment Due Process Clause protects women’s right to privacy and thus their right to choose to have an abortion before the end of the first trimester. The Court further held that after the first trimester but before fetal viability, the State may only impose regulations related to the protection of the mother’s health. However, the Court found that following the viability of the fetus, the State may prohibit abortions except those necessary to protect the mother’s life. This decision was affirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey.

Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán, a 17-year-old Peruvian, decided to terminate her pregnancy when she discovered that carrying her anencephalic fetus to term would pose serious risks to her health. When she arrived at Archbishop Loayza National Hospital in Lima to obtain the abortion procedure, the hospital director refused to allow the procedure because article 119 of the Criminal Code permitted therapeutic abortions solely when termination was the only way of saving the mother’s life or avoiding serious and permanent damage to her health. Huamán gave birth to an anencephalic daughter who died four days later, causing Huamán to fall into a deep depression. In her complaint to the Committee, Huamán asserted that by forcing her to continue her pregnancy, the hospital caused her not only physical pain but mental suffering in violation of article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibiting cruel and inhuman treatment. Huamán also cited a violation of article 17, which protects women from interference in decisions that affect their bodies, lives, and opportunity to exercise their reproductive rights. Finally, she claimed that Peru’s failure to adopt economic, social, and cultural measures to safeguard her rights under article 17 was tantamount to a violation of article 24 of the Covenant. The Committee concluded that the State’s refusal to allow Huamán to obtain a therapeutic abortion was the direct cause of the suffering she experienced, and that the protection from physical pain and mental suffering under article 7 is particularly important in the case of minors. The Committee noted that Huamán’s case presented the conditions for a lawful abortion, and the refusal to act in accordance with her wishes to terminate the pregnancy equated to a violation of article 17. Finally, in the absence of any information from Peru on Huamán’s claim that she did not receive the medical and psychological support necessary during her pregnancy, the Committee found that the facts presented reveal a violation of article 24 which guarantees State protection to minors.