The Act provides for parentage in case of donor-assisted human reproduction (“DAHR”) (Part 2), issues relating to DAHR facilities (including acquisition of gametes by operators) (Part 3), and amendments to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (Part 4), Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, the Status of Children Act 1987, Family Law Act 1995, and among other legislation, to reflect rights and responsibilities of spouses or civil partners of biological parents and to take into account DAHR situations. The Act provides that a child born as a result of a DAHR procedure shall have as parents the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant, provided that the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant have consented to the latter being a parent to the child (Section 5). When construed as the parents of the child, the mother and any other parent, as the case may be, shall have all parental rights and duties in respect of the child (Section 5(3)). The donor of a gamete or embryo used in a DAHR procedure is not the parent of the child nor do they have any parental rights or duties in respect of the child (Section 5(5) and Section 5(6)). A person can only consent to providing a gamete for use in a DAHR procedure where they have attained the age of 18, have received the necessary information pursuant to the Act, and made a declaration pursuant to the Act (Section 6). An intending mother and her partner must be over the age of 21 to consent to parentage (Sections 9, 11).
Women and Justice: Keywords
Legislation
Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz (Reproductive Medicine Act) (1992)
Medically assisted reproduction is available only to married couples, or those in a registered partnership or cohabitation. Further, it is only permitted to the couple if certain difficulties in conceiving exist, such as (i) all other possible or reasonable treatments to induce pregnancy through sexual intercourse are unsuccessful or hopeless; (ii) pregnancy through sexual intercourse would expose the spouse or partner to a serious risk of transmitting a serious infectious disease; (iii) for certain couples where there may be difficulty becoming pregnant or giving birth, or may give birth to a child with a hereditary disease (such as severe, untreatable pain or brain damage, or which would require the child be kept alive through constant use of modern medical technology) due to genetic dispositions. It is also available to a woman living in a registered partnership or cohabitation with another woman. Surrogacy is not permitted in Austria because medically assisted reproduction is only permissible within a marriage or registered partnership or cohabitation, and only the ova and the semen of the spouses, registered partners, or cohabitants may be used. There are two exceptional circumstances in which a third party’s genetic material may be used for medically assisted reproduction: (i) the semen of a third person may be used if the spouse, registered partner or cohabitant is not capable of reproduction, or if the couple is two women in a registered partnership; or (ii) the oocyte of a third person may be used if a woman, younger than 45, whom the pregnancy will be induced is otherwise not able to reproduce.
Medizinisch assistierte Fortpflanzung steht verheirateten Paaren, eingetragenen Partnerschaften oder einer Lebensgemeinschaft zur Verfügung. Außerdem ist es Paaren nur gestattet, wenn sie gewisse Schwierigkeiten bei der Empfängnis haben; dies sind z.B.: (1.) alle oder zumutbare Behandlungen, um eine Schwangerschaft durch Geschlechtsverkehr herbeizuführen, sind erfolglos oder aussichtslos; (2.) der Geschlechtsverkehr ist dem Paar nicht zumutbar, da eine ernsthafte Gefahr der Übertragung einer schweren Infektionskrankheit besteht; (3.) wenn das Paar Schwierigkeiten hat schwanger zu werden oder zu gebären, oder das Kind wegen genetischer Dispositionen mit einer Erbkrankheit geboren würde (so wie ernsthaften, unbehandelbaren Schmerzen oder Gehirnschäden, oder solche die es erforderlich machen, dass das Kind dauerhaft durch moderne Technologie am Leben erhalten würde). Außerdem stehen die Möglichkeiten homosexuellen Frauen offen, die in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft oder Lebensgemeinschaft leben. Nicht erlaubt ist Leihmutterschaft in Österreich, denn medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung ist nur in der Ehe, eingetragenen Partnerschaften und in Lebensgemeinschaften erlaubt. Es gibt zwei Ausnahmen, in denen das genetische Material für eine medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung genutzt werden darf: (1.) Der Samen einer dritten Person darf verwendet werden, wenn der Ehegatte, eingetragene Partner oder Partner in Lebensgemeinschaft nicht der Fortpflanzung fähig ist oder das Paar aus zwei Frauen in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft besteht; (2.) die Eizelle einer dritten Person darf einer Frau eingesetzt werden, wenn diese jünger als 45 Jahre alt ist und auf andere Weise nicht fähig ist, sich fortzupflanzen.
Domestic Case Law
Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2003)
The plaintiff’s employee health benefit plan denied coverage for certain infertility procedures that can only be performed on women, including in vitro fertilization (“IVF”). She sued her employer for unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and state law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer. On the plaintiff’s appeal, the Second Circuit analyzed the issue differently than the district court but ultimately affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that the health plan’s exclusion of coverage for surgical implantation procedures limited its infertility procedures for male and female employees equally and as a result did not amount to unlawful discrimination.
平成16年（受）1748 (2004 (Ju) No. 1748) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2006)
The Supreme Court was asked to rule whether a father-child relationship could be legally recognized in the case where a child’s mother became pregnant through in-vitro fertilization with the frozen sperm of a deceased husband who, while he was alive, had consented to the use of the sperm even after his death. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling and declined to recognize the father-child relationship. The Supreme Court considered that the legal framework in Japan concerning parent-child relationships did not anticipate such a relationship between a father and his child who was conceived after his death in light of the fact that, even if the father-child relationship had been legally established, the deceased father would not be in a position to hold parental rights, he would not be able to support his child, and the child could not be an heir of the father for the purposes of inheritance. According to the Supreme Court, such issues need to be addressed by legislation upon analyzing several factors including bioethics, child welfare, and social acceptance. As the country lacks such legislation, the Supreme Court did not find that the father-parent relationship could be established.
本件は、亡夫の妻が冷凍保存していた亡夫の精子を用いて人工受精で妊娠した場合に、亡夫と子の父子関係が法的に認められるべきか否かを最高裁が判断した事案である。最高裁は高裁の判決を破棄し、夫は死後の授精、出産の意思をもっていたが、法律上の親子関係が生じることを想定していないとし、父子関係が認められないとした。また、最高裁は、仮に父子関係が法的に成立していたとしても、その父親は親権者になり得る余地はなく、子を養育、扶養することもできず、子が父の相続人にもなり得ないとした。このように、父子関係が存在するか否かは、生命倫理、子の福祉、社会一般の考え方等多角的な観点から検討を行い、立法によって解決されるべき問題であって、日本にこのような法律がない以上、父子関係の形成は認められないとした。
平成19年（許）47 (2006 (Kyo) No. 47) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2007)
A Japanese married couple petitioned for a court order that a Japanese local government accept birth registers for twins born from a surrogate mother in Nevada with the ovum and sperm of the Japanese couple. The state of Nevada, pursuant to its state court, had issued birth certificates for the twins, which showed the Japanese couple as their parents. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling that the birth registers need to be accepted. It stated that Article 118 of the Japanese Civil Proceedings Act prescribes that a final judgment made by a foreign court takes effect in Japan only if it satisfies all enumerated conditions, which include that “the foreign court’s ruling and its proceedings are not contrary to public policy in Japan.” The Supreme Court recalled that the Japanese Civil Code stands on the premise that a mother of a child is a woman who conceived and delivered the child and that a mother-child relationship is established through objective factors such as gestation and delivery. According to the Supreme Court, when a parent-child relationship can be legally established is a matter that forms the basis of the country’s legal order, and factors for finding such a relationship must be unequivocal. Thus, the Court found that a mother-child relationship between the twins and the Japanese wife could not be established, given that the Nevada court’s ruling, which recognized a parent-child relationship contrary to Japanese laws, ran against the public policy in Japan. In its statement, the Supreme Court urged the Japanese legislature to address the issues of parent-child relationships and assisted reproductive technology through legislation.
日本人夫婦がその卵子と精子を使い、ネバダ州在住の米国人女性に双子の子らを懐胎・出産させた。その後、夫婦は日本へ帰国し、が自らが双子の父母であると記載した出身届を区長である抗告人が受理するよう裁判所に申し立てた。これに対し、ネバダ州の裁判所は日本人夫婦を両親とする双子の出生証明書をすでに発行していた。最高裁は、出生届を受理する必要があるとした高裁判決を破棄し、日本の民事訴訟法第118条により、外国の裁判所が下した終局判決は、「その判決及び手続が日本の公序良俗に反しないこと」などの条件を満たした場合にのみ、日本で効力を生じるとし、また、日本の民法上、母子関係の成立の前提は懐胎し出産した女性がこの母である、母子関係の成立は懐胎、出産という客観的な事実により当然に成立することが前提であると述べた。最高裁によると、実親子関係の成立は、国における身分法秩序の根幹を成すものであり、その関係の存否の基準は一律でなければならない。したがって、日本の民法が実親子関係を認めていない者の間にその成立を認めたネバダ州の判決は、日本の公序良俗に反するものであるとして、双子と日本人夫婦との間に親子関係は存在しないと最高裁は判断し、同時に、早急に立法による対応を促した。
Castles v. Secretary to the Department of Justice Supreme Court of Victoria (2010)
This case challenged a decision by the Secretary of the Department of Justice to refuse Ms. Castles’ access to in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) treatment, while she was in a low security prison. Prior to her imprisonment for social security fraud, Ms. Castles was undergoing IVF treatment. Although she was sentenced to only 18 months of imprisonment, Ms. Castles was nearing the age at which IVF would no longer be available to her. Ms. Castles sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to enable her to continue IVF treatment to conceive a second child with her husband. The question decided by the Supreme Court was whether access to IVF is inherent in the right to respect privacy and family life. The Supreme Court acknowledged that although incarceration necessarily involves a limitation of the right to liberty, it places an additional burden on the State to preserve human dignity. International agreements, including CEDAW and ICESCR, recognize that decisions concerning the number and spacing of children, and access to health services, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health, are an aspect of the inherent dignity of a person that underlies all human rights. The Supreme Court held that the requirement to give proper consideration to human rights required the decision-maker to consider the possible impact of the decision on a person’s human rights, but that this need not be a sophisticated legal exercise. The Supreme Court further ordered the Department of Justice to allow Ms. Castles access to the relevant medical treatment, subject to an assessment of any countervailing security or other concerns on a visit-by-visit basis.