Women and Justice: Keywords

Article 178 of the Labor Code provides for the right of pregnant women and women with children under the age of three to request that their employer reduce the woman’s production and service rates, or transfer her to easier work in order to avoid dangerous conditions while maintaining her pay from her original position. At the same time, the woman must provide her employer with an appropriate medical documentation confirming the pregnancy and the impossibility of performing the original work. While the employer is making the decision about whether to provide the pregnant woman with another job, she must be released from work and all work days missed during that time must be paid. Women who have children under the age of three who can no longer perform their previous job also have the right to request that they be transferred to another job before the child reaches the age of three and preserve their earnings from their previous work.

Стаття 178 Кодексу законів про працю України встановлює, що вагітна жінка та жінка, яка має дітей віком до трьох років, має право вимагати від роботодавця зниження норм виробітку та обслуговування або переведення її на легшу роботу з метою уникнення шкідливих умов із збереженням оплати праці, яку вона мала на попередній посаді. При цьому, жінка повинна надати своєму роботодавцю відповідну медичну документацію, що підтверджує вагітність і неможливість виконувати первинну роботу. Поки роботодавець приймає рішення про надання вагітній жінці іншої роботи, її необхідно звільнити від роботи та оплатити всі пропущені за цей час робочі дні. Жінки, які мають дітей віком до трьох років, які не можуть виконувати попередню роботу, також мають право вимагати переведення їх на іншу роботу до досягнення дитиною трирічного віку із збереженням заробітку за попередньою роботою.

Article 56 of the Labor Code stipulates the employer's obligation to set part-time working hours for certain categories of employees, including (i) pregnant women; (ii) women with children under the age of 14 and/or a child with a disability; (iii) women caring for a sick family member. The scope of their labor rights is not limited; such women still have the right to a full-time vacation and social benefits. For part-time work days, a person is paid in proportion to the time worked. Article 60-1 provides for the right of pregnant women and women with children to choose to work from home. At the same time, a woman can work from home only if: (i) it is possible, taking into account the nature of the work they performed and (ii) employer has the appropriate resources and means to do so.

Стаття 56 Кодексу законів про працю України передбачає обов’язок роботодавця встановлювати неповний робочий час для окремих категорій працівників, у тому числі (I) для вагітних жінок; (II) жінок, які мають дітей віком до 14 років та/або дитину з інвалідністю; (III) жінок, які доглядають за хворим членом сім'ї. Обсяг їх трудових прав не обмежений; такі жінки зберігають право на повну відпустку та соціальні виплати. За неповний робочий день робота особа оплачується пропорційно відпрацьованому часу. Стаття 601 передбачає право вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей, вибирати роботу вдома. Водночас жінка може працювати вдома, лише якщо: (I) це можливо з урахуванням характеру виконуваної роботи та (II) роботодавець має для цього відповідні ресурси та засоби.

Articles 49, 50 of the Family Code of Ukraine refer the right to maternity and the right to parentage to the personal non-property rights of spouses. The term “maternity” means women’s legally guaranteed right to reproductive opportunity on (i.e., to give birth to children, raise them). The core of this personal non-property right is the wife's authority to decide whether or not to have a child. In addition, these articles establish that a woman's reluctance to have a child or her inability to conceive a child can be grounds for the dissolution of marriage. The same consequences entail if a man's refuses to, or his cannot, have a child. Such rules of the family legislation on the reason for the dissolution of marriage due to the wife's or husband's unwillingness or inability to have children restrict the freedom of behavior of women and men in marriage and violate the right to reproductive freedom. Article 123 establishes that if a married couple produce an embryo that is carried by a surrogate, then, the spouses are deemed the parents of the child. Similarly, the spouses are recognized as the parents when the wife gives birth to a child via implantation of an embryo that is not biologically hers. Article 136 of the Family Code of Ukraine allows a person legally registered as a child’s father to contest that registration, and thus his legal responsibilities as a parent to that child, if he believes or knows that he is not the child’s biological father. An analysis of court practice indicates that, as evidence of the lack of a parent-child relationship, the court accepts testimony of witnesses and results of forensic genetic examination.

Статтями 49, 50 Сімейного кодексу України право на материнство та право на батьківство віднесено до особистих немайнових прав подружжя. Термін "материнство" означає гарантоване законом право жінки на репродуктивну можливість (тобто народжувати дітей, виховувати їх). Ядром цього особистого немайнового права є правомочності дружини вирішувати питання про народження чи ненародження дитини. Крім цього, ці статті встановлюють, що підставою для розірвання шлюбу може бути небажання жінки мати дитину або її нездатність зачати дитину. Такі ж наслідки виникають, якщо чоловік відмовляється або не може мати дитину. Такі норми сімейного законодавства про підстави розірвання шлюбу через небажання чи нездатність дружини чи чоловіка мати дітей обмежують свободу поведінки жінки та чоловіка у шлюбі та порушують право на репродуктивну свободу. Статтею 123 встановлено, що, якщо у подружжя зароджується ембріон, виношуваний сурогатною матір'ю, то батьками дитини визнається подружжя. Так само, подружжя визнається батьками, коли дружина народжує дитину, шляхом перенесення в її організм ембріона, який їй біологічно не належить. Стаття 136 Сімейного кодексу України дозволяє особі, яка в установленому законом порядку записана батьком дитини, оскаржити таку реєстрацію, а отже, і свої обов’язки як батька щодо цієї дитини, якщо вона вважає або знає, що не є біологічним батьком дитини. Аналіз судової практики вказує на те, що як доказ відсутності зв’язку між батьком та дитиною суд приймає показання свідків та результати судово-генетичної експертизи.

The Civil Registration Act 2019 made technical amendments to the Civil Registration Act of 2004, the purposes of which were to facilitate legislation to provide for registration of the birth of donor-conceived children, and to enable both partners in a same-sex female relationship to have their details recorded in such registrations. Specifically, Section 10 provides for the recording of a ‘parent’s’ details and any parent may so register although the options of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are still available.

The Act provides for parentage in case of donor-assisted human reproduction (“DAHR”) (Part 2), issues relating to DAHR facilities (including acquisition of gametes by operators) (Part 3), and amendments to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (Part 4), Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, the Status of Children Act 1987, Family Law Act 1995, and among other legislation, to reflect rights and responsibilities of spouses or civil partners of biological parents and to take into account DAHR situations. The Act provides that a child born as a result of a DAHR procedure shall have as parents the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant, provided that the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant have consented to the latter being a parent to the child (Section 5). When construed as the parents of the child, the mother and any other parent, as the case may be, shall have all parental rights and duties in respect of the child (Section 5(3)). The donor of a gamete or embryo used in a DAHR procedure is not the parent of the child nor do they have any parental rights or duties in respect of the child (Section 5(5) and Section 5(6)). A person can only consent to providing a gamete for use in a DAHR procedure where they have attained the age of 18, have received the necessary information pursuant to the Act, and made a declaration pursuant to the Act (Section 6). An intending mother and her partner must be over the age of 21 to consent to parentage (Sections 9, 11).

The 2015 Marriage Act enacted the Thirty-Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland into law, which legalized same-sex marriage. Previously, same-sex couples could enter into civil partnerships under the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010. The Marriage Act amended the Civil Registration Act 2004, inter alia, by adding a provision that allows anything that applies to marriage between two people of the opposite sex to apply to marriage between people of the same sex (Section 5). The Act also provides that nothing therein obliges a religious body to recognize a particular form of marriage ceremony or to solemnize a marriage (Section 7). It also provides for the recognition of certain foreign marriages and registered foreign relationships (Sections 12 and 13) and amends the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 to allow a married couple of the same sex to adopt a child (Section 16).

The legislation sets out various child benefits, such as a one-time payment for the birth or adoption of a child (EUR 462 in 2022) and entitlement to a monthly payment until a child reaches 18 years old (EUR 73,5 in 2022).

Šiame teisės akte nustatytos įvairios išmokos vaikui, pavyzdžiui, vienkartinė išmoka už vaiko gimimą ar įvaikinimą (462 EUR 2022 m.) ir teisė į mėnesinę išmoką, kol vaikui sueis 18 metų (73,5 EUR 2022 m.).

The Constitution is an essential pillar of gender equality legislation in Lithuania. Article 29 affirms that human rights may not be restricted, or any privileges granted, on the grounds of “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, or views.” Further, Article 38 declares that marriage can only be concluded upon free mutual consent between a man and a woman, and that the rights of spouses are equal. The provisions do not declare same-sex marriages or partnerships valid. Article 39 states that working mothers are entitled to paid leave before and after childbirth, and favorable working conditions. English translation available here.

Konstitucija yra esminis lyčių lygybės teisės aktų ramstis Lietuvoje. Straipsnyje 29 teigiama, kad žmogaus teisės negali būti ribojamos ar suteikiamos privilegijos dėl „lyties, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, tikėjimo, įsitikinimų ar pažiūrų“. Be to, straipsnyje 38 nustatyta, kad santuoka gali būti sudaroma tik gavus laisvą vyro ir moters tarpusavio sutikimą ir kad sutuoktinių teisės yra lygios. Šios nuostatos nedeklaruoja tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokų ar partnerysčių galiojančiomis. Straipsnyje 39 nustatyta, kad dirbančios motinos turi teisę į mokamas atostogas prieš gimdymą ir po jo bei palankias darbo sąlygas.

The full title of the Abolition of Marital Power Act 34 of 2004 is “An Act to provide for the abolition of marital power, to amend the matrimonial property law of marriages, to provide for the domicile of married women, to provide for the domicile and guardianship of minor children and to provide for matters incidental thereto.” The Act provides for equal powers in property ownership for spouses. It also gives women equal powers to assume guardianship of minor children and in determining the domicile of their children. Furthermore, it removes the common law position of the husband as head of the family. Its effect is limited to common law marriage; it has no effect on customary or religious marriages (couples may marry under customary or common law).

The current family law in Ethiopia provides that there must be, inter alia, consent by both spouses to constitute a valid marriage (Article 6); respect and support between spouses (Article 49); equal rights in the management of the family (Article 50); fidelity owed by both husband and wife (Article 56). This is a substantial step forward in Ethiopian law.

With this decision, the Toulouse Court of Appeal held that a transgender woman had the right to be designated as the mother of her child when she had conceived the child before undergoing gender affirmation surgery. V., the claimant, and N.D. married and had two children. In 2009, V. successfully applied to change her civil status from male to female. She conceived the child that was the subject of these proceedings in 2014. She sought to be registered as the child’s mother, as opposed to as a surrogate, but the civil register refused. Until the decision of the Court of Appeal, only the claimant’s partner, their child’s biological mother, was listed on the child’s birth certificate. The claimant successfully argued, among other things, that it would be in the best interests of the child to have the claimant linked as the biological parent on the birth certificate. The decision was the first of its kind in France, and the result of eight years of proceedings. The Toulouse Court of Appeal referred in particular to the primacy of the child’s best interests, enshrined in the New York Convention, and to the right to respect for private and family life and the right to sexual self-determination, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 14). It found that those conventions require that a child born to a couple including a transgender person have the right to have both parents legally recognized, and that those conventions were not contrary to French national law.

This decision unified court’s criteria regarding issues of protection of motherhood and employment rights for pregnant women. The Constitutional Court analyzed 33 cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers after learning of their pregnancy status. The court ruled in favor of reinforced protection of motherhood in the workplace. Such doctrine must be duly applied in all those cases in which a woman is pregnant or during her lactation period. In relation to the dismissal of female workers, the court established criteria that takes into consideration the knowledge of the pregnancy status by the employer. It is argued that in order to dismiss a woman under such circumstances, the employer shall demonstrate (i) that a fair motive can be argued and (ii) that permission from the competent administrative authority has been granted. The required protection measures in cases where the employer dismissed the worker without the aforementioned procedure are as follows: (i) recognition of health benefits, up to the moment the woman acquires the right to claim the economic maternity leave benefit; (ii) reinstatement of the pregnant woman or the renewal of her contract, whenever possible; (iii) in some cases, compensation as provided for in article 239 of the Labor Code.

Esta sentencia unificó los criterios de la Corte Constitucional en temas de protección de la maternidad y derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas. La Corte Constitucional analizó 33 casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores después de conocer su estado de embarazo. El tribunal falló a favor de una protección laboral reforzada de la maternidad en el lugar de trabajo. Tal doctrina debe ser debidamente aplicada en todos aquellos casos en los que una mujer se encuentre embarazada o lactando. En relación con el despido de trabajadoras, la Corte estableció criterios que toman en consideración el conocimiento del estado de embarazo por parte del empleador. Se argumenta que, para despedir a una mujer embarazada, el empleador deberá demostrar (i) que se puede alegar una justa causa y (ii) que se ha otorgado el permiso de la autoridad administrativa competente. Las medidas de protección requeridas en los casos en que el empleador despida a la trabajadora sin el procedimiento antes mencionado son las siguientes: (i) reconocimiento de beneficios de salud, hasta el momento en que la mujer adquiera el derecho a reclamar el beneficio económico de licencia por maternidad; (ii) la reincorporación de la mujer embarazada o la renovación de su contrato, cuando sea posible; (iii) en algunos casos, la indemnización prevista en el artículo 239 del Código del Trabajo.

The case concerned labor rights and protection of sex workers. The plaintiff, a sex worker, sued her former employer for firing her after she became pregnant. Under articles 236 and 239 of the Colombian Labor Code, a pregnant woman is subject to special labor protection, and therefore cannot be fired without cause and without authorities’ permission. The court consisdered whether pregnant sex workers should have the same labor protection as other professions. Article 13 of the Constitution provides the right of all citizens to be treated equally, as such, the court held it necessary to provide the aforementioned labor protection to sex workers. This conclusion was achieved by virtue of comparative law and legislation, where the protection shall be provided in connection with the right to motherhood. Sex workers, whether men or women, shall not be discriminated and should hold the same rights as any other worker. In this regard, court acknowledged the plaintiff’s right to the financial compensation she was entitled to.

El caso se refería a los derechos laborales y la protección de las trabajadoras sexuales. La demandante, una trabajadora sexual, demandó a su antiguo empleador por despedirla después de quedar embarazada. De conformidad con los artículos 236 y 239 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, la mujer embarazada es sujeto de una protección laboral reforzada, por lo que no puede ser despedida sin justa causa y sin permiso de las autoridades competentes. El tribunal analizó si las trabajadoras sexuales embarazadas deberían tener la misma protección laboral que otras profesiones. El artículo 13 de la Constitución establece el derecho de todos los ciudadanos a ser tratados por igual, por lo que el tribunal consideró necesario extender la mencionada protección laboral a las trabajadoras sexuales. Esta conclusión se logró en virtud de análisis de derecho comparado y de la legislación local, donde la protección nace del estado de embarazo. Los trabajadores sexuales, ya sean hombres o mujeres, no deben ser discriminados y deben tener los mismos derechos que cualquier otro trabajador. En este sentido, el tribunal reconoció el derecho de la demandante a la compensación económica a la que tenía derecho.

Person X1 transitioned from female to male. X1 registered as a male and married a woman, X2, in 2008. In 2009, X2 bore a child. In 2012, X1 applied to have the family registry reflect that X1 was the child’s father and that the child was born while X1 and X2 were married. The ward mayor in charge of changes to family registries held that there was a problem with the application because Article 774 of the Civil Law was inapplicable to the child’s situation as the child was not related by blood to X1. X1 did not comply with the ward mayor’s request to fix the application, so the ward mayor filled in the family registry for the child with a blank for father and a note that the child was X2’s oldest son. X1 and X2 filed suit to have X1 added as the child’s father on the grounds that the child should be presumed to be a “legitimately” born child based on Article 772 of the Civil Law. The Supreme Court held that the child should be presumed to be the son of X1, overruling the lower court and the ward mayor’s decision. The court reasoned that under Article 3.1 of the Gender Identity Disorder Law, a transgender man should be treated for all purposes under the law as a man. The court held that this includes being able to marry and have a “legitimate” child. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a notification on 27 January, 2014 directing that this procedure be followed for any similarly situated families. Subsequently, the state changed the family registry for 45 such couples to reflect that both parents are their children’s parents.

X1は女性だったが、男性になるため、性転換手術を受けた。その後、彼は男性として登録し、2008年に女性のX2と結婚した。その翌年、X2は子どもを出産した。2012年、X1は、X1が子どもの父親であること、子どもがX1とX2の婚姻中に生まれたことを戸籍に反映させることを地方公共団体に請求した。戸籍変更を担当する区長は、子どもがX1と血縁関係にないことから、民法774条の適用を受けられないため、申請に問題があると、子の戸籍に父の欄を空欄にして、子がX2の長男であると記入した。X1とX2は、子が民法772条に基づいて「嫡出子」と推定されるべきであるとして、X1を子の父として加えることを要求し提訴した。最高裁は、X1の子と推定すべきであるとし、下級審および区長の判断を棄却し、「性同一性障害の性別の取り扱いの特例に関する法律」第3条第1項に基づき、トランスジェンダーの男性は、法に基づき、あらことで男性として扱われるべきであるとした。これには、結婚して「正当に」子どもを産むことができることも含まれるとした。この判決を受けて、法務省は2014年1月27日に、同様の状況にある家族に対してこの手続きを行うよう指示する通達を出した。その後、国は、そのようなカップル45組の戸籍を訂正した。

The plaintiff, a female Venezuelan citizen married to a female Venezuelan citizen, got married in Argentina, where LGBT marriage rights are fully granted to homosexual couples. In the following years, they tried to validate their marriage in Venezuela through a judicial homologation process. Such homologation was denied on the basis that the marriage regulations in Argentina did not comply with the provisions of Article 44 of the Venezuelan Civil Code, which regulates marriage rights in Venezuela and provides that “marriage cannot be entered into except between one single man and one single woman.” Thereafter, the couple conceived a child through the assisted reproduction method in Argentina, who was born and presented for registration as their son in Argentina. Immediately after the baby was born, the couple moved back to Venezuela, where they tried to present the newborn as their son to the Venezuelan competent authorities, requiring that the baby carried the surnames of both mothers. The registration was denied. The couple introduced a complaint before the competent court and the judge decided the registration of the boy was inadmissible. The plaintiff appealed this decision until it reached the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (“TSJ”), Venezuelan’s highest judicial body, which decided to annul the decision of the lower court. The TSJ overruled the lower court’s decision on the basis that the decision violated the plaintiff’s right to present the child as an LGBTIQ couple’s child. Likewise, the TSJ stated that this action violated the child’s constitutional right to have an identity. The TSJ final decision was to allow the registration of the child with both mothers’ surnames.

Parents of students enrolled at Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, a private all-male high school, filed suit to prevent the implementation of an order of the High Council of the National University of Córdoba (Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba) mandating that the high school admit female applicants. They argued that parents have the right to choose the type of education their children receive. The court of first instance found partially in favor of the parents, which was overturned by the appellate court. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court ruling on the basis that (1) the High Council of the National University of Córdoba acted within its statutory authority, (2) the Argentine constitution does not guarantee the right to enroll children in schools limited to a specific gender, (3) mixed gender schools do not infringe on the rights of parents to elect the type of education their children receive, and (4) establishing a mixed gender school is the only alternative compatible with the constitutional principles of equality and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to which Argentina is a signatory.

Los padres de los estudiantes matriculados en el Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, una escuela secundaria privada exclusivamente masculina, presentaron una demanda para evitar la implementación de una orden del Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba que ordenaba que el la escuela secundaria admitiera mujeres solicitantes. Argumentaron que los padres tienen derecho a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos. El tribunal de primera instancia falló parcialmente decidiendo a favor de los padres, lo que fue anulado por el tribunal de apelaciones. Entre otras razones, la Corte Suprema confirmó la sentencia de la corte de apelaciones sobre la base de que (1) el Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba actuó dentro de su autoridad estatutaria, (2) la constitución argentina no garantizaba el derecho a matricular a los niños en las escuelas limitadas a un género específico, (3) las escuelas mixtas no infringen los derechos de los padres a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos, y (4) establecer una escuela mixta es la única alternativa compatible con los principios constitucionales de igualdad y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer de la que Argentina es signataria.

A Japanese married couple petitioned for a court order that a Japanese local government accept birth registers for twins born from a surrogate mother in Nevada with the ovum and sperm of the Japanese couple. The state of Nevada, pursuant to its state court, had issued birth certificates for the twins, which showed the Japanese couple as their parents. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling that the birth registers need to be accepted. It stated that Article 118 of the Japanese Civil Proceedings Act prescribes that a final judgment made by a foreign court takes effect in Japan only if it satisfies all enumerated conditions, which include that “the foreign court’s ruling and its proceedings are not contrary to public policy in Japan.” The Supreme Court recalled that the Japanese Civil Code stands on the premise that a mother of a child is a woman who conceived and delivered the child and that a mother-child relationship is established through objective factors such as gestation and delivery. According to the Supreme Court, when a parent-child relationship can be legally established is a matter that forms the basis of the country’s legal order, and factors for finding such a relationship must be unequivocal. Thus, the Court found that a mother-child relationship between the twins and the Japanese wife could not be established, given that the Nevada court’s ruling, which recognized a parent-child relationship contrary to Japanese laws, ran against the public policy in Japan. In its statement, the Supreme Court urged the Japanese legislature to address the issues of parent-child relationships and assisted reproductive technology through legislation.

日本人夫婦がその卵子と精子を使い、ネバダ州在住の米国人女性に双子の子らを懐胎・出産させた。その後、夫婦は日本へ帰国し、が自らが双子の父母であると記載した出身届を区長である抗告人が受理するよう裁判所に申し立てた。これに対し、ネバダ州の裁判所は日本人夫婦を両親とする双子の出生証明書をすでに発行していた。最高裁は、出生届を受理する必要があるとした高裁判決を破棄し、日本の民事訴訟法第118条により、外国の裁判所が下した終局判決は、「その判決及び手続が日本の公序良俗に反しないこと」などの条件を満たした場合にのみ、日本で効力を生じるとし、また、日本の民法上、母子関係の成立の前提は懐胎し出産した女性がこの母である、母子関係の成立は懐胎、出産という客観的な事実により当然に成立することが前提であると述べた。最高裁によると、実親子関係の成立は、国における身分法秩序の根幹を成すものであり、その関係の存否の基準は一律でなければならない。したがって、日本の民法が実親子関係を認めていない者の間にその成立を認めたネバダ州の判決は、日本の公序良俗に反するものであるとして、双子と日本人夫婦との間に親子関係は存在しないと最高裁は判断し、同時に、早急に立法による対応を促した。

The aunt of three children applied to a Moslem Religious Court to be appointed as their guardian. The children’s mother argued that she was entitled to the guardianship under the Women’s Equal Rights Law. The mother, believing that the religious judge (the Kadi) would apply religious law and disregard the Women’s Equal Rights Law, applied for an order staying or setting aside the proceedings of the religious court. The court held that the issue was not ripe for review, as there was no indication that the Kadi would disregard civil law and rely only upon religious law. The order in which the Kadi decided to proceed was a matter of procedure with which the court would not interfere.

Here, appellants, the State and the children, sought review of a judgment from the circuit court, which found in favor of respondents, a mother and father, in the State’s action to terminate their parental rights. The Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment terminating the parental rights of father and mother. With reference to ORS 419B.504, the Court of Appeals of Oregon terminated the father’s parental rights with regard to his own daughter, because he was convicted for sexually abusing the mother’s daughter from previous marriage and had sexually abused his own daughter. In addition, integration of the children into his home was unlikely in the foreseeable future. In keeping with ORS 419B.504, the Court of Appeals of Oregon terminated the mother’s parental rights, because the children were subjected to severe sexual abuse while in her care, but she had neither recognized the signs of sexual abuse nor protected them. Furthermore, the evidence also demonstrated that mother would not be able to adjust her behavior to protect the children in the future, most importantly because she continuously denied the possibility that father subjected the children to sexual abuse.