Women and Justice: Keywords

This law promotes, protects, and supports motherhood and breastfeeding for working women, up to 24 months of age, to ensure the proper care of the children. On this note, every pregnant worker shall have the right to access a maternity leave, for a period of 18 uninterrupted weeks, regardless the type of contract under which she provides a service. This leave will be extended to 24 weeks in cases of baby’s severe diseases or premature births. Mothers have the right to receive their regular salary during maternity leave.

Esta ley promueve, protege y apoya la maternidad y lactancia de la mujer trabajadora, hasta los 24 meses de edad del menor, asegurando el cuidado adecuado de los hijos. En este sentido, toda trabajadora embarazada tendrá derecho a acceder a la licencia de maternidad, por un período de 18 semanas ininterrumpidas, independientemente del tipo de contrato bajo el cual preste un servicio. Este permiso se extenderá a 24 semanas en caso de enfermedades graves del bebé o parto prematuro. Las madres tienen derecho a recibir su salario regular durante la licencia de maternidad.

This law modified articles 236, 239, 57, and 58 of the Labor Code, among other provisions to establish special labor protections for pregnant and lactating women. The law prohibits the dismissal of pregnant or lactating women without cause and without prior permission of a labor inspector. It also granted women the right to receive their regular salary during a 14-week maternity leave.

Esta ley modificó los artículos 236, 239, 57 y 58 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, entre otras disposiciones. Su intención es establecer protecciones laborales reforzadas para las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes. En esta medida, la ley establece la prohibición de despedir a una mujer embarazada o lactante sin causa y sin permiso previo de un inspector de trabajo. También otorgó a las mujeres el derecho a recibir su salario regular durante una licencia de maternidad de 14 semanas.

Art. 262 prohibits employing women in “hard” work and work with harmful or hazardous conditions (see Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Belarus No. 35 dated 12 June 2014 for a full list). Art. 263 prohibits engaging pregnant women in overtime work, work on holidays and weekends, work at night, and sending pregnant women on business trips; women with children under the age of 14 (and disabled children under the age of 18) can be engaged in such work with the worker’s written consent. Under certain conditions, pregnant women and women with children under the age of one and a half years are transferred to an “easier” position while maintaining the average earnings of her previous job under Art. 264. Under Art. 265, upon the application of a parent or stepparent raising a disabled child or two children under the age of 16, an additional paid day off is granted per week or month depending on the age of the child. Under Art. 267, women with children under the age of one and a half years are entitled to additional breaks to feed the child. It is prohibited to refuse to enter into an employment contract with a worker or reduce his or her wages for reasons related to pregnancy or the existence of children under Art. 268.

Art. 199 prohibits the unjustified refusal to hire or the unlawful firing of a person, including a woman for reasons related to her pregnancy. This crime is punishable by a prohibition to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities, correctional labor, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.

This Act is a comprehensive act that replaced several pieces of legislation, including the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In general, The Equality Act 2010 legally protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society, and provides equality provisions, including the following:

The Family Status Discrimination Ordinance (“FSDO”) prohibits direct and indirect discrimination based on family status. The principles used by courts applying the FSDO are very similar to those of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.​

The Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 makes it unlawful to directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis of certain grounds (“attributes”) in connection to public life; including employment, education and training, and provision of facilities, goods and services. The various unlawful grounds of discrimination include: sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, gender, gender identity, intersex variations of sex characteristics, martial status, relationship status, pregnancy, breastfeeding, parental status, family responsibilities, irrelevant medical record, association with a person who has, or is believed to have, any of these attributes. Additionally, the Act prohibits inciting hatred towards a person on the grounds of their race, disability, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, or gender identity, as well as harassment, sexual harassment, and victimization towards a person based on protected attributes or their intent to file a claim under this Act. It also prohibits a person from promoting discrimination through a sign, notice, or advertisement. The Act also establishes the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner to investigate and resolve complaints. Complaints can be initiated by the person targeted by the discrimination, a trade union, or another representative for the targeted person. The Commission can also investigate any discrimination ex officio. If the Commissioner believes that the complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation or that the nature of the complaint is such that it should be referred to the Tribunal, the Commissioner can refer the complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. If the Tribunal finds that a complaint is substantiated, it may, among other remedies, order the respondent to pay the complainant an amount the Tribunal thinks appropriate as compensation for any loss or injury suffered by the complainant and caused by the respondent's discrimination or prohibited conduct.

This decision unified court’s criteria regarding issues of protection of motherhood and employment rights for pregnant women. The Constitutional Court analyzed 33 cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers after learning of their pregnancy status. The court ruled in favor of reinforced protection of motherhood in the workplace. Such doctrine must be duly applied in all those cases in which a woman is pregnant or during her lactation period. In relation to the dismissal of female workers, the court established criteria that takes into consideration the knowledge of the pregnancy status by the employer. It is argued that in order to dismiss a woman under such circumstances, the employer shall demonstrate (i) that a fair motive can be argued and (ii) that permission from the competent administrative authority has been granted. The required protection measures in cases where the employer dismissed the worker without the aforementioned procedure are as follows: (i) recognition of health benefits, up to the moment the woman acquires the right to claim the economic maternity leave benefit; (ii) reinstatement of the pregnant woman or the renewal of her contract, whenever possible; (iii) in some cases, compensation as provided for in article 239 of the Labor Code.

Esta sentencia unificó los criterios de la Corte Constitucional en temas de protección de la maternidad y derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas. La Corte Constitucional analizó 33 casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores después de conocer su estado de embarazo. El tribunal falló a favor de una protección laboral reforzada de la maternidad en el lugar de trabajo. Tal doctrina debe ser debidamente aplicada en todos aquellos casos en los que una mujer se encuentre embarazada o lactando. En relación con el despido de trabajadoras, la Corte estableció criterios que toman en consideración el conocimiento del estado de embarazo por parte del empleador. Se argumenta que, para despedir a una mujer embarazada, el empleador deberá demostrar (i) que se puede alegar una justa causa y (ii) que se ha otorgado el permiso de la autoridad administrativa competente. Las medidas de protección requeridas en los casos en que el empleador despida a la trabajadora sin el procedimiento antes mencionado son las siguientes: (i) reconocimiento de beneficios de salud, hasta el momento en que la mujer adquiera el derecho a reclamar el beneficio económico de licencia por maternidad; (ii) la reincorporación de la mujer embarazada o la renovación de su contrato, cuando sea posible; (iii) en algunos casos, la indemnización prevista en el artículo 239 del Código del Trabajo.

The case concerned labor rights and protection of sex workers. The plaintiff, a sex worker, sued her former employer for firing her after she became pregnant. Under articles 236 and 239 of the Colombian Labor Code, a pregnant woman is subject to special labor protection, and therefore cannot be fired without cause and without authorities’ permission. The court consisdered whether pregnant sex workers should have the same labor protection as other professions. Article 13 of the Constitution provides the right of all citizens to be treated equally, as such, the court held it necessary to provide the aforementioned labor protection to sex workers. This conclusion was achieved by virtue of comparative law and legislation, where the protection shall be provided in connection with the right to motherhood. Sex workers, whether men or women, shall not be discriminated and should hold the same rights as any other worker. In this regard, court acknowledged the plaintiff’s right to the financial compensation she was entitled to.

El caso se refería a los derechos laborales y la protección de las trabajadoras sexuales. La demandante, una trabajadora sexual, demandó a su antiguo empleador por despedirla después de quedar embarazada. De conformidad con los artículos 236 y 239 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, la mujer embarazada es sujeto de una protección laboral reforzada, por lo que no puede ser despedida sin justa causa y sin permiso de las autoridades competentes. El tribunal analizó si las trabajadoras sexuales embarazadas deberían tener la misma protección laboral que otras profesiones. El artículo 13 de la Constitución establece el derecho de todos los ciudadanos a ser tratados por igual, por lo que el tribunal consideró necesario extender la mencionada protección laboral a las trabajadoras sexuales. Esta conclusión se logró en virtud de análisis de derecho comparado y de la legislación local, donde la protección nace del estado de embarazo. Los trabajadores sexuales, ya sean hombres o mujeres, no deben ser discriminados y deben tener los mismos derechos que cualquier otro trabajador. En este sentido, el tribunal reconoció el derecho de la demandante a la compensación económica a la que tenía derecho.

The respondent was employed by the appellant, Property Center Bienes Raíces, as the secretary of the owner, Taylan Ozdemir, for approximately four years. When the respondent was three months pregnant, she experienced a health issue threatening her pregnancy and presented a doctor’s note to her employer stating that she could not work for 10 days and had to rest at home. Four days later, she returned to her office to return a work laptop for the use of her co-worker who was filling in while she was absent. According to the co-worker’s testimony, the appellant-owner began to yell at the respondent, stating she was uneducated, that there was “too much risk” in having a pregnant employee, and that she was fired. When the respondent began to cry, informing the owner-appellant that he could not terminate a pregnant employee, he said that he did not care if he was brought before the courts because he had enough money to pay any penalty. He then practically dragged the respondent physically from the premises. The lower court found that the appellant and his business illegally discriminated against the respondent. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected the appeal. Article 233 of the Employment Code (Código de Trabajo) clearly states that a woman cannot be dismissed from her employment because of her pregnancy (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada.”). The Supreme Court found that witness testimony and medical documentation clearly established that 1) between the parties a contract of employment existed, 2) that the respondent was pregnant; and 3) that at the time of her dismissal, her pregnancy was known to her employer. The Supreme Court ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the legal proceeding and the appropriate back pay to the respondent.

La demandada era empleada del demandante, Property Center Bienes Raíces, como secretaria del propietario, Taylan Ozdemir, por aproximadamente cuatro años. Cuando la demandada tenía tres meses de embarazo, sufrió un problema de salud que amenazó su embarazo y presentó una nota del médico a su empleador indicando que no podía trabajar durante 10 días y tenía que descansar en casa por ese período. Cuatro días después, regresó a su oficina para devolver una computadora portátil del trabajo para que la usara su compañera de trabajo que la estaba reemplazando mientras ella estaba ausente. Según el testimonio de la compañera de trabajo, el apelante comenzó a gritarle a la demandada, diciendo que no tenía educación, que había "demasiado riesgo" en tener una empleada embarazada y la despidió. Cuando la demandada comenzó a llorar, informando a el apelante que no podía despedir a una empleada embarazada, éste le dijo que no le importaba si lo llevaban ante los tribunales porque tenía suficiente dinero para pagar cualquier multa. Luego, prácticamente arrastró físicamente a la demandada fuera del local. El tribunal de primera instancia determinó que el apelante y su negocio discriminaron ilegalmente a la demandada. La Corte Suprema estuvo de acuerdo y rechazó la apelación. El Artículo 233 del Código de Trabajo establece claramente que una mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo debido a su embarazo (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada”). La Corte Suprema determinó que el testimonio de testigos y la documentación médica establecían claramente que 1) existía un contrato de trabajo entre las partes, 2) que la demandada estaba embarazada; y 3) que al momento de su despido, su empleador tenía conocimiento de su embarazo. La Corte Suprema ordenó a los recurrentes que pagaran las costas del proceso judicial y el correspondiente pago atrasado a la demandada.

The plaintiff was the defendant’s employee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s management began treating her poorly after her pregnancy, culminating in her eventual dismissal. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s actions were prohibited by the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. The court found that management had, among other things, had made derogatory remarks to the plaintiff, reduced her income, compelled her to transfer teams, and failed to investigate her internal complaints about her treatment. The court further found that the plaintiff had showed that, on a balance of probabilities, she had been discriminated against by the defendant’s management on the basis of her pregnancy.

The applicant was dismissed by her employer, the respondent, because of operational requirements. The applicant was employed by the respondent from 1 November 2007 until her dismissal on 24 October 2012. The applicant claimed that she was dismissed unfairly because she was pregnant. Prior to her dismissal, the applicant delivered a letter from the Qacha’s Nek Hospital stating that she was pregnant and would be required to attend monthly clinics until she delivered her baby. The respondent then dismissed the applicant, claiming that her employment could not continue because of her pregnancy. The Labour Court referred to subsection 3(d) of the Labour Code Order 24 of 1992, which provides that pregnancy, among others, does not constitute a valid reason for terminating employment. The court stated that this type of dismissal carried an element of discrimination, the freedom against which is protected by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the highest law of the land. The court held that the dismissal of the applicant was unfair, that the respondent must reinstate her to her former position, and that the respondent pay for her lost earnings following dismissal.

A woman informed her employer of the fact that she was pregnant. Two months later, her employer fired her due to alleged restructuring of the company. Subsequently, the appellant started proceedings before the Court to receive an indemnity. The appellant claims that she has a right of indemnity based on the right of pregnant women to be protected against redundancy or, following the right to be protected against discrimination. The court held for the appellant and ordered the previous employer to pay the appellant a sum of EUR 33,135.00 and EUR 703.24 and to deliver to the appellant requested social documents.

The plaintiff was a police officer with the Humboldt Police Department. While off duty, she ran into an ex-boyfriend against whom she had a protective order. Based on this encounter, she filed a criminal charge against him for violating the order. The chief of police commenced an internal affairs investigation into her charges, and her ex-boyfriend filed a criminal charge against her for filing a false charge. While both charges were pending, the plaintiff informed the chief of police that she was pregnant. Once the internal affairs investigation was completed, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated. She filed suit in the Gibson County Circuit Court for discrimination based on gender and pregnancy in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that she was treated differently than similarly situated male police officers.

The Plaintiff was employed as secretary of the Director by the Defendant in 2001. In February 2002, the Plaintiff suffered a threatened miscarriage, and was admitted to the hospital several times thereafter. From June to August 2012, she took sick leave frequently for treatment of her pregnancy complications. During that period, a permanent secretary was hired by the Defendant. The Plaintiff returned to work after expiry of her maternity leave in November 2012 as agreed with the Defendant, but was moved to a new work station which was not properly equipped, and was not given her original duties. Shortly after she resumed her work after maternity leave, she was dismissed by the Defendant. She sued the Defendant for her dismissal on the grounds of discrimination due to pregnancy, family status and victimization. The Court applied the “but for” and “less favorable treatment” test, and held that the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove discrimination on a balance of probabilities – once the Plaintiff can show that a possibility of discrimination can be inferred from the primary facts, the Court will look to the employer for an explanation, with which or if such explanation is not enough, the Court will infer the existence of discrimination. Based on the facts and evidence in this case, the Court found that the Plaintiff has established the primary facts on her claims on the grounds of discrimination due to pregnancy and family status, and found that the Defendant failed to establish the unsatisfactory performance of the Plaintiff and there were no significant enough reasons for the Defendant to dismiss the Plaintiff. On a balance of probabilities, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff was dismissed because of her pregnancy and family status, and held the Defendant liable. Damages for injury to feelings and loss of income were awarded to the Plaintiff.

The respondent was employed by the appellant to bottle Aquelle spring water. The appellant’s plant was located on property belonging to a religious mission, and to gain access to the workplace, the appellant’s employees had to cross the mission’s property. The mission’s security guards were instructed to bar entry to any persons who did not comply with its code of conduct; one provision, for example, prohibited “amorous relationships between any two persons outside of marriage”. The respondent and a colleague were denied access because they became pregnant outside of marriage. Consequently, the respondent and her colleague were not able to access the workplace, as they were refused access to the mission’s property. They were subsequently fired. The court ruled that the dismissal of the respondent employee was automatically unfair because she had been dismissed for her pregnancy. The court noted that all persons have a constitutional right to equality. Discriminatory dismissals, such as this one, are accordingly automatically unfair and higher compensation is allowed in such cases. Employers are obliged to avoid discriminating against employees directly or indirectly ̶ protection against being discriminated against on the ground of pregnancy is not a preserve of married women. An agreement that denies pregnant employees access to the workplace is accordingly prima facie unenforceable unless it can be justified on grounds consistent with constitutional norms. The mission’s code of conduct interfered with the employment relationship between the appellant and its employees and created a situation in which breaches could lead to dismissal. Such provisions blurred the line between the appellant’s terms and conditions of employment and the mission’s code. That the employee was not a party to the mission’s code proved decisive. As lessee, the appellant had legal remedies to compel the mission to allow full use and enjoyment of the leased property. The appellant’s faint plea of operational necessity could not serve as a defense because it had failed to exercise its rights as lessee to protect its pregnant employees. The employee had tendered her services, and the appellant’s refusal to accept the tender constituted a breach of contract. The court further held that the appellant’s acquiescence in the mission’s discriminatory practice of barring unwed pregnant women from the leased premises violated the appellant’s constitutional duty to treat its employees fairly and was a breach of its common law duty to accept the employees into service. The court, therefore, confirmed that the employee had been dismissed and that her dismissal was automatically unfair. The court also confirmed the remedy of 12 months’ compensation.

Die respondent is in die diens van die appêlant om Aquelle water te bottel. Die appêlant se aanleg was op eiendom wat aan 'n godsdienstige sending behoort, en om toegang tot die werksplek te verkry, moes die appêlant se werknemers die sending se eiendom oorsteek. Die sending se sekuriteitswagte is opdrag gegee om toegang te verbied aan enige persone wat nie aan hul gedragskode voldoen het nie; een bepaling, byvoorbeeld, het "verliefde verhoudings tussen enige twee persone buite die huwelik" verbied. Die respondent en 'n kollega is toegang geweier omdat hulle buite die huwelik swanger geraak het. Gevolglik was die respondent en haar kollega nie in staat om toegang tot die werksplek te verkry nie. Aangesien hulle toegang tot die missie se eiendom geweier is is hulle is daarna afgedank. Die hof het beslis dat die ontslag van die respondent werknemer outomaties onregverdig was omdat sy vir haar swangerskap ontslaan is. Die hof het kennis geneem dat alle persone 'n grondwetlike reg tot gelykheid het. Diskriminerende afdankings, soos hierdie een, is dienooreenkomstig outomaties onregverdig en hoër vergoeding word toegelaat in sulke gevalle. Werkgewers is verplig om te verhoed dat daar diskriminasie is teen werknemers, direk of indirek - beskerming teen diskriminasie op die grond van swangerskap is nie 'n bewaar van getroude vrouens nie. 'n ooreenkoms wat verwagtende werknemers se toegang tot die werksplek ontken is gevolglik prima facie-onafdwingbaar tensy dit geregverdig kan word op grond wat met grondwetlike norme bestaanbaar is. Die sending se gedragskode het met die werksverhouding tussen die appêlant en sy werknemers ingemeng en 'n situasie geskep waarin oortredings tot ontslag kan lei. Sodanige bepalings vervaag die lyn tussen die appêlant se bepalings en voorwaardes van indiensneming en die sending se kode. Dat die werknemer nie 'n party tot die sending se kode was nie, was beslissend. As huurder het die appêlant regsmiddels gehad om die sending te dwing om volle gebruik en genot van die gehuurde eiendom toe te laat. Die appêlant se dowwe pleidooi van operasionele noodsaaklikheid kon nie dien as 'n verdediging nie omdat dit versuim het om sy regte as huurder om sy swanger werknemers te beskerm uit te oefen. Die werknemer het haar dienste aangebied, en die appêlant se weiering om die aanbod te aanvaar het 'n skending van die kontrak saamgestel. Die hof het verder bevind dat die appêlant se vrywaring in die diskriminerende praktyk van die missie om ongewenste swanger vroue van die gehuurde perseel te belet. Die appellant se grondwetlike plig om sy werknemers billik te behandel is geskend en dat dit ‘n oortreding van sy gemeenregtelike plig was om die werknemers in diens te neem. Die hof het dus bevestig dat die werknemer ontslaan is en dat haar ontslag outomaties onregverdig was. Die hof het ook die regsmiddel van 12 maande se vergoeding bevestig.

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Mexican Supreme Court has previously determined the social benefits to which a former public safety employee is entitled at the time of her termination. The social benefits and salary must be paid upon termination and must account for both the period before and after an unjustified termination for pregnancy. The Mexican Constitution (Article 123, section B, item XI, subparagraphs (a) & (c)) recognizes the rights of pregnant women. These include social benefits during pregnancy. Consequently, the impairment that results from the termination must be paid and includes: (a) medical bills and payments made to private medical institutions due to the lack of social security benefits and (b) the payment of the full salary from the last month before birth as well as the two months after it, unless there is a court ruling in relation to unpaid wages. This provision of the Mexican Constitution, as well as other provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment And Eradication Of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará” compels the courts to rule with a gender perspective in order to ensure justice for this historically vulnerable social group. (Amparo Directo Administrativo 121/2016: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=1320/13200000186095880003003....)

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son relevantes a todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, dichos criterios pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La Corte Suprema de México ha determinado previamente los beneficios sociales a los que tiene derecho un ex-empleado de seguridad pública en el momento de su despido. Los beneficios sociales y el salario deben pagarse a la terminación y deben tener en cuenta tanto el período antes como el de después de una terminación injustificada por embarazo. La Constitución mexicana (Artículo 123, sección B, artículo XI, subpárrafos (a) y (c)) reconoce los derechos de las mujeres embarazadas. Estos incluyen beneficios sociales durante el embarazo. En consecuencia, el deterioro que resulta de la terminación debe pagarse e incluye: (a) facturas médicas y pagos realizados a instituciones médicas privadas debido a la falta de beneficios de seguridad social y (b) el pago del salario completo del último mes anterior al nacimiento, así como los dos meses posteriores al mismo, a menos que exista un fallo judicial en relación con los salarios impagos. Esta disposición de la Constitución mexicana, así como otras disposiciones de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW) y la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer "Convención de Belém do Pará" obliga a los tribunales a gobernar con una perspectiva de género para garantizar la justicia para este grupo social históricamente vulnerable.

Quijote, S.R.L., (the “Company”) fired the plaintiff while she was pregnant. The Labor Appeals Court (the “Court”) found that the firing was illegal because the law seeks to protect pregnant women, and though the medical certificate is a guarantee for the employer, it is not a requirement. The Court ordered the company to reinstate the plaintiff to her position and pay her lost wages. The Company challenged the court order in 1993, but the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge as an unconstitutional action in 1995. Consequently, the Labor Appeals Court ruling remained in effect.

Quijote, S.R.L., (la “Compañía”) despidió a la demandante mientras estaba embarazada. La Corte de Apelaciones Laborales (la “Corte”) determinó que el despido era ilegal porque la ley busca proteger a las mujeres embarazadas y, aunque el certificado médico es una garantía para el empleador, no es un requisito. El Tribunal ordenó a la empresa que reinstalara a la demandante en su puesto y le pagara su salario perdido. La Compañía impugnó la orden judicial en 1993, pero la Corte Suprema desestimó la impugnación como una acción inconstitucional en 1995. En consecuencia, la sentencia de la Corte de Apelaciones Laborales se mantuvo vigente.

Plaintiff Khadara-Ayan Yousuf, a U.S. citizen and a Muslim woman of Somali national origin, sued her former employer, Fairview Health Services for discrimination based on race, sex, pregnancy, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Fairview Health Services, her former employer, alleged that they terminated her employment when she allegedly did not return from a leave of absence. Plaintiff claimed discrimination as violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §1982. She appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals partially vacated the judgment with respect to the sex and pregnancy discrimination citing that Title VII has been amended via the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to prohibit employers from discriminating against a woman for her capacity to become pregnant, not merely because she is pregnant.