The defendant was charged the defilement of the complainant, a 17-year-old girl. In his defence, the accused claimed that he could not get an erection (albeit, apparently, only after the magistrate raised the question himself). During the proceedings, a woman stood up in court and volunteered to ascertain whether the accused could obtain an erection. One week later, the magistrate, prosecutor, court interpreter, accused, complainant, and the woman who had volunteered met in the magistrate’s chambers to witness whether the woman could touch the defendant sexually until he obtained an erection. The magistrate observed, after approximately 30 minutes of sexual contact, that the accused’s “penis got a bit hard but not very hard.” Following a complaint from the complainant’s parent, the High Court was requested to review the conduct of the magistrate to determine the veracity of the complaint. At this point, the magistrate had not reached a verdict. By way of a preliminary conclusion, the High Court noted that “this illegal show seemed to come out of the blue” and found that the manner of investigation into the accused’s ability to obtain an erection was “raised by the magistrate, thereby making the [High] Court conclude that there were extra judicial discussions” between the accused and the magistrate. The Court also expressed serious concern about secondary victimisation, given that the sexual act occurred in the presence of the complainant. The Court then outlined its reasons for arriving at its ultimate decision, focusing on two matters: the existence of bias and judicial stereotyping. Regarding the first issue, the Court cited caselaw from across common law jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights relating to actual or perceived bias. Regarding the second issue, the Court highlighted the significant dangers associated with gender stereotyping on the part of the judiciary. The Court emphasised that judges should be alive to the concerns of victims of sexual offences, specifically that gender stereotypes harm such victims and contribute to further violations of their rights. Presiding officers are obliged to ensure that the courts offer equal access to men and women. In this context, it was emphasised that it matters not only how judges conduct themselves, but also how their conduct could be perceived during a trial. A judicial officer has to be aware of the negative results of displaying condescension toward women in court. In this case, the complainant was concerned about judicial bias, corruption, and/or collusion with the accused. The decision implied that the magistrate’s conduct could have arisen from his bias against, and stereotyping of, the complainant as a complainant in a sexual offence case. The Court highlighted that the judiciary could not condone the perpetuation of “structural gender-based violence, where courts instill fear in women and girls who are victims of sexual offences, using the criminal justice system.” Therefore, in order to create a discrimination-free judicial system that victims can rely on, it is incumbent on the judiciary to remain cognisant of its own biases and stereotypes, especially in the context of victims of sexual offences, and conduct cases in a manner which counteracts such biases and stereotypes. In conclusion, the High Court ordered a retrial under a different magistrate, and that the complainant and her family be provided with the resources needed to ensure her attendance at court. The Court referred (i) the magistrate’s conduct in the trial and (ii) the wider question of gender bias among judicial officers to the Judicial Service Commission. Finally, the Court recommended that the Chief Justice, through the judiciary’s training committee, should develop training programmes to avoid a matter like this re-occurring in the future.
Women and Justice: Keywords
Domestic Case Law
R. v. Yusuf Willy (Criminal Review No. 6 of 2021/Criminal Case No. 183 of 2021) High Court of Malawi (2022)
Cправа № 334/5052/17 (Case No.334/5052/17) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2020)
The appellant attacked the victim in the park in an attempt to rape her, but he was noticed by other people and fled the scene of the crime before committing rape. The court of first instance sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for three years. However, the court discharged the appellant from imprisonment and instead put him on probation, with the imposition of certain duties. The appellate court overturned this decision and reinstituted the prison sentence of three years, cancelling the discharge from punishment on probation. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, finding that the court of first instance did not sufficiently consider the degree of public danger of the crime, or that the victim was disabled since childhood, which made her exceptionally vulnerable. Also, the first-instance court did not consider the fact that the appellant did not succeed in raping the victim only because of the intervention of other people who forced the appellant to flee the scene, not because he willingly abandoned the crime. This case is significant because it illustrated how Ukrainian courts should apply the sentencing factors for attempted crimes – (i) the gravity of the offense, (ii) the amount of progress made toward completing the crime, and (iii) the reasons the crime was incomplete – in sexual violence cases.
Скаржник напав на жертву в парку, намагаючись її зґвалтувати, але оскільки його помітили інші люди, він втік з місця злочину, перш ніж вчинити зґвалтування. Суд першої інстанції засудив заявника до трьох років позбавлення волі. Проте, суд звільнив скаржника від відбування покарання, натомість призначив йому випробувальний термін із покладенням певних обов’язків. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення та поновив покарання у вигляді трьох років позбавлення волі, скасувавши звільнення від відбування покарання з випробуванням. Верховний Суд залишив без змін рішення апеляційного суду, встановивши, що суд першої інстанції недостатньо врахував ступінь суспільної небезпеки злочину та те, що потерпіла була інвалідом з дитинства, що робило її особливо вразливою. Крім того, суд першої інстанції не взяв до уваги той факт, що скаржнику не вдалося зґвалтувати жертву лише через втручання інших осіб, які змусили скаржника втекти з місця події, а не через те, що він добровільно відмовився від злочину. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки вона продемонструвала, які обставини мають враховувати українські суди при призначенні покарання за замах на злочин у справах, які стосуються сексуального насильства: (i) тяжкість правопорушення, (ii) ступінь досягнутого на шляху завершення злочину, і (iii) причини, через які злочин не був доведений до кінця злочину.
Cправа №265/5853/17 (Case No.265/5853/17) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2020)
The appellant was convicted of debauchery for committing lewd acts against the victim, a girl under 14 years old. The first-instance court sentenced the defendant to five years of imprisonment and banned him for three years from continuing to volunteer at a children’s home. The appellate court left this decision unchanged. However, the Supreme Court changed the additional punishment, stating that courts may only impose such additional punishment if the commission of the crime was related to the perpetrator’s position or to engagement in certain activities. The Supreme Court found that, although the appellant provided volunteer assistance to the children's center, his volunteer activity was in no way related to the commission of a crime. This case is significant because the Supreme Court used a narrow definition of “related to” in finding that the defendant’s volunteer work with children unrelated to his sexual abuse of a child.
Скаржник був засуджений за вчинення розпусних дій щодо особи, дівчини віком до 14 років. Суд першої інстанції засудив обвинуваченого до п’яти років позбавлення волі та заборонив йому продовжувати волонтерську діяльність у дитячому будинку строком на 3 роки. Суд апеляційної інстанції залишив це рішення без змін. Проте, Верховний Суд змінив додаткове покарання, зазначивши, що суди можуть призначати таке додаткове покарання лише у тому випадку, якщо вчинення злочину було пов’язане зі службовим становищем винного або із заняттям певною діяльністю. Верховний Суд встановив, що хоча скаржник надавав волонтерську допомогу дитячому центру, його волонтерська діяльність жодним чином не пов’язана зі вчиненням злочину. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки Верховний суд використав вузьке визначення "пов’язаного з", коли встановив, що волонтерська робота обвинуваченого з дітьми не має відношення до сексуального насильства над дитиною.
Cправа № 171/765/15-к (Case No. 171/765/15-к) Касаційного кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Cassation Court within the Supreme Court) (2019)
The two defendants were charged with raping the complainant. The court of first instance sentenced the first defendant to four years of imprisonment, but discharged him from punishment on probation. The court acquitted the second defendant due to lack of evidence. The prosecutor appealed, arguing that the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the acquitted defendant. The prosecutor argued that discharging the first man from punishment on probation did not correspond to the gravity of the crime. Thus, the prosecutor asked the Court of Appeal to re-evaluate the matter and sentence both men to imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. However, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions and assigned new proceeding, due to the need to impose a more severe punishment in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal did not properly examine and evaluate the prosecutor’s arguments and evidence.
Двох підсудних було обвинувачено у зґвалтуванні скаржниці. Суд першої інстанції засудив першого обвинуваченого до чотирьох років позбавлення волі, але звільнив його від покарання з випробуванням. Другого обвинуваченого суд виправдав за браком доказів. Прокурор подав апеляційну скаргу, стверджуючи, що стороною обвинувачення надано достатньо доказів для доведення вини виправданого обвинуваченого. Прокурор стверджував, що звільнення першого обвинуваченого від покарання з випробуванням не відповідає тяжкості злочину. Таким чином, прокурор просив апеляційний суд переглянути справу та призначити обом чоловікам покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк 10 років. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок суду першої інстанції без змін. Однак, Верховний Суд скасував рішення судів попередніх інстанцій і відправив справу на новий розгляд в суд апеляційної інстанції у зв’язку з необхідністю призначити більш суворе покарання відповідно до закону. На думку Верховного Суду, суд апеляційної інстанції належним чином не перевірив і не оцінив доводи прокурора та докази.
Cправа № 135/1530/16-к (Case No.135/1530/16-к) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2018)
The appellant was convicted by the court of first instance for the murder and rape of one woman and the murder and attempted of rape of a second woman. Taking into account the fact that the man had previously been convicted of similar crimes, the first instance court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellate court left the judgment unchanged. The appellant’s attorney filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he asked the Court to revoke the sentence and close the criminal proceedings due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that a third party staged the crime scene and placed his property there; sexual intercourse with the first woman was consensual; and the forensic medical examination confirmed that the appellant did not engage in sexual intercourse with another woman. The Supreme Court emphasized that the conclusions of the lower courts regarding the appellant’s guilt were based on their careful examination of the evidence (e.g., the appellant’s property near the corpses indicated that he was at the place of the crimes; forensic medical examinations found traces of a man's DNA on the bodies). Accordingly, the Supreme Court left the sentence of life imprisonment unchanged. This decision is important because it demonstrates that serving a prison sentence may not deter persons who commit sex crimes from re-offending after their release from custody.
Cкаржник був засуджений судом першої інстанції за вбивство та зґвалтування однієї жінки, а також вбивство та замах на зґвалтування іншої жінки. Враховуючи те, що чоловік раніше був судимий за аналогічні злочини, суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді довічного позбавлення волі. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін. Адвокат скаржника подав до Верховного Суду касаційну скаргу, в якій просив суд скасувати вирок та закрити кримінальне провадження через недостатність доказів. Зокрема, скаржник стверджував, що третя сторона влаштувала інсценування злочину та розмістила там його майно; статевий акт з першою жінкою був за її згодою; і судово-медична експертиза підтвердила, що скаржник не вступав у статеві зносини з іншою жінкою. Верховний Суд підкреслив, що висновки судів попередніх інстанцій щодо винуватості скаржника ґрунтувалися на ретельному дослідженні доказів (наприклад, майно скаржника поблизу трупів вказувало на те, що він був на місці злочинів; судово-медичні експертизи виявили сліди ДНК чоловіка на тілах). Відповідно, Верховний Суд залишив без змін покарання у вигляді довічного ув'язнення. Це рішення є важливим, оскільки воно демонструє, що відбування покарання не може стримувати осіб, які вчинили сексуальні злочини, від повторного вчинення злочину після звільнення з-під варти.
PA-II-KZ-5/2014 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2014)
The defendants, both Serbs and a police officer, were accused of forcibly abducting a Kosovar Albanian civilian female and raping her, thus committing the offense of War Crime Against the Civilian Population, in violation of Article 153 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo in addition to other offences. The court of first instance acquitted both defendants of war crimes, but the acquittal was annulled by the appellate court, which sentenced them to 10 and 12 years of imprisonment respectively. Both defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies of a witness’s statement should not be treated as discrediting. The tribunal found it proven that two Serbs did rape the victim, determined that the victim’s and witnesses’ statements were credible insofar as they did not relate to the identification of the suspects, and disagreed that the lack of medical report raised doubts that the rape occurred at all because such a report’s absence was well justified by the prevailing circumstance of an armed conflict. However, the court held that it had not been proven beyond any reasonable doubt, as required by law, that the defendants were the persons who committed the rape due to deficiencies in the suspect identification process. For example, the initial process had been carried out by the KLA MP years ago, and the court lacked evidence on how the process was carried out, the photos shown to the victim, and whether statements by the KLA blurred the victim’s memory. Subsequent identification was deficient because the defendants’ photos were obviously dissimilar from the other photos shown and the victim and witnesses thereby may have been guided in identifying the perpetrators. Further, the victim’s and witnesses’ description of the perpetrators were either general and not sufficient to conclude that the defendants were the perpetrators, or not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. As a result, the tribunal granted the defendants’ appeal and acquitted the defendants. (Also available in Srpski and English.)
KI 82/16 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2017)
The applicant, a local employee of the UN mission in Kosovo, was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses, including facilitating or compelling prostitution (Article 241 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo). The Basic Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the guilty verdict. The applicant filed a request for protection of legality with the Supreme Court, which rejected the request. The applicant then submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging, among other things, that he was discriminated against on the grounds of gender in violation of Article 24 of the Constitution because the trial court found credible the statement of a victim and a witness because they were women. The Constitutional Court explained that, in the applicant’s circumstance, equality before the law should be understood as a right of a party to impartial treatment and equal opportunity to exhaust legal remedies despite personal status. Under European Court of Human Rights case law interpreting Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification – that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim, or there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means and aim. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation of gender discrimination as “manifestly ill-founded,” finding that he failed to prove how and why the trial court treated him in an unequal way in relation to the victim and witness at issue, only because they were women. The tribunal rejected the applicant’s other claims and concluded that he had not substantiated his allegations of a violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the applicant’s referral was declared inadmissible. (Also available in Srpski and English.)
HKSAR v. Hoque Court of First Instance (2014)
The court considered the issues of open justice, fair trials, and the right of the accused to confront the accuser. The prosecution in a rape case applied to the court for orders permitting the complainant to leave the courtroom without going through the public gallery and to give her evidence behind a screen so that she would be shielded from view by members of the public gallery. The defendant opposed the application for the screen, claiming that it would be prejudicial to him. The Court of First Instance held that the use of the screen to shield the witness from the public did not infringe on the right of an accused to confront the accuser, since the screen did not shield the complainant from the defendant.
U.S. v. Robinson United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2012)
A federal grand jury convicted the defendant-appellant of child sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. A minor victim testified that she started dating the defendant when she was 17 years old but had told him and others that she was 19 years old. She insisted that the defendant was only living off her income as a prostitute and was not a pimp facilitating prostitution. However, the prosecution introduced videotaped statements in which the defendant repeatedly implored Doe to make money for him and threatened her when she failed to deliver the money. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of sex trafficking of a minor. On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), an evidentiary provision added by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), which provides that “[i]n a prosecution . . . in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe [the victim], the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.” The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that this provision imposes strict liability with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age and relieves the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of the victim’s underage status under § 1591(a). The Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s challenges to this provision as lacking merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Sentencia nº 235 de Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Número de Expediente: C15-366) Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (2016)
In the predawn hours of a Sunday morning, police officers came upon a cab parked in a secluded location. A woman (apparently an adolescent) emerged from the car naked and told the officers she was being raped by the driver, who was found with his pants down. Prosecutors charged the driver with attempted sexual violence. After the driver pled guilty and was sentenced to 50 months of imprisonment, the victim appealed the classification of the offense and prosecutors opposed the appeal. Based on evidence in the record, the court of appeals modified the conviction to sexual violence, doubling the time of the prison sentence. On the driver’s cassation appeal, the Supreme Court held that, by upgrading the conviction beyond the driver’s plea, the modification denied the driver the opportunity to present a defense and thus violated his right to due process. The Supreme Court accordingly vacated the modification and remanded the case for rehearing of the victim’s appeal.
Squire v. R. Court of Appeal (2015)
On 24 May 2013, the applicant was found guilty of the abduction and rape of a 14-year-old girl. He had a good relationship with the parents of the girl and thus was a trustworthy person to her. The applicant’s first appeal application was denied. He renewed his application and the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeal granted the application. This time his conviction was quashed, the sentences were set aside, and the Court ordered a new trial at the next sitting of the Circuit Court. The applicant criticized the quality of the representation given by his counsel at the trial, arguing that his attorney did not provide an adequate defense and did not take full instructions from him. The attorney defending the applicant at the first trial argued that the applicant was properly defended, that the prosecutor also submitted that the defense was adequate and that, as the case turned on the contest of credibility between the complainant and the applicant, the jury’s verdict would have been the same, regardless of any omission by the defense counsel at the trial. Despite the seriousness of the alleged crime, the Court held that the applicant was denied the substance of a fair trial and quashed the conviction, setting aside the sentences, without doing a balancing test between the rights of the 14-year-old girl who was a victim of a crime, and the sex offender’s due process rights.
平成28年（許）45 (2016 (Kyo) No. 45) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2017)
The appellant in this case had been arrested and punished with a fine for allegedly paying for child prostitution in violation of the Act on Punishment of Activities Relating to Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and the Protection of Children (before its revision by Act No. 79 of 2014). The news media reported his arrest for the alleged charge, and all or part of the coverage was made available at several websites that were searchable on the appellee search engine. This case concerned the appellant’s request—based on his personal rights and moral interests—for an order of provisional disposition, requiring the search engine to make websites that refer to the appellant’s criminal record unsearchable. The High Court dismissed the request. The Supreme Court, on one hand, recalled its finding from precedents that the protection of information related to an individual’s privacy is subject to legal protection. On the other hand, it noted that search engines’ provision of search results (1) may constitute acts of expression and (2) has become an important infrastructure for distribution of information through the internet. The Supreme Court then found that the evaluation of whether providing particular search results amounts to an illegal action must take into account both the benefits of making the information at question unsearchable, and reasons and circumstances pertaining to providing such search results; the court can require that the search engine remove such search results only if the former exceeds the latter. In this case, the Supreme Court found that, while the criminal record at issue pertained to the privacy of the appellant and which he did not wish to be made largely available to the public, such information also concerned the public interest in light of the nature of crimes relating to child porn and child prostitution. In addition, the Supreme Court took into account that the information dissemination was limited to a certain degree considering that such search results did not show up unless a search engine user used the appellant’s name and his residing prefecture together as search keywords. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the benefit of making the information at issue unsearchable did not exceed the need of having the websites at issue on the search engine and sustained the lower court’s ruling.
本件の抗告人は、「児童買春、児童ポルノに係る行為等の規制及び処罰並びに児童の保護等に関する法律」（平成26年法律第79号による改正前）に違反した容疑で逮捕され、罰金刑に処せられた。複数のニュースメディアがその逮捕に関する記事をネット上で公開し、それらの記事は抗告人の氏名と居住する都道府県をキーワードに入れ、検索エンジンで検索すれば出るようになっていた。本件は、抗告人がその人格的権利に基づき、犯罪歴を公開するウェブサイトを検索できないよう検索事業者に削除を求めた仮処分命令の事案である。高裁は、抗告人の請求を棄却した。最高裁は、個人のプライバシーに関する情報は法的保護の対象であるという判例から、本件検索結果の提供は、（1）検索エンジンの表現行為である可能性があり、（2）ネット検索エンジンによる情報流通の社会的役割を果たしていると指摘した。また、特定の検索結果を提供することが違法行為に当たるか否かの評価は、当該検索結果を提供しない法的利益と、提供する理由に関する諸般の事情を比較衡量しなければならず、前者が後者を上回る場合のみ、検索エンジンに対して当該検索結果の削除を求めることができると最高裁は判断した。本件の場合、問題となっている犯罪記録は、抗告人のプライバシーに関わり、抗告人が広く公開されることを望んでいないものではあるが、児童ポルノや児童買春に関する犯罪の性質を鑑み、公共の利益にも関わるものでもある。また、検索エンジンの利用者は、抗告人の氏名と居住する都道府県を検索キーワードとして併用しなければ、関連する逮捕情報が検索結果として表示されないことを考慮すると、その逮捕情報の公開が一定程度制限されていたことが分かる。本件において、最高裁は、検索結果を提供しない法的利益は、検索結果を提供する必要性を超えていないと判断し、高裁判決を支持した。
Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v. Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2009)
Two men convicted of child rape challenged the constitutionality of the Sexual Offenses Act's amendments to the existing Criminal Procedure Act (CPA). The amendments permit child victims and witnesses of sexual offenses to participate in modified court proceedings to facilitate testimony. The lower court declared the amendments to the CPA constitutionally invalid. The Constitutional Court reversed the ruling, holding that (1) courts must inquire into the need to appoint an intermediary in sexual offense trials whenever children are expected to testify, regardless of whether the state raises the issue; (2) courts may exercise discretion whether to hold proceedings in camera; and (3) courts must give reasons for refusing to allow the use of intermediaries or other safeguards.
Twee mans wat skuldig bevind is aan verkragting van kinders het die grondwetlikheid van die wysigings van die Wet op Seksuele Misdrywe betwis teen die bestaande Strafproseswet (CPA). Met die wysigings kan kinderslagoffers en getuies van seksuele misdrywe deelneem aan gewysigde hofverrigtinge om getuienis te vergemaklik. Die laer hof het die wysigings aan die CPA konstitusioneel ongeldig verklaar. Die konstitusionele hof het die beslissing omgekeer en gesê dat (1) howe moet ondersoek instel na die behoefte om 'n tussenganger in seksuele misdrywe aan te stel wanneer daar van kinders verwag word om te getuig, ongeag of die staat die saak aan die order stel; (2) howe mag diskresie uitoefen of hulle verrigtinge in camera moet hou; en (3) howe moet redes gee vir die weiering om die gebruik van tussengangers of ander voorsorgmaatreëls, toe te laat.
Legislation
In addition to abolishing the offence of buggery (sodomy) between adults, this Act codifies the law relating to sex work (referred to as ‘prostitution’), with the starting point being that it does not make prostitution itself illegal. However, the Act does not define ‘prostitute’. Section 1(2) defines ‘prostitution’ as occurring where “a person solicits or importunes another person for the purpose of obtaining that other person’s services as a prostitute,” or where they solicit or importune another person on behalf of a third person for the purposes of prostitution. Section 7A criminalizes paying for sexual favors from any person, and payment can include contracting with another for cash, barter, or other consideration. Section 9 criminalizes living off prostitution in the form of ‘pimping’, providing for an offence where a person controls, organizes, compels, coerces, or directs the activities of ‘a prostitute’ in respect of prostitution for gain. Section 10 further criminalizes living of the earnings of ‘the prostitution of another person.’ Section 11 makes brothel-keeping and management an offence.
قانون العقوبات (Penal Code) (1960)
Articles 97-98 and 340-341 relate to who may benefit from more lenient sentences for “honour crimes,” such as a person who has witnessed his or her spouse committing adultery. However, Article 345 now excludes honor crimes where the victim is under 15 from qualifying as a mitigating circumstance as enumerated in Articles 97 and 98. Further, Article 308, which allowed a rapist to avoid punishment if they married their victim, was removed in the same 2017 amendment. Article 292 criminalizes intercourse with a woman, other than the man's wife, without her consent through either the means of coercion, threat, or deception. The punishment for such an action is at least 15 years’ imprisonment. This is extended under Article 293 to those women who are unable to resist sexual advances due to a physical or mental disability. In Article 294, a person who has intercourse with a girl of 15-17 years of age will be subject to 7 years temporary hard labor. If the victim is between 12 - 15 years, the minimum penalty will be 15 years. Article 304 provides a minimum standard of six months to three years imprisonment for those persons who “deflower virgins” of 18 years after promising to marry them in addition to compensation. Article 305 and 306 provides that anyone who commits sexual harassment or any type of sexual gesture with a child of under 18 (male or female), or over 18 without consent, is penalized. Article 314 provides that caretakers who permit a child between 6-16 to frequent brothels is penalized for imprisonment for a period of 6 years or with a fine of 20 (JD). Articles 309-318 prohibit prostitution, running a brothel, forcing a woman into prostitution, exposing a child to a brothel, renting a house for brothel, living off of a woman’s sex work. Article 323 punishes whomever aborts a woman's pregnancy without her consent with labor penalties for 10 years, and more than 10 years if the abortion leads to the woman’s death. Abortion remains illegal, but obtaining an abortion “to preserve honor” is a mitigating factor.
توضح المواد 97-98 والمواد 340-341 من يمكن أن يستفيد من العقوبات المخففة لجرائم الشرف مثل الشخص الذي فوجئ بزوجته بجريمة الزنا. بينما بينت المادة 345 أن العقوبات المخففة لا تشمل من هم دون 15 عام. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه تم حذف المادة 308 التي كانت تسمح للمغتصب بأن يتزوج الضحية. ومنعت المادة 292 مواقعة أنثى بغير رضاها سواء بالتهديد أو بالإكراه أو بالحيلة أو الخداع، وتكون العقوبة 15 سنة فأكثر. كما تمتد ذات العقوبة إلى الأنثى التي لا تستطيع المقاومة بسبب ضعف نفسي أو عقلي أو جسدي. كما أشارت المادة 294 إلى أن كل شخص واقع أنثى ما بين 15-17 سنة عوقب بالأشغال المؤقتة لمدة لا تقل عن 7 سنوات، أما إذا كان يقل عمره عن 15 سنة فتمتد عقوبة الأشغال إلى 15 سنة كحد أدنى. ووضحت المادة 304 أن كل شخص قام بخداع بكرًا يبلغ عمرها 18 عام فأكثر بوعده لها بالزاوج ففض بكارتها أو تسبب في حملها يعاقب بالحبس من 6 أشهر على 3 سنوات، بالإضاقة إلى ضمان بكارتها. ذكرت كل من المادتين 305 و306 أنه يعاقب كل شخص قام بفعل جنسي أو أي إيحاء يدل على ذلك لشخص لم يتم 18 من عمره أو أكمل 18 من عمره لكن لو يؤخذ برضاه. كما أشارت المادة 314 أن كل من عوهد إليه بالعناية بولد يتراوح عمره ما بين 6-16 سنة، وسمح له بالاقامة في بيت بغاء أو التردد عليه، يعاقب بالحبس حتى 6 أشهر أو بغرامة حتى 20 دولار. أما اامواد 309-318 فقد جاءت لتمنع الدعارة، والمادة 323 أشارت إلى أنه من أقدم بأي وسيلة كان على اجهاض امرأة، فيعاقب بالحبس لمدة لا تزيد على 10 سنوات، وأكثر من 10 سنوات إذا سبب ذلك الإجهاض وفاة. الإجهاض لا يزال غير قانوني، ولكن لو أرادت المرأة أن تقوم بالإجهاض للحفاظ على الشرف هو عامل مؤثر.