Alabama

The defendant was charged with chemical endangerment of a child for ingesting cocaine while pregnant, which resulted in her child testing positive for cocaine at birth. The defendant was convicted after a guilty plea, but challenged her conviction on appeal, arguing that the legislature did not intend for Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute to apply to unborn children. Additionally, she alleged that if the statute applied to unborn children, the law was: (1) bad public policy because it does not protect unborn children and (2) unconstitutionally vague. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Hicks’ claims, relying on an Alabama Court of Appeal decision, Ankrom v. State, 152 So.3d 373 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), in which the court held that the plain language of the statute included an unborn child or viable fetus in the term “child.” The Alabama Supreme Court refused to consider the defendant’s public policy arguments, stating that policy arguments are ill-suited to judicial resolution and should instead be directed at the legislature. Finally, the court concluded that the law was not vague, as it “unambiguously protects all children, born and unborn, from exposure to controlled substances.”

The defendant was convicted of third-degree domestic violence, harassment, and harassing communications based on evidence that he attacked his ex-wife, Karen Kelly, while they were driving in a car. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly admitted testimony from the treating physician concerning what Ms. Kelly told him as he was treating her broken nose. Specifically, the physician testified that Ms. Kelly told him that her injuries were caused by an “altercation with her husband while they were driving.” The defendant argued that the medical-diagnosis hearsay exception in Alabama Rule of Evidence 804(3) or Federal Rule of Evidence 804(3) did not apply because the statement did not concern the cause of Ms. Kelly’s injuries, but rather was a statement of fault. In concluding that the physician’s testimony was admissible under Rule 804(3), the court cited two prior decisions. First, the court considered Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala. 2005), in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that statements by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member or friend of the victim’s immediate household are reasonably pertinent to the treatment and admissible under Rule 804(3). Second, the court considered United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1993), in which the Tenth Circuit held that that “the identity of the abuser is reasonably pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault case, even those not involving children.” The Tenth Circuit found that a treating physician generally must know who the abuser was in order to render proper treatment because the physician’s treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim’s household. Based on these cases, the court held that Ms. Kelly’s statements to the treating physician “concerning the cause of her injuries and the identity of the person who committed the injuries were admissible under Rule 803(4).”

N.C., a minor, filed a personal injury action against her physical education teacher, her school principal, and the Tallapoosa County Board of Education. N.C. alleged that after her seventh grade physical education class, she was pulled into the boys’ locker room and raped by A.H., a 12th grade student whom her teacher, Caldwell, had appointed as a teacher’s aide. N.C.’s complaint alleged that Caldwell had actual knowledge that A.H. was sexually harassing students and had negligently or wantonly supervised N.C. and the other students in her class. Caldwell, the principal, and the Board filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that N.C.’s claims were barred by the doctrine of state-agent immunity. N.C. opposed entry of summary judgment against only Caldwell. The trial court reasoned that the Alabama Supreme Court “has been particularly reluctant to hold an educator responsible for sexual misconduct by another” and granted summary judgment in favor of Caldwell based on stage-agent immunity. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court considered an exception to state-agent immunity: “a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity . . . when the State acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.” The Alabama Supreme Court found that Caldwell was exercising judgment in the discharge of his duty to supervise students at the time of the rape, which occurred after the dismissal bell had rung. Nonetheless, the Alabama Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to (i) whether Caldwell actually appointed A.H. as a student aide, and, if so, whether he acted beyond his authority in doing so, and (ii) whether Caldwell ignored and failed to report allegations of sexual harassment from other female students about A.H.. The Alabama Supreme Court also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Caldwell was aware that A.H. was sexually harassing other female students and, if so, whether he failed to respond to the allegations. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that these issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and accordingly reversed the trial court.

Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, female minor children in the custody of Alabama’s Department of Youth Service (“DYS”), brought an action against DYS and its executive director, alleging federal claims of sexual harassment and abuse under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“Title IX”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision of DYS employees, and intentional misrepresentation. Defendants’ filed a motion to dismiss the claims based on various arguments for immunity, which the trial court denied. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint. In ruling on Defendants’ petition, the Supreme Court considered each claim for immunity. First, DYS claimed it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. The Court, however, held that, because Congress enacted Title IX not only pursuant to its Article I powers, but also pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, power, Congress successfully abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states from suits in federal and state courts for violations of Title IX. Second, the executive director argued he was entitled to federal qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim, since he was a government official. The Court disagreed, citing law holding that there is no state interest in protecting government officials accused of sexually molesting a child. Because the plaintiffs alleged that the executive director failed to protect them from harm even after he received notice of the sexual harassment and abuse, he did not have a clear legal right to dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim on the ground of federal qualified immunity. Third, the Court found that, based on the sovereign immunity provision of the Alabama constitution, dismissal of plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the executive director in his official capacity was proper. However, the Court found that the doctrine of state-agent immunity did not warrant dismissal of plaintiffs’ state law claims against the executive director in his individual capacity.