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Article 63 of the Code of Labor Laws prohibits overtime work for pregnant women and women with children under the age of three. This rule is meant to protect women, but at the same time it makes them vulnerable to discrimination. The direct application of this rule violates women's right to freely choose their work, restricts women's access to jobs for which additional payment is provided (for example, under the hourly payment system, overtime work is paid at doubled hourly rate), and can also inhibit women’s career and professional growth. In addition, such a prohibition leads to the unofficial, unsanctioned employment of women in such types of work, which leads to women lacking legal protection and adequate wages. Articles 176-177 determine that women are not allowed to work on nights or weekends. These articles also prohibit employers from sending pregnant women and women with children under three on business trips. Women with children aged three to fourteen, or children with disabilities cannot work overtime, and they cannot be sent on business trips without their consent. These rules also apply to men with children, but only if they are raising them without a mother permanently or long-term (for example, the mother is receiving long-term medical care). This approach discriminates against both men and women, and further reinforces stereotypes that child care is exclusively a woman's duty. For violations of these prohibitions, the Code of Labor Laws provides for fining the employer the amount of the minimum wage for each such violation (currently 6,700 hryvnias).

Статтею 63 Кодексу законів про працю забороняється надурочна робота вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Це правило покликане захистити жінок, але водночас воно робить їх уразливими до дискримінації. Пряме застосування цієї норми порушує право жінок на вільний вибір роботи, обмежує доступ жінок до робіт, за які передбачена додаткова оплата праці (наприклад, за погодинної системи оплати праці понаднормова праця оплачується у подвійному розмірі годинної ставки), а також може перешкоджати. кар'єрному і професійному росту жінки. Крім того, така заборона призводить до неофіційного незаконного працевлаштування жінок на такі види робіт, що призводить до того, що жінки не мають правового захисту та належної оплати праці. Статті 176-177 визначають, що жінки не можуть працювати у нічний час та у вихідні дні. Ці статті також забороняють роботодавцям направляти у відрядження вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Жінки, які мають дітей віком від трьох до чотирнадцяти років або дітей-інвалідів, не можуть працювати понаднормово, а також направлятися у відрядження без їх згоди. Ці правила поширюються і на чоловіків, які мають дітей, але тільки в тому випадку, якщо вони виховують їх постійно або тривалий час без матері (наприклад, мати перебуває на тривалому лікуванні). Такий підхід дискримінує як чоловіків, так і жінок і ще більше зміцнює стереотипи про те, що догляд за дітьми є виключно жіночим обов’язком. За порушення цих заборон Кодексом законів про працю передбачено накладення штрафу на роботодавця в розмірі мінімальної заробітної плати за кожне таке порушення (зараз це 6700 гривень).

Article 1258 of the Civil Code of Ukraine defines the rules of intestate inheritance, or inheritance without a will. If a person did not write a will, or made a will and canceled it before their death, then inheritance proceeds in accordance with the legislation. The grounds for inheritance according to law can be family relationships, adoption, or dependence on the testator for at least five years before his death. For example, children of the testator, including those who were born after his death, parents of the deceased person, and the surviving spouse have the right to inherit as heirs of the first line. Each of five lines of heirs (defined in Articles 1261-1265) receives the right to inherit in the order set in legislation. Only the types of heirs enumerated in legislation are eligible for inheritance rights at law. However, the order in which the heirs receive the right to inherit according to the law can be changed by a notarized agreement of the interested heirs. It is important to note that persons who lived with the testator as a family for at least five years before their death have the right to inherit as heirs of the fourth line. This means that, while the legally registered wife of a man who died intestate will inherit as an heir of the first line, a woman who lived in a civil (unregistered) marriage with a man who died intestate can only inherit as a heir of the fourth line. Accordingly, the probability that a woman in a civil marriage will inherit property after the death of her civil husband is rather low because there are likely to be higher-line heirs who will inherit before her. Moreover, a woman who lived in a civil marriage with the deceased must prove in court that they lived together as family and were not in any other marriage. Appropriate evidence of living as family without marriage registration are, for example: (i) birth certificates of children; (ii) photos, letters, or documents demonstrating that they operated a joint farm, etc.

Стаття 1258 ЦК України визначає правила спадкування без заповіту. Якщо особа не склала заповіту або склала заповіт і скасувала його перед смертю, то спадкування відбувається відповідно до законодавства. Підставою для спадкування за законом можуть бути родинні зв'язки, усиновлення або перебування на утриманні спадкодавця не менше п'яти років до його смерті. Наприклад, право на спадкування як спадкоємці першої черги, мають діти спадкодавця, у тому числі ті, що народилися після його смерті, батьки померлого та той з подружжя, який пережив. Кожна з п'яти черг спадкоємців (визначених статтями 1261-1265) отримує право на спадкування в порядку, встановленому законодавством. Право на спадкування за законом мають лише види спадкоємців, перелічені в законодавстві. Але черговість виникнення спадкоємцями права на спадкування за законом може бути змінена нотаріально посвідченою угодою заінтересованих спадкоємців. Важливо зазначити, що право на спадкування як спадкоємці четвертої черги мають особи, які проживали зі спадкодавцем сім’єю не менше п’яти років до його смерті. Це означає, що, якщо жінка, перебувала в офіційно зареєстрованому шлюбі із чоловіком, який помер без заповіту, то вона спадкує як спадкоємець першої черги, а жінка, яка проживала в цивільному (незареєстрованому) шлюбі з чоловіком, який помер без заповіту, може успадкувати лише як спадкоємець четвертої черги. Відповідно ймовірність того, що жінка, яка перебуває у цивільному шлюбі, успадкує майно після смерті цивільного чоловіка, є досить низькою, оскільки, ймовірно, будуть спадкоємці попередніх черг, які успадкують раніше неї. Крім того, жінка, яка проживала з померлим у цивільному шлюбі, повинна довести в суді, що вони проживали разом сім'єю і не перебували в іншому шлюбі. Відповідними доказами проживання сім'єю без реєстрації шлюбу є, наприклад: (I) свідоцтва про народження дітей; (II) фотографії, листи або документи, які підтверджують, що вони керували спільним господарством тощо.

Article 1241 of the Civil Code of Ukraine provides for a special type of inheritance regardless of the content of the will. This article establishes the rule that a certain category of heirs, including incapacitated widows, will inherit half of the share (“compulsory share”) that would belong to them pursuant to inheritance by law. An “incapacitated citizen” is, for example, a person who has reached the age at which they have the right to a pension, a person with a disability, etc. This rule is meant to protect the testator’s closest relatives. The court may reduce size of a compulsory share, depending on the relationship between the heirs and the testator, as well as other significant circumstances (for example, the heir’s property status). According to the law, it is not possible to deprive the heir of the right to a compulsory share in the inheritance.

Статтею 1241 ЦК України передбачає особливий вид спадкування незалежно від змісту заповіту. Ця стаття встановлює правило, згідно з яким певна категорія спадкоємців, у тому числі непрацездатні вдови, успадковує половину частки ("обов’язкової частки"), яка належала б їм в порядку спадкування за законом. "Непрацездатним громадянином" є, наприклад, особа, яка досягла віку, з якого вона має право на пенсію; особа з інвалідністю тощо. Ця норма покликана захистити найближчих родичів спадкодавця. Суд може зменшити розмір обов’язкової частки залежно від відносин між спадкоємцями та спадкодавцем, а також інших обставин, що мають істотне значення (наприклад, майнового стану спадкоємця). Відповідно до закону, позбавити спадкоємця права на обов'язкову частку у спадщині не можна.

Article 3502 lists the persons who can apply to the court for a restraining order, which means a judicial measure that temporarily restricts rights or imposes obligations on a perpetrator of domestic violence and is aimed at ensuring the victim's safety. For example, the court may order a ban on staying in the common residence with the victim of domestic violence; prohibition to approach within a specified distance to the victim’s place of residence, study, work, or other frequently visited locations; prohibition to contact the victim. The following categories of persons are eligible to apply for a restraining order: (i) a person who has suffered from domestic violence, or their representative; (ii) a person who has suffered from gender-based violence, or their representative; (iii) parents and other legal representatives of a child who suffered from domestic violence or gender-based violence; (iv) a guardian representing the interests of an incapable person who has suffered from domestic violence or gender-based violence.

Стаття 3502 містить перелік осіб, які можуть звернутися до суду із заявою про видачу обмежувального припису, що означає встановлений у судовому порядку захід тимчасового обмеження прав чи покладення обов’язків на особу, яка вчинила домашнє насильство, спрямований на забезпечення безпеки постраждалої особи. Наприклад, суд може встановити заборону на перебування у спільному місці проживання з жертвою домашнього насильства; заборону наближатися на визначену відстань до місця проживання, навчання, роботи чи інших місць, які часто відвідує потерпілий; заборону контактувати з потерпілим. Право на подання заяви про видачу обмежувального припису мають наступні категорії осіб: (I) особа, яка постраждала від домашнього насильства, або її представник; (II) особа, яка постраждала від ґендерно зумовленого насильства, або її представник; (III) батьки та інші законні представники дитини, яка постраждала від домашнього або ґендерно зумовленого насильства; (IV) опікун, який представляє інтереси недієздатної особи, яка постраждала від домашнього або ґендерно зумовленого насильства.

These articles determine the legal consequences related to joint property of the spouses after the dissolution of the marriage. Dissolution of marriage shall not terminate the joint ownership of any property acquired in marriage, meaning that co-owners shall manage any property that remains in their joint ownership upon divorce only on the basis of their mutual agreement. However, the Family Code protects the rights of divorced spouses: (i) they can agree to divide ownership of the joint property or (ii) apply to the court to the divide the joint property after the dissolution of the marriage. As a general rule, any joint property must be allotted to the spouses in equal shares unless otherwise agreed or contracted. However, in determining the division of joint property, the court may divert from the rule of equal shares in the light of any vital circumstances, such as either spouse was not contributing to the family maintenance, concealed assets, eliminated or caused damage to any joint assets, or used any joint assets in a way that was detrimental to the family interests. Children living with one of the spouses in itself is not a reason for increasing the share in the property of one of the spouses.

Ці статті визначають правові наслідки щодо спільного майна подружжя після розірвання шлюбу. Розірвання шлюбу не припиняє право спільної власності на будь-яке майно, набуте в шлюбі, тобто співвласники розпоряджаються майном, яке залишається в їхній спільній власності після розірвання шлюбу, лише за взаємною згодою. Проте, Сімейний кодекс захищає права розлученого подружжя: (I) вони можуть домовитися про поділ спільного майна або (II) звернутися до суду з позовом про поділ спільного майна після розірвання шлюбу. За загальним правилом будь-яке спільне майно подружжя має бути розподілене між подружжям у рівних частках, якщо інше не встановлено домовленістю чи договором. Однак, вирішуючи питання про поділ спільного майна, суд може відхилитися від правила рівних часток у світлі будь-яких життєво важливих обставин, наприклад, якщо будь-хто з подружжя не брав участі в утриманні сім’ї, приховував активи, знищив або завдав шкоди будь-якому спільному майну або використовував будь-які спільні активи у спосіб, який завдавав шкоди інтересам сім’ї. Саме по собі проживання дітей з одним із подружжя не є підставою для збільшення частки у майні одного з подружжя.

Article 57 of the Family Code of Ukraine defines a list of types of property that are not considered joint property of spouses, for example: (i) any property acquired by either spouse before getting married; (ii) any property acquired under a gift agreement or as heritage during the marriage; (iii) any property acquired during marriage with one spouse’s own money; (iv) personal items such as jewelry, even if acquired with money owned jointly by the spouses, etc. However, according to Ukrainian legislation and judicial practice, there is a presumption of joint spousal ownership: it is assumed that all property of the spouses is their joint property and subject to division, until proven otherwise. When deciding whether property belongs to both spouses, Ukrainian courts are guided by criteria including the time of acquisition of the property and the funds with which such property was acquired (source of acquisition). For example, if property was acquired with personal funds during the marriage, the property is not joint property of the spouses, but rather is the personal private property of the spouse who purchased it. At the same time, if it is not confirmed that the property was bought with personal funds, the presumption of joint ownership of the spouses will remain. The spouse contesting the claim that the property is individual property bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of joint. When managing property, Article 59 requires that spouses must consider the interests of the child and other family members who are lawfully authorized to use their property.

Стаття 57 Сімейного кодексу України визначає перелік видів майна, яке не є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя, наприклад: (I) будь-яке майно, набуте одним із подружжя до шлюбу; (II) будь-яке майно, набуте за договором дарування або в порядку спадкування; (III) будь-яке майно, придбане під час шлюбу за особисті кошти одного з подружжя; (IV) особисті речі, такі як ювелірні вироби, навіть якщо вони придбані за кошти, які є спільною власністю подружжя, тощо. Однак, згідно з українським законодавством та судовою практикою, існує презумпція спільної власності подружжя: вважається, що все майно подружжя є їхньою спільною власністю і підлягає поділу, доки не буде доведено інше. Вирішуючи питання про належність майна обом подружжю, українські суди керуються такими критеріями, як час набуття майна та кошти, на які таке майно набуто (джерело набуття). Наприклад, якщо майно було придбано за особисті кошти під час шлюбу, це майно не є спільною власністю подружжя, а є особистою приватною власністю того з подружжя, який його придбав. При цьому, якщо не буде підтверджено факт придбання майна за особисті кошти, презумпція спільної власності подружжя збережеться. Той з подружжя, який заперечує вимогу про те, що майно є індивідуальною власністю, несе тягар спростування презумпції спільної власності. Стаття 59 вимагає, щоб подружжя при управлінні майном зважало на інтереси дитини та інших членів сім’ї, які за законом мають право користуватися їх майном.

Spouses who have children may file to a competent court a divorce application supported by a written agreement detailing with whom the children will live following the divorce, to what extent the other parent will support the children, and the other parent's right to care for the children. The competent court shall award a divorce one month following the submission of the divorce application, if it is established that the divorce application is in line with the genuine intent of the wife and husband. It is interesting that the family law establishes rules according to which the court shall attempt to facilitate the reunification of the couple through measures that are not in conflict with the moral principles of society (in such circumstances, the court may suspend the proceedings and set a time limit for the spouses to reconcile, which may not exceed six months). If both spouses agree to dissolve the marriage, the terms for reconciliation are usually not set by the court. Either spouse may apply for a divorce. At the same time, the legislature limited access to justice to certain categories of persons, namely: pregnant wives and their husbands, as well as parents of children under one year of age. Thus, a divorce application may not be filed during the wife's pregnancy and within one year of childbirth, unless either spouse engages in illegal behavior that may be classified as a criminal offense against the other spouse or the child. Such a limitation does not typically preserve the family, and may interfere with a person's right to marry another person with whom they already live, affects decision-making regarding the acquisition of property, because in this case it will be considered joint property (it will be very difficult for a person to challenge the presumption of joint property in court even if the persons do not live together). When deciding the issue of divorce, the court shall investigate the actual relationship of the spouse and genuine grounds for filing for divorce, with due regard to whether the spouses have a minor child or any other important factors. After divorce, a person has the right to revert their pre-marriage last name. In case of divorce granted by the court, the marriage shall be deemed terminated as of the effective date of the court judgment awarding the divorce.

Подружжя, яке має дітей, може подати до компетентного суду заяву про розірвання шлюбу, яка супроводжується письмовою угодою, в якій вказується, з ким проживатимуть діти після розірвання шлюбу, в якому обсязі другий з батьків утримуватиме дітей, а також право другого з батьків піклуватися про дітей. Компетентний суд ухвалює рішення про розірвання шлюбу через місяць після подання заяви про розірвання шлюбу, якщо буде встановлено, що заява про розірвання шлюбу відповідає справжнім намірам дружини та чоловіка. Цікаво, що сімейне законодавство встановлює правила, відповідно до яких суд намагається сприяти возз’єднанню подружжя за допомогою заходів, які не суперечать моральним засадам суспільства (за таких обставин суд може призупинити провадження та призначити строк для примирення подружжя, який не може перевищувати шести місяців). У разі згоди обох з подружжя на розірвання шлюбу строк примирення судом зазвичай не встановлюються. Будь-хто з подружжя може подати заяву на розірвання шлюбу. Водночас законодавець обмежив доступ до правосуддя певним категоріям осіб, а саме: вагітним дружинам та їхнім чоловікам, а також батькам дітей віком до одного року. Таким чином, заява про розірвання шлюбу не може бути подана під час вагітності дружини та протягом одного року після пологів, за винятком випадків, коли будь-хто з подружжя вчинив протиправну поведінку, яка може бути кваліфікована як кримінальний злочин щодо іншого з подружжя або дитини. Таке обмеження, як правило, не зберігає сім’ю, може перешкоджати праву особи на шлюб з іншою особою, з якою вони вже проживають, впливати на прийняття рішення щодо придбання майна, оскільки в цьому випадку воно вважатиметься спільною власністю (вкрай важко оскаржити презумпцію спільної власності в суді, навіть якщо особи не проживають разом). При вирішенні питання про розірвання шлюбу суд з'ясовує фактичні стосунки подружжя та дійсні підстави для звернення до суду з позовом про розірвання шлюбу, з урахуванням наявності у подружжя неповнолітньої дитини та інших важливих обставин. Після розірвання шлюбу особа має право повернути своє дошлюбне прізвище. У разі розірвання шлюбу за рішенням суду шлюб вважається припиненим з дня набрання законної сили рішенням суду про розірвання шлюбу.

Termination of marriage is a legal status, after which the legal relationship between the spouses no longer exists. Articles 104-105 of the Family Code of Ukraine provide that a marriage is terminated if either spouse is presumed dead or declared missing. Dissolution is one of the types of termination of marriage provided by the Family Code. Dissolution can take place via in-court and out-of-court procedure, namely: (i) upon application to the civil registration office for divorce filed by (a) both spouses (if spouses do not have children) or (b) only one of spouse (if the second spouse has been declared missing or incapacitated); (ii) upon successful application to a competent court from spouses who have children; (iii) upon the application of one of the spouses. These articles reflect the principle of “voluntary marriage,” which requires free and complete consent not only at the time of marriage registration, but also during marriage and its subsequent dissolution. No one can be forced to stay in a marriage. A simple unwillingness to continue being married to a certain person is enough, even in the absence of conflicts, quarrels, etc.

Припинення шлюбу є правовим станом, після якого правовідносини між подружжям перестають існувати. Статтями 104-105 Сімейного кодексу України передбачено, що шлюб припиняється у разі визнання одного з подружжя померлим або безвісно відсутнім. Розірвання шлюбу є одним із видів припинення шлюбу, передбачених Сімейним кодексом. Розірвання шлюбу може відбутися в судовому та позасудовому порядку, а саме: (I) за заявою до відділу реєстрації актів цивільного стану про розлучення, поданою (а) обома подружжям (якщо подружжя не має дітей) або (б) лише одним із подружжя (якщо другий з подружжя визнано безвісно відсутнім або недієздатним); (II) після успішного звернення до компетентного суда від подружжя, яке має дітей; (III) за заявою одного з подружжя. У цих статтях відображено принцип "добровільності шлюбу", який вимагає вільної та повної згоди не лише під час реєстрації шлюбу, але й під час шлюбу та його подальшого розірвання. Нікого не можна змусити залишатися в шлюбі. Досить простого небажання продовжувати перебування в шлюбі з певною людиною, навіть за відсутності конфліктів, сварок і т.

The Procedure defines the rules for determining the status of a victim of human trafficking based on relevant information. The document requires that a victim submit an application to establish status to their local state administration. The Procedure determines victims’ rights to receive shelter, medical, psychological, and other government assistance. If the application is approved, the victim of human trafficking is issued a certificate. The requirements for establishing the status are: (i) conclusion of an illegal agreement (for example, if a person (victim) was sold by agreement as goods by one person (seller) to another person (buyer)); (ii) recruitment, movement, concealment, transfer, or receipt of a person for the purpose of exploitation, including coercion, abduction, fraud, blackmail, material, or other dependence; (iii) the applicant’s supporting documents and materials affirm their eligibility. A person whose status has been established and who has received the relevant certificate has the right to receive one-time financial assistance in accordance with the Procedure. Also, victims will receive information about their rights and opportunities, set out in their own language, as well as compensation for moral and material damage at the expense of the persons who caused it. The status is granted for up to two years and can be extended. According to official statistics for 2021, the status of victims of human trafficking was established for 47 citizens, of whom 11 are women, 36 are men, and 1 is a child. The greatest number of persons suffered from labor exploitation. The main destination countries are Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Порядок визначає правила визначення статусу особи, яка постраждала від торгівлі людьми, за відповідною інформацією. Документ передбачає, що потерпілий подає заяву про встановлення статусу до місцевої державної адміністрації. Порядок визначає права потерпілих на отримання притулку, медичної, психологічної та іншої державної допомоги. У разі задоволення заяви, потерпілому від торгівлі людьми видається довідка. Вимогами для встановлення статусу є: (I) укладення незаконної угоди (наприклад, якщо особа (потерпілий) була продана за домовленістю як товар однією особою (продавцем) іншій особі (покупцю)); (II) вербування, переміщення, приховування, передача або одержання особи з метою експлуатації, включаючи примус, викрадення, шахрайство, шантаж, матеріальну чи іншу залежність; (III) документи та матеріали, що зібрані під час проведення перевірки і підтверджують можливість встановлення статусу. Право на отримання одноразової грошової допомоги згідно з Порядком має особа, статус якої встановлено та, яка отримала відповідну довідку. Також потерпілі отримають інформацію про свої права та можливості, викладену рідною мовою, а також відшкодування моральної та матеріальної шкоди за рахунок осіб, які її завдали. Статус надається на термін до двох років і може бути продовжений. Згідно з офіційною статистикою за 2021 рік статус постраждалих від торгівлі людьми встановлено 47 громадянам, з яких 11 жінок, 36 чоловіків, 1 дитина. Найбільша кількість осіб постраждала від трудової експлуатації. Основні країни призначення – Україна та Російська Федерація.

This Order invalidated Order No 256, which listed heavy work and work with harmful and dangerous working conditions in which the employment of women was prohibited. Order No 256’s list of prohibited work for women included 70 types of work and 558 professions. Among the priority factors were the physical stress associated with lifting and carrying loads, forced working posture, vibration, and other similar tasks that could affect a woman's body and reproductive health. The following types of professions were prohibited for women: the well-paid professions of a subway driver, a motorist on a ship, and long-distance bus driver. In addition, the Law of Ukraine 'On Organization of Labor Relations under the Martial Law' specifies that during the period of martial law, the employment of women (except for pregnant women and women with a child under one year of age) is allowed for heavy work with their consent and in jobs with harmful or dangerous working conditions, including underground works. Invalidating Order No 256 is a positive step because (i) no one has the right to determine what a person should study for and where they should work; (ii) the Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that no one may be discriminated against based on gender, age, religion, etc.; (iii) Order 256’s now-defunct prohibitions deprived women of social protections because, for example, in practice, women unofficially worked in the positions they considered necessary in violation of the Law. This, in turn, led women not receiving salaries equal to men’s because women could not be officially employed.

Цим наказом визнано таким, що втратив чинність, Наказ № 256, який містив перелік важких робіт та робіт із шкідливими та небезпечними умовами праці, на яких заборонялося застосування праці жінок. До списку заборонених Наказом № 256 робіт для жінок увійшли 70 видів робіт і 558 професій. Серед пріоритетних факторів були фізичні навантаження, пов'язані з підйомом і перенесенням вантажів, вимушеною робочою позою, вібрацією та іншими подібними завданнями, які можуть вплинути на жіночий організм і репродуктивне здоров'я жінки. Для жінок були заборонені такі види професій: високооплачувані професії машиніста метрополітену, моториста на кораблі, водія автобуса далекого прямування. Крім цього, Законом України "Про організацію трудових відносин в умовах воєнного стану" визначено, що на період дії воєнного стану допускається прийняття на роботу жінок (крім вагітних і жінок, які мають дитину віком до одного року) на важких роботах за їх згодою та на роботах із шкідливими або небезпечними умовами праці, у тому числі на підземних роботах. Визнання недійсним Наказу № 256 є позитивним кроком, оскільки (I) ніхто не має права визначати, де людина має навчатися і де працювати; (II) Конституція України визначає, що ніхто не може бути дискримінований за ознакою статі, віку, віросповідання тощо; (III) заборони Наказу № 256, які тепер не діють, позбавляли жінок соціального захисту, оскільки, до прикладу, на практиці жінки неофіційно працювали на посадах, які вони вважали необхідними, всупереч Закону. Це, у свою чергу, призводило до того, що жінки не отримували заробітну плату на рівні заробітній платі чоловіків, оскільки жінки не могли бути офіційно працевлаштовані.

The Law (No 2523-VIII) amended the Statute of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine 'On Military Service and Military Duty' in order to allow women to be assigned to 24-hour military duty on an equal basis with men. Before these amendments, the Statute of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine contained the rule according to which female soldiers, as a rule, are not assigned to 24-hour military duty. In addition, all officer and sergeant positions now are available to women in the Armed Forces, subject to compliance with legislation on childhood and maternity protection. At the same time, advantages for women in the field of military service still exist. For example, Article 101 of the Law of Ukraine 'On social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families' defines the following procedure for granting leave to men: only a female soldier can receive maternity leave during “special” periods, specifically (i) from the moment of the announcement of the decision to mobilize; (ii) the introduction of martial law in Ukraine or in some of its localities and includes the time of mobilization, wartime, and partial of the reconstruction period after the end of military actions. In contrast, a male soldier can use childcare leave only in peacetime. Similarly, the legislation of Ukraine contains a rule that prohibits male soldiers using childcare leave before a child reaches three years of age for military men during martial law or “special” period. Amendments introduced by the Law (No. 2523-VIII) are a step towards the equality of men and women in the field of military service, but there are still certain gender discriminatory norms that are not regulated by the current legislation.

Законом (№ 2523-VIII) внесено зміни до Статуту внутрішньої служби Збройних Сил України та Закону України "Про військову службу і військовий обов’язок", аби дозволити призначення жінок на цілодобове військове чергування на рівні з чоловіками. До цих змін у Статуті внутрішньої служби Збройних Сил України була норма, згідно з якою військовослужбовці-жінки, як правило, не призначаються на цілодобове військове чергування. Крім того, усі офіцерські та сержантські посади тепер доступні жінкам у Збройних Силах, за умови дотримання законодавства про охорону дитинства та материнства. Водночас переваги для жінок у сфері військової служби все ж існують. Наприклад, статтею 101 Закону України "Про соціальний і правовий захист військовослужбовців та членів їх сімей" визначено такий порядок надання відпустки чоловікам: лише військовослужбовець-жінка може отримати відпустку у зв’язку із вагітністю та пологами в "особливий" період, а саме (I) з моменту оголошення рішення про мобілізацію; (II) введення воєнного стану в Україні або в окремих її місцевостях, що охолює мобілізацію, воєнний стан та частково період відбудови після закінчення військових дій. Натомість військовослужбовець-чоловік може використовувати відпустку по догляду за дитиною лише в мирний час. Так само, в законодавстві України є норма, яка забороняє військовослужбовцям-чоловікам використовувати відпустку по догляду за дитиною до досягнення нею трирічного віку під час воєнного стану чи "особливого" періоду. Зміни, внесені Законом № 2523-VIII, є кроком до рівноправності чоловіків і жінок у сфері військової служби, але залишаються певні ґендерно-дискримінаційні норми, які не врегульовані чинним законодавством.

The Law provides a number of benefits and guarantees for women. In particular, annual basic and additional full-time leave in the first year of work is provided to employees after six months of continuous work at the enterprise, institution, or organization. However, until this term, such leave may be granted to women (at their request) before or after maternity leave, as well as to women who have two or more children under the age of 15 or a child with a disability. Also, mentioned above categories of women have the right to receive annual leave at their request at a time convenient for them. The Law also guarantees women's right to leave in connection with pregnancy and childbirth (this means that women shall be granted a paid maternity leave for 70 calendar days before childbirth and for 56 calendar days after childbirth, counting from the day of childbirth). According to amendments to the Law, a child's father, after the end of maternity leave, can use childcare leave (parental leave) until his child reaches the age of three. In addition, a man whose wife has given birth to a child has the right to a one-time paid paternity leave of up to 14 calendar days after the birth of the child. These changes were introduced in the year 2021 by the Law of Ukraine 'On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts Concerning Ensuring Equal Opportunities for Mothers and Fathers to Care for a Child'. Such a step brings Ukraine closer to the policy of gender equality. Both women and men have the same rights and responsibilities regarding the upbringing of their children.

Закон передбачає ряд пільг та гарантій для жінок. Зокрема, щорічні основна та додаткові відпустки повної тривалості в перший рік роботи надаються працівнику після шести місяців безперервної роботи на підприємстві, в установі, організації. Але до цього терміну така відпустка може надаватися жінкам (за їх бажанням) до або після відпустки у зв’язку з вагітністю та пологами, а також жінкам, які мають двох і більше дітей віком до 15 років або дитину-інваліда. Також вищезазначені категорії жінок мають право на отримання щорічної відпустки за їх бажанням у зручний для них час. Закон також гарантує жінкам право на відпустку у зв'язку з вагітністю та пологами (це означає, що жінкам надається оплачувана відпустка тривалістю 70 календарних днів до пологів і 56 календарних днів після пологів, починаючи з дня пологів). Відповідно до змін до Закону, батько дитини після закінчення відпустки у зв’язку з вагітністю та пологами може використати відпустку по догляду за дитиною до досягнення дитиною трирічного віку. Крім цього, чоловік, дружина якого народила дитину, має право на одноразову оплачувану відпустку по догляду за дитиною тривалістю до 14 календарних днів після народження дитини. Ці зміни були внесені у 2021 році Законом України "Про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів щодо забезпечення рівних можливостей матері та батька щодо догляду за дитиною". Такий крок наближає Україну до політики гендерної рівності. І жінки, і чоловіки мають однакові права та обов'язки щодо виховання дітей.

The Model Regulation defines that the main tasks of the shelter are to provide a place for a safe temporary 24-hour stay and comprehensive assistance (psychological, medical, informational, legal and other services) for victims of domestic violence and/or gender-based violence. Certain categories of persons have the right to be placed in a shelter: (i) adult victims of violence (on referral from the National Police of Ukraine, mobile brigade for social and psychological assistance to victims of domestic violence and/or gender-based violence, etc.); (ii) a person who has not reached the age of majority, but is (or was) in a registered marriage; (iii) a child together with their parent or other guardian. However, if a victim is in a state of alcohol or drug intoxication, has signs of mental diseases, infectious diseases of the skin and hair, tuberculosis, etc., they will not be admitted to the shelter. It is interesting that the address of the temporary shelter cannot be found on the Internet; it cannot be disclosed for the safety of those who are in shelter. Moreover, victims do not know the exact address (in practice, they come to the shelter with social service workers). Currently, the issue of the length of stay of the women, who are victims of violence in the shelter is problematic. According to the Model Regulation, people can stay in a shelter for up to three months or, in case of difficult life circumstances, up to six months. After three months, women very often return to their abusers. This can be explained by two main reasons: (i) during this period, not everyone finds the internal resources to restore and start an independent life; (ii) court hearing of divorce or division of property is quite lengthy in time. And very often after 90 days in the shelter, these women still have nowhere to go, except back 'to the family' (that's why 40% of women return to the shelter again).

Типовим положенням визначено, що основними завданнями притулку є забезпечення місця для безпечного тимчасового цілодобового перебування та надання комплексної допомоги (психологічні, медичні, інформаційні, юридичні та інші послуги) жертвам насильства в сім’ї та/або ґендерно зумовленого насильства. Право на влаштування до притулку мають певні категорії осіб: (I) повнолітні особи, які постраждали від насильства (за направленням Національної поліції України, мобільної бригади соціально-психологічної допомоги жертвам домашнього та/або ґендерно зумовленого насильства) тощо; (II) особа, яка не досягла повноліття, але перебуває (або перебувала) у зареєстрованому шлюбі; (III) дитина разом із батьками чи іншими опікунами. Проте, якщо потерпілі перебувають у стані алкогольного чи наркотичного сп'яніння, має ознаки психічних захворювань, інфекційних захворювань шкіри та волосся, туберкульоз тощо, вони не допускаються до притулку. Цікаво, що в Інтернеті неможливо знайти адресу тимчасового притулку; його не можна розголошувати заради безпеки тих, хто перебуває в притулку. Крім того, постраждалі не знають точної адреси (на практиці вони приходять до притулку разом із працівниками соціальних служб). Наразі проблемним є питання щодо тривалості перебування у притулку жінок, які є жертвами насильства. Відповідно до Типового положення, люди можуть перебувати у притулку до трьох місяців, а у разі складних життєвих обставин – до шести місяців. Через три місяці жінки дуже часто повертаються до своїх кривдників. Це можна пояснити двома основними причинами: (I) у цей період не всі знаходять внутрішні ресурси для відновлення та початку самостійного життя; (II) судове засідання щодо розірвання шлюбу або поділу майна є досить тривалим у часі. І дуже часто після 90 днів у притулку цим жінкам все ще нікуди подітися, окрім як повертатись "до сім’ї" (тому 40% жінок повертаються до притулку знову).

The Expert Council on issues of consideration of appeals on facts of discrimination on the basis of gender (hereinafter “the Expert Council”), which was created under the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine with the purpose of responding to complaints and appeals from citizens regarding gender discrimination. Discrimination is when an individual and/or a group of individuals suffers from a gender-based restriction on the recognition, exercise, or enjoyment of rights and freedoms in any form established by the Law of Ukraine 'On the Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine', except for cases in which such restriction has a legitimate, reasonably justified aim that is achieved in an appropriate and necessary way. The main tasks of the Expert Council are: (i) evaluating appeals based on gender discrimination by executive authorities, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and citizens with the aim of providing an expert assessment and taking appropriate measures; (ii) preparing proposals for legislative amendments in order to ensure compliance with protecting equal rights and opportunities for women and men; (iii) preventing all forms of gender discrimination, etc. Most of the appeals considered by this body concern discriminatory advertising (sexist outdoor advertising on the streets of Ukrainian cities). At the same time, the creation of the Expert Council does not guarantee its effectiveness. According to the Order No 345: (i) there is no effective enforcement mechanism for the decisions of the Expert Council (it only provides recommendations to authorities and other entities regarding the elimination of violations and appropriate response measures); (ii) the decisions of the Expert Council are advisory and not binding in nature; (iii) Ukrainian law does not impose liability for failure to comply with decisions of the Expert Council. In addition, there is almost no information in the media about the activities of the Expert Council. Consequently, many citizens are not aware of the existence of this state body and how to contact it.

З метою реагування на скарги та звернення громадян за фактами дискримінації за ознакою статі при Міністерстві соціальної політики України було створено Експертну раду з питань розгляду звернень за фактами дискримінації за ознакою статі (надалі — "Експертна рада"). Дискримінація за ознакою статі означає ситуацію, за якої особа та/або група осіб зазнає обмежень у правах і свободах в будь-якій формі, встановленій Законом України "Про засади запобігання та протидії дискримінації в Україні", крім випадків, коли таке обмеження має правомірну, об’єктивно обґрунтовану мету, способи досягнення якої є належними та необхідними. Основними завданнями Експертної ради є: (I) оцінка звернень щодо гендерної дискримінації від органів виконавчої влади, органів місцевого самоврядування, громадських організацій, громадян з метою надання експертної оцінки та вжиття відповідних заходів; (II) підготовка пропозицій щодо внесення змін до законодавства з метою забезпечення захисту рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків; (III) запобігання будь-яким формам гендерної дискримінації тощо. Більшість звернень, розглянутих цим органом, стосуються дискримінаційної реклами (зовнішньої сексистської реклами на вулицях міст України). Водночас, створення зазначеного органу не говорить про його ефективність, оскільки (I) відсутній ефективний механізм виконання рішень Експертної ради (вона лише надає рекомендації органам влади та іншим установам усунути відповідні порушення та вжити відповідні заходи); (II) рішення цього органу мають рекомендаційний, а не обов’язковий характер; (III) законодавством України не передбачена відповідальність за невиконання рішення Експертної ради. Крім цього, у медіапросторі майже відсутня інформації про діяльність Експертної ради у зв’язку із чим багато громадян не обізнані про факт існування такого органу та можливості звернення до нього.

This Act criminalized female genital mutilation and related offences in Ireland. Section 1 defines female genital mutilation as any act the purpose or effect of which is the excision, infibulation or other mutilation of the whole or any part of the labia majora, labia minora, prepuce of the clitoris, clitoris, or vagina. Section 2 makes this an offence, but lays down certain statutory defences, including where the act committed is a surgical operation performed by a medical practitioner (or in some cases a midwife) where it is necessary for the protection of physical or mental health, or where it is performed in connection with labour or birth. Section 2(3) also explicitly provides that consent is not a defence. Section 3 also makes it an offence to remove or attempt to remove a girl or woman from Ireland where one of the purposes of removal is to subject her to an act of female genital mutilation. Persons convicted of offences under the Act are liable to a term of imprisonment of up to 12 months on summary conviction or to a class A fine, or to up to 14 years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.

The 2015 Act provides for free health services for women who worked in Magdalen laundries (institutions ostensibly intended to house and employ ‘fallen’ women). Its Schedule provides for the 'Relevant Institutions' for the purposes of identifying women entitled to the provision of services. The 2015 Act was updated in 2019 (available here) to expand the group of women eligible for benefits under the Act.

The 2012 Act makes it an offence to withhold information, without reasonable excuse, about certain offences against children and vulnerable adults from the Garda Síochána (Sections 2 and 3). These ‘certain offences’ include, inter alia, murder, assault, false imprisonment, rape, sexual assault, and incest. Defences are set out in Section 4, including those which may be raised by “prescribed persons” employed or engaged by a prescribed organization (defined in Sections 5 and 6). Penalties for offenses under Sections 2 or 3 are set forth in Section 7. Upon summary conviction, a person is liable to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment; for conviction on indictment, the term of imprisonment changes relative to the term of imprisonment stipulated in the statute providing for the principal offence (Section 7).

Marital rape is a crime under the 1990 Act. The 1990 Act deletes the word “unlawful” from the statutory definition of rape (‘unlawful sexual intercourse’ without consent, as set forth in the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981). The amended definition of rape therefore does not exclude ‘lawful’ sexual intercourse (i.e., between married persons). The 1990 Act also explicitly abolished ‘any rule of law by virtue of which a husband cannot be guilty of the rape of his wife’ (Section 5). Section 4 defines rape as any penetration (however slight) of the anus or mouth by the penis or of the vagina by any object held or manipulated by another person, providing for a punishment on conviction of up to life imprisonment (Section 4). Section 7 of the Act also deals with the corroboration rule in the case of sexual offences. In particular, the judge is no longer required to give the jury a corroboration warning, but such warning is not prohibited.

The Civil Registration Act 2019 made technical amendments to the Civil Registration Act of 2004, the purposes of which were to facilitate legislation to provide for registration of the birth of donor-conceived children, and to enable both partners in a same-sex female relationship to have their details recorded in such registrations. Specifically, Section 10 provides for the recording of a ‘parent’s’ details and any parent may so register although the options of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are still available.

The Act provides for parentage in case of donor-assisted human reproduction (“DAHR”) (Part 2), issues relating to DAHR facilities (including acquisition of gametes by operators) (Part 3), and amendments to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (Part 4), Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, the Status of Children Act 1987, Family Law Act 1995, and among other legislation, to reflect rights and responsibilities of spouses or civil partners of biological parents and to take into account DAHR situations. The Act provides that a child born as a result of a DAHR procedure shall have as parents the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant, provided that the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant have consented to the latter being a parent to the child (Section 5). When construed as the parents of the child, the mother and any other parent, as the case may be, shall have all parental rights and duties in respect of the child (Section 5(3)). The donor of a gamete or embryo used in a DAHR procedure is not the parent of the child nor do they have any parental rights or duties in respect of the child (Section 5(5) and Section 5(6)). A person can only consent to providing a gamete for use in a DAHR procedure where they have attained the age of 18, have received the necessary information pursuant to the Act, and made a declaration pursuant to the Act (Section 6). An intending mother and her partner must be over the age of 21 to consent to parentage (Sections 9, 11).

The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 gave effect to European Council Directive No. 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. It also amended certain other legislation, including the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 (available here), the Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) Act 1995, the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here), the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here), and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006. The Act provides for offences relating to sexual acts with protected persons and relating to payment for sexual activity with sex workers, offensive conduct of a sexual nature and harassment of victims of sexual offences. The Act defines ‘sexual exploitation’ in relation to a child and specifies the elements that would constitute a sexual offence against a child, including performing sexual acts in front of a child and prostitution of a child. Generally, Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 broaden the scope of criminal acts in relation to children, such as the prohibition of causing a child to watch sexual activity (Section 6), meeting a child for the purposes of sexual exploitation (Section 7), and the use of information and communication technology to facilitate the sexual exploitation of a child (Section 8). The Act also criminalizes the purchase of sexual services and prohibits sexual activity with a protected person, as defined by the Act. The Act creates a distinction related to the commission of a sexual act with a child under 17 years of age and with a child under 15 years of age, with a conviction on indictment for the former offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of up to 7 years (unless the person is in authority, in which case they may be sentenced for up to 15 years) (Section 17), and with a conviction on indictment for the latter offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of life (Section 16). Importantly, Section 48 of the Act reforms the law in relation to consent to sexual acts. In particular, it states that a person does not consent to a sexual act if, inter alia, they permits the act to take place or submits to it because of the application, threat or fear of use of force against them, if they are asleep, if they are incapable of consenting because of intoxication, or if they are mistaken as to the nature and purpose of the act or the identity of the person involved. The Act also clarifies that consent can be withdrawn at any time and that lack of physical resistance does not, of itself, constitute consent (Section 48). Finally, Section 46 allows a court to issue a “Harassment order” against a person when imposing a sentence for a sexual offence or at any time before the convicted person is released from prison.

The 1998 Act prohibits trafficking of children for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) amended the 1998 Act’s provisions related to child trafficking and sexual exploitation (Section 3) and the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2013 (available here) expanded the definition of labour exploitation and aggravating factors. The 1998 Act also criminalizes allowing a child to be used for child pornography (Section 4). A person found guilty on indictment of this offence faces up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Section 5 has been substituted by Section 12 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here), which prohibits the production, distribution, and possession, inter alia, of child pornography. Persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 14 years’ imprisonment (Section 5, as amended). Section 6, as amended, prohibits the possession of child pornography; persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here) also inserts Section 5A, prohibiting, inter alia, causing, inciting, compelling, coercing, recruiting, inviting, or inducing of a child to participate in a pornographic performance or the gaining from such participation.

The 2008 Act, which amends the 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act (available here) among other legislation, defines trafficking as when a person, in relation to another person, “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbours the person, or (i) transfers the person to, (ii) places the person in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the person to, another person, (b) causes a person to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of a person or takes a person— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the person with accommodation or employment” (Section 1). Exploitation includes labour exploitation, sexual exploitation, or exploitation consisting of the removal of one or more of the organs of a person. Labour exploitation includes subjecting the person to forced labour, forcing him or her to render services to another, or enslavement or similar servitude. Sexual exploitation includes production of pornography depicting the person alone or with others, causing the person to engage in sexual activity for the purpose of the production of pornography, prostitution of the person, or otherwise causing the person to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 1). The Act contains specific provisions regarding trafficking of a child (a person under the age of 18), which were further amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here). Trafficking a child for exploitation is an offense, as is selling or offering to sell a child, or purchasing or offering to purchase a child (Sections 2 and 3). There is an additional definition of “trafficks” in relation to a child, meaning that a person “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbors the child, or— (i) transfers the child to, (ii) places the child in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the child to, another person, (b) causes the child to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of the child or takes the child— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the child with accommodation or employment” (Section 3). There is also separate definition of “sexual exploitation” in relation to a child, and includes inviting, inducing, or coercing a child to engage in prostitution or the production of child pornography, or inviting, inducing, or coercing the child to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 3). The offences of exploitation and sexual exploitation in relation to children are subject to penalties specified in sections 2 and 3; a court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. Penalties for trafficking of persons other than children are specified in Section 4; the court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. The Act also explicitly provides for penalties where an accused is found guilty of attempt, incitement, or conspiracy in relation to the offences under the Act. Soliciting or importuning for purposes of prostitution of trafficked persons, or benefiting from such activities, is also an offence subject to specified penalties (Section 5), as are offences committed by corporate bodies (Section 6). Jurisdiction includes extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., where a person commits an act in relation to an Irish citizen in a place other than the State that, if done in the State, would constitute one of certain enumerated offenses). The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 (available here) further amends these provisions, in particular with expanded definitions of labour exploitation and aggravating factors.

The Equal Status Act pertains to the delivery of goods and services. (Section 1). It prohibits discrimination (with specified exceptions) in the disposal of goods and provision of services (Section 5), the disposal of premises and provision of accommodation (Section 6), and education establishments (Section 7). Discrimination by private clubs with regard to membership may be sanctioned via loss of permission to provide alcohol to members (Section 8 and 10) with some exceptions (Section 9). The Act also prohibits sexual and other harassment (Section 11); advertisement which indicates an intent to engage in prohibited conduct, or might reasonably be so understood (prohibited conduct means, per Section 1, discrimination against, or sexual harassment or harassment of, or permitting the sexual harassment or harassment of a person) (Section 12); and procurement of prohibited conduct (Section 13).

The 2018 Act consolidates the law on domestic violence. It provides for safety orders (Section 6), protection orders (Section 10), barring orders (Sections 8-9), and care or supervision orders (Section 12), which a court may issue based on all factors or circumstances it deems relevant, including the Act’s 19 enumerated factors (Section 5). The Act penalizes a contravention of an order with a class B fine (up to €4,000), imprisonment of a term not exceeding 12 months, or both. It also prohibits forced marriage (Section 38) and coercive control (Section 39) that has a serious effect on a relevant person (creating a fear of violence or serious alarm or distress that has a substantial adverse impact on a person’s day-to-day activities). The sentencing range for forced marriage is one to seven years, depending on the type of conviction. The sentencing range for coercive control is one to five years, depending on the type of conviction.

The Act focuses on the non-consensual distribution of explicit images, inter alia. Section 2 makes it an offence to distribute, publish, or threaten to distribute or publish an intimate image with (i) intent to harm or (ii) being reckless as to whether harm is caused. Section 1 defines “distribute” and “publish” as being distributed or published to the public or a section of the public. Section 1 further defines an “intimate image” in broad terms, encompassing a photographic, film, video, or digital representation, and includes nude, non-nude, or sexual images. “Harm” includes psychological harm (Section 1). A person found guilty of an offence under Section 2 is subject to a Class A fine (up to €5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment if tried summarily, or a fine and/or up to seven years’ imprisonment if convicted on indictment. Section 3 makes it an offence to record, distribute, or publish intimate images without consent. A person found guilty of such an offence is liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (up to €5,000), and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment. Section 4 makes it an offence to distribute, publish, or send threatening or grossly offensive communications. A person found guilty of an offence under Section 2 is subject to a Class A fine (up to €5,000) and/or up to six months’ imprisonment if tried summarily, or a fine and/or up to two years’ imprisonment if convicted on indictment. Section 7 provides that summary proceedings for an offence under the Act may be instituted within two years from the date on which the offence was committed.

The legislation generally serves to protect all male and female employees. Specifically targeting the protection of women, Article 6(4) states that female employees shall not perform work that, by its very nature, may hold specific dangers for women. Alternatively, women may only perform such work with certain restrictions or measures that prevent such risks. The Federal Ministry of Labor shall specify those works in a separate regulation (Article 18 no. 2).

Dieses Gesetz dient grundsätzlich dem Schutz sowohl von männlichen als auch weiblichen Angestellten. Spezifisch auf den Schutz von Frauen geht Artikel 6 Abs. 4 ein. Hiernach dürfen Frauen Arbeiten, die eine spezifische Gefahr für sie beinhalten nicht oder nur unter Bedingungen oder Einschränken ausführen, die diese besondere Gefahr vermeiden. Diese Arbeiten sollen von dem Bundesministerium für Arbeit in einer separaten Verordnung festgehalten werden (Artikel 18 Ziff. 2).

This law amended the definition of sexual harassment in the French Criminal Code and increased the maximum penalties for sexual harassment. The definition of sexual harassment became broader and more precise, encompassing the imposition upon a person, in a repeated manner, of words or behaviors of a sexual nature, which either violate a person’s dignity due to their humiliating or degrading nature or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive situation. The use of any pressure, even on a one-off basis, for the real or apparent purpose of obtaining a sexual favor was also assimilated to the definition of sexual harassment.

Cette loi modifie la définition du harcèlement sexuel dans le Code Pénale Français et augmente la peine maximum pour le harcèlement sexuel. La définition de harcèlement sexuel s’élargit et devient plus précis, encadrant l’imposition sur une personne, d’une manière répétée, de mots ou d’actions d’une nature sexuelle, qui enfreint la dignité d’une personne à cause de la nature humiliante ou dégradante de ces propos, ou crée une situation d’intimidation, d’hostilité, ou une situation offensante. L’utilisation de pression, même une seule fois, pour le but d’obtenir une faveur sexuelle est aussi assimilé à la définition de harcèlement sexuel.

Article 11 amended the French Criminal Code to recognize that a spouse can commit rape against their spouse. It also states that the presumption that a spouse has consent to sexual acts within the matrimonial relationship only continues until proof to the contrary. Furthermore, in sentencing a person convicted of rape, the fact that the victim is the accused’s spouse does not affect the application of rape sentencing guidelines. Article 14 amended the French Criminal Code to allow for the prosecution of female genital mutilation committed abroad on a minor victim legally residing in France. This paralleled a legal shift making female genital mutilation an exception to medical confidentiality that must be reported to the police, social services, and administrative services.

Article 11 modifie le Code Pénal Français, pour reconnaître qu’un conjoint peut commettre le viol contre leur conjoint. L’article conclut que le fait qu’un conjoint a consenti à des actes sexuels durant leur relation matrimoniale ne continue que jusqu’à preuve du contraire. Par ailleurs, durant la période d’imposition de peine, le fait que la victime de viol est le conjoint de l’accusé n’affecte pas le besoin de suivre les directives légales d’années de peines pour viol. Article 14 a modifié le Code Pénal Français pour permettre la poursuite en justice de tout acte de mutilations sexuelles féminines fait à l’étranger sur une victime mineur résident habituellement sur le territoire Français. Cette décision est prise en parallèle à d’autres modifications de lois, faisant que tout acte de mutilations sexuelles féminines est une exception au privilège médical, et qu’il faut informer la police, les services sociaux, et administratifs.

The French Parliament modified the Labor Code through Article 8, which protected any candidates for recruitment, internships, and training periods against sanction, dismissal, or discrimination on the basis of sexual harassment. Before the article modified the Labor Code, only employees were protected under the relevant section of the French Labor Code. The law also specified the types of discrimination covered, which are all forms of direct or indirect discrimination, in regards to any remuneration, training, upgrading, posting, status, staff category, promotion, transfer, and renewal of contract.

Le Parlement Français a modifié le Code du Travail avec Article 8, qui protège tout candidat pour tout recrutement, stage, et période de formation contre la sanction, la licence ou la discrimination sur la base du harcèlement sexuel. Avant que l’article ne modifie le Code du Travail, ce n’était que les employés qui étaient protégés sous la section pertinente du Code du Travail. La loi aussi spécifie les formes de discrimination couvertes, qui inclut toute forme de discrimination directe ou indirecte, en particulier avec respect à la rémunération, la formation, le reclassement, d’affectation, de qualification, de classification, de promotion personnelle, de mutation, ou de renouvellement de contrat.

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). As a result of these amendments, new dangerous acts were criminalized. For example, Article 151-2 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine by providing criminal liability for forced marriage. Forced marriage (meaning coercing a person to marry, to continue a forcible marriage, to enter into cohabitation without marriage, to continue cohabitation, or to move to a territory other than that in which they reside, regardless of citizenship) is punishable by arrest for a term of up to six months, by restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by imprisonment for the same term. Article 126-1 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code by providing criminal liability for domestic violence. Domestic violence (meaning intentional systematic physical, psychological, or economic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or another person with whom an offender has had a family or close relationship) is punishable by community service of up to 150-240 hours, or arrest for up to six months, restriction of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. A new chapter, “Restrictions,” established that, in the interests of domestic violence victims, the convicted person might be (i) banned from living with a person who suffered from domestic violence or (ii) restricted in communications with their child if the child was a victim or observer of domestic violence. In addition, these amendments provide criminal liability for failure to comply with restrictive measures, which is punishment with arrest for up to six months or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, in consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни з метою закріплення положень Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), прийнятої у 2011 році. У результаті цих змін нові суспільно небезпечні діяння були криміналізовані. Наприклад, особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України доповнено статтею 151-2, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за примушення до шлюбу. Примусовий шлюб (тобто примушування особи до вступу в шлюб або до продовження примусово укладеного шлюбу, або до вступу у співжиття без укладання шлюбу, або до продовження такого співжиття, або спонукання з цією метою особи до переміщення на територію іншої держави, ніж та, в якій вона проживає (там «проживає» означає постійне місце проживання в певному місці, не обов’язково пов’язане з громадянством) карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Також у 2017 році особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України було доповнено статтею 126-1, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за домашнє насильство. Домашнє насильство (тобто умисне систематичне вчинення фізичного, психологічного або економічного насильства щодо подружжя чи колишнього подружжя або іншої особи, з якою винний перебуває (перебував) у сімейних або близьких відносинах, що призводить до фізичних або психологічних страждань, розладів здоров’я, втрати працездатності, емоційної залежності або погіршення якості життя потерпілої особи) караються громадськими роботами на строк від 150 до 240 годин, або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. Додано новий розділ «Обмежувальні заходи». Встановлено, що в інтересах потерпілого від злочину, пов'язаного з домашнім насильством, на засудженого можуть бути покладені такі обов'язки: заборона перебувати в спільному місці проживання з жертвою; обмеження спілкування з дитиною у разі вчинення насильства в сім'ї щодо дитини або в її присутності; крім того, ці зміни передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за невиконання обмежувальних заходів (покарання у вигляді арешту на строк до шести місяців або обмеження волі на строк до двох років). Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.

Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and also procuring people for sex work in brothels, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and procurement, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 303 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine prohibits engaging a person in prostitution or compulsion to engage in prostitution, involving deceit, blackmail or vulnerable state of a person, with imposition of violence or threat of violence, or pimping. If breached, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of three to five years. Under this Article, pimping shall mean any action of a person committed for the purpose of engaging another person in prostitution.

Статтею 302 Кримінального кодексу України передбачено, що створення або утримання місць розпусти, а також звідництво для розпусти караються штрафом від 1000 до 2000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років. Статтею 303 Кримінального кодексу України забороняється втягнення особи в заняття проституцією або примушування її до зайняття проституцією з використанням обману, шантажу чи уразливого стану цієї особи, або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, або сутенерство. У разі вчинення дій, що криміналізовані цією статтею, передбачено покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від трьох до п'яти років. Відповідно до цієї статті під сутенерством слід розуміти дії особи по забезпеченню заняття проституцією іншою особою.

The Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 300 prohibits the importation, manufacture or distribution of works that promulgate violence and cruelty, racial, national or religious intolerance and discrimination. Importation into Ukraine for sale or distribution purposes, or manufacture, storage, transportation or other movement for the same purposes, or sale or distribution of works (and also compelling others to participate in the creation of such works) that promulgate discrimination, among other things, are criminalized by Article 300. These dangerous culpable acts shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-4,000 tax-free minimum incomes, or arrest for a term of up to six months, or restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years. Committing the same actions with regard to motion pictures and video films that promulgate discrimination, and also selling works that promulgate discrimination, to minors or distribution of such works among minors are as aggravating circumstances.

Ввезення в Україну творів, що пропагують, серед іншого, дискримінацію, з метою збуту чи розповсюдження або їх виготовлення, зберігання, перевезення чи інше переміщення з тією самою метою або їх збут чи розповсюдження (а також примушування до участі в їх створенні) криміналізовано статтею 300. Ці небезпечні винні дії караються штрафом від 1000 до 4000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років. Ті самі дії щодо кіно- та відеопродукції, що пропагують дискримінацію, а також збут такої продукції неповнолітнім чи розповсюдження серед них творів, що пропагують дискримінацію є кваліфікуючою ознакою цього злочину, що обтяжує покарання.

Article 149 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides criminal liability for trafficking in human beings, as well as recruitment, movement, concealment, transfer, or receipt of a person committed for the purpose of exploitation, coercion, abduction, fraud, blackmail, material, or other dependence of the victim, their vulnerable condition or bribery of a third-party controlling victim, to obtain consent for their exploitation. A person who commits such socially dangerous acts shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years. Article 149 defines exploitation of a human being as including, among other things, all forms of the sexual exploitation, forcing someone to work in the pornography industry, forced pregnancy or forced termination of pregnancy, forced marriage, etc. The Article also provides an explanation of a person's “vulnerable state” (i.e., physical or mental properties or external circumstances, that eliminate or limit the ability to realize their acts (omission) or to control them, to take independent decisions, to resist the violent or other unlawful actions, the coincidence of difficult personal, family, or other circumstances).

Стаття 149 Кримінального кодексу України передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за торгівлю людьми, а так само вербування, переміщення, переховування, передачу або одержання людини, вчинені з метою експлуатації, з використанням примусу, викрадення, обману, шантажу, матеріальної чи іншої залежності потерпілого, його уразливого стану або підкупу третьої особи, яка контролює потерпілого, для отримання згоди на його експлуатацію. Особа, яка вчинила вищезгадані суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до восьми років. Згідно примітки до цієї статті під експлуатацією людини, серед іншого, розуміються всі форми сексуальної експлуатації, використання в порнобізнесі, примусову вагітність або примусове переривання вагітності, примусове одруження тощо. У примітці також надається визначення поняття "уразливий стан особи" (тобто це зумовлений фізичними чи психічними властивостями або зовнішніми обставинами стан особи, який позбавляє або обмежує її здатність усвідомлювати свої дії (бездіяльність) або керувати ними, приймати за своєю волею самостійні рішення, чинити опір насильницьким чи іншим незаконним діям, збіг тяжких особистих, сімейних або інших обставин).

The 2015 Marriage Act enacted the Thirty-Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland into law, which legalized same-sex marriage. Previously, same-sex couples could enter into civil partnerships under the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010. The Marriage Act amended the Civil Registration Act 2004, inter alia, by adding a provision that allows anything that applies to marriage between two people of the opposite sex to apply to marriage between people of the same sex (Section 5). The Act also provides that nothing therein obliges a religious body to recognize a particular form of marriage ceremony or to solemnize a marriage (Section 7). It also provides for the recognition of certain foreign marriages and registered foreign relationships (Sections 12 and 13) and amends the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 to allow a married couple of the same sex to adopt a child (Section 16).

The Ministry of Education encourages the integration of sex education into the content of subject curricula and non-formal education. This leaves considerable discretion to schools and teachers in presenting the topic. Moreover, the program aims to prepare for “the creation of marriage and a harmonious family,” seeking to encourage the association of sexuality expression with “fertility and the possibility of having children in the future.” The decree dictates that it is not permissible to present the use of birth control as an equivalent alternative to abstinence. Furthermore, there is no ascertainable mention of LGBTIQ inclusivity in the curriculum.

Švietimo ministerija skatina lytinio švietimo integravimą į dalykinių programų ir neformaliojo švietimo turinį. Tai palieka didelę savo nuožiūrą mokykloms ir mokytojams pristatant šią temą. Be to, šia programa siekiama parengti „santuokos ir darnios šeimos kūrimui“ ir skatinti seksualumo išraiškos siejimą su „vaisingumu ir galimybe turėti vaikų ateityje“. Įsakyme taip pat nurodoma, kad kontracepcijos naudojimo negalima pateikti kaip lygiavertės alternatyvos abstinencijai. Be to, nėra aiškiai paminėtas LGBTIQ temų įtraukimas į mokymo programą.

In 2015, the Lithuanian Military Code of Ethics was amended to include the obligation to “respect and protect the dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of every human being, regardless of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, belief, opinion, age, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, religion.” The original version did not expressly include protection against discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation.

Lietuvos karo etikos kodeksas buvo pakeistas 2015 m. įtraukiant pareigą „gerbti ir ginti kiekvieno žmogaus orumą bei pagrindines teises ir laisves, neatsižvelgiant į jo lytį, rasę, tautybę, kalbą, kilmę, socialinę padėtį, tikėjimą, įsitikinimus ar pažiūras, amžių, lytinę orientaciją, negalią, etninę priklausomybę, religiją“. Pirminėje versijoje nebuvo aiškiai numatyta apsauga nuo diskriminacijos dėl lyties ar seksualinės orientacijos.

The legislation implements the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Lithuanian Parliament ratified in 1995. The Act sets out the rights of a child and defines neglect, physical, psychological, and sexual abuse. In 2019, the text was amended to include a clause on the prioritization of biological family, which means that the separation of children and parents against their will is only allowed in “extreme cases,” where it is “unavoidable and necessary to protect a child from real danger to his physical and psychological security, health, or life and when there is no other recourse to achieve such protection.”

Šiuo teisės aktu įgyvendinama Jungtinių Tautų Vaiko Teisių konvencija, kurią Lietuvos Seimas ratifikavo 1995 metais. Šis įstatymas nustato vaiko teises ir apibrėžia nepriežiūrą, fizinę, psichologinę ir seksualinę prievartą. Tekstas buvo iš dalies pakeistas 2019 m., įtraukiant nuostatą dėl biologinės šeimos prioriteto, kuri reiškia, kad vaikų ir tėvų atskyrimas prieš jų valią leidžiamas tik „kraštutiniais atvejais“, kai „neišvengiama ir būtina apsaugoti vaiką nuo realaus pavojaus jo fiziniam ir psichologiniam saugumui, sveikatai ar gyvybei ir kai nėra kitų priemonių tokiai apsaugai pasiekti“.

This Act aims to protect any persons who are victims of domestic violence, including persons having a common household. It also defines “violence” as “intentional physical, mental, sexual, economic, or other influence exerted upon a person by act or omission, due to which the person suffers physical, material, or non-pecuniary damage.” Under the Act, victims do not have to submit a private complaint, but public prosecutors must charge the offenders. In addition, the victim of domestic abuse has the right to receive specialized support such as consulting a psychologist or receiving legal assistance. English translation available here.

Šiuo įstatymu siekiama apsaugoti visus asmenis, kurie yra smurto artimoje aplinkoje aukos, įskaitant asmenis, turinčius bendrą namų ūkį. Šis įstatymas taip pat apibrėžia jog „smurtas“ yra tiek veikimu, tiek neveikimu atliekamas „tyčinis fizinis, psichinis, seksualinis, ekonominis ar kitas poveikis, dėl kurio asmuo patiria fizinę, turtinę ar neturtinę žalą“. Pagal įstatymą nukentėjusiesiems nereikia pateikti privataus skundo, tačiau prokurorai privalo pateikti kaltinimus pažeidėjams. Be to, smurto artimoje aplinkoje auka turi teisę gauti specializuotą kompleksinę psichologo, teisinę ir kitą pagalbą.

The Labor Code confers upon the employer a duty to implement gender equality and non-discrimination principles, which include equal selection criteria, working conditions, benefits, work evaluation criteria, and remuneration for employees. Moreover, eligible employees are entitled to pregnancy and childbirth leave, amounting to 70 calendar days before and 56 calendar days after childbirth. Also, an employer cannot present a termination notice without mutual agreement to an employee they know to be pregnant until the day the baby turns four months old. In addition, employers with more than 50 employees must publish the measures, implementation, and enforcement of their equal opportunities’ strategy. English translation available here.

Darbo kodeksas įpareigoja darbdavį įgyvendinti lyčių lygybės ir nediskriminavimo principus, kurie apima vienodus atrankos kriterijus, darbo sąlygas, išmokas, darbo vertinimo kriterijus ir darbuotojų atlyginimą. Be to, reikalavimus atitinkantys darbuotojai turi teisę į nėštumo ir gimdymo atostogas, kurios sudaro 70 kalendorinių dienų iki gimdymo ir 56 kalendorines dienas po gimdymo. Darbdavys negali pateikti pranešimo apie atleidimą iš darbo be abipusio susitarimo su darbuotoja, kuri jų žiniomis, yra nėščia, iki tos dienos, kai kūdikiui sukaks keturi mėnesiai. Be to, darbdaviai, turintys daugiau nei 50 darbuotojų, privalo paskelbti savo lygių galimybių strategijos priemones, įgyvendinimą ir vykdymą.

Under the Civil Code, same-sex marriages are prohibited. In case of a divorce by mutual consent, the marriage can be dissolved if over a year has elapsed, the spouses have made a contract regarding divorce consequences, and they have full active legal capacity. If a couple has children, they have equal rights and duties as parents, regardless of whether they were married, divorced, or separated. A parent cannot surrender their rights or responsibilities over underage children. An unmarried person can adopt a child only in exceptional cases, and unmarried persons may not adopt the same child. In addition, the adopter must be under the age of 50. Moreover, the Code states that an unmarried adult can change their designated gender if it is feasible medically with conditions for the change prescribed by law. Essential to mention, there is no existing legislation setting out the requirements for gender reassignment (see L. v. Lithuania, even though the case is from 2007, legislation efforts have been stalled to this day). English translation available here.

Pagal civilinį kodeksą tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokos yra draudžiamos. Santuoka gali būti nutraukta bendru sutarimu, jei praėjo daugiau nei metai, sutuoktiniai sudarė sutartį dėl santuokos nutraukimo pasekmių ir jie turi teisinį veiksnumą. Jei pora turi vaikų, jie turi lygias teises ir pareigas kaip tėvai, nepriklausomai nuo to, ar jie susituokę, išsiskyrę ar gyvena skyrium. Tėvas ar motina negali atsisakyti teisių ar pareigų savo nepilnamečiams vaikams. Nesusituokęs asmuo gali įvaikinti vaiką tik išimtiniais atvejais, o nesusituokę asmenys negali įvaikinti to paties vaiko. Be to, įvaikintojas turi būti jaunesnis nei 50 metų. Taip pat, kodekse nustatyta, kad nesusituokęs suaugęs asmuo gali pakeisti paskirtą lytį, jei tai įmanoma mediciniškai, įstatymų nustatyta tvarka. Svarbu paminėti, kad iki šiol nėra galiojančių teisės aktų, nustatančių lyties keitimo sąlygas (žr. L prieš Lietuvą).

The purpose of the Equal Opportunities Act is to prohibit any discrimination, harassment, or sexual harassment based on gender within employment, education, consumer protection, social security schemes, and involvement in organizations. It also established a duty of state and municipal institutions, educational establishments, and employers to actively implement equal rights for women and men. It defines the different types of discrimination and establishes that the burden of proving that equal rights were not violated rests within the person or institution against whom a complaint was filed. Under Article 24, a person who has suffered such discrimination has the right to demand pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages following the Civil Code. English translation available here.

Lygių galimybių įstatymo tikslas yra uždrausti bet kokią diskriminaciją, priekabiavimą ar seksualinį priekabiavimą dėl lyties darbe, švietimo institucijose, skelbimuose, socialinės apsaugos sistemoje ir organizacijose. Taip pat nustatyta valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijų, švietimo įstaigų ir darbdavių pareiga aktyviai įgyvendinti lygias moterų ir vyrų teises. Teisės akte apibrėžiamos skirtingos diskriminacijos rūšys ir nustatoma, kad pareiga įrodyti, kad lygios teisės nebuvo pažeistos, tenka asmeniui ar institucijai, prieš kurią buvo pateiktas skundas. Pagal straipsnį 24, asmuo, patyręs tokią diskriminaciją, turi teisę reikalauti turtinės ir neturtinės žalos atlyginimo pagal civilinį kodeksą.

Among other aspects, this act aims at ensuring gender equality in various areas of life, for instance, in the workplace. It addresses issues like equal opportunities for men and women as well as sexual harassment in the workplace. It also lists the authorities a person may turn to if they feel they are being discriminated against. Notable is the shift of the burden of proof in Section 25: a discrimination claimant only has to credibly substantiate the claim, whereas the defending party has to prove that there was no discrimination.

Dieses Gesetz zielt unter anderem darauf ab, die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter in verschiedenen Lebensbereichen zu gewährleisten, zum Beispiel am Arbeitsplatz. Es behandelt Themen wie Chancengleichheit für Männer und Frauen sowie sexuelle Belästigung am Arbeitsplatz. Außerdem werden die Behörden genannt, an die sich eine Person wenden kann, wenn sie sich diskriminiert fühlt. Bemerkenswert ist die Umkehr der Beweislast in Abschnitt 25: Ein Kläger, der eine Diskriminierung geltend macht, muss seine Behauptung lediglich glaubhaft machen, während die beklagte Partei beweisen muss, dass keine Diskriminierung vorlag.

Section 106(a) states that a person who coerces another person to marry or establish a registered partnership, by force or by dangerous threat or threat of breaking off family contacts, is liable to a term of imprisonment of six months to five years. The same punishment applies to the act of coercing a person or forcing a person by dangerous threat of threat of interruption or withdrawal of family contacts, to move to another state or transports them to another state, with the intention of coercing the person to marry or establish a registered partnership in such other state. If the conduct results in a suicide (including an attempt) of the victim, the term of imprisonment is 1-10 years (Section 106a(3) in connection with Section 106(2)). The principle of territoriality does not apply under Section 64(1) no. 4a – even if the location of the crime is outside of Austria, a perpetrator is liable under Austrian law when he or the victim is Austrian.

Gemäß § 106a ist eine Person mit 6 Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren Freiheitsstrafe zu bestrafen, wenn sie eine andere Person mit Gewalt oder Drohung zur Eingehung einer Ehe oder eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft nötigt. Dies gilt ebenso, wenn eine Person eine andere Person durch Täuschung, Gewalt oder Drohung in einen anderen Staat bewegt, wo die Eheschließung oder Eintragung einer Partnerschaft erzwungen wird. Wenn dieses Verhalten dazu führt, dass sich das Opfer umbringt oder versucht sich umzubringen, erhöht sich die Gefängnisstrafe auf 1-10 Jahre (§ 106a Abs. 3 i.V.m. § 106 Abs. 2). Das Territorialitätsprinzip findet auch hier keine Anwendung. Vielmehr gilt nach § 64 Abs. 1 Ziff. 4a, dass der Täter auch strafbar hiernach ist, wenn der Tatort außerhalb von Österreich liegt, aber das Opfer zum Beispiel österreichischer Staatsangehöriger ist.

Section 321a (1) and (3) provide that a person who holds a woman captive who has been impregnated through the use of coercion, with the intent to influence the ethnic composition of a population or to commit other serious violations of international law, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5-15 years, or, if such an act results in the death of a person, a term of 10-20 years or life imprisonment. The abovementioned applies where such acts are performed as part of an extended or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Gemäß § 321a (1), (3) ist eine Person mit 5 bis 15 Jahren Gefängnis zu bestrafen, wenn sie im Rahmen eines systematischen und ausgedehnten Angriffskrieges gegen die Zivilbevölkerung eine Frau gefangen hält, die unter Anwendung von Zwang geschwängert wurde und dies mit dem Ziel erfolgt, die ethnische Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung zu beeinflussen oder andere schwere Verletzungen des Internationalen Rechts vorzunehmen. Wenn die Handlung den Tod der anderen Person herbeiführt, ist die Strafe zwischen 10 und 20 Jahren oder sogar lebenslänglicher Freiheitssrafe festzusetzen.

The Federal Equality Act aims at creating equality throughout various service agreements (see Section 1) the Federal Government might have with individuals. The main body no. 1 (1. Hauptstück) focuses on the equal treatment of men and women (Section 3). Section 7(2) states that job advertisements should be written in such a way that they equally refer to both men and women and do not contain details that could lead to the conclusion that the advertisement is only for one gender. Sections 8 and 8a define sexual and gender-based harassment and emphasize that they constitute gender discrimination. Section 11 requires the promotion of equal opportunities for women. Section 11b states that, where women are underrepresented (meaning less than 50% of employees), employers must prioritize women applicants if they are equally well suited for the position as the best-suited male applicant until the percentage of employed women reaches at least 50%. Section 11c applies the same rule to job promotions. Section 11d provides that employers must prioritize female employees in participation in training and coaching measures to prepare them to assume higher-ranking and more senior positions.

Das Bundes-Gleichbehandlungsgesetz zielt darauf ab, für alle Dienstverhältnisse, die die Bundesregierung mit Einzelpersonen hat, Gleichheit zu schaffen. Das 1. Hauptstück des Gesetzes fokussiert sich auf die Gleichbehandlung von Mann und Frau (§ 3). § 7 Abs. 2 verlangt, dass Stellenausschreibungen in einer Art und Weise verfasst werden müssen, dass sie sich gleichermaßen an Männer und Frauen wenden und keine Details enthalten, die den Leser zu dem Schluss kommen lassen könnten, dass die Ausschreibung sich nur an ein Geschlecht richtet. § 8 und § 8a betonen, dass eine Diskriminierung auch in einem Fall vorliegt, in dem ein Arbeitnehmer (sexuell) belästigt wird. § 11 enthält ein Frauenförderungsgebot. In diesem Sinne gelten Frauen als unterrepräsentiert, wenn weniger als 50% der Angestellten Frauen sind. Nach § 11b müssen Frauen in unterrepräsentierten Bereichen bei der Bewerberauswahl bevorzugt behandelt werden, wenn sie für die Stelle gleichgeeignet sind wie der bestqualifizierte männliche Bewerber. Dies gilt, bis der Anteil der Frauen in diesem Bereich mindestens 50% beträgt. § 11c wendet diese Regel auch auf Beförderungen an. Nach § 11d sind weibliche Angestellte zur Teilnahme an Aus- und Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen, die zur Übernahme höherwertiger Verwendungen qualifizieren, vorrangig zuzulassen.

The legislation shall support planning, execution, and controlling of personnel allocation on the Federal level. Personnel controlling shall ensure, inter alia, gender equality (Article 1 para. 1 no. 2). Therefore, Article 5 provides that federal service authorities shall submit to the chancellor biennially a report detailing the target quota of women holding the highest remuneration levels (para. 2). If the targeted percentage ratios are not met, the relevant federal service authority shall submit to the chancellor an additional report explaining the reasons for such non-compliance by the end of the first quarter of the following year (para. 4).

Dieses Gesetz soll die Planung, Ausführung und der Kontrolle von Personenallokation auf Bundesebene unterstützen. Personalkapazitätskontrolle soll u.a. Geschlechtergleichheit sicherstellen (Art. 1 Abs. 1 Ziff. 2). Hierfür haben die haushaltsleitenden Organe gemäß Artikel 5 dem Bundeskanzler alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht vorzulegen, der detailliert auf die Zielquoten von Frauen in der höchsten Vergütungsklasse eingeht (Abs. 2). Für den Fall, dass die angestrebten Zielanteile nicht erreicht werden, müssen die Organe dem Kanzler bis zum Ende des ersten Quartals des Folgejahres einen Zusatzbericht vorlegen, der die Gründe für das Nichterreichen der Quote angibt (Abs. 4).

Article 7(1) states that all citizens are equal before the law and prohibits sex-based privileges (among other factors). Article 7(2) states that the federal government and all federal states and municipalities affirm actual equality between women and men. It further stresses that measures to achieve factual equality between women and men are legal. Regarding job titles or academic titles, Article 7(3) requires that the gendered nouns in those titles reflect the gender of the respective holder are in accordance with law. Article 14(6) states that public schools, kindergartens, and similar institutions shall be accessible to all children regardless of sex (among other factors).

Artikel 7 Abs. 1 macht deutlich, dass alle Bürger vor dem Gesetz gleich sind und verbietet gleichzeitig u.a. geschlechterbezogene Privilegien. Nach Artikel 7 Abs. 2 betonen die Bundesregierung, die Bundesstaaten sowie die Gemeinden die Gleichheit von Mann und Frau. Weiterhin betont das Gesetz, dass Maßnahmen, die dem Ziel dienen, eine faktische Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau zu erreichen, rechtmäßig sind. Betreffend Jobbezeichnungen oder akademischer Titel macht Artikel 7 Abs. 3 deutlich, dass eine geschlechterspezifische Anpassung dieser ebenso rechtmäßig ist. Artikel 14 Abs. 6 folgend müssen öffentliche Schulen, Kindergärten und vergleichbare Einrichtungen für alle Kinder egal welchen Geschlechts verfügbar sein.

This Directive from the Federal Prosecutor's Office establishes specific procedures to be followed by the judges and prosecutors when handling reports of domestic violence crimes. Notably, Section I.4 of the Directive states that, in analyzing the facts, when in doubt, the authorities should qualify the offense as domestic violence, unless unequivocal evidence establishes that another crime was committed. Section II imposes that, when the judge or the prosecutor become aware of the accusation of domestic violence, they must carry out or order the criminal police body to carry out, in a deliberate manner and by the most expeditious means, the specific procedural acts in the shortest possible time, without exceeding 72 hours, to take measures to protect the victim and protection measures for the victim and the promotion of coercive measures against the accused.

A directiva estabelece procedimento que deverão ser seguidos pelos Magistrados e membros do Ministério Público relacionados aos crimes de violência doméstica. Dentre os procedimentos, destaca-se a Seção I.4 que prevê que “sempre que, aquando do registo de inquérito, se suscita dúvida quanto à qualificação como violência doméstica da factualidade subjacente, deve aquela prevalecer, mantendo -se a mesma até ao momento em que seja inequívoco enquadramento diverso.” Além disso, a Seção II impõe que, quando o juiz ou o promotor tomar conhecimento da acusação de violência doméstica, eles devem realizar ou ordenar ao corpo de polícia criminal que realize, de forma discriminada e da maneira mais rápida possível, os atos processuais específicos no menor tempo possível, sem exceder 72 horas, para tomar medidas de proteção à vítima e medidas de proteção para a vítima e a promoção de medidas coercitivas contra o acusado.

Article 163 punishes sexual coercion – to coerce someone to practice a “relevant sexual act” – with imprisonment from one to eight years. Article 164 punishes forcible intercourse (“violação”) with imprisonment from one to six years. Article 168 punishes artificial procreation without a woman’s consent, with imprisonment from one to eight years. Articles 171 and 172 punish sexual abuse of minors of 14 years with imprisonment from 1-10 years. Article 173 punishes sexual acts with adolescents (individuals between 14 and 16 years old) with imprisonment up to three years. Article 174 punishes the practice for “relevant sexual acts” with a minor between 14 and 18 years), upon payment or other type of consideration with imprisonment up to three years. Article 175 punishes facilitating the prostitution of minors with imprisonment from 1-8 years. The term of imprisonment rises to a minimum of two and a maximum of ten years if the crime is committed by means of violence or threat, fraud, authority abuse, or with the intent to profit, or if the victim is vulnerable or mentally incapable. Article 176 punishes child pornography with imprisonment up to five years. The term of imprisonment rises to a minimum of one and a maximum of eight years if the crime is committed by means of violence or threat or with the intent to profit. Article 176-A punishes the act of befriending a minor online with the intent to commit sexual abuse with imprisonment of up to one year. If the act of online befriending effectively leads to an encounter, the conduct is punishable with imprisonment of up to two years. Article 176-B punishes the organization of sexual tourism with imprisonment of up to three years.

O artigo 163 pune a coerção sexual – ato de coagir alguém a praticar um "ato sexual relevante" - com prisão de um a oito anos. O artigo 164 pune as relações sexuais forçadas (violação ou estupro) com prisão de um a seis anos. O artigo 168 pune a procriação artificial sem o consentimento da mulher, com prisão de um a oito anos. O artigo 169 pune a exploração econômica da prostituição por terceiros. Entretanto, a prostituição em si não é um crime em Portugal. O artigo 176-B pune a organização do turismo sexual com pena de prisão de até três anos. Artigos 171 e 172 punem o abuso sexual de menores de 14 anos com prisão de um a dez anos. O artigo 173 pune atos sexuais com adolescentes (indivíduos entre 14 e 16 anos de idade) com prisão de até três anos. O artigo 174 pune a prática de "atos sexuais relevantes" com um menor entre 14 e 18 anos, mediante pagamento ou outro tipo de contraprestação, com prisão de até três anos. O Artigo 175 pune a facilitação da prostituição de menores com prisão de um a oito anos. A pena de prisão é aumentada para um mínimo de dois e um máximo de dez anos se o crime for cometido por meio de violência ou ameaça, fraude, abuso de autoridade ou com a intenção de lucro, ou se a vítima for vulnerável ou mentalmente incapaz. O artigo 176 pune a pornografia infantil com prisão até 5 anos. A pena de prisão é aumentada para um mínimo de um e um máximo de 8 anos, caso o crime tenha sido cometido por meio de violência ou ameaça ou com a intenção de lucrar. O Artigo 176-A pune o ato de fazer amizade com um menor on-line com a intenção de cometer abuso sexual com pena de prisão de até um ano. Se o ato de fazer amizade on-line levar efetivamente a um encontro, a conduta é punível com prisão de até dois anos.

Under Article 140, abortion is considered a “crime against the intra-uterine life,” and someone who causes an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman may be sentenced from 2-8 years of imprisonment, while the person who performed the abortion and the pregnant woman can be sentence to up to three years of imprisonment. Article 142, however, permits the abortion if performed by a doctor and in the following scenarios: (1) the abortion is the only method to avoid risk of death or grave physical or mental harm to the mother; (2) the abortion is recommended in order to avoid the risk of death or permanent grave physical damage to the mother, up to the 12th week of pregnancy (3) the fetus is at risk of grave illness or malformation, up to the 24th week of pregnancy; (4) the pregnancy was caused by rape or sexual assault, up to the 16th week of pregnancy; (5) by the mother’s choice, up to the 10th week of pregnancy. In cases where the fetus is not viable, abortion can be performed at any time during pregnancy. Any of the conditions above mentioned have to be certified by a doctor, except item 5, case in which the mother has to submit an affidavit to a doctor or clinic stating that her decision was “mindful and responsible.” If the mother is under 16 years old or mentally incapacitated, the consent to perform an abortion has to be provided by the woman’s legal representative (usually parents).

Segundo o artigo 140 do Código Penal Português, o aborto é considerado um "crime contra a vida intrauterina", e quem causar aborto sem o consentimento da grávida pode ser condenado a penas de dois a oito anos de prisão, enquanto quem causar um aborto com o consentimento da grávida, bem como a própria grávida poderá ser condenado a pena de até 3 anos de prisão. A seção 142, entretanto, permite o aborto se realizado por um médico e nas seguintes situações: (1) o aborto é o único método para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico ou mental à mãe; (2) o aborto é recomendado para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico permanente à mãe, até a 12ª semana de gravidez; (3) o feto está em risco de doença grave ou malformação, até a 24ª semana de gravidez; (4) a gravidez foi causada por estupro ou agressão sexual, até a 16ª semana de gravidez; (5) por escolha da mãe, até a 10ª semana de gravidez. Nos casos em que o feto não é viável, o aborto pode ser realizado a qualquer momento durante a gravidez. Qualquer uma das condições acima mencionadas tem que ser certificada por um médico, exceto o item 5, caso em que a mãe tem que apresentar uma declaração juramentada a um médico ou clínica declarando que sua decisão foi "atenta e responsável". No caso de a mãe ser menor de 16 anos ou mentalmente incapacitada, o consentimento para realizar um aborto tem que ser dado por um representante legal da mulher (geralmente os pais).

Under Art. 75, both parents exercise parental authority equally, meaning that all issues regarding the forms and methods of upbringing, education, religion, organization of free time among other child-rearing matters, require mutual agreement. Disagreements between parents on raising children are resolved in the courts.

Under Art. 20, spouses decide on issues related to their marriage and family relations jointly, by mutual agreement, and on the basis of equality. The relationship between the spouses must be based on mutual respect, assistance, and fair distribution of responsibilities. Spouses also have the right to resolve issues related to their personal interests independently. Spouses may choose any of their last names, a double last name, or leave their last name unchanged at their individual discretion in accordance with Art. 21. Both spouses are free to choose their occupation, profession, and place of residence in accordance with Art. 22. Under Art. 23, all property acquired during a marriage, even if one of the spouses did not have independent income during the time of the marriage due to being engaged in housekeeping or childcare, is the common joint property of the spouses. Both spouses have equal rights to the possession, use, and disposal of such property. However, property belonging to one spouse before marriage and property received during marriage by gift or inheritance remains the property of that spouse in accordance with Art. 26. In the event of division of the common joint property of the spouses, the property is divided equally in accordance with Art. 24.

In accordance with Art. 1, all married couples and individuals have the right to freely decide on the number of children, periodicity and time of their birth, and to have the necessary information for such decisions.

Under Art. 26, sterilization of a person may be performed in a State healthcare organization upon the written application of the person who has reached the age of 35 or has at least two children. In case there are “medical indications,” sterilization can be performed with the consent of the person if he or she is an adult, or a parent, guardian, etc., regardless of the age of the person or the number of existing children. Under Art. 27, women have the right independently to decide the issue of motherhood. A woman can terminate her pregnancy (abort) at a State healthcare organization, after consultation with a specialist doctor, if the term of pregnancy is no more than 12 weeks; if there are “social indications” listed in Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 1580 dated 23 October 2008, a woman can terminate her pregnancy if the term of pregnancy is no more than 22 weeks. Pregnancy may be terminated regardless of the term of the pregnancy if there are “medical indications” and the pregnant woman consents to the termination. If the pregnant woman is a minor, abortion may be performed on the same conditions, however, the consent of her legal representative (parent/guardian) is required. Healthcare organizations must provide counselling for women who have applied for an abortion. A doctor may refuse to carry out an abortion if the refusal does not threaten the life or health of the woman and must make arrangements for another specialist doctor to perform the abortion.

Art. 262 prohibits employing women in “hard” work and work with harmful or hazardous conditions (see Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Belarus No. 35 dated 12 June 2014 for a full list). Art. 263 prohibits engaging pregnant women in overtime work, work on holidays and weekends, work at night, and sending pregnant women on business trips; women with children under the age of 14 (and disabled children under the age of 18) can be engaged in such work with the worker’s written consent. Under certain conditions, pregnant women and women with children under the age of one and a half years are transferred to an “easier” position while maintaining the average earnings of her previous job under Art. 264. Under Art. 265, upon the application of a parent or stepparent raising a disabled child or two children under the age of 16, an additional paid day off is granted per week or month depending on the age of the child. Under Art. 267, women with children under the age of one and a half years are entitled to additional breaks to feed the child. It is prohibited to refuse to enter into an employment contract with a worker or reduce his or her wages for reasons related to pregnancy or the existence of children under Art. 268.

Art. 14 prohibits employment discrimination; which is defined as restricting labor rights or obtaining privileges based on certain qualities or circumstances of a person, including gender. A person that believes he or she has been discriminated against can apply to a court to eliminate such discrimination. Art. 16 prohibits the unjustifiable refusal to conclude an employment agreement with a pregnant woman, woman with a child under three years of age, or a single parent of a child under 14 years of age or a disabled child under 18. Under Art. 23, conditions of an employment contract of a “discriminatory nature” are invalid.

Law No. 350-3 defines human trafficking and sets out measures to prevent human trafficking and related crimes. These include identifying victims of trafficking, educating, and providing information to citizens on related issues. The law further sets out measures for the protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, including ensuring their safety, providing temporary accommodation, legal, medical, and psychological assistance, among others. The law provides that persons guilty of trafficking in persons or related crimes are punishable in accordance with the legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus and the victim's "unwillingness or inability" to change his or her "anti-social behavior" caused by the trafficking does not eliminate or mitigate the offender's liability.\

Art. 343 prohibits the production and distribution of pornographic materials or items of a pornographic nature depicting minors, which is punishable by correctional work for up to two years, administrative arrest, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, and by a term of up to eight years in case of aggravating circumstances.

Art. 190 prohibits intentional violation or restriction of rights and freedoms, or the establishment of advantages for citizens based on, for example, gender resulting in substantial harm to the rights, liberties, and lawful interests of citizens. This crime is punishable with a fine, correctional labor, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term up to two years, as well as restrictions to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities.

Art. 181 defines trafficking in persons as the “recruiting, transporting, transferring, harboring, or receiving a person” for the purposes of exploitation by deception, abuse of trust, or use of violence, or threat of such violence. Trafficking in persons is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years and for a term of up to 15 years if committed in aggravating circumstances, such as, knowingly against a pregnant woman or a minor, or with the removal of the person outside of the country, among others. Art. 181 also notes that “exploitation” means the illegal coercion of a person to work or provide services, for example, sexual acts and surrogacy when the victim, for reasons beyond his or her control cannot refuse to perform such work or services. Art. 1811 criminalizes the use of slave labor and other forms of exploitation. In the absence of signs of criminal behavior described in Art. 180, the crime is punishable by imprisonment for a term of two to five years, with a fine, but for a term of up to 12 years if committed in aggravating circumstances, such as knowingly against a pregnant woman or minor. Arts. 182-185 criminalize kidnapping, unlawful deprivation of liberty, and coercion. Art. 186 prohibits threats of murder, infliction of grievous bodily harm, or destruction of property if there was reason to fear fulfillment of the threats. An Art. 186 crime is punishable by community service, fines, correctional labor, or restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to two years.

Article 132 of the Portuguese Penal Code imposes a more severe penalty (imprisonment from 12 to 25 years) for the crime of qualified homicide (“homicídio qualificado”), if, among other special circumstances, the victim is the current or former spouse or person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender, if the victim is pregnant or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

O artigo 132 do Código Penal português impõe uma pena mais severa (de 12 a 25 anos de prisão) aos crimes de homicídio qualificado, se, além de outras circunstâncias especiais, o crime for praticado: (i) contra cônjuge, ex-cônjuge, pessoa de outro ou do mesmo sexo com quem o agente mantenha ou tenha mantido uma relação de namoro ou uma relação semelhante à de conjuges, ainda que sem coabitação; (ii) contra mulher gestante; e (iii) em razão de sexo, orientação sexual ou pela identidade de gênero da vítima.

The Election Law promotes women’s participation in political and public life by mandating that every candidates list shall include candidates of male and female gender. There must be at least 40% female candidates. English translation available from RefWorld here.

The Criminal Code defines rape and the persecution of a person based on his or her sex as a crime against humanity (Article 172). It also includes rape or forcible prostitution under threat to a person’s life or limb and/or the threat to the life or the limb of a loved one as a crime of war (Article 180). English translation available from ILO and LegislatiOnline through External URL.

This law provides a framework for implementation of equal rights and opportunities to all persons in Bosnia and defines a system of protection from discrimination. It defines responsibilities and obligations of legislative, judicial, and executive authorities in Bosnia, as well as legal persons and individuals with public authorities to ensure the protection, promotion, and creation of conditions for equal treatment. The law further mandates the protection of women from discrimination, including the prohibition of sexual harassment, which is defined as every form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal, or physical behavior of a sexual nature that aims to or has the effect of harming dignity of a person, especially when it creates a fearful, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment. English translation available here.

The Law on Gender Equality forms the basis for creating a network of mechanisms and institutional structures for advancing gender equality at all levels of administration in BiH. Its stated goal is to “regulate, promote and protect gender equality, guarantee equal opportunities and equal treatment of all persons regardless of gender in public and private sphere of society, and regulate protection from discrimination on grounds of gender.” The legislation defines the following offenses: discrimination on grounds of gender, direct gender-based discrimination, indirect gender-based discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and victimization. Unofficial English translation available from LegislatiOnline here.

Abortion is legal in the Netherlands when performed by a doctor in an appropriate medical setting as described in the Law on the Termination of Pregnancy. Abortion is criminalized outside these circumstances, and violations carry a penalty of up to four years and six months imprisonment or a fine. A criminal abortion that kills the woman carries a penalty of up to six years in prison or a fine. A criminal abortion performed without the woman's consent carries a penalty of up to 12 years in prison or a fine. A criminal abortion that both kills the woman and is performed without her consent is punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment or a fine. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0024649/2020-07-01)

Female genital mutilation is punishable as a form of child abuse under sections 300-304, 307, and 308 of the Criminal Code. Such abuse carries a maximum sentence of 12 years or a maximum fine of 76,000 euros. Parents who perform the circumcision themselves on their own daughter or on a child over whom they exercise parental authority or whom they care for or raise, may serve a one-third increase in their prison sentence, per section 304(1). Parents and custodians are also punishable if they allow and/or support the procedure to be performed, order it, pay for it, provide the means for it and/or assist the circumciser during the circumcision, as these acts are considered soliciting, abetting or co-perpetration under Dutch criminal law. Though FGM is not specifically mentioned in these sections, the General Provisions Section 5(3°) explicitly includes FGM in these Title XX-XXI provisions. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)

This section of the Criminal Code penalizes the recruitment, transportation, harboring, or reception of another person with the intention of exploiting them. The scope of trafficking is broad and encompasses “exploitation of another person in prostitution, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced or compulsory labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude.” Penalties dependent on the circumstances of the offense and range from 8-18 years imprisonment and/or a fifth category fine. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)

This Act prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination between men and women. Direct discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or motherhood, and indirect discrimination is based other characteristics that result in sex discrimination. The Act covers discrimination in employment, equal pay and pension schemes, and excludes discrimination aimed at placing women in a privileged position or occupations in which sex is a determining factor because of the nature of the occupation in question.

This Act prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination between men and women. Direct discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or motherhood, and indirect discrimination is based other characteristics that result in sex discrimination. The Act covers discrimination in employment, equal pay and pension schemes, and excludes discrimination aimed at placing women in a privileged position or occupations in which sex is a determining factor because of the nature of the occupation in question. Sections 5(2)-(3) list the conditions in which sex may be considered. (English translation available here: https://mensenrechten.nl/sites/default/files/2013-05-08.Legislation%20Eq...)

The Domestic Abuse Act (Scotland) of 2018 came into force on April 1, 2019. It modifies and expands upon portions of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act of 1995. The act expands the definition of domestic abuse to include psychological abuse and coercive and controlling behavior. It criminalizes both psychological and physical harm directed to a partner or an ex-partner. Section 11.2 defines a “partner” as a spouse or civil partner, a person with whom one lives as a spouse, or a person with whom one is in an “intimate personal relationship.” Section 2 defines abuse as “violent, threatening, or intimidating” behavior that may consist of controlling a victim’s daily activities, causing the victim to become subordinate or dependent on the perpetrator, isolating the victim from friends or family, depriving or restricting a victim’s actions, or frightening, humiliating, degrading, or otherwise punishing the victim. Section 3 contains an extraterritoriality clause covering such conduct occurring partly or wholly outside the country, and thus the abusive behavior need not take place within the United Kingdom. Section 5 creates a is the only UK legislation with a specific statutory sentencing aggravation for the harm that can be caused to children growing up in an environment in which domestic abuse takes place. Section 2.2.n., likewise, includes a victim’s child under the age of 18 as a potential additional victim of abuse. Section 5.3 clarifies that the aggravation can be applied both in cases in which abusive behavior is directed at a child, and in scenarios in which a child “sees or hears, or is present during, an incident of behavior that A directs at B as part of the course of behavior.” The Domestic Abuse Act has been lauded by women’s rights organizations as a “welcome change” that “should increase the opportunity [for victims] to obtain protection and seek justice through the criminal justice system."

When regulating the legal regime applicable to publicly traded companies, the Capital Companies Law establishes that the board of directors shall ensure that its selection procedures favor gender diversity (Article 529 bis). Furthermore, the mandatory annual corporate governance report shall include a description explaining how the company is furthering diversity, particularly in relation to the representation of women in its board of directors (Article 540).

Al regular el régimen legal aplicable a las empresas que cotizan en bolsa, la Ley de Sociedades de Capital establece que el consejo de administración se asegurará de que sus procedimientos de selección de miembros favorezcan la diversidad de género (Artículo 529 bis). Además, el informe anual obligatorio de gobierno corporativo debe incluir una descripción que explique cómo la empresa está fomentando la diversidad, particularmente en relación con la representación de las mujeres en su junta directiva (Artículo 540).

Article 3 prohibits any publicity which discriminates against women. It describes discrimination as (i) showing women’s bodies or body parts as objects unrelated to the products being marketed or (ii) showing stereotyped descriptions of women’s behavior in a way that is contrary to their dignity.

El Artículo 3 prohíbe cualquier publicidad que discrimine a las mujeres. Describe la discriminación como (i) mostrar los cuerpos o partes del cuerpo de las mujeres como objetos no relacionados con los productos que se comercializan o (ii) mostrar descripciones estereotipadas del comportamiento de las mujeres de una manera que sea contraria a su dignidad.

The Workers’ Statute contains some special rights for women who have suffered gender-based violence. Article 37.8 establishes that said women could work part-time if they wanted to. Article 40.4 gives them a preferential right to occupy a new position in another location if they needed to move as a result of the gender-based violence they suffered.

El Estatuto de los Trabajadores contiene algunos derechos especiales para las mujeres que han sufrido violencia de género. El Artículo 37.8 establece que dichas mujeres podrían trabajar a tiempo parcial si quisieran. El Artículo 40.4 les otorga un derecho preferencial a ocupar un nuevo puesto en otro lugar si necesitaban mudarse como resultado de la violencia de género que sufrieron.

This is a broad piece of legislation that regulates the prevention, education, social assistance, social security benefits, procedural, criminal, and medical aspects of gender-based violence. The Sexual Violence Law also created specific courts within the judiciary system, like the Courts of Violence Against Women, to hear all cases related to gender-based violence.

Esta es una amplia legislación que regula la prevención, educación, asistencia social, beneficios de seguridad social, aspectos procesales, penales y médicos de la violencia de género. La Ley de Violencia de Género también creó tribunales específicos dentro del sistema judicial, como los Tribunales de Violencia contra la Mujer, para escuchar todos los casos relacionados con la violencia de género.

Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.

España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.

If a married person dies, the surviving spouse inherits the estate of the deceased. The spouses’ common children inherit from both spouses when the surviving spouse dies. If the spouse who dies had children with another person at the time of their passing, the non-common children may receive their inheritance immediately. It is possible to write a will on who is to inherit, however, a direct heir (e.g. the deceased’s non-common child) always has the right to its share of that spouse’s inheritance. Cohabitees do not inherit from one another and will have to write a will that regulates the inheritance in case one of them dies.

Sweden’s Gender Recognition Act states that a person may be legally recognized as another gender provided that they: (i) over a long period of time have perceived that they belong to that gender, (ii) have presented in accordance with the chosen gender, (iii) are expected to live in accordance with the gender identity in the future, and (iv) are at least 18 years old. Applications for legal gender change are reviewed by the National Board of Health and Welfare (Sw. Socialstyrelsen) and their decision may be appealed in the Administrative Court. The requirement for sterility was removed from Sweden’s Gender Recognition Act on 1 July 2013.

An amendment to the Swedish Aliens Act allows for the potential issuance of residence permits to victims of human trafficking crimes. The permit is issued for the duration of the investigation or hearing into the crime. During the duration of the permit the victims are eligible for health care, financial aid, and medical attention.

The Discrimination Act (“DA”) promotes equality regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or any other identity by defining and prohibiting discrimination and sexual harassment. The DA provides anti-discrimination laws which state that as long as an individual is capable of performing the relevant task, or eligible to receive services, he or she may not be discriminated against based on any identity factors. Moreover, the DA provides that organization leaders are obligated to investigate and take measures to prevent future discrimination or harassment upon becoming aware of such potential discrimination or harassment. Finally, the DA provides immunity provisions for those who report behavior that violates the DA. The penalty for failing to fulfill obligations under the DA is an obligation to pay compensation for the discrimination suffered, decided by the Board against Discrimination, and subject to appeal by the payee.

The law identifies and provides certain protections for vulnerable groups of migrants, including pregnant women, single mothers, and victims of domestic violence, rape, and human trafficking. The act also contains temporary residence provisions for victims of trafficking or individuals who are victims of serious criminal offenses. Victims of trafficking may be granted residence for a period of one year, whereas victims of serious criminal offenses may be eligible to stay for a minimum of six months and a maximum of one year, though this can be extended if the factors that the temporary residence was based on are still continuing. The act includes provisions to grant such individuals safe accommodation, psychological and material assistance, counseling, and access to education for minors. (English translation available here.)

The Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination introduced a systematic basis for general anti-discrimination protection in Serbia. It includes a general prohibition on discrimination in addition to specific articles covering hate speech, harassment, and other more severe forms of discrimination such as slavery and trafficking. (English translation available here.)

The Criminal Code defines and criminalizes domestic violence under Article 194, which is the main legislation providing for domestic violence prosecution. Domestic violence is defined as the “use of violence, threat of attacks against life or body, insolent or ruthless behaviour [that] endangers the tranquility, physical integrity or mental condition of a member of his family.” The definition of “family member” does not include ex-spouses or unmarried partners who do not live together or have children. The penalties for domestic violence under the Criminal Code are fines or imprisonment for up to 15 years. In 2017, new crimes for stalking (Art. 138a) and sexual harassment (Art. 182a) were added to the Criminal Code. Additionally, the minimum statutory sentence for rape was increased from three years to five years. In 2019, amendments to the Criminal code introduced life imprisonment without conditional release for those who commit crimes of rape or murder of children, pregnant women, or disabled persons. New crimes for stalking, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage were also introduced. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

Law No. 05/L-020 on Gender Equality promotes gender equality, by defining the relevant concepts, setting forth various measures to protect equal rights of genders, and specifying the institutions responsible for gender equality. The Law defines “woman” and “man” as including any person who considers oneself as such, and describes gender identity – which does not require medical intervention – as a “protected characteristic.” Direct and indirect gender discrimination are prohibited under the Law, including less favorable treatment of women for reasons of pregnancy, maternity, or sexual orientation, and gender-based violence. Harassment and sexual harassment are also forbidden, and whether a person refuses or surrenders to such behavior shall not be used as a basis for a decision affecting that person in a legal proceeding. The Law directs the Kosovo institutions to implement various general measures to achieve gender equality in Kosovo, including gender mainstreaming in all policies and legislation, gender budgeting in all areas, and ensuring recruitment and appointment are consistent with the requirement for equal representation of women and men. In areas where inequities exist, public institutions are further instructed by the Law to take temporary special measures to accelerate the realization of gender equality, including quotas, preferential treatment, hiring, and promotion. The Law in particular requires legislative, executive, and judicial bodies at all levels to adopt special measures until equal gender representation is achieved. The Law establishes an Agency for Gender Equality to support the implementation of the Law, and further mandates that all ministries and municipalities must appoint gender equality officials, and allocate sufficient resources from their budget, to implement the Law. Discrimination on bases including sex, pregnancy, or birth, is prohibited in employment matters including access to employment or training, and working conditions. In regard to education, the Law proscribes sex discrimination in access to education and scholarships, evaluation results, and attainment of degrees, and mandates the inclusion of gender equality education in school curricula at all levels. Persons who believe the principle of equal treatment has not been implemented in relation to them may initiate proceeding in accordance with the Law on Protection from Discrimination. Violations of the Law are punishable by fines of up to 700 Euros for individuals, and 900 Euros for legal entities. (Unoffocial English version available here.)

Article 7 of the Constitution of Kosovo states that Kosovo’s constitutional order is based on principles including equality, respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and social justice. The article further declares that Kosovo ensures gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural, and other areas of societal life. Article 24(2) prohibits discrimination on grounds of gender and sexual orientation. Article 28(1) stipulates that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude, and paragraph (3) specifically forbids trafficking in persons. Article 37 declares that everyone enjoys the right to marry based on free will. It mandates that marriage and divorce be based on the equality of spouses. Article 71(2) stipulates that the composition of the Assembly of Kosovo shall respect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 101(1) stipulates that the composition of the civil service shall take into account internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 104(2) stipulates that the composition of the judiciary shall reflect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 108(2) charges the Kosovo Judicial Council to ensure that the Kosovo courts follow the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (4) requires proposals for appointment of judges to reflect principles of gender equality. Article 109(4) stipulates the State Prosecutor shall respect the principles of gender equality. Article 110(1) charges the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council to ensure that the State Prosecutor reflects the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (2) requires that proposals for appointments of prosecutors shall reflect principles of gender equality. Article 114(1) requires the composition of the Constitutional Court to respect principles of gender equality. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act of 2004 was enacted to protect victims of crime and specifically domestic violence. It amends non-molestation orders under Family Law Act 1996 to provide a criminal sanction for non-compliance, with a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment and fines. See Section 1. It amends the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to allow restraining orders to be imposed upon even acquitted defendants, if the court “considers it necessary to do so to protect a person from harassment by the defendant.”

This Act is a comprehensive act that replaced several pieces of legislation, including the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In general, The Equality Act 2010 legally protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society, and provides equality provisions, including the following:

Article 10 (Protection Measures against Domestic Violence) provides the court with the power to order, among other things, the immediate removal of the perpetrator from the place of residence for a certain period of time, the prohibition of the perpetrator from being within a certain distance of the victim, a court officer to accompany the victim or the perpetrator to the victim’s residence to remove personal belongings, and the perpetrator to pay rent as well as certain support contributions to the victim, children, or other members of the family under their care. (English translation available here.)

The Labour Code enshrines equality in the workplace into Albanian legislation and provides specific protection to women’s rights. Article 9 (Prohibition against Discrimination) expressly prohibits any discrimination in the fields of labour and education (including but not limited to discrimination based on sex, race and nationality). Article 32 (Protection of Personality) specifically prohibits any acts of sexual harassment against an employee by an employer or other employees. Sexual harassment is defined to include any act that “considerably harms the psychological state of the employee because of sex.” Article 54 (Working Conditions) provides a requirement for pregnant women to have breaks every three hours. Article 105/a (Woman's Employment Protection) provides that women cannot be dismissed solely based on the reason of pregnancy or child delivery. Article 115 (Equality between Sexes in terms of Reward) makes mandatory equal pay between men and women for carrying out jobs of equal value. (External link to the International Labour Organization website for Albanian labor-related legislation, including the ILO's unofficial English translation available here.)

The Constitution provides for the general principles of equality and non-discrimination. Article 4 provides that democracy shall be exercised based on diversity of political institutions, ideologies and opinions. It also provides that the ideologies of different entities may not be made mandatory for citizens. Article 14 provides that the State shall regulate relations among social, ethnic and other communities on the basis of principles of equality before the law and respect of rights and interests. Article 16 states that religions and faiths shall have equality before the law. Article 22 provides that “all shall be equal before the law and have the right to equal protection of their rights and legitimate interest without any discrimination.” Further, Article 32 of the Constitution contains general protections with respect to marriage, family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood. In particular, it provides that “on reaching the age of consent, a woman and a man shall have the right to enter into marriage on a voluntary basis and found a family. Spouses shall have equal rights in family relationships” and women shall be guaranteed equal rights as men in their opportunities to receive education and vocational training, promotion in labor, social and political, cultural and other spheres of activity as well as in creating conditions safeguarding their occupational health and safety. Article 42 provides a right to equal pay. According to Art. 44, the State guarantees to every person the right to own property, meaning the right to own, use, and dispose of property individually or jointly with other persons. The right of ownership and inheritance are protected by law. Unofficial English translation available here.

Medically assisted reproduction is available only to married couples, or those in a registered partnership or cohabitation. Further, it is only permitted to the couple if certain difficulties in conceiving exist, such as (i) all other possible or reasonable treatments to induce pregnancy through sexual intercourse are unsuccessful or hopeless; (ii) pregnancy through sexual intercourse would expose the spouse or partner to a serious risk of transmitting a serious infectious disease; (iii) for certain couples where there may be difficulty becoming pregnant or giving birth, or may give birth to a child with a hereditary disease (such as severe, untreatable pain or brain damage, or which would require the child be kept alive through constant use of modern medical technology) due to genetic dispositions. It is also available to a woman living in a registered partnership or cohabitation with another woman. Surrogacy is not permitted in Austria because medically assisted reproduction is only permissible within a marriage or registered partnership or cohabitation, and only the ova and the semen of the spouses, registered partners, or cohabitants may be used. There are two exceptional circumstances in which a third party’s genetic material may be used for medically assisted reproduction: (i) the semen of a third person may be used if the spouse, registered partner or cohabitant is not capable of reproduction, or if the couple is two women in a registered partnership; or (ii) the oocyte of a third person may be used if a woman, younger than 45, whom the pregnancy will be induced is otherwise not able to reproduce.

Medizinisch assistierte Fortpflanzung steht verheirateten Paaren, eingetragenen Partnerschaften oder einer Lebensgemeinschaft zur Verfügung. Außerdem ist es Paaren nur gestattet, wenn sie gewisse Schwierigkeiten bei der Empfängnis haben; dies sind z.B.: (1.) alle oder zumutbare Behandlungen, um eine Schwangerschaft durch Geschlechtsverkehr herbeizuführen, sind erfolglos oder aussichtslos; (2.) der Geschlechtsverkehr ist dem Paar nicht zumutbar, da eine ernsthafte Gefahr der Übertragung einer schweren Infektionskrankheit besteht; (3.) wenn das Paar Schwierigkeiten hat schwanger zu werden oder zu gebären, oder das Kind wegen genetischer Dispositionen mit einer Erbkrankheit geboren würde (so wie ernsthaften, unbehandelbaren Schmerzen oder Gehirnschäden, oder solche die es erforderlich machen, dass das Kind dauerhaft durch moderne Technologie am Leben erhalten würde). Außerdem stehen die Möglichkeiten homosexuellen Frauen offen, die in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft oder Lebensgemeinschaft leben. Nicht erlaubt ist Leihmutterschaft in Österreich, denn medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung ist nur in der Ehe, eingetragenen Partnerschaften und in Lebensgemeinschaften erlaubt. Es gibt zwei Ausnahmen, in denen das genetische Material für eine medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung genutzt werden darf: (1.) Der Samen einer dritten Person darf verwendet werden, wenn der Ehegatte, eingetragene Partner oder Partner in Lebensgemeinschaft nicht der Fortpflanzung fähig ist oder das Paar aus zwei Frauen in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft besteht; (2.) die Eizelle einer dritten Person darf einer Frau eingesetzt werden, wenn diese jünger als 45 Jahre alt ist und auf andere Weise nicht fähig ist, sich fortzupflanzen.

This article provides that in order to obtain protection from violence, threats or harassment, a person (the “applicant”) may request a court to order the offending party to refrain from approaching the applicant or the applicant’s home, contacting and harassing the applicant, and frequenting specific locations. If the applicant lives in the same dwelling as the offending party, the applicant may ask the court to order the offending party to leave the dwelling for a specified period, which may be extended on one occasion for good cause. The statute further provides that, when justified by the circumstances, the court may require the applicant to pay reasonable compensation for his or her exclusive use of the dwelling, or, with the landlord’s consent, transfer the rights and obligations under the lease to the applicant alone. The statute requires the Swiss Cantons to designate an authority and to enact rules for the immediate expulsion of the offending party from the joint dwelling in urgent cases. Unofficial English translation available here.

Provides for a criminal penalty of not less than five years for any person who commits certain specified offenses as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, including (1) assuming and exercising a right of ownership over a person, in particular in the form of trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation or forced labor; and (2) raping a person of the female gender or, after she has been forcibly made pregnant, confining her unlawfully with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population, forcing a person to tolerate a sexual act of comparable severity or forcing a person into prostitution or to be sterilized. Unofficial English translation available here.

Provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for, among other things, a person who recruits or causes a minor to participate in a pornographic performance, or for any person who produces, imports, stores, markets, advertises, exhibits, offers, shows, passes on or makes accessible to others or possesses pornography that contains sexual acts involving animals, acts of violence involving adults or non-genuine sexual acts with minors. For pornography containing genuine sexual acts with minors, the penalty is imprisonment for not more than five years or a monetary penalty. Criminal penalties are also provided for persons who obtain or produce such pornographic materials for their own use. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 189 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a monetary penalty for any person who uses threats, force or psychological pressure on another person or makes that other person incapable of resistance in order to compel him or her to tolerate a sexual act similar to intercourse or any other sexual act. If the offender acts with cruelty, and if the offender used an offensive weapon or other dangerous object, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than three years. Art. 190 provides that a person can be sentenced to between 1 and 10 years in custody or a fine for using violence, threats, or psychological pressure to force a female to engage in a sexual act, or for making her incapable of resisting. Art. 191 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a monetary penalty for any person who, in the knowledge that another person is incapable of judgement or resistance, has sexual intercourse with, or commits an act similar to sexual intercourse or any other sexual act on, that person. Art. 192 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who, by abusing a dependent relationship with a person in institutional care, an inmate of an institution, a prisoner, a detainee or a person on remand, induces the dependent person to commit or submit to a sexual act. Art. 193 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who induces another to commit or submit to a sexual act by exploiting a position of need or a dependent relationship based on employment or another dependent relationship. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 182 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment or a monetary penalty for any person who as a supplier, intermediary or customer engages in the trafficking of a human being for the purpose of sexual exploitation, exploitation of his or her labor or for the purpose of removing an organ. If the victim is a minor or if the offender acts for commercial gain, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than one year. In every case, a monetary penalty must also be imposed. The statute also provides that the soliciting of a person for these purposes is equivalent to trafficking, and that any person who commits the act abroad is also guilty of an offense. Unofficial English translation available here.

This article provides that a person who is sentenced to a custodial sentence of more than six months or to indefinite incarceration or involuntary commitment for offenses committed during the exercise of a professional activity or organized non-professional activity shall be prohibited from carrying on the exercise when it involves regular contact with any minors for 10 years. The offenses include: statutory rape or other child sexual abuse, rape and sexual coercion, child pornography, encouraging prostitution, and human trafficking. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 5 provides that the Swiss Penal Code also applies to any person who is in Switzerland, is not being extradited, and has committed any of the following offenses abroad: (1) Trafficking in human beings (Penal Code Art. 182), sexual coercion (Penal Code Art. 189), rape (Penal Code Art. 190), sexual acts with a person incapable of proper judgment or resistance (Penal Code Art. 191) or encouraging prostitution (Penal Code Art. 195) if the victim was less than 18 years of age; (2) sexual acts with dependent persons (Penal Code Art. 188) and sexual acts with minors against payment (Penal Code Art. 196); (3) sexual acts with a child (Penal Code Art. 187) and sexual acts with a minor of age less than 14; or (4) aggravated pornography (Penal Code Art. 197, para. 3 and 4) if the objects or representations depict sexual acts with minors. Unofficial English translation available here.

This legislative decree protects maternity and paternity, and prohibits discrimination on the basis of either. It regulates parental leave, leave for the illness of a child, rest, and the treatment of pregnant workers to protect their health. (Note: PDF is the consolidated text only. Follow the external link for the entire text of the decree.)

Il presente decreto legislativo tutela la maternità e la paternità e proibisce le discriminazioni basate su di esse. Il decreto disciplina i congedi parentali, i congedi per la malattia dei figli, i riposi e la tutela delle lavoratrici incinta. (Nota: il PDF è il solo testo consolidato. Seguire il link esterno per l’intero testo del decreto).

The Italian Penal Code prohibits domestic violence (art. 572), female genital mutilation (art. 583), personal injury aggravated by permanent deformation or scarring of the face (art. 583 quinquies), harassment (art. 612 bis), the crime of illicit diffusion of sexually explicit images or videos without the consent of the persons represented (so-called revenge porn) (art. 612 ter). Punishable crimes against a person's freedom also include slavery and forced prostitution (art. 600), human trafficking (art. 601), sexual acts coerced through violence, threats, or abuse of authority (art. 609 bis) and group sexual assault (art. 609 octies). Sexual acts with a minor of 14 year old is always a crime (art. 609 quarter). Aggravating factors in sexual violence are: when the perpetrator is a relative, a parent or a guardian, when the sexual act is committed against a pregnant woman, when the victim is under 18 years old, and when the perpetrator uses a weapon (art. 609 ter). Sexual acts with a minor are not punishable when (1) both parties are minors, (2) the minor is at least 13 years old, and (3) the age difference between the two is no more than four years (art. 609 quater). Moreover, the Italian Penal Code prohibits the crime of coercion or induction into marriage (art. 558 bis) and the violation of the order for removal from the family home and of the prohibition to approach the places frequented by the victim (art. 387 bis). Finally, the Italian Penal Code prohibits crimes against pregnancy. In particular, under article 593-ter, anyone who causes the termination of a pregnancy without the woman’s consent shall be punished by imprisonment from four to eight years. Consent that is extorted by violence or threat, or that is obtained by deceit, shall be considered as not having been given. Aggravating factors in crimes against pregnancy include a woman under 18 years of age.

Article 144-A bans female genital mutilation and imposes a prison sentence of 2-10 years. Article 145 imposes greater penalties for offenses against physical integrity and female genital mutilation if the crime is committed, among other special circumstances, against the current or former spouse or a person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender; if the victim is pregnant; or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Article 118 provides that the statute of limitations on crimes of sexual violence and female genital mutilation against minors do not expire until the victim is at least 23 years old. Article 152 establishes the crime of domestic violence, punishable with imprisonment from 1-5 years. The crime consists of mental or physical abuse, including mistreatment, corporal punishment and sexual offenses, inflicted once or repeatedly on the following victims (1) a current or former spouse; (2) a person with whom the perpetrator has or had a relationship akin to a spousal relationship; (3) a parent of the perpetrator’s child; (4) a person who is incapable to defend him/herself due to age, disability, pregnancy, illness or economic dependency to the perpetrator. In addition, under Article 152, (1) the minimum imprisonment penalty is increased from one to two years if the perpetrator publicizes the victim’s personal information or any other private information (including information stored on audio or video) via Internet or other means available; (2) the perpetrator may be prohibited of having contact with the victim; (3) the perpetrator may be prohibited from being granted a gun license; (4) the perpetrator may lose parenting rights for up to 10 years. Also, Article 152 imposes a sentence of 2-8 years imprisonment if the domestic violence results in serious physical injury, which increases to imprisonment to 3-10 years if the domestic violence results in death.

O artigo 114 proíbe a realização de mutilação genital feminina, impondo pena de prisão de dois a 10 anos. O artigo 145 estabelece penas maiores aos crimes de ofensa contra a integridade física e mutilação genital feminina, se o crime for cometido, dentre outras circunstâncias, contra cônjuge ou ex-cônjuge ou contra pessoa no qual o agente tenha estabelecido um relacionamento romântico, independente do gênero ou do sexo, se a vítima estiver grávida ou se o crime for cometido em razão do gênero, orientação sexual ou identidade de gênero da vítima. O artigo 118 estabelece que os crimes contra a liberdade e autodeterminação sexual de menores, bem como no crime de mutilação genital feminina sendo a vítima menor, o procedimento criminal não se extingue, por efeito da prescrição, antes de o ofendido perfazer 23 anos. O artigo 152 versa sobre o crime de violência doméstica, punível com prisão de um a cinco anos. O crime consiste em abuso mental ou físico, incluindo maus-tratos, castigos corporais e ofensas sexuais, infligidos uma ou várias vezes às seguintes vítimas (1) atual ou ex-cônjuge; (2) uma pessoa com a qual o agente tem ou teve uma relação semelhante a uma relação conjugal; (3) um dos pais do filho do agente; (4) uma pessoa incapaz de se defender devido à idade, deficiência, gravidez, doença ou dependência econômica do agente. Além disso, nos termos do artigo 152, (1) a pena mínima de prisão é aumentada de um para dois anos se o agente divulgar as informações pessoais da vítima ou qualquer outra informação privada (inclusive informações armazenadas em áudio ou vídeo) via Internet ou outros meios disponíveis; (2) o agente pode ser proibido de entrar em contato com a vítima; (3) o agente pode ser proibido de receber uma licença de porte de arma; (4) o agente pode perder os direitos parentais por até 10 anos. Além disso, o Artigo 152 pune com prisão de dois a oito anos caso a violência doméstica resulte em sérios danos físicos e pune com prisão de três a dez anos se a violência doméstica resultar em morte.

Section 29 of the Portuguese Labor Law ensures equal opportunity in labor and and prevents gender discrimination. The Code also guarantees maternity and paternity leave, bans harassment, establishes universal preschool for children until the age of five, and requires children to attend school.

A seção 29 do Código do Trabalho Português garante oportunidades iguais de trabalho e impede a discriminação de gênero. O Código também garante as licenças de maternidade e paternidade, proíbe o assédio, estabelece pré-escola universal para crianças até os cinco anos, e requer que as crianças frequentem a escola.

The Law on Prevention of and Protection from Discrimination (the “LPPD”), which entered into force in 2011, introduced the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination (Article 6), instruction to discriminate (Article 9) and harassment and sexual harassment (Article 7). The LPPD covers almost all grounds of discrimination as covered by EU law i.e. “ sex, race, colour, gender, belonging to a marginalized group, ethnic origin, language, nationality, social background, religion or religious beliefs, other types of beliefs, education, political affiliation, personal or social status, mental and physical impediment, age, family or marital status, property status, health condition or any other basis anticipated by a law or ratified international agreement." However, the LPPD does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation. Article 9 of the LPPD also covers sexual harassment, which states that “sexual harassment shall be unwanted behavior of sexual nature, manifested physically, verbally or in any other manner, aimed at or resulting in violation of the dignity of a person, especially when creating a hostile, intimidating, degrading or humiliating environment." Article 4 of the LPPD covers a wide scope on the prohibition on harrassments, which includes: (a) labour and labour relations; (b) education, science and sport; (c) social security, including the area of social protection, pension and disability insurance, health insurance and health protection; (d) judiciary and administration; (e) housing; (f) public information and media; (g) access to goods and services; (h) membership and activity in unions, political parties, citizens’ associations and foundations or other membership-based organizations; (i) culture, and (j) other areas determined by law. (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)

Art. 96: A person cannot remarry until the person proves that his or her previous marriage has been annulled or dissolved.

Art. 105: A person can annul a marriage if a spouse was already married when they wed.

Article 1 of this act states that it is intended to promote equality between men and women. Article 3 prohibits discrimination against employees based on sex. Article 4 prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace. Article 5 provides for relief, including injunctive relief and lost salary. Article 10 protects against retaliation against complainants.

This act, the Local Election Act of Ukraine, was superseded and replaced by the 2019 Electoral Code of Ukraine. The Local Election Act established quotas for female representation in legislative bodies at local level elections. required that representation of persons of one sex in the electoral lists of candidates for members of local councils in multi-mandate constituencies should be at least 30% of the total number of candidates in the electoral roll.

The law's purpose is to ensure equal opportunities for the realization of human and civil rights and freedoms. The law defines “discrimination” as a situation in which an individual or a group of individuals suffers from the restriction of the recognition, exercise, or enjoyment of rights and freedoms in any form established in this Law based on sex or on other grounds (“particular grounds”), except for cases when such restriction has a legitimate, reasonably justified aim, which is achievable in an appropriate and necessary way. The Act defines the principles of non-discrimination in the legislation of Ukraine. In addition, the Act defines forms of discrimination, for example, direct, indirect, and otherwise. The Act provides that (i) all forms of discrimination are prohibited in Ukraine, (ii) all persons should have equal rights and freedoms as well as opportunities for their implementation, and establishes civil, administrative, and criminal liability for the violation of anti-discrimination legislation (including under the Act).

Метою закону є забезпечення рівних можливостей для реалізації прав та свобод людини і громадянина. Закон визначає поняття “дискримінація” як ситуацію, в якій особа чи група осіб зазнають обмеження у визнанні, реалізації або користуванні правами і свободами в будь-якій формі, встановленій цим Законом, за ознакою статі або іншими ознаками (“певні ознаки”), крім випадків, коли таке обмеження має правомірну, об’єктивно обґрунтовану мету, способи досягнення якої є належними та необхідними. Закон визначає принципи недискримінації в законодавстві України. Крім того, Закон визначає форми дискримінації, наприклад, пряму, непряму та інші. Закон передбачає, що (i) усі форми дискримінації в Україні заборонені, (ii) усі люди повинні мати рівні права і свободи, можливості їх реалізації, а також встановлює цивільну, адміністративну та кримінальну відповідальність за порушення антидискримінаційного законодавства (у тому числі, цей Закон).

This legislation introduces the concept of “domestic violence,” which is defined as act (or omission) of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic violence (intentional deprivation of housing, food, clothing, other property, funds or documents or the ability to use them; leaving without care; hampering the receipt of necessary treatment or rehabilitation services; prohibition of, or compulsion to, work; prohibition of studies; and other offenses of an economic nature) committed within a family or between relatives, or between spouses or ex-spouses, former or current spouses, or other persons who have lived together as a family, irrespective of whether the person who committed domestic violence lives (or lived) together with the victim, as well as a threat of similar actions. The Act contains a series of governmental steps aimed at combatting domestic violence and improving the status of victims of domestic violence, which includes that the Ukrainian government (i) maintain a unified state register of cases of domestic violence and sex-based violence; (ii) establish a domestic violence call center; (iii) adopt immediate injunctions with respect to domestic violence offenders; (iv) provide free legal, medical, social, and psychological assistance to all victims in all cases of domestic violence; and (v) reimburse inflicted harm and damage to the victim’s physical and psychological health. The Act, through amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses Act and the Criminal Code, makes domestic violence or sex-based violence without grave consequences punishable by a fine in the amount of 20 non-taxable minimal income wages or public works for up to 30 - 40 hours or administrative detention for up to 10 days. If such actions are repeated within a year, the punishment is increased up to 40 non-taxable minimal income wages, public works for a period of up to 60 hours, or administrative arrest for up to 15 days. Domestic violence or sex-based violence that results in grave consequences is punishable by public works for up to 240 hours or detention for up to six months or imprisonment for up to two years.

Закон України «Про захист від насильства в сім’ї» (далі – «Закон») вводить поняття «домашнє насильство», яке визначається як діяння (дії або бездіяльність) фізичного, сексуального, психологічного або економічного насильства, що вчиняються в сім’ї чи в межах місця проживання або між родичами, або між колишнім чи теперішнім подружжям, або між іншими особами, які спільно проживають (проживали) однією сім’єю, але не перебувають (не перебували) у родинних відносинах чи у шлюбі між собою, незалежно від того, чи проживає (проживала) особа, яка вчинила домашнє насильство, у тому самому місці, що й постраждала особа, а також погрози вчинення таких діянь. (Економічне насильство - форма домашнього насильства, що включає умисне позбавлення житла, їжі, одягу, іншого майна, коштів чи документів або можливості користуватися ними, залишення без догляду чи піклування, перешкоджання в отриманні необхідних послуг з лікування чи реабілітації, заборону працювати, примушування до праці, заборону навчатися та інші правопорушення економічного характеру). Закон містить низку заходів, спрямованих на боротьбу з домашнім насильством та покращення статусу жертв домашнього насильства, серед яких, зокрема, ведення урядом України Єдиного державного реєстру випадків домашнього насильства та сексуального насильства та створення відповідного кол-центру, прийняття невідкладних заходів щодо винних у домашньому насильстві, надання безоплатної правової допомоги всім потерпілим у всіх випадках домашнього насильства, безоплатної медичної, соціальної та психологічної допомоги, відшкодування завданої шкоди. Кодексом України про адміністративні правопорушення передбачено відповідальність за домашнє насильство (без тяжких наслідків) у вигляді штрафу в розмірі двадцяти неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадські роботи на строк до від 30 до 40 годин або адміністративний арешт на строк до 10 семи діб. Кримінальний Кодекс передбачає відповідальність за домашнє насильство (яке спричинило тяжкі наслідки)у вигляді громадських робіт на строк до 240 годин або арешту на строк до 6 місяців, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. У разі повторного вчинення подібних дій протягом року передбачається посилення покарання: штраф до 40 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян, громадські роботи на строк до 60 годин або адміністративний арешт на строк до 15 діб.

While intoxicated, the defendant attempted to rape the victim and intentionally inflicted moderately severe physical injuries on her. The court of the first instance imposed a sentence of three years and six months of imprisonment for attempted rape (Part 3 of Article 15, Part 1 of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and inflicting moderate bodily harm (Part 1 of Article 122 of the Criminal Code). However, the appellate court reversed the conviction for attempted rape and imposed punishment only for inflicting moderate bodily harm (two years of imprisonment). The appellate court reasoned that he was not subject to criminal liability for attempted rape because he did not finish the rape. In his complaint to the Supreme Court, the victim’s attorney insisted on a retrial of the case, arguing that the defendant did not voluntarily decide not to complete the rape. The prosecutor supported the victim’s complaint. The Supreme Court noted that a voluntary refusal in the case of an unfinished crime is the final stop of an attempt to commit a crime by a person of his own free will if, at the same time, he was aware of the possibility of finishing the crime. A person who voluntarily refuses to complete a criminal offense shall be criminally liable only if the actual act(s) committed by that person met the requirements of another crime. The law does not require specific motives for voluntary refusal in the case of an unfinished crime. Therefore, the motives can vary, for example, fear of punishment, remorse, or empathy for the victim. The lower courts found that the offender had an objective opportunity to complete the crime and was aware of it. For these reasons, the complaint was not satisfied. This decision is important because it illustrates the concept of voluntary refusal of rape attempts.

Особа у стані алкогольного сп’яніння вчинила замах на зґвалтування (ч. 3 ст. 15 ч., 1 ст. 152 Кримінальний Кодекс України - далі КК) підчас якого завдала постраждалій умисних тілесних ушкоджень середньої тіжкості (ч.1 ст. 122 КК). Суд першої інстнації призначив покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 3 роки 6 місяців з вчинення замаху на зґвалтування та завдання тіслесних ушкоджень середньої тяжкості, але апеляційний суд призначив покарання у вигляді 2 роки позбавлення волі тільки за тілксні ушкодження. Апеляційний суд посилався на те, що винна особа відмовилась від доведення злочину до кінця тому не підлягає кримінальній відповідальності за замах на зґвалтування. Захисник постраждалої у своїй скарзі до Верховного Суду заперечив добровільну відмову винного та наполягав на повторному розгляді справи. Прокурор підтримав скаргу захисника. Верховний Суд у відповідь на скаргу зазначив, що добровільною відмовою при незакінченому злочині є остаточне припинення особою за своєю волею замаху на злочин, якщо при цьому вона усвідомлювала можливість доведення злочину до кінця. Закон не конкретизує мотиви добровільної відмови при незакінченому злочину, а тому вони можуть бути різними - страх перед покаранням, розкаяння, співчуття, жалість до потерпілого. Оскільки судом було з’ясовано, що винний мав об’єктивну можливість закінчити злочин і усвідомлював це. З таких причин скаргу не було задоволено. Це рішення є важливим, бо розкриває поняття добровільної відмови від замаху на зґвалтування на практичному прикдалі.

The complainant visited the gynecologist for an abortion. In the process, the doctor damaged the complainant’s uterus, bladder, and intestines. The complainant needed surgery to repair the damage and lost the ability to bear children. During the court hearing, the State’s forensic medical examiner found that the doctor did not violate medical protocols. The examiner also found that the doctor's actions did not cause the complainant’s organ damage, and that the accident occurred due to the peculiarities of the complainant’s body. The court of first instance found the doctor not guilty, taking into account the doctor's impressive professional qualifications. The prosecutor filed an appeal, but later refused to continue because of insufficient evidence of the doctor’s guilt. This case is important because it shows the difficulty in gathering evidence in criminal cases related to abortion and the protection of women's reproductive rights. One of the reasons for this is the lack of an independent forensic medical examination in Ukraine, as well as falsification of medical documentation.

Скаржниця звернулася до гінеколога для проведення аборту. При цьому лікар пошкодила скаржниці матку, сечовий міхур і кишечник. Скаржниця потребувала операції, щоб усунути пошкодження, і вона втратила здатність народжувати дітей. Під час судового засідання державна судово-медична експертиза встановила, що лікар не порушував медичних протоколів. Експерт також встановив, що дії лікаря не спричинили ушкодження органів скаржника, а нещасний випадок стався через особливості організму скаржника. Суд першої інстанції визнав лікаря невинним, враховуючи високу професійну кваліфікацію лікаря. Прокурор подав апеляцію, але пізніше відмовилася підтримувати обвинувачення через брак доказів провини лікаря. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки показує складність збору доказів у кримінальних справах щодо абортів та захисту репродуктивних прав жінок. Однією з причин цього є відсутність в Україні незалежної судово-медичної експертизи, а також фальсифікація медичної документації.

The appellant sued his ex-wife, the respondent, regarding the division of property acquired during the marriage as the ex-spouses’ joint property. The appellant noted that during their marriage, the spouses accumulated funds that were kept in the respondent’s bank account. However, immediately after the divorce, the respondent independently managed the funds and bought an apartment. The appellant’s main argument was that, according to Ukrainian family law, the dissolution of marriage does not terminate the right of joint co-ownership of property acquired during the marriage. When the spouses’ jointly owned property is divided, each spouse shall receive an equal share, unless otherwise envisaged by the marriage contract. Thus, the appellant argued that half of the money belonged to him. The respondent claimed that the money was her private property because it was a gift from her friend from the Slovak Republic. The first-instance court satisfied the appellant’s claim, noting that, according to Ukrainian legislation, the deed of gift agreement should have been, but was not, notarized, rendering it null and void. Consequently, the money was the joint property of the spouses. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision. The Supreme Court also supported the position that the court of first instance erroneously satisfied the husband's claim because, as a gift from a citizen of the Slovak Republic, the Ukrainian courts should apply Slovak law, which does not require notarization of the deed of gift agreement. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the money was the woman's personal property and could not be divided.

Скаржник звернувся до суду з позовом до своєї колишньої дружини (відповідача) про поділ майна, нажитого за час шлюбу як спільної сумісної власності подружжя. Скаржник зазначив, що за час шлюбу подружжя накопичило кошти, які зберігалися на банківському рахунку відповідача. Проте, одразу після розірвання шлюбу, відповідач самостійно розпорядилась коштами та придбала квартиру. Основним аргументом скаржника було те, що відповідно до сімейного законодавства України розірвання шлюбу не припиняє права спільної сумісної власності на майно, набуте за час шлюбу. При поділі майна, що є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя, вважається, що частки кожного із подружжя є рівними, якщо інше не встановлено домовленістю між ними або договором. Таким чином, скаржник стверджував, що половина грошей належить йому. Відповідач стверджувала, що гроші є її приватною власністю, оскільки це подарунок її друга із Словацької Республіки. Суд першої інстанції задовольнив позов скаржника, зазначивши, що відповідно до законодавства України договір дарування мав бути (проте не був) нотаріально посвідчений, що робить його нікчемним. Отже, гроші були спільною власністю подружжя. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення. Верховний Суд також підтримав позицію про те, що суд першої інстанції помилково задовольнив позов чоловіка, оскільки щодо подарунку громадянина Словацької Республіки українські суди мають застосовувати законодавство Словаччини, яке не вимагає нотаріального посвідчення договору дарування. Таким чином, Верховний суд дійшов висновку, що гроші є особистою власністю жінки і не підлягають розподілу.

The appellant sued to establish co-residence with the deceased, a man with whom she lived for more than five years but never married. The claim was related to the fact that the man died without a will, so inheritance defaulted to take place in order of precedence according to Ukrainian legislation. Without establishing co-residence, the appellant had no legal right to inherit at all, but establishing co-residence with the deceased would give her the opportunity to inherit the property as a fourth-line heir, as she lived with the deceased for at least five years. However, the deceased's niece also claimed her rights to his property including land plots and a residential building. The plaintiff argued that the niece should not inherit because she did not take part in the material support of her uncle, carry out his burial, nor take an interest in his health. The first-instance court partially satisfied the appellant’s claim and established her co-residence with the deceased man without marriage. At the same time, the court assumed that the appellant provided long-term care and assistance to the deceased, who was unable to care for himself. The appellate court overturned this decision, finding that there was no evidence to prove that the appellant lived with the deceased as a family, and that they were connected by common life, joint farming, etc. The Supreme Court left this decision unchanged, stating that the fact that the appellant and the deceased lived at the same address did not prove that they lived as a family. Therefore, according to the Court, the appellant had no right to inherit the deceased’s property. This case is important because it shows how women’s property and inheritance rights are unprotected outside of registered marriage, and that it is very difficult to prove living as one family in a Ukrainian court.

Скаржниця пред'явила позов про встановлення спільного проживання з померлим, чоловіком, з яким вона прожила більше п'яти років, але так і не вийшла заміж. Позов був пов’язаний з тим, що чоловік помер без заповіту, тому спадкування мало відбуватися за законом (в порядку черговості) згідно із законодавством України. Без встановлення спільного проживання, скаржниця взагалі не мала законного права на спадкування, але встановлення спільного проживання з померлим дало б їй можливість успадкувати майно як спадкоємець четвертої черги, оскільки вона проживала з померлим принаймні п'ять років. Однак, племінниця померлого також заявила свої права на його майно, зокрема земельні ділянки та житловий будинок. Позивач стверджувала, що племінниця не повинна приймати спадщину, оскільки не брала участі в матеріальному забезпеченні свого дядька, не здійснила його поховання, не цікавилася його здоров'ям. Суд першої інстанції частково задовольнив позов скаржниці та встановив її спільне проживання з померлим без шлюбу. Водночас, суд виходив з того, що скаржниця надавала тривалий догляд та допомогу померлому, який був не в змозі обслуговувати себе сам. Суд апеляційної інстанції скасував це рішення, встановивши відсутність доказів того, що скаржниця проживала із померлим однією сім’єю і, що вони були пов’язані спільним побутом, вели спільне господарство тощо. Верховний Суд залишив це рішення без змін, вказавши, що той факт, що скаржниця і померлий проживали за однією адресою, не доводить, що вони проживали однією сім'єю. Таким чином, на думку Суду, скаржниця не мала права успадкувати майно померлого. Ця справа є важливою, тому що показує, що майнові та спадкові права жінок поза зареєстрованим шлюбом є незахищеними, а також те, що в українському суді досить важко довести факт проживання однією сім’єю.

The two defendants were charged with raping the complainant. The court of first instance sentenced the first defendant to four years of imprisonment, but discharged him from punishment on probation. The court acquitted the second defendant due to lack of evidence. The prosecutor appealed, arguing that the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the acquitted defendant. The prosecutor argued that discharging the first man from punishment on probation did not correspond to the gravity of the crime. Thus, the prosecutor asked the Court of Appeal to re-evaluate the matter and sentence both men to imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. However, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions and assigned new proceeding, due to the need to impose a more severe punishment in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal did not properly examine and evaluate the prosecutor’s arguments and evidence.

Двох підсудних було обвинувачено у зґвалтуванні скаржниці. Суд першої інстанції засудив першого обвинуваченого до чотирьох років позбавлення волі, але звільнив його від покарання з випробуванням. Другого обвинуваченого суд виправдав за браком доказів. Прокурор подав апеляційну скаргу, стверджуючи, що стороною обвинувачення надано достатньо доказів для доведення вини виправданого обвинуваченого. Прокурор стверджував, що звільнення першого обвинуваченого від покарання з випробуванням не відповідає тяжкості злочину. Таким чином, прокурор просив апеляційний суд переглянути справу та призначити обом чоловікам покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк 10 років. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок суду першої інстанції без змін. Однак, Верховний Суд скасував рішення судів попередніх інстанцій і відправив справу на новий розгляд в суд апеляційної інстанції у зв’язку з необхідністю призначити більш суворе покарання відповідно до закону. На думку Верховного Суду, суд апеляційної інстанції належним чином не перевірив і не оцінив доводи прокурора та докази.

The plaintiff sued her ex-husband and asked the court to evict her ex-husband, the defendant-appellant. The plaintiff owned half of the house and the other half of the house belonged to her brother. After the divorce, the defendant-appellant lived in the same house without becoming a joint owner. The defendant-appellant systematically caused moral and physical suffering to the plaintiff and violated the rules of cohabitation. The first-instance court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, noting that a former family member of the owner of the house cannot be evicted as this could be interference with the right to housing, guaranteed by the Article 8 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The appellate court overturned this decision and granted the plaintiff's the claim because the defendant-appellant systematically committed domestic violence and his continued residence in the house violated the interests of the owner of the house. The Supreme Court left this decision unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the evidence indicated that for a long time the defendant-appellant systematically violated the rules of cohabitation with the plaintiff and her child, abused alcohol, and used psychological and physical violence, which made it impossible to live with him. In view of the above, in order to prevent further cases of bullying, intimidation, and violence against the plaintiff and her child, the Supreme Court concluded that there were grounds for granting the plaintiff’s claim and terminating the defendant-appellant's right to use the disputed housing by evicting him. Specifically, the Court found that the interference with the right to housing was proportionate and pursued a legitimate aim.

Позивач пред'явила позов до свого колишнього чоловіка та просила суд виселити її колишнього чоловіка – відповідача (скаржника). Половина будинку належала позивачу, а інша половина будинку належала її братові. Після розірвання шлюбу відповідач (скаржник) проживав із позивачем в одному будинку, який не був їх спільною сумісною власністю. Відповідач (скаржник) систематично завдавав позивачу моральні та фізичні страждання та порушував правила спільного проживання. Суд першої інстанції відхилив позов позивача, зазначивши, що колишній член сім’ї власника будинку не може бути виселений, оскільки це може бути втручанням у право на житло, гарантоване статтею 8 Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод. Суд апеляційної інстанції скасував це рішення та задовольнив позов, оскільки відповідач (скаржник) систематично вчиняв насильство в сім’ї і його подальше проживання в будинку порушувало інтереси власника будинку. Верховний Суд залишив це рішення без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що наявні докази вказують на те, що відповідач (скаржник) протягом тривалого часу систематично порушував правила спільного проживання з позивачем та її дитиною, зловживав алкоголем, застосовував психологічне та фізичне насильство, що зробило проживання з ним неможливим. Враховуючи викладене, з метою запобігання подальшим випадкам булінгу, залякування та насильства щодо позивача та її дитини, Верховний Суд дійшов висновку про наявність підстав для задоволення позову позивача та припинення права відповідача (скаржника) на користування спірним житлом шляхом його виселення. Зокрема, Суд визнав, що втручання у право на житло було пропорційним і переслідувало законну мету.

For years, the appellant lived with his civil wife in the same apartment (in Ukraine, the term 'civil marriage' means cohabitation of a man and a woman without official marriage registration). While intoxicated one evening, he began to accuse his wife of cheating on him with other men and degrading his honor and dignity as a man. After a verbal conflict, the man, decided to kill his wife. In order to cause the most severe physical pain, he purposefully poured sulfuric acid from a bottle on his wife and verbally wished for her death, causing serious chemical burns. In addition, the acid fell on her minor son, which burned him. The court of first instance sentenced the man to eight years imprisonment for attempted murder, as well as causing bodily injury to the wife and her son. Also, the court imposed the obligation on the appellant to pay for the costs of their treatment. The appellant filed an appeal, arguing that the first-instance court wrongly characterized his actions because he did not want to kill his wife, but only cause her bodily injury. The Court of Appeal left the sentence unchanged, citing the following facts: when the appellant poured acid on the victim, he expressed his desire for her death; he poured the acid on her head and face, which are vital organs; and, according to the conclusion of the experts, the man poured most of the acid in the bottle on the victim.

Скаржник роками проживав зі своєю цивільною дружиною в одній квартирі (в Україні термін "цивільний шлюб" означає спільне проживання чоловіка та жінки без офіційної реєстрації шлюбу). Одного вечора, перебуваючи у стані алкогольного сп’яніння, він почав звинувачувати свою дружину в тому, що вона зраджує йому з іншими чоловіками та принижує його честь і гідність як чоловіка. Після словесної сварки чоловік вирішив убити свою дружину. З метою заподіяння сильного фізичного болю, він цілеспрямовано облив дружину сірчаною кислотою з пляшки та на словах побажав їй смерті, спричинивши серйозні хімічні опіки. Крім того, кислота потрапила на її неповнолітнього сина, від чого він отримав опіки. Суд першої інстанції засудив чоловіка до восьми років позбавлення волі за замах на вбивство, а також заподіяння тілесних ушкоджень дружині та її сину. Також суд поклав на скаржника обов'язок оплатити витрати на їх лікування. Скаржник подав апеляцію, вважаючи, що суд першої інстанції неправильно кваліфікував його дії, оскільки він не хотів вбити свою дружину, а лише заподіяти їй тілесні ушкодження. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін, посилаючись на такі факти: коли скаржник облив потерпілу кислотою, він висловив бажання, аби вона померла; він вилив кислоту на її голову та обличчя, які є життєво важливими органами; та, відповідно до висновку експертів, чоловік вилив на потерпілу більшу частину кислоти із пляшки.

The plaintiff requested that the court grant his divorce from his wife, the respondent. He argued that their married life had ended. After the respondent took the children and his property and left him in 2014, she lived separately from plaintiff, did not have marital relations with him, nor run a joint household with him. The first-instance court granted the divorce and concluded that the family had broken up and continuing the marriage was against everyone’s interests. The Court of Appeal left the decision of the first instance unchanged. The respondent insisted on preserving the marriage and filed the cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming that the courts of previous instances had no right to interfere in her relationship with her husband. The Family Code of Ukraine allows either spouse to terminate the marriage. Forcing the termination or continuation of marriage, or forcing sex through physical or psychological violence, is an abuse of the right of the wife or husband to freedom and personal inviolability and may have additional legal implications. Therefore, the courts must determine the actual spousal relationship and any valid reasons for divorce. If it is established that the future joint life of the spouses and preservation of the marriage would be contrary to the interests of one of them, the court should terminate the marriage. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no interference in married life by the courts and under such circumstances there were grounds for dissolution of the marriage, as its continuation was contrary to the plaintiff’s interests.

Позивач просив суд розірвати його шлюб із дружиною (відповідачем). Він стверджував, що їхнє подружнє життя закінчилося, і що саме відповідач винна в тому, що їхня сім’я розпалася. Після того, як у 2014 році відповідач забрала дітей, його майно та покинула його, вона проживала окремо від позивача, не перебувала з ним у шлюбних стосунках, не вела спільного господарства. Суд першої інстанції задовольнив позов про розірвання шлюбу та дійшов висновку, що сім'я фактично розпалася і продовження шлюбу суперечить інтересам кожного з подружжя. Апеляційний суд залишив рішення першої інстанції без змін. Відповідач наполягала на збереженні шлюбу та подала касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що суди попередніх інстанцій не мають права втручатися у її стосунки з чоловіком. Сімейний кодекс України передбачає право кожного з поружжя припинити шлюбні відносини. Примушування до припинення шлюбних відносин, примушування до їх збереження, в тому числі примушування до статевого зв'язку за допомогою фізичного або психічного насильства, є порушенням права дружини, чоловіка на свободу та особисту недоторканість і може мати наслідки, встановлені законом. Таким чином, суди повинні визначити фактичні подружні стосунки та будь-які поважні причини розірвання шлюбу. Якщо буде встановлено, що подальше спільне життя подружжя та збереження шлюбу суперечило б інтересам одного з них, суд повинен розірвати шлюб. Тому Верховний Суд дійшов висновку про відсутність втручання судів у подружнє життя і, що за таких обставин були підстави для розірвання шлюбу, оскільки його продовження суперечило інтересам позивача. Тому суди мають визначати фактичні взаємини подружжя, дійсні причини позову про розірвання шлюбу. Суд постановляє рішення про розірвання шлюбу, якщо буде встановлено, що подальше спільне життя подружжя і збереження шлюбу суперечило б інтересам одного з них. Таким чином, Верховний Суд дійшов висновку про відсутність втручання судів у подружнє життя і, що за таких обставин були підстави для розірвання шлюбу, оскільки його продовження суперечило інтересам позивача.

The appellant was convicted of committing systematic physical and psychological violence against his ex-wife. The eyewitnesses to their fights were minor children. Despite the seriousness of the alleged crime, the first-instance court sentenced the appellant to a three-year restriction of liberty, which means holding a person in an open penal institution (“correctional center”) without isolation from society but under supervision and with compulsory engagement in socially useful paid work under a fixed-term labour contract for a term of one to five years. All convicts have the right to wear civilian clothes, have portable personal computers, money, mobile phones. Convicts may be allowed short trips outside the correctional center in the circumstances provided for by law, for example if they need to visit a medical institution. However, the court also discharged him from punishment on probation, meaning that the appellant did not serve the sentence of restriction of liberty, but he had to fulfill other court-imposed obligations during the probationary period. The Court of Appeal overturned the lower court and sentenced the appellant to five months of arrest, which means detention for one to six months with unpaid work on improvements or services to the detention facility. The appellant filed the cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the punishment of arrest was not fair. The Supreme Court left the judgment of the Court of Appeal unchanged, noting that the courts should design domestic violence sentences to correct the convicted person and prevent them from committing new crimes. However, the first-instance court did not provide any reasons explaining how correcting the appellant would be possible without a custodial sentence, nor how to take into account that the defendant’s repeated acts of domestic violence. This case is important because it demonstrates how Ukrainian courts can impose minimal punishment for domestic violence, which sends the message that it is not a serious violent crime.

Скаржник був засуджений за вчинення систематичного фізичного та психологічного насильства щодо своєї колишньої дружини. Очевидцями їх конфліктів були неповнолітні діти. Незважаючи на тяжкість злочину, у вчиненні якого обвинувачувався чоловік, суд першої інстанції засудив скаржника до трьох років обмеження волі, що полягає у триманні особи в кримінально-виконавчій установі відкритого типу ("виправному центрі") без ізоляції від суспільства, але в умовах здійснення за нею нагляду з обов'язковим залученням до суспільно корисної оплачуваної праці за строковим трудовим договором на строк від одного до п'яти років. Усі засуджені мають право носити цивільний одяг, мати портативні персональні комп’ютери, гроші, мобільні телефони. Засудженим можуть бути дозволені короткострокові виїзди за межі виправного центру у випадках, передбачених законом, наприклад, у разі необхідності відвідування лікувального закладу. Однак, суд також звільнив його від покарання з випробуванням, тобто скаржник не відбував покарання у вигляді обмеження волі, але він повинен був виконувати інші покладені судом обов'язки протягом іспитового терміну. Апеляційний суд скасував рішення суду першої інстанції та засудив скаржника до п’яти місяців арешту, що полягає у триманні особи під вартою від одного до шести місяців із залученням до виконання неоплачуваної роботи з благоустрою арештних домів або поліпшення житлово-побутових умов засуджених. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, вважаючи несправедливим покарання у вигляді арешту. Верховний Суд залишив рішення апеляційного суду без змін, зазначивши, що суди мають призначати вироки за домашнє насильство, аби виправити засуджених і попередити вчинення ними нових злочинів. Однак суд першої інстанції не навів жодних мотивів, які б пояснювали, яким чином можливе виправлення скаржника без призначення покарання, що пов’язане із позбавленням волі, а також не врахував те, що обвинувачений неодноразово вчиняв насильство в сім’ї. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки він демонструє, як українські суди можуть призначають мінімальне покарання за домашнє насильство, що дає зрозуміти, що це не є серйозний насильницький злочин.

This case represented the first trial and conviction for female genital mutilation in Ireland. The accused were originally from a French-speaking African country, and were charged and convicted with female genital mutilation and neglect of their daughter in relation to the same incident. At the time of the offence, the girl was under two years old, and her injuries were discovered when her parents brought her to the Accident and Emergency Department of an Irish hospital due to uncontrollable bleeding. Following their conviction, the victim’s parents were sentenced to an unspecified number of years imprisonment for the female genital mutilation and neglect, the sentences running concurrently. They appealed their convictions, claiming that they had not received a fair trial because (i) they did not have the opportunity to present ‘appropriate’ expert evidence and (ii) the translation of H.M.’s testimony before the jury was inaccurate. The Court of Appeal quashed the appellants’ convictions on the second ground, finding that their trial was unsafe and unsatisfactory for not having complied with either the spirit or the substance of the European Union’s Interpretation and Translation Directive, which provides for the rights to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. Thus, according to the court, the appellants were unable to properly exercise their right of defence. Following the judgment, the DPP requested a retrial, which was not opposed by the appellants.

Section 17(4B) of the Electoral Act 1997 introduced a provision aimed at addressing a significant disparity in the sex of members of parliament in Ireland (“TDs”). Only 15.1% of TDs elected in 2011 were women. The figure has never exceeded 20%. The 2012 Act tried to solve this problem via candidate selection; it tied the level of political funding allocated to a political party to the gender balance of its candidates. From the first general election after the section came into force, a party would lose 50% of its public funding if at least 30% of its candidates in that election were not women (or if 30% of its candidates were not men). Seven years after that, the minimum requirement for each gender would increase to 40% or the same penalty would apply. The Act deals only with candidature, not election. It also does not compel a party to select any particular candidate, but instead penalises the party with a withdrawal of public funds for non-conformity. In this case, a member of a political party challenged the constitutionality of this measure on several grounds after his party did not select him as a candidate and informed him that their candidate “must be” a woman. He claimed that this was a result of the 2012 Act, in violation of several constitutional provisions, including the equality guarantee in Article 40.1; the right to free speech and association under Article 40.6; and the Article 16.1.1° guarantee that every citizen without distinction of sex is eligible for the Irish parliament. The High Court rejected these claims due to lack of standing; the plaintiff could not show ‘any, or any sufficient, causal nexus between the direction of the party excluding his nomination from consideration at the relevant candidate selection convention and the operation of that provision’. The court was not satisfied that the party would not, without the influence of the 2012 Act, have implemented gender quotas of its own motion. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had standing, but also acknowledged that this sophisticated piece of legislation was pursuing an important social goal through “positive discrimination” on gender grounds and controlling public funding for political representation. Therefore, the court found that the case could be addressed on its merits rather than decided on the basis of standing and remitted it to the High Court for a full hearing.

This appellate decision overruled the Berlin-Brandenburg Labor Court’s (Landesarbeitsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg) 2008 decision 15 Sa 517/08 which held that the plaintiff was discriminated against in the course of her employment on the basis of her gender. She sued her employer in trial labor court in Berlin on the grounds of discrimination after a male colleague received a promotion to a management role that she had hoped for and for which she considered herself to be equally qualified. The Berlin-Brandenburg Labor Court, on appeal, decided for the claimant, accepting statistical evidence showing that, while the majority of employees of the employer (69%) were women, no women were represented on the three most senior management levels (“glass ceiling”). The Berlin-Brandenburg Labor Court held in that context that the statistics are sufficient to prove the defendant-employer’s discriminatory attitude in the past with regard to the general promotion policy. This was the first decision of a court accepting such statistical evidence in the context of discrimination. On appeal, the Federal Labor Court confirmed that statistics can in principle be introduced as evidence of discrimination, but disagreed with the Berlin-Brandenburg Labor Court in so far that it held that there must be further indications of discrimination beyond these statistics. Rather, the sole fact that more male employees were in leading positions was not sufficient to prove the employer’s discriminatory attitude without further evidence. The Federal Labor Court reversed and required remand for further proceedings. The parties eventually settled.

Mit diesem Berufungsurteil wurde das Urteil des Landesarbeitsgerichts Berlin-Brandenburg aus dem Jahr 2008 (15 Sa 517/08) aufgehoben, in dem entschieden wurde, dass die Klägerin im Rahmen ihrer Beschäftigung aufgrund ihres Geschlechts diskriminiert wurde. Die Klägerin verklagte ihren Arbeitgeber vor dem Arbeitsgericht Berlin wegen Diskriminierung, nachdem ein männlicher Kollege eine Beförderung in eine Führungsposition erhalten hatte, auf die sie gehofft hatte und für die sie sich für ebenso qualifiziert hielt. Das Landesarbeitsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg entschied in der Berufungsinstanz zugunsten der Klägerin und akzeptierte statistische Daten, die zeigten, dass zwar die Mehrheit der Beschäftigten des Arbeitgebers (69 %) Frauen waren, aber auf den drei höchsten Führungsebenen keine Frauen vertreten waren ("gläserne Decke"). Das Landesarbeitsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg stellte in diesem Zusammenhang fest, dass die Statistiken ausreichen, um eine diskriminierende Haltung der Beklagten in der Vergangenheit im Hinblick auf die allgemeine Beförderungspolitik zu beweisen. Dies war die erste Entscheidung eines Gerichts, das solche statistischen Beweise im Zusammenhang mit Diskriminierung akzeptierte. In der Revision bestätigte das Bundesarbeitsgericht, dass Statistiken grundsätzlich als Beweismittel für eine Diskriminierung herangezogen werden können, stimmte aber insoweit nicht mit dem Landesarbeitsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg überein, als es der Auffassung war, dass über diese Statistiken hinaus weitere Anhaltspunkte für eine Diskriminierung vorliegen müssen. Allein die Tatsache, dass mehr männliche Beschäftigte in Führungspositionen sind, reicht ohne weitere Indizien nicht aus, um eine diskriminierende Haltung des Arbeitgebers zu beweisen. Das Bundesarbeitsgericht hob die Entscheidung auf und verfügte die Zurückverweisung zur weiteren Verhandlung. Die Parteien schlossen schließlich einen Vergleich.

The claimant, a female employee, exercised her right under the Transparency in Wage Structures Act (available here: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/entgtranspg/BJNR215210017.html) to obtain information from her employer about the average salary in the group of colleagues who performed the same or equivalent work as she did as a head of department. She found that her compensation was below average. The average salary of comparably employed male department heads at the claimant’s employer was 8% higher than that of female department heads, although the person with the highest remuneration within this group was a woman. The claimant’s employer justified the compensation disparity on the basis of the difference of the duration of employment between the individual employees serving as heads of department. The Court held that the employer bears the burden to prove that the reason for the pay disparity is not due to gender discrimination and that the mere assertion that the lower pay is based on other reasons is not sufficient. According to the Court, demonstrating a pay disparity between comparably employed male and female colleagues creates a rebuttable presumption of gender discrimination. This decision is an important step towards equal pay for women and men in Germany, as it places the burden of proof on the employer to prove that a pay disparity is justified by non-discriminatory reasons. This decision effectively promotes the enforcement of the law because an employee often will not be able to prove the actual reason for a disparity in compensation.

Die Klägerin, eine Arbeitnehmerin, machte von ihrem Recht nach dem Entgelttransparenzgesetz (EntGTranspG) Gebrauch, um von ihrem Arbeitgeber Informationen über das Durchschnittsgehalt in der Gruppe der Kollegen zu erhalten, die die gleiche oder eine gleichwertige Arbeit wie sie als Abteilungsleiterin verrichteten und stellte fest, dass sie unter dem durchschnittlichen Vergütungsniveau bezahlt worden war. Das Durchschnittsgehalt der vergleichbar beschäftigten männlichen Abteilungsleiter bei dem Arbeitgeber der Klägerin war 8% höher als das der weiblichen Abteilungsleiter, obwohl die Person mit der höchsten Vergütung innerhalb dieser Gruppe eine Frau war. Der Arbeitgeber des Klägers begründete den Gehaltsunterschied mit der unterschiedlichen Dauer der Beschäftigung der einzelnen Mitarbeiter/innen in der Abteilungsleiterstelle. Das Gericht stellte fest, dass der Arbeitgeber die Beweislast dafür trägt, dass der Grund für die niedrigere Vergütung nicht auf eine Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts zurückzuführen ist, und dass die bloße Behauptung, dass die niedrigere Vergütung auf andere Gründe zurückzuführen ist, nicht ausreicht. Nach Ansicht des Gerichts schafft der Nachweis von Lohnunterschieden zwischen vergleichbar beschäftigten männlichen Kollegen des Arbeitnehmers/der Arbeitnehmerin eine widerlegbare Vermutung für eine Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts.

With this decision, the Toulouse Court of Appeal held that a transgender woman had the right to be designated as the mother of her child when she had conceived the child before undergoing gender affirmation surgery. V., the claimant, and N.D. married and had two children. In 2009, V. successfully applied to change her civil status from male to female. She conceived the child that was the subject of these proceedings in 2014. She sought to be registered as the child’s mother, as opposed to as a surrogate, but the civil register refused. Until the decision of the Court of Appeal, only the claimant’s partner, their child’s biological mother, was listed on the child’s birth certificate. The claimant successfully argued, among other things, that it would be in the best interests of the child to have the claimant linked as the biological parent on the birth certificate. The decision was the first of its kind in France, and the result of eight years of proceedings. The Toulouse Court of Appeal referred in particular to the primacy of the child’s best interests, enshrined in the New York Convention, and to the right to respect for private and family life and the right to sexual self-determination, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 14). It found that those conventions require that a child born to a couple including a transgender person have the right to have both parents legally recognized, and that those conventions were not contrary to French national law.

The plaintiff was a mother whose second and third pregnancies were complicated by medical issues and resulted in her suffering from a stroke and temporary paralysis. She was advised that her life would be endangered if she became pregnant again. As such, she sought to obtain contraceptives, but their sale and importation was prohibited by Irish law. The Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting the importation, sale or advertising of contraceptives was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s right to privacy in marital affairs, an unenumerated right in the Irish Constitution. Although the Court left undisturbed the then-existing ban on sale of contraceptives in Ireland, the use and importation of contraceptives was not prohibited based on the law’s inconsistency with the Constitution.

The plaintiff, the Child and Family Agency, sought permission to disclose the HIV status of A., a minor teenager living with HIV since birth in the plaintiff’s care, to another minor (B.) who the plaintiff believed had a sexual relationship with A. A. denied having a sexual relationship with B. and refused to consent to the disclosure of his HIV status. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to disclose A.’s status so that B. could obtain testing, medical treatment, and counseling. Citing doctor-patient confidentiality, the High Court refused to order disclosure of A.’s HIV status without his consent. The test applied by the court was whether, on the balance of probabilities, the failure to breach patient confidentiality would create a significant risk of death or very serious harm to an innocent third party. The court concluded that it did not because the plaintiff failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that A. and B. were having unprotected sex. In addition, the court reasoned, if B. was willing to have unprotected sex with A., thereby assuming all the risks associated with unprotected sex, then the “low” risk of HIV infection (due to (i) A. taking anti-retroviral medication, albeit without complete consistency, (ii) A. having an undetectable viral load when tested, and (iii) HIV being a "chronic condition" rather than "a terminal illness") in such circumstances is not such as to justify breaching a patient’s right to confidentiality, which should only be breached in exceptional circumstances. The court repeatedly expressed concerns about "paternalistic" state interference in private matters. Finally, the court emphasized the public interest in HIV-positive people seeking treatment rather than foregoing medical care to avoid potential disclosure of their status or sexual activities.

In 2007, the High Court held that the failure to allow the applicant, a transgender woman who had undergone gender-affirming surgery, to obtain a new birth certificate recording her gender as female violated her rights under Article 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had been made part of Irish law, despite having found in previous proceedings involving the same applicant that her constitutional right to privacy was not disproportionately or excessively infringed. The Court agreed with the applicant that existing Irish law barred the effective recognition of her Article 8 and 12 rights in Ireland as they rendered her without the power to correct or vary the original entry on her birth certificate. The High Court considered the European Court of Human Right’s 2002 decisions in Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I. v. United Kingdom, in which the Court held that the State’s failure to have a system of law in place affording proper respect for a trans person’s Convention rights violated Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention.

The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in finding that the appellant’s professional activity of assisting with childbirth at home is prohibited. Instead, it specified that the circumstances of her working without a license and necessary qualifications, such as being a doctor, an obstetrician-gynecologist, or a midwife, made this type of activity illegal.

Aukščiausiasis Teismas nusprendė, kad apeliacinis teismas suklydo konstatuodamas, jog apeliantės profesinė veikla—pagalba gimdyti namuose, yra draudžiama. Vietoj to, Teismas nurodė, kad šio darbo be licencijos ir būtinų kvalifikacijų aplinkybės padarė tokio pobūdžio veiklą neteisėtą. Sveikatos apsaugos ministras 2019 m. patvirtino įsakymą Nr. V-10 dėl gimdymo namuose priežiūros paslaugos teikimo tvarkos aprašo patvirtinimo.

The applicant, a translator for the Romanian Embassy, was terminated without explanation the day after officially informing the employer of her pregnancy. She argued that her dismissal was based on gender discrimination, while the employer stated that it was because of unsatisfactory results during the contractual probationary period. The Court ruled in favor of the applicant awarding LT 50,000 in pecuniary and LT 10,000 in non-pecuniary damages to be paid by the Romanian Embassy in the Republic of Lithuania.

Pareiškėja, vertėja Rumunijos ambasadoje, buvo atleista iš darbo be paaiškinimo dieną po to, kai oficialiai informavo darbdavį apie savo nėštumą. Ji grindė šį atleidimą diskriminacija dėl lyties, bet darbdavys nurodė, kad priežastis buvo nepatenkinami rezultatai bandomuoju sutarties laikotarpiu. Teismas priėmė sprendimą ieškovės naudai priteisdamas 50 000 LT turtinės žalos ir 10 000 LT neturtinės žalos, kurią turi sumokėti Rumunijos ambasada Lietuvos Respublikoje.

This case considers conformity of constitutional provisions mandating that the State shall ensure, foster, and protect fatherhood, motherhood, and childhood, with the Children’s Maintenance Fund’s requirement that the applicant and the child must permanently reside in Lithuania to receive benefits. The petitioner argued that if the applicant and the child would lose their state-guaranteed support upon leaving Lithuania, it would violate the right to freedom of movement and the State’s duty to prioritize child interests. The Court clarified that the applicant and the child must permanently reside within the Country at the moment of the application for benefits but can move to another State later without the termination of benefits; therefore, the Law of the Fund does not contradict the Constitution. English translation available here.

Šioje byloje nagrinėjamas konstitucinių nuostatų, įpareigojančių valstybę užtikrinti, puoselėti ir saugoti tėvystę, motinystę ir vaikystę, atitikimas Vaikų išlaikymo fondo reikalavimui, kad pareiškėjas ir vaikas nuolat gyventų Lietuvoje, norint gauti išlaikymo išmokas. Pareiškėjas teigė, kad jeigu jie ir vaikas išvykęs iš Lietuvos prarastų valstybės garantuojamą paramą, tai pažeistų jų judėjimo laisvę ir valstybės pareigą teikti pirmenybę vaiko interesams. Teismas išaiškino, kad pareiškėjas ir vaikas prašymo skirti išmoką pateikimo metu turi nuolat gyventi Lietuvoje, tačiau vėliau gali persikelti į kitą valstybę neprarasdami išmokos, todėl Vaikų išlaikymo fondo įstatymas neprieštarauja Konstitucijai.

This case considers conformity of a Constitutional provision declaring that the State recognizes marriages registered in church with the Matrimonial and Family Code, which states that only civil marriages have legal effect. A widow was refused inheritance from her deceased spouse because their marriage was not contracted in a civil office before the passage of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that Constitutional provisions could not be applied retroactively, and thus only after 1992 when the legislation came into force can a church marriage be recognized by the State. English translation available here.

Šioje byloje nagrinėjamos konstitucinės nuostatos, skelbiančios, kad valstybė pripažįsta bažnyčioje įregistruotas santuokas, atitikimas santuokos ir šeimos kodeksui, kuriame teigiama, kad teisinę galią turi tik civilinės santuokos. Našlei buvo atsisakyta išduoti paveldėjimo teisės liudijimą, nes santuoka su vėlioniu nebuvo sudaryta civilinės metrikacijos institucijose iki Konstitucijos priėmimo. Teismas patvirtino, kad konstitucinės nuostatos negali būti taikomos atgaline data, todėl tik po 1992 m., kai įstatymas įsigaliojo, valstybė gali pripažinti bažnytinę santuoką.

The local court denied the petitioner’s motion to certify the approval of her female partner to conduct in vitro fertilization with a third person’s semen. The regional court denied the appeal. It held that the wording of the Austrian Reproductive Medicine Act (FMedG) aims to exclude same-sex parenthood. The Supreme Court decided to bring this question to the attention of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court decided that certain sections of the FMedG were unconstitutional. Referencing the European Court of Human Right’s judgements, the Court stressed that same-sex partnerships can fall under the protection of Article 8 of the EHRC as a family. Even though the legislature has discretion in the implementation of new rules, the FMedG is missing sufficient grounds for a differential treatment of same sex couples and heterosexual couples. The impact of this decision was far-reaching because it made it immediately permissible for lesbian couples to receive sperm donations and reproductive medication. Before this decision, these medical treatments were solely available to heterosexual couples.

Das Amtsgericht lehnte den Antrag der Antragsstellerin ab, die Zustimmung ihres weiblichen Partners zur Durchführung einer In-vitro-Fertilisation mit dem Samen einer dritten Person zu bescheinigen. Das Landgericht wies die Berufung zurück. Es vertrat die Auffassung, dass der Wortlaut des österreichischen Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes (FMedG) darauf abziele, gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft auszuschließen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof beschloss, den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof mit dieser Frage zu befassen. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof entschied, dass bestimmte Abschnitte des FMedG verfassungswidrig sind. Unter Verweis auf die Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte betonte das Gericht, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften als Familie unter den Schutz von Artikel 8 der EMRK fallen können. Auch wenn der Gesetzgeber bei der Umsetzung neuer Regelungen einen Ermessensspielraum hat, fehlt es dem FMedG an einer ausreichenden Begründung für eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von gleichgeschlechtlichen und heterosexuellen Paaren. Die Auswirkungen dieser Entscheidung waren weitreichend, da sie es lesbischen Paaren sofort erlaubte, Samenspenden und reproduktionsmedizinische Behandlungen in Anspruch zu nehmen. Vor dieser Entscheidung waren diese medizinischen Behandlungen ausschließlich heterosexuellen Paaren vorbehalten.

The appellant, a Somali girl, applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection due to her precarious situation in Yemen. The appellant’s family fled to Yemen when she was four years old because her family was discriminated against in Somalia due to their affiliation with a Madhibaan minority clan. The plaintiff’s brother and father were killed and no other family remained in Somalia. Further, female genital mutilation is a common practice in Somalia. The appellant’s application for asylum and international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that the nature of the persecution was found to be insufficiently intense or severe. It was further decided that the appellant’s genital mutilation had already happened , so the international protection against threatened genital mutilation could not apply. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of this case were not given sufficient consideration, in particular, the disregard of the fact that women of minority clans in the relevant geographic areas were particularly vulnerable to risks of torture, rape, murder, and forced marriages. The lower court also failed to consider sufficiently the possibility of repeated genital mutilation. Finally, the Court referred to UNHCR’s finding that prior genital mutilation was an equally reasonable justification for the application for asylum and international protection because the victim suffered life-long physical and mental damages.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, ein somalisches Mädchen, beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz aufgrund ihrer prekären Situation im Jemen. Die Familie der Klägerin floh in den Jemen, als sie vier Jahre alt war, weil ihre Familie in Somalia aufgrund ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu einem Clan der Madhibaan-Minderheit diskriminiert wurde. Der Bruder und der Vater der Klägerin wurden getötet, und keine andere Familie blieb in Somalia. Außerdem ist die weibliche Genitalverstümmelung in Somalia eine gängige Praxis. Der Antrag der Klägerin auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, dass die Art der Verfolgung nicht ausreichend intensiv oder schwer sei. Außerdem wurde festgestellt, dass die Genitalverstümmelung der Beschwerdeführerin bereits stattgefunden hatte, so dass der internationale Schutz gegen drohende Genitalverstümmelung nicht zur Anwendung kommen konnte. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf, da er (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) feststellte, dass die Umstände dieses Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt wurden, insbesondere die Tatsache, dass Frauen von Minderheitenclans in den betreffenden geografischen Gebieten besonders gefährdet sind, gefoltert, vergewaltigt, ermordet und zwangsverheiratet werden. Die Vorinstanz hat auch die Möglichkeit wiederholter Genitalverstümmelung nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt. Schließlich verwies das Gericht auf die Feststellung des UNHCR, dass eine frühere Genitalverstümmelung eine ebenso angemessene Begründung für den Antrag auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz sei, da das Opfer lebenslange körperliche und seelische Schäden erleidet.

The 90-year-old female appellant (an Iraqi national) applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection, stating that due to the war in Iraq, she feared for her life and for her family. She stated that she had been threatened by various battle groups. It appeared that the appellant was confined to a wheelchair and suffered from various illnesses including labyrinthine deafness, arterial hypertonia, kidney cysts, and dementia with behavioral disorder. Her application for international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that she did not meet the criteria for asylum or international protection. Among other reasons, her medical conditions were found to be insufficiently serious and of a nature that could be treated in Iraq. In addition, the fact that she still had family in Iraq to support her was found to be sufficient proof that she could lead a life without undue hardship. However, the Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of the case were not sufficiently considered, especially the appellant’s age, serious medical condition, unreasonable difficulty accessing medical treatment in Iraq. Therefore, the Court found (1) the appellant’s rights of Article 3 European Human Rights Convention to be violated, and (2) the lower court’s decision arbitrary.

Die 90-jährige Beschwerdeführerin (eine irakische Staatsangehörige) beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz mit der Begründung, dass sie aufgrund des Krieges im Irak um ihr Leben und ihre Familie fürchte. Sie gab an, dass sie von verschiedenen Kampfgruppen bedroht worden sei. Es stellte sich heraus, dass die Beschwerdeführerin an einen Rollstuhl gefesselt war und an verschiedenen Krankheiten litt, darunter labyrinthische Taubheit, arterielle Hypertonie, Nierenzysten und Demenz mit Verhaltensstörungen. Ihr Antrag auf internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, sie erfülle nicht die Kriterien für Asyl oder internationalen Schutz. Unter anderem wurde ihr Gesundheitszustand als nicht so schwerwiegend eingestuft, sodass dieser auch im Irak behandelt werden könne. Außerdem wurde die Tatsache, dass sie noch Familie im Irak hat, die sie unterstützen könnte, als ausreichender Beweis dafür angesehen, dass sie ein Leben ohne unzumutbare Härten führen kann. Das Verfassungsgericht hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf und stellte (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) fest, dass die Umstände des Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt wurden, insbesondere das Alter der Beschwerdeführerin, ihr schwerer Gesundheitszustand und die unzumutbaren Schwierigkeiten beim Zugang zu medizinischer Behandlung im Irak. Daher stellte das Gericht fest, dass (1) die Rechte des Beschwerdeführers aus Artikel 3 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention verletzt wurden und (2) die Entscheidung der unteren Instanz willkürlich war.

The Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality of Art. 14 of the Labor Code and Arts. 10 and 21 of the law “on Employment of the Population of the Republic of Belarus” and decided that, to ensure the completeness of legal regulation in the field of labor relations and the implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to work, it was necessary to add age and place of residence to the list of circumstances, based on which employment discrimination is prohibited. The Court specifically noted that the employer’s inclusion of requirements based on age, place of residence, or other circumstances that could be deemed discriminatory in job announcements creates the prerequisites for the violation of citizens’ constitutional rights, including the right of women to opportunities equal to those of men at work and career advancement.

The Plenum of the Supreme Court explained (i) that rape (Art. 166 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against women only, while violent sexual acts (Art. 167 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against both women and men, and (ii) that the victim’s circumstances, for example previous commission of a crime, lifestyle, or marital relationship to the offender, do not prohibit conviction of the offender for these crimes. The Plenum further held that “violence,” which is one of the conditions for commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall be understood as a physical act against the victim (or relatives of the victim in case of rape). Examples of violence include tearing the victim’s clothes, causing physical pain, beating, strangulation, making the victim take alcohol or drugs against his or her will, restricting the victim’s freedom by tying, or locking the doors. Threat of violence shall be understood as specific words, actions, or gestures showing the intention of the offender to harm the victim. The Plenum noted that non-violent acts, such as obtaining consent by deception or abuse of trust (such as the promise to marry or to reward sexual favors) do not qualify under Arts. 166-167 of the Criminal Code. The Plenum further explained that “using the helpless state of the victim,” which is the alternative condition to violence or threat of violence for the commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall mean that the victim due to young age, mental disorder, loss of consciousness, alcohol or drug intoxication could not understand the nature of actions performed with him or her or that due to a physical disability could not oppose it. The Plenum noted that it does not matter whether the offender made or witnessed the victim take alcohol or drugs or other intoxicating substances, rather the offender simply has to be aware of the intoxication that renders the victim helpless. The Plenum also explained that a person is not guilty of attempted rape or commission of violent acts of sexual nature if that person voluntary abandons the commission of the crime. Abandonment caused by circumstances beyond the control of the offender, such as resistance by the victim, third party interference, or physiological inability to commit the crime is not voluntary.

The defendant appealed from a lower court decision (Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Viseu) convicting him to nine years of imprisonment, for human trafficking and human trafficking of minors (persons under the age of 18 years old), with the intent of sexual exploitation. In his appeal, the defendant argued that the victim was living with him of her own free will and thus his actions did not fit the crime of human trafficking. The Court of Appeals of Coimbra partially granted the appeal to the extent the description of some facts was erroneous. With respect to the crimes committed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that defendant had continued to commit the crime of human trafficking even after the victim turned 18 (the victim started to live with the defendant when she was a minor, ran away, then went back to living with defendant after turning 18 years old). All of the elements of the crime were present at all times in which the victim lived with defendant: physical and psychological threats, domestic work without remuneration, intent to sexually exploit the victim, and imposition of restrictions of the victim’s personal liberty. As for the crime of human trafficking, it is important to clarify that, as of 2007, there was a broadening of the criminal type, which is now considered a crime against personal freedom, similar to quasi-slavery.

O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida em 1ª instancia pela Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Viseu, o qual o condenou a 9 anos de prisão, em razão dos crimes de tráfico de menor de 18 anos e de pessoas, com o intuito de exploração sexual. Em seu Recurso, o Defendente alegou que a vítima vivia com ele por vontade própria, de modo que o tipo penal de tráfico de pessoas não estava caracterizado. O Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra conheceu parcialmente do Recurso em razão da descrição equivocada de parte dos fatos trazidos nos autos. No tocante aos crimes cometidos, o Tribunal confirmou a decisão proferida em 1ª instância, concluindo que o Defendente continuou a cometer o crime de tráfico humano mesmo após a vítima ter completado 18 anos de idade. Nesse aspecto, ressalta-se que a vítima começou a viver com o Defendente quando ela era menor de idade, tendo fugido e retornado a viver com o Defendente após completar a maioridade. Ainda, o Tribunal concluiu que todos os elementos dos crimes estavam presentes durante a convivência entre o Defendente e a vítima: ameaça psicológica e física, realização de trabalhos domésticos não-remunerados, intenção de exploração sexual da vítima e imposição de restrições a liberdade pessoal da vítima. Importa, por fim, esclarecer que em 2007, houve um alargamento do crime de tráfico de pessoas, o qual passou a ser considerado crime contra a liberdade pessoal, semelhante a uma quase escravidão.

The defendant appealed from a lower court (Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Coimbra) judgment convicting him of domestic violence. The evidence in the record showed that defendant called his former wife names several times and once, during an altercation, defendant punched the victim in the head, causing her pain, anxiety, and fear. The defendant alleged that the lower court erred in concluding that the facts in evidence could be characterized as domestic violence, and argued that instead, he had committed defamatory libel, a less serious criminal offense. The Court of Appeals of Coimbra granted the appeal. In its reasoning, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence in the record showed that the act of violence was one isolated act, without reiteration or regularity. There was no evidence that defendant had acted with cruelty, had the specific intent to humiliate the victim or cause any further damage to her personal dignity. The Court concluded that defendant committed crime of offense against bodily integrity and crime of threat with an imposition of a monetary fine.

O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida pelo Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Coimbra (1ª instância) que o condenou pelo crime de violência doméstica. As provas presentes nos autos demonstram que o Defendente proferiu ofensas, em diversas ocasiões, à sua ex-mulher e que, durante uma discussão, proferiu um soco em sua cabeça, causando-lhe dor, ansiedade e medo. O Defendente, em sede recursal, alegou que a decisão em 1ª instância se equivocou ao condená-lo pelo crime de violência doméstica, de modo que a decisão deveria ser reformada, vez que ocorrido se tratava de crime de difamação/injúria em razão das ofensas proferidas, um crime de menor potencial ofensivo. O Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra deferiu o Recurso, entendendo que as provas trazidas nos autos demonstram que o ato de violência praticado pelo Defendente se tratou de um ato isolado, sem reiteração ou regularidade. Ainda, entendeu não haver provas que o Defendente tenha agido com crueldade, com intenção de humilhar a vítima ou de causar-lhe qualquer dano à dignidade da vista. O Tribunal, por fim, condenou o Defendente pelo crime de ofensa contra a integridade física da defendente, bem como crime de ameaça, impondo-lhe uma pena pecuniária.

In Slovakia, a petition signed by at least 350,000 voters may initiate a referendum as long as the questions relate to public interest. However, the subject of the referendum may not be basic rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Court reviews whether the subject of the referendum conforms to the Constitution. In 2014, 408,000 voters signed a petition asking the President to announce a referendum on the following questions: 1) Do you agree that the term “marriage” may not be used to designate any other form of cohabitation of persons other than the union between one man and one woman?; 2) Do you agree that pairs or groups of persons of the same sex may not be allowed to adopt children and subsequently to bring them up?; 3) Do you agree that no other form of cohabitation of persons other than marriage should be accorded the special protection, rights and obligations which are accorded solely to marriage and spouses by the legal system as at 1 March 2014?; and 4) Do you agree that schools may not require children to attend lessons in the field of sexual behavior or euthanasia, if their parents and the children themselves do not agree with the teaching content? The President asked the court to consider whether the first, second, and third questions were admissible as they related to the right to privacy, and whether the last question was admissible as it might interfere with the right to education. The Constitutional Court balanced the inalterability of constitutional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms with the impossibility of rejecting every question which might minimally affect a right or freedom. The court held that the irrevocability of human rights means the standard of human rights is as set in the constitutional text. Any referendum questions that would lead to a broadening of human rights would be constitutionally acceptable, and any that would reduce human rights would not be constitutionally acceptable. Thus, the first, second, and fourth question were declared acceptable, and the third unacceptable. This case is available through the search function on the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic website here by searching for the case file number (PL. ÚS 24/2014).

X was a 14-year-old girl who became pregnant and suicidal after being raped. Her parents tried to take her to England in order to obtain a first-trimester abortion that was illegal in Ireland, but the Attorney General obtained an interim injunction from the High Court restraining the girl and her parents from leaving the country for a period of nine months or from arranging an abortion for her. The family appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution's prohibition on abortion did not prevent a suicidal 14-year-old, pregnant as the result of rape, from obtaining an abortion in Ireland because the suicide was a substantial risk to the life of the pregnant girl. The Court also struck down the injunction prohibiting the girl from leaving the country.

Here, the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the appeal of the respondent employer and rejected a prior holding of the Edinburgh Employment Tribunal that found the respondent employer liable for having violated Section 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act for having given a male staff member a more favorable employment contract than two female co-workers and having done so without genuine, material, and sex-neutral factors accounting for this disparity. The claimants in this appeal were two female employees of Scottish Enterprise, a non-departmental public body of the Scottish Government focused on economic development. The women alleged that a male co-worker doing work of equal value had a more favorable employment contract, and that there were no genuine, material, and sex-neutral factors accounting for this disparity. The Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted respondent’s argument that the reason for the disparity in compensation between the claimants’ contracts and that of their male comparator was due to the fact that the terms of the male comparator’s contract were protected under Scotland’s Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE) regulations. These regulations protect an employee’s contract from modification in the case of a business transfer. While the lower tribunal had accepted that this explanation for the disparity was genuine, it held that the respondent should have frozen the male comparator’s salary and not granted him pay increases after a certain period to keep his pay equal to that of the claimants. The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected this holding and granted the appeal, noting that it was not the respondent’s practice to freeze salaries for any employees. Furthermore, the Employment Appeal Tribunal stated that the lower tribunal had made “no finding that the Claimants suffered discrimination on grounds of sex.” Neither had it made any finding that respondent committed any form of “culpable inactivity” motivated by sex. Finally, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respondent established a valid defense under the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act states that an employer must show that “that the difference in pay or other conditions is explained by something that has nothing to do with sex.” The Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respondent made a “causal link between a non gender related explanation and the difference in pay complained of,” and that, therefore, respondent had established a defense. Therefore, it rejected the decision of the Edinburgh Employment Tribunal, upheld the appeal, and dismissed the claims.

The defendant appealed a lower court decision, arguing that it violated the principle of innocence until proven guilty. The defendant argued that the majority of the evidence against him was the testimony of the complainant, his wife, accusing him of domestic violence. The Supreme Court ruled that witness testimony can be in and of itself sufficient and that judges are free to rule based on the evidence presented before them. In this case, the witness testimony and corroborating evidence were sufficient for the Court to find that there had been habitual physical or psychological violence (Article 173 of the Criminal Code). As stated by the Court, this crime “punishes the aggressor’s imposition of a climate of violence and domination; of a psychological and moral toxic atmosphere, in which the victim is annulled and their free development as a person is inhibited, precisely due to the fear, humiliation, and anguish which are induced in such environment.”

El acusado apeló una decisión del tribunal inferior, argumentando que su condena violó el principio de inocencia hasta que se demuestre su culpabilidad. El acusado argumentó que la mayoría de las pruebas en su contra eran el testimonio de la demandante, su esposa, acusándolo de violencia doméstica. La Corte Suprema dictaminó que el testimonio de los testigos puede ser en sí mismo suficiente y que los jueces son libres de decidir sobre la base de la evidencia presentada ante ellos. En este caso, el testimonio de los testigos y las pruebas corroborantes fueron suficientes para que el Tribunal constatara que había habido violencia física o psicológica habitual (artículo 173 del Código Penal). Según lo declarado por el Tribunal, este delito “castiga la imposición del agresor de un clima de violencia y dominación; de una atmósfera tóxica psicológica y moral, en la que se anula a la víctima y se inhibe su libre desarrollo como persona, precisamente debido al miedo, la humillación y la angustia que se inducen en dicho entorno.”

The Swedish Equality Ombudsman ruled that separate opening hours in public swimming pools for women and men can constitute discrimination, but that separate opening hours can be legal if the discrimination is a result of achieving a permissible and legal purpose. As such, it is permissible for a public swimming pool to have female-only hours in the event that the group of women using the swimming pool do not bathe with men due to their religious beliefs, and would not be able to learn how to swim otherwise. In the decisions, the Swedish Equality Ombudsman stressed that such permissible discrimination justifications are exceedingly rare, and that the ground rule is that public swimming pools should be open to both women and men at all times.

A man, E.O., repeatedly physically assaulted his wife, S.M., and threatened to kill her. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of S.M. and expanded the definition of domestic violence in Sweden, stating that the victim’s entire situation is relevant when assessing gross violations of a person’s integrity, not just a single act. The court further ruled that the injurious acts must only be of a type that would typically lead to a serious injury to a person’s self-confidence, as opposed to having led to serious injury to this particular person’s self-confidence.

According to Chapter 5 Section 4 of the Swedish Marital Law, if only one of the spouses wishes to divorce, that spouse has the right to divorce only after a time for consideration. As an exception, spouses who have lived separately for at least two years have the right to divorce without prior time for consideration. In this case, the wife, E.J., wanted to divorce her husband, L-G.J., against his will. The spouses had only been married for one year, during which they lived separately. The question in the Supreme Court was whether time prior to the marriage can be included in the calculation of how long the spouses have lived separately, or if only time during which the spouses have been married can affect the time for consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgement. The lower court had ruled that what is crucial is that they had in fact lived separately for at least two years. Thus, E.J. was allowed to divorce her husband, L-G.J., without time for consideration.

A Swedish dental student was during her dental clinic required to work with bare under-arms. Due to the student’s religious convictions, she asked for permission to wear disposable underarm protection, but her request was denied. The student filed a complaint with the Swedish Equality Ombudsman, who decided to bring an anti-discrimination case to civil court against the education provider Karolinska Institutet. Both parties agreed that working with bare underarms constituted a higher burden on Muslim women, and the case came down to conflicting expert testimony regarding how sanitary the arm covers were in practice. The court found that the education provider had the burden of proof to provide objective justification for an indirect discrimination and that both experts provided equally strong arguments. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the student. The student was awarded SEK 5000 as compensatory damages.

A man, W.B.F., put his cell phone camera under a woman’s skirt and took pictures of her on an escalator in a subway station in Stockholm. The woman, F.L., did not notice the picture being taken, but was made aware of it shortly thereafter. Under Swedish law, taking insulting pictures of another person is prohibited only if the person being photographed is inside a house or in another location especially purposed for privacy. However, under Chapter 6 Section 10 of the Swedish Penal Code, one who by word or act molests another person in a sense that is intended to violate the person’s sexual integrity may be convicted for sexual molestation. The assessment must be made objectively. The Supreme Court found that the regulation must include situations where the offender does not physically touch the victim, and the victim does not notice the violation. If the act constitutes a clear offense of the victim’s right over his or her body, it should be equated with an act that involves physical touch. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that W.B.F. should be convicted for sexual molestation and sentenced him to 60 daily fines of SEK 50 each, an amount which was based on his economic situation.

The court ruled that a person who was designated male at birth, but who had undergone sex reassignment therapy and who had changed their legal identity to female has the right to change their legal identity back to male, despite having female genitalia. The court further held that Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act can be applied in this situation (i.e., where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity after having undergone sex reassignment therapy). Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act provides the test for changing one’s gender identity as follows: (i) the person feels that they belong to the opposite sex, (ii) the person has been acting in accordance with the desired gender identity, (iii) the person can be expected to live with the chosen gender identity in the future, and (iv) the person is above 18 years old. The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare and the Stockholm Administrative Court denied the petition, arguing that due to the applicant’s previous sex change it cannot be expected that the applicant will continue to live with the chosen identity. On appeal, the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal found (a) that it was possible to apply Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act in a case where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity, and (b) that the fact that the applicant had previously gone through a sex change did not indicate that the now-chosen gender identity will not be maintained in the future. Therefore, the Court of Appeal allowed the change of identity.

A Muslim woman refused to shake a male interviewer’s hand for religious reasons during a job interview. She placed her hand over her heart and explained her reasons. The recruitment process was then canceled, as the company had a policy which required employees to shake hands with both men and women. The Swedish Equality Ombudsman claimed that the cancellation was an indirect discrimination of Muslims who refuse to shake hand with a person of an opposite sex. The Swedish Labor Court first established that the right to refuse a handshake on religious grounds is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. The court further found that the handshake policy was neither appropriate nor necessary to achieve its justified purpose (promoting gender equality at the workplace). The court ordered the company to pay the woman SEK 40,000 in damages.

A man was sentenced to nine years in prison in the Skane and Blekinge Court of Appeal for approximately 100 cases of rape and other sexual offenses against a child over the course of five years. The Swedish Supreme Court ruled that when assessing the penalty value for repeated serious sexual offenses against the same plaintiff, the court must weigh the connection between the crimes and their characteristics. When the perpetrator has committed crimes for a long time against the same person, the victim is often vulnerable and in a constrained situation. There is therefore particular reason to consider the effects of the crime on the victim. Considering these factors, the Supreme Court increased the sentence to 12 years' imprisonment.

In this case a doctor was held criminally liable under section 219a of the Criminal Code for publishing information about abortion services on the her website. The doctor argued that she was not "advertising" abortion (which is prohibited by law under section 219a) but merely providing information on abortions. The court disagreed, holding that the downloadable PDF on the doctor's website that contained information about abortions fell under the prohibited conduct of section 219a. The doctor was required to pay a fine of 6000 Euros (150 euros per day over the course of 40 days).

This case held the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act of 1976 allows the court to issue an injunction against a man to order him out of the home, even in a non-marital joint tenancy.

In the prosecution of an international human trafficking ring, B.D., a nightclub owner, was charged with Facilitating Prostitution in violation of Article 201 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, for recruiting and organizing 16 Moldovan women for prostitution. His co-defendants B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were immigration officials charged with Abusing Official Position and Smuggling of Migrants in violation of Articles 339 and 138 of the Criminal Code, for enabling 35 illegal immigrants – mostly Moldovan women – to enter Kosovo, including by issuing fake identification documents to them, with the motive of obtaining unlawful material benefits for themselves. B.D. was found guilty by the District Court, while B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were acquitted. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the District Court based B.D.’s guilt exclusively on text messages sent to his mobile phone asking to make reservations to meet with various individuals identified only by nicknames. The challenged judgment did not clarify the identities of the persons behind the nicknames and did not assess whether they were indeed the alleged victims identified in the indictment. The lower court’s decision also made no reference to the statements of the alleged victims, particularly whether the statements corresponded to and corroborated the contents of the text messages. The court further held that the District Court’s judgment did not contain sufficient reasoning a proper assessment of the evidence regarding B.J., M.G., and S.Z’s alleged enabling of illegal immigration. The tribunal also faulted the lower court for failing to determine the complete facts, including the immigration registration system, movements of large sums in the defendants’ bank accounts, and transcripts of intercepted communications between the defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court annulled the District Court’s verdict and remanded for retrial. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was added to an expanded ongoing rape investigation against his associates, charged and convicted of rape in violation of Article 193 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and sentenced to three years of imprisonment. Following the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the first instance court’s judgment, the prosecutor filed a Request for Protection of Legality in favor of the defendant, claiming that the court of first instance failed to assess relevant evidence in favor of the defendant and based its decision on evidence which did not meet the requisite standard of “beyond any reasonable doubt.” In particular, the prosecutor argued that the conviction was based on the statement of the alleged victim in court, corroborated only by hearsay, that the victim in the immediate early stages of the police investigation did not claim the defendant had committed any crimes against her, and that her allegations against the defendant were evolving and increasing with time. The prosecutor noted that there was an absence of medical and physical evidence to support the conviction, and the police officers involved were not interviewed. The Supreme Court rejected the Request. The court first repudiated the notion that “beyond any reasonable doubt” was the requisite standard of proof under Kosovar law. It then noted that the hearsay was a direct confirmation that the victim had reported the rape to the witness. The tribunal dismissed the prosecutor’s argument that there was no physical evidence, because of the way the rape was committed – without physical violence as the victim surrendered under threat – it was meaningless to expect any trace of violence to be found. The court also saw no reason to discredit the victim on the basis that the victim only denounced the defendant one year after the commission of the rape, stating that it was “absolutely normal that a victim of rape finds the courage to denounce the aggressor only once the risk of revenge against the denouncer . . . has ceased.” Finally, the tribunal held that the defendant was investigated only at the end of the investigation against his associates, and that the details of the rape increased with time, were features common in many rape investigations and normally had no significance in the assessment of the evidence. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was arrested for being suspected of touching a female police officer’s shoulder and trying to kiss her, and charged with Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession pursuant to Article 200 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and attempt to commit such an offense, among other crimes. The municipal court found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years and four months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for three years. The district court rejected the charge of Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession, and reduced the sentence to 12 months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for two years. Thereafter, the defendant filed a Request for Protection of Legality against the lower courts’ decisions, arguing that the lower courts unlawfully convicted him of attempted Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession. The defendant argued that an attempt requires the offender to intentionally take immediate action toward the commission of the offense. Here, the commencing of the criminal offense was not proven because there was no action manifesting a sexual purpose behind his touching. The Supreme Court held the defendant’s claim was unfounded, pointing out that Article 200’s text states only “[w]hoever touches another person for a sexual purpose.” Here, the defendant not only touched the victim but also tried to kiss her, and was prevented from kissing her mouth only by the victim’s resistance. Hence, the defendant did not commit an attempt, but in fact completed the offense. The court, however, determined that the principle of reformatio in peius (prohibiting placing the appellant in a worse position after appeal) barred it from changing the lower courts’ qualification of the criminal offense. The court additionally rejected the defendant’s argument that the attempt in this case was not punishable, determining that an attempt to commit Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession was punishable under the Criminal Code. (Also available in English.)

The applicant was a judge on the Court of Appeals and was a candidate in the election for the President of the Court of Appeals. She received the highest number of points among the three candidates in the candidate evaluation commissioned by the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC, the body which administers the judiciary). During the voting by the KJC, the applicant was voted on first, but did not receive the necessary majority of votes. The voting then moved on to the second-ranked candidate, who won the overwhelming share of votes and was elected. Upon losing, the applicant submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging various constitutional violations, including violation of the principle of gender equality under Article 24 (Equality before the Law) of the Constitution of Kosovo. The KJC responded that the principle of gender equality consisted of equal treatment of every candidate using the same standards, and that it had done so irrespective of the candidates’ gender or ethnic background. The Constitutional Court noted that Article 24 of the Constitution implies that general principles of equality of treatment apply to all actions of public authorities in their dealings with individuals. The tribunal explained that in a voting process, a fundamental aspect of the principle of equality is that each candidate shall benefit from the opportunity to be considered fairly and equally. The panel then held that the KJC’s vote did not provide equal opportunities to the candidates, because it did not provide for procedural safeguards pertinent to the guarantee of equality of treatment. Each candidate was voted on in succession, and so KJC members could vote in favor or against all three candidates. Members could also abstain from the voting selectively and arbitrarily. Thus, it was impossible to know which candidate actually had the support of the majority of the KJC. The court therefore declared the vote incompatible with the Constitution, and ordered the KJC to conduct a new vote. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The applicant (former husband) and his former wife purchased an apartment during their marriage, with the applicant’s father contributing to the purchase as well. The parties concluded an agreement stipulating that, in case of dispute, the parties agreed that the ownership of the apartment would be divided based on each party’s investment. After their divorce, the applicant filed a claim for the division of the property. The Municipal Court rejected the claim and, deeming the applicant’s father’s contribution to be an assistance to both spouses, ruled that the applicant and his former wife were co-owners, each owning half of the property. On appeal, the District Court quashed the Municipal Court’s decision and remanded, but the Municipal Court on remand reached the same decision (i.e., applicant and former wife each owned one-half of the property). The District Court then amended the Municipal Court’s judgment and ruled that the applicant owned 85.48% of the apartment, and his former wife 14.52%, according to their agreement. The applicant then litigated to execute the District Court’s judgment. The former wife filed a request for a revision with the Supreme Court, which granted the request and upheld the Municipal Court’s judgment, holding that the apartment was an asset created during the marital union, and the parties by law could not contract to the detriment of common assets acquired in marriage. The applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging violation of his right to the protection of property and right to a fair trial under the Constitution of Kosovo and the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitutional Court emphasized that its task was not to act as a court of fourth instance or to deal with errors of fact or law unless it may have infringed on constitutional rights. The Supreme Court’s reasoning was clear and the proceedings below had not been unfair or arbitrary. Therefore, the Constitutional Court ruled inadmissible the applicant’s appeal from the Supreme Court’s judgment. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The applicant, a local employee of the UN mission in Kosovo, was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses, including facilitating or compelling prostitution (Article 241 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo). The Basic Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the guilty verdict. The applicant filed a request for protection of legality with the Supreme Court, which rejected the request. The applicant then submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging, among other things, that he was discriminated against on the grounds of gender in violation of Article 24 of the Constitution because the trial court found credible the statement of a victim and a witness because they were women. The Constitutional Court explained that, in the applicant’s circumstance, equality before the law should be understood as a right of a party to impartial treatment and equal opportunity to exhaust legal remedies despite personal status. Under European Court of Human Rights case law interpreting Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification – that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim, or there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means and aim. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation of gender discrimination as “manifestly ill-founded,” finding that he failed to prove how and why the trial court treated him in an unequal way in relation to the victim and witness at issue, only because they were women. The tribunal rejected the applicant’s other claims and concluded that he had not substantiated his allegations of a violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the applicant’s referral was declared inadmissible. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The applicant was registered as female at birth, but has always identified himself as male. He lived and appeared as a man in all areas of life, and had begun hormonal treatment to transition. The applicant filed a request with the Civil Status Office to change his name and gender marker to reflect his male gender identity, but the request was rejected. He appealed the decision to the Civil Registration Agency, which rejected the appeal on the grounds that the applicant provided no evidence that his current name prevented his integration in society, and no medical report supporting his request for a change of his gender marker. The applicant filed a claim with the Basic Court, and, only one week later and before a decision was rendered, referred the matter to the Constitutional Court. The applicant alleged the Civil Registration Agency’s decision violated his fundamental rights and freedoms, guaranteed by Articles 23 (Human Dignity), 24 (Equality Before the Law), and 36 (Right to Privacy) of the Constitution of Kosovo, and Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant requested to be exempted from the legal obligation to exhaust all legal remedies before seeking a constitutional review on the grounds that the regular courts’ legal remedy would not be effective or sufficiently certain because of his special circumstances and the length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court surveyed foreign constitutional courts via the Venice Commission for their respective relevant case law, confirming the general requirement for an applicant to exhaust his/her legal remedies before seeking constitutional review. The court noted the existence of a very similar and recently decided case, in which a person sued the Civil Status Office and Civil Registration Agency for their refusal to grant his request to change his name and gender marker from female to male after a successful gender reassignment surgery. The Basic Court ruled for the applicant and ordered the changes made, and the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Constitutional Court therefore determined that the regular courts could furnish an effective and sufficiently certain legal remedy for the applicant. Moreover, the court noted that the applicant was not seeking review of an already lengthy court proceeding, but merely of the possibility of one, and in any event the Basic Court and Court of Appeals disposed of the above mentioned precedent in reasonable time. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court ruled the applicant’s referral inadmissible because it was premature. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The petitioners were found guilty of violating several provisions of the Austrian Criminal Code after the regional court found that they acted as a criminal organization to recruit victims by means of extortion, massive violence, penalties for not performing sex work, and threats, and arranged for the victims’ transfer and accommodation in brothels in Austria. After an appeal on procedural grounds, the Austrian Supreme Court upheld the convictions. The Regional Court Leoben’s decision from April 28, 2009 [13 Hv 122/08x-492] was not available at the time of publication.

Die Beschwerdeführer wurden vom Landgericht Loeben für schuldig befunden verschiedene Sexualstraftatbestände des Österreichischen Strafgesetzbuches verwirklicht zu haben. Hierbei haben sie als kriminelle Vereinigung gehandelt, um ihre Opfer als Prostituierte zu rekrutieren, die sie dann erpressten, massiver Gewalt aussetzten und bestraften, wenn sie der Sexarbeit nicht nachkamen. Sie haben ihre Opfer bedroht und bereits vor dem Transfer nach Österreich, den sie organisierten derartiger Gewalt ausgesetzt, dass sie in ihrer Entscheidungsfreiheit stark eingeschränkt waren. Gegen dieses Urteil gingen die Beschwerdeführer aufgrund von Verfahrensfehlern vor. Der Oberste Gerichtshof wies die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zurück und hat die Verurteilungen aufrechterhalten.

The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had prohibited the parents of a young daughter of Gambian nationality resident in Germany from determining her whereabouts and relocating her to Gambia due to a high risk to the girl of female genital mutilation or cutting.

Der Gerichtshof bestätigte die Entscheidung der Vorinstanz, die es der Mutter einer Minderjährigen mit gambischer Staatsangehörigkeit, wohnhaft in Deutschland, teilweise untersagt hatte, ihr Recht, den Aufenthaltsort ihrer Tochter zu bestimmen, auszuüben, insbesondere das Kind in den Urlaub nach Gambia zu bringen oder einen Wohnortwechsel dorthin zu veranlassen, da ein hohes Risiko bestehe, dass die Tochter während ihres Aufenthalts in Gambia einer Genitalverstümmelung unterzogen werde.

The claimant sued her employer on the grounds of discrimination after a male colleague received a promotion to a management role she had hoped for. The Court decided for the claimant, accepting statistical evidence showing that, while the majority of employees of the employer (69%) were women, no women were represented on the three most senior management levels. This was the first decision of a court accepting such statistical evidence of discrimination. This decision is now only available via subscription service. The Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labor Court) overruled this decision (8 AZR 1012/08), but affirmed that statistical evidence is admissible in discrimination analyses.

The Court held that it was in breach of the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German constitution that periods of maternity leave (which affects women only) were not counted towards certain pension benefits whereas periods of sick leave (which affects both men and women) were. English translation of 1 BvR 1409/10 available here.)

Der Gerichtshof stellte fest, dass es gegen das im deutschen Grundgesetz verankerte Recht auf Gleichbehandlung verstößt, wenn Zeiten des Mutterschaftsurlaubs (der nur Frauen betrifft) nicht auf bestimmte Rentenleistungen angerechnet werden, längere Krankheitszeiten (die sowohl Männer als auch Frauen betreffen) hingegen schon.

A woman informed her employer of the fact that she was pregnant. Two months later, her employer fired her due to alleged restructuring of the company. Subsequently, the appellant started proceedings before the Court to receive an indemnity. The appellant claims that she has a right of indemnity based on the right of pregnant women to be protected against redundancy or, following the right to be protected against discrimination. The court held for the appellant and ordered the previous employer to pay the appellant a sum of EUR 33,135.00 and EUR 703.24 and to deliver to the appellant requested social documents.

The accused was prosecuted for assaulting a trans woman and her partner for being transsexual. The accused confessed to calling the victim and her partner “dirty transsexuals” and assaulting them. Following the assault, a doctor determined that the victim was unable to work. The Court found that the facts were uncontested and therefore proven. According to the Court, the accused showed a lack of respect for social norms and the physical integrity of other human beings. Additionally, the Court found the punishment should reflect that the crime was based on the victim’s transsexual status and that the punishment should serve to have a strong deterrent effect. The court convicted the accused and imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50 (i.e., in total EUR 5000))which would be suspended during three years if the accused obeyed the terms of probation.

Appellant A (name omitted from the public record) challenged the district court’s (Tribunal da Comarca) decision which convicted him of domestic violence, for having inflicted physical and psychological injuries on his spouse, who later filed for divorce. As provided under the Portuguese Penal Code, the crime of domestic violence occurs whenever a person—repeatedly or not—inflicts physical or psychological harm to their spouse or former spouse (Sec. 152). The Appellant argues that the occurrence of the crime of domestic violence requires repeated episodes of physical or psychological harm for the marital relation to be damaged by the injuries of the spouse. In this case, the Appellant argued that there was only one episode of physical and psychological injury, and he therefore should be tried for the lesser crime of inflicting bodily injury. The appellate court held that the crime of domestic violence is not characterized by repeated episodes of harm, but rather by the gravity of the harms inflicted. The appeal was denied.

Apelante A (nome omitido do registro público) impugnou a decisão do Tribunal da Comarca que o condenou por violência doméstica, por ter provocado lesões físicas e psicológicas em sua esposa, que depois pediu o divórcio. Como previsto pelo Código Penal Português, o crime de violência doméstica ocorre sempre que uma pessoa - repetidamente ou não - provoca danos físicos ou mentais a seu cônjuge ou ex-cônjuge (Sec. 152). O Apelante argumenta que a ocorrência do crime de violência doméstica requer episódios repetidos de danos físicos ou psicológicos para que a relação conjugal seja prejudicada pelas lesões do cônjuge. Nesse caso, o Apelante argui que teve somente um episódio de lesão física e psicológica, e então ele deveria ser julgado pelo crime menor de provocação de lesões corporais. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que o crime de violência doméstica não é caracterizado por episódios repetidos de lesões, mas pela gravidade das lesões provocadas. A apelação foi negada.

The Supreme Court, in deciding upon the applicability of certain procedural rules, confirmed the main international definitions of violence within relationships. Particularly, the local court dismissed the case against a man charged with the crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, without giving any notice of the motion to dismiss to the person injured by the crime in accordance with Article 408 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The injured person appealed the decision of the local court and requested that the Italian Supreme Court declare the dismissal of the case null and void. In deciding the procedural issue at hand, the Italian Supreme Court pointed out that the Italian criminal law has drawn the definitions of gender violence and violence against women mainly from international law provisions, which are directly enforced in the system pursuant to Article 117 of the Constitution. In this decision the Italian Supreme Court gave all the definitions of violence within gender relationships in consideration of international conventions and specifically European law, and concluded that such definitions, even if not directly included in domestic regulations, “are fully part of our national system through international law and are therefore enforceable.” According to this interpretation, the definitions of gender violence given by the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence are directly applicable in the Italian legal framework. On this basis, the Court ruled that notice of dismissal of the case must always be served on the person injured by crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, as those provisions relate to the gender violence notion set forth under the international and EU provisions applicable in the Italian legal framework.

La Corte di Cassazione, in una decisione riguardo all’applicabilità di alcune regole procedurali, ha confermato l’applicabilità delle principali definizioni internazionali in tema di violenza di genere. In particolare, il Tribunale ha archiviato un caso contro un uomo accusato di aver commesso i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, senza aver dato avviso della richiesta di archiviazione alla parte offesa secondo quanto disposto dall’articolo 408 del codice di procedura penale italiano. Il difensore della persona offesa ricorreva per cassazione e chiedeva alla Corte di Cassazione di dichiarare nullo il provvedimento di archiviazione. Nel decidere la questione procedurale, la Corte di Cassazione evidenziava che il diritto penale italiano ha tratto le definizioni di violenza di genere e violenza contro le donne principalmente dalle disposizioni di diritto internazionale, che sono direttamente applicabili nel sistema ai sensi dell’articolo 117 della Costituzione. In questa decisione la Corte di Cassazione ha fornito tutte le definizioni di violenza di genere in considerazione delle convenzioni internazionali e in particolare del diritto europeo, e ha concluso che tali definizioni, anche se non direttamente incluse nelle normative nazionali, “per il tramite del diritto internazionale sono entrate a far parte dell’ordinamento e influiscono sull’applicazione del diritto”. Secondo questa interpretazione, le definizioni di violenza di genere previste dalla Convenzione di Istanbul sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza domestica sono direttamente applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano. Sulla base di ciò, la Cassazione ha ritenuto che l’avviso della richiesta di archiviazione debba sempre essere notificato alla persona offesa nel caso in cui si proceda per i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, in quanto queste disposizioni si riferiscono alla nozione di violenza di genere sancita dalle disposizioni internazionali e comunitarie applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano.

The Court of Appeal of Turin upheld the lower court’s judgment deeming a clause of a collective agreement negotiated at the enterprise level to be discriminatory because it infringed on Articles 3 and 37 of the Constitution, Article 25, para 2bis, of Decree No. 198/2006 and Article 3 of Decree No. 151/2001. Under the relevant clause the “real presence at work” was as an eligibility criterion to receive an additional remuneration, it being understood that any family-related leave, including any compulsory maternity leave, parental leave, and/or leave for illness, could affect the employees’ level of performance in that respect. The Court maintained that even though the criterion was formally neutral, it resulted in an indirect pay discrimination since female workers usually take more family-related leave than male workers. Moreover, during the trial, the company failed to provide a permissible justification regarding the requirement of “real presence at work.” Therefore, the employer was ordered to (1) cease the discrimination by computing leave as actual time worked for the purposes of achieving the real presence requirement and becoming eligible for the additional remuneration, (2) to pay the additional remuneration incentive to the plaintiffs, and (3) to enhance a plan to remove the discrimination by avoiding the inclusion of the above criterion in any future collective bargaining at the enterprise level. The latter was promoted by the intervention of the Regional Equality Adviser as a case of collective discrimination.

La Corte d’Appello di Torino ha confermato la sentenza del Tribunale di primo grado che considerava discriminatoria una clausola di un contratto collettivo negoziato a livello di impresa in quanto contraria agli articoli 3 e 37 della Costituzione, all’articolo 25, paragrafo 2 bis, del decreto n. 198/2006 e all’articolo 3 del decreto n. 151/2001. Ai sensi della clausola rilevane, l’“effettiva presenza in servizio” era un criterio di ammissibilità per ricevere una retribuzione aggiuntiva, fermo restando che qualsiasi congedo per motivi familiari, compresi i congedi di maternità obbligatori e i congedi parentali e/o congedi per malattia, avrebbero potuto influire sul livello di prestazioni dei dipendenti a tale riguardo. La Corte ha sostenuto che, pur essendo la clausola formalmente neutrale, il criterio comportava una discriminazione retributiva indiretta, in quanto le lavoratrici prendono generalmente un numero di congedi familiari superiore a quello dei lavoratori di sesso maschile. Inoltre, durante il processo, l’azienda non aveva fornito una giustificazione ammissibile per quanto riguarda il requisito dell’“effettiva presenza in servizio”. Pertanto, al datore di lavoro è stato ordinato di (1) cessare la discriminazione calcolando il congedo come tempo effettivo di lavoro ai fini del raggiungimento del requisito di presenza effettiva in servizio e quindi di poter essere ammessi al percepimento della remunerazione aggiuntiva, (2) versare l’incentivo retributivo supplementare ai ricorrenti, e (3) implementare un piano per rimuovere le discriminazioni evitando l’inclusione della clausola di cui sopra in qualsiasi futura contrattazione collettiva a livello di impresa. Quest’ultimo obiettivo è stato promosso dall’intervento del Consigliere regionale di Parità al fine di far cassare un caso di discriminazione collettiva.

The Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) brought charges against the defendant, “A” (name omitted from public record), for sexual harassment against the victim, “D” (name omitted from public record) a minor girl. A had naked pictures of D and threatened to expose them using the internet unless D agreed to have sexual intercourse with him. The Lower Court held that D’s conduct did not meet the requirements of sexual harassment under section 163 of the Portuguese Penal Code, which requires a grave threat to the victim as an element of the crime. The Lower Court held that the threat to expose naked pictures of D is considered a grave threat under the Portuguese Penal Code. The Public Prosecutor appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed the decision, finding B guilty of sexual harassment.

O Ministério Público trouxe acusações contra o réu, “A” (nome omitido do registro público), por assédio sexual contra a vítima, “D” (nome omitido do registro público) uma garota menor de idade. A tinha fotos de D pelada e ameaçou expor as fotos na internet a menos que D concordasse em ter relações sexuais com ele. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que a conduta de D não cumpria com as exigências de assédio sexual sob a seção 163 do Código Penal Português, que requer uma grave ameaça à vítima como elemento do crime. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que a ameaça de expor as fotos de D pelada é considerada grave ameaça sob o Código Penal Português. O Ministério Público apelou, e o Tribunal da Relação reverteu a decisão, condenando B pelo crime de assédio sexual.