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Civil Rights Act

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.

Issues

Whether a defect in a claim as to the nature of “employment” under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination by employers with fifteen or more employees, limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts in hearing Title VII claims, as held by the FourthFifthSixthNinthTenth, and Eleventh Circuits, or if it only raises an issue going to the merits of the claim, as held by the SecondSeventh, and Federal Circuits?

 

In November of 2001, Jenifer Arbaugh brought suit against her former employer, Y & H Corporation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, alleging that she was discriminated against because of her sex, and was forced to resign her position as a bartender and waitress. Y & H admitted to the questions of jurisdiction and its status as an employer under Title VII. In a district court trial, a jury found for Arbaugh. Y & H then advanced the claim that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Arbaugh’s claim because Y & H did not have fifteen full-time employees at the time of the incident, and thus did not actually qualify as an “employer” under § 2000e(b) of Title VII. If an employer’s status is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, as Y & H proposes, then Arbaugh’s suit would have to be dismissed even though a verdict had already been passed because jurisdiction cannot be admitted to or waived by a defendant, and a challenge to jurisdiction may be brought up at any point in the litigation, even after a verdict has been given. Arbaugh responded that the definition of “employer” is a question of merit and not of subject-matter jurisdiction. As such Y & H could have and did indeed waive the matter in its admission. The district court, after a lengthy determination of whether Y & H did qualify as an employer, ruled in favor of Y & H, and dismissed Arbaugh’s case. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the so-called “employee-numerosity” issue is a jurisdictional question. The Supreme Court’s decision is expected to definitively determine whether the employment status of a Title VII defendant is a jurisdictional matter or one going to the merits of the case to be decided by the trier of fact. The Supreme Court will also resolve existing conflicts between and within the various circuits as to this question, and will hopefully establish a uniform standard for all plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII employment claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 701(b) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applies the Title VII prohibition against employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Does this provision limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts, or does it only raise an issue going to the merits of a Title VII claim?

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Domino's Pizza v. McDonald

Issues

Does 42 U.S.C. § 1981 create a cause of action in one not a party to a contract, but who sustained personal injuries as a result of a breach of that contract, where the breach was motivated by racial discrimination against him?

 

JWM Investments, Inc., a company wholly owned by Respondent John McDonald, entered into a contract with Petitioner Domino’s Pizza under which it the parties agreed that JVM would build and lease to Domino’s four restaurant buildings.  After the relationship began to sour, McDonald, an African-American, demanded that Domino's perform their end of the bargain. Another petitioner Deborah Pear Phillips, employee of Domino's, refused to sign contractually required "estoppel certificates," and the general counsel for Domino's said that it would perform the contracts only if McDonald would agree to amend them, which he refused to do. McDonald claimed that Petitioners' decision to breach the contracts was motivated by racial discrimination and sued under 42 U.S.C § 1981, which protects the right to make and enforce contracts. Petitioners argue that McDonald does not have standing to sue because he was not personally a party to the contract. The Supreme Court will thus decide whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates a cause of action in one who is not a party to a contract, but who sustained personal injuries as a result of a breach of that contract, where the breach was motivated by racial discrimination against him.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the absence of a contractual relationship with the defendant, are allegations of personal injuries alone sufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981?

Domino's Pizza, Inc. ("Domino's") entered into four contracts with JWM Investments, Inc. ("JWM") under which JWM was to build restaurants and lease them to Domino's. Respondent John McDonald, an African-American, was the sole officer, director, and stockholder of JWM. Under the contract, Domino's was required to execute "estoppel certificates" if necessary for JWM to obtain financing for the restaurants. Deborah Pear Phillips, the real estate negotiator for Domino's and one of the petitioners, refused to sign the certificates.

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Lewis v. City of Chicago, IL

Issues

Does a plaintiff have to file an EEOC charge within 300 days after an employer announces its discriminatory hiring practice, or can a plaintiff file an EEOC charge within 300 days after each instance that the employer uses or applies the discriminatory hiring practice?

 

Petitioners, Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al. (“Lewis”), a group of African Americans who applied to become firefighters in Chicago sued the city under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming Chicago’s use of an eligibility test had a disparate racial impact on African Americans, effectively resulting in employment discrimination. The plaintiffs won their discrimination lawsuit in the federal district court, but the Seventh Circuit reversed on the basis that the claim had not been filed within the 300-day filing period for employment discrimination claims. The Court held that the filing period began at the time that the applicants were informed of the results of the test. This case presents the Court with the opportunity to determine whether the subsequent use of the results of an eligibility test with disparate racial impact qualifies as a discretely new violation of the Civil Rights Act that would begin anew another 300-day filing period.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under Title VII, a plaintiff seeking to bring suit for employment discrimination must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after the unlawful employment practice occurred. Where an employer adopts an employment practice that discriminates against African Americans in violation of Title VII's disparate impact provision, must a plaintiff file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the announcement of the practice, or may a plaintiff file a charge within 300 days after the employer's use of the discriminatory practice?

In 1995, the City of Chicago (“Chicago”) adopted a new exam to screen applicants for entry-level firefighter positions. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.

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