cruel and unusual punishment

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a death row inmate challenging an execution method must prove a feasible alternative execution method when the challenged method will allegedly inflict an unconstitutional level of pain as applied to the inmate’s medical condition. Russell Bucklew argues that the state should bear the burden of proving an alternative method in such an “as-applied” challenge. He reasons that because there is no risk that the challenged execution method will be outlawed in its entirety and because the state is in the best position to evaluate the effect of existing execution methods on the inmate’s medical condition, the Court should place the burden on the state. The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) argues that the inmate in an “as-applied” challenge case should bear this burden. The DOC notes that the inmate would be able to obtain an exemption from capital punishment and needlessly delay their execution by bringing meritless claims if the Court placed the burden on the state rather than on the inmate. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the ability of inmates to challenge execution methods, the administrability of common execution methods such as lethal injection, and the effect of the capital punishment process on drug regulators, physicians, and state corrections officers.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute between the City of Grants Pass, Oregon, and a class of homeless residents of Grants Pass represented by Gloria Johnson. Petitioner Grants Pass contends that its anti-camping ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent Johnson argues that the city’s ordinances amount to criminalization of the status of homelessness, contravening the Eighth Amendment. This case could impact the balance of power between federal, state, and local government and may clarify the limits on criminalizing conduct like camping outside at night.

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The Supreme Court will consider the following three issues: (1) whether a state violates the Eighth Amendment when the state uses a three-drug protocol for executions, where the first drug does not always relieve the prisoner from pain and or put the prisoner in a deep state of unconsciousness; (2) whether Baze v. Rees is the proper standard for obtaining a stay of execution; and (3) whether a prisoner challenging a state’s lethal injection protocol is required to establish the availability of alternative drugs. See Brief for Petitioner, Richard E. Glossip at i. Glossip contends that midazolam is incapable of reliably rendering prisoners unconscious and creates a substantial risk of harm that violates the Eighth Amendment, that the standard for obtaining a stay of execution should continue to be “a significant possibility of success on the merits” as established in Baze, and that prisoners should not be required to establish the availability of alternative drugs. See id. at 28, 39, 46. Gross counters that using midazolam does not create a substantial risk of harm since it is highly likely to render prisoners unconscious and insensate, that Baze clearly established a heightened stay request standard, and that establishing the availability of alternative drugs is required post-Baze. See Brief for Respondent, Kevin J. Gross at 41, 57–58, 61–62. The Supreme Court’s decision will potentially affect the availability of certain execution methods as well as address the acceptability of lethal injection protocols that potentially result in a lingering and painful death. See Brief of Former State Attorneys General, in Support of Petitioners at 23; Brief for National Catholic Reporter, in Support of Petitioner at 8.

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Appealed from: Florida First District Court of Appeal (Graham v. Florida, Apr. 10, 2008; Sullivan v. Florida, June 17, 2008)​Terrance Jamar Graham ("Graham") committed an armed burglary when he was sixteen years old. Joe Harris Sullivan committed sexual battery when he was thirteen years old. Both men are currently serving life sentences in the State of Florida ("Florida") with no possibility of parole. Graham and Sullivan each argue that sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Florida counters that such sentences are not constitutionally barred and reflect a state's considered legislative response to the growing problem of juvenile crime. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether juveniles may be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing non-homicide offenses.

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Respondent Joseph Smith is challenging a death sentence for murder by claiming an intellectual disability under an Alabama state law Atkins-like framework. The first prong of the test requires claimants to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they have an intelligence quotient (“IQ”) score below 70. While Smith has had five IQ tests over 70, one of the tests includes 69 within its 95% confidence interval. Petitioner John Hamm argues that Smith’s higher IQ scores prevent Smith from meeting his burden of proof on this first prong, so Smith cannot use the intellectual disability defense to escape execution. Smith, on the other hand, argues that his scores are borderline and inconclusive, so the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Alabama state law both permit him to use additional evidence to prove his intellectual disability. This case raises questions of victims’ interests in efficient and complete justice, the right to not be subject to cruel and unusual punishment, and states’ rights to develop and enforce their own criminal code, including sentencing preferences.

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This case asks the Court to decide whether a state may impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile who is found guilty of murder without first finding that the juvenile is permanently incorrigible. Petitioner Brett Jones contends that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on cruel and unusual punishment categorically prohibits a life sentence without parole for a juvenile offender who is not permanently incorrigible and requires courts to make a factual finding on incorrigibility. Respondent Mississippi counters that the Eighth Amendment imposes no such requirement, claiming that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence only forbids states from imposing mandatory life without parole sentences on juvenile offenders. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications because it raises concerns of federalism, transparency in sentencing procedures, and impact on victims.

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Christopher Simmons was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for first degree murder for a crime that he committed at age 17. He appealed as of right to the Missouri Supreme Court, which exercises exclusive jurisdiction in death penalty case. In 1997, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997). On his initial appeal, Simmons could not argue that his youth prohibited his execution because the United States Supreme Court held in 1989 that there was no national consensus against the execution of young adults who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of their crimes, and that, as a result, executing juveniles was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (discussing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). The Missouri Supreme Court thus affirmed the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Missouri on both the conviction and death sentence. See id.

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court reversed Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which held that a national consensus did not exist against execution of the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the Supreme Court concluded that such a consensus had developed in the thirteen years since Penry and that executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 321. Hoping that the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins might signal a parallel shift in the Court's view toward the execution of juvenile offenders, Simmons appeared before the Missouri Supreme Court again in 2003 on a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that a national consensus opposing the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders had emerged since Stanford v. Kentucky. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that "the Supreme Court would today hold such executions are prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 400.

The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear Simmons' case in order to address two specific issues. First, the Court will consider whether a lower court may contradict a previous ruling by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Court will decide whether it was permissible for the Missouri Supreme Court to conclude that the execution of juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual punishment and violates the Eighth Amendment, in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court's ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky. Second, the Supreme Court will decide for itself whether a national consensus now opposes the execution of offenders younger than eighteen years and, therefore, whether the practice now violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

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