election law

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one-person, one-vote” principle requires states to apportion eligible voters equally across districts. See Reply Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 2. The Texas Constitution requires that the State legislature reapportion its legislative districts after each federal decennial census. See Evenwel et al. v. Perry et al., 14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, at 2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). In 2013, Texas adopted a new redistricting plan (“Plan S172”). See id. at 2. Texas drew its senatorial districts based only on total population. See id. at 2–3. Sue Evenwel is a registered Texas voter. See id. at 2. Evenwel argues that the one-person,  one-vote  principle requires states to divide their districts so that they each comprise a substantially equal number of eligible voters. See Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 19. Texas Governor Greg Abbott contends that the Constitution does not require states to utilize any specific measure, and thus they are free to equalize districts on the basis of total population. See Brief for Appellees, Greg Abbott et al. at 43–44. The Court’s decision could affect the voting power of eligible voters, and the method and amount of data collection states must engage in to constitutionally apportion voting districts.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

Margarita Lopez Torres, nine other judicial candidates, and voters sued the New York State Board of Elections in federal court, claiming that state election laws regulating judicial elections violated the First Amendment rights of party members and candidates. Torres claimed that the state-mandated system by which parties elect nominees makes it impossible, in practice, for candidates without party backing to gain access to the party nomination ballot. In particular, Torres argued that the system enables party leaders to exert control over the nomination process, creating an environment ripe for abuse of judicial independence. As an example of such abuses, Torres offered her experiences as a judicial candidate: despite enjoying popular support in civil court elections, she failed in multiple district elections to receive the nomination of her party after refusing to follow the demands of party leaders.

After reviewing evidence of the lack of competitive elections and the difficulty of gaining access to the nomination ballot without party support, the Eastern District of New York agreed that New York's election laws violated the First Amendment associational rights of voters and candidates. The district granted a preliminary injunction mandating primary elections for party voters to select candidates. The Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that the District Court had acted within its discretion. The New York State Board of Elections ("New York State Board") now appeals, arguing that political parties' First Amendment rights are infringed by the lower courts' holding. The New York State Board further argues that the district court's remedy violates the First Amendment rights of political parties to control their intra-party nomination process. At issue in this case are the competing First Amendment rights of party members, candidates, and political parties during a party's candidate selection process. The Supreme Court decision will better define the scope of these rights in a unique situation: an intra-party nomination convention that is mandated and closely regulated by state law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

The Supreme Court will decide the scope of authority given to a single judge in cases that are otherwise referable to a three-judge panel. See Brief for Petitioners, Stephen M. Shapiro et al. at 1. Shapiro argues that the Three-Judge Court Act prohibits a single-judge district court from dismissing non-frivolous reapportionment complaints for failure to state a cause of action because the statute limits federal court review to subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 17. McManus argues that the Act creates a procedural framework wherein single-judge district courts may dismiss claims for failure to state a cause of action without convening a three-judge court for every reapportionment complaint. See Brief for Respondents, David J. McManus, Jr., et al. at 15–17. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case could affect the ability of Americans to challenge the constitutionality of state election laws. See Brief for Petitioners at 9.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

The state of Arizona passed Proposition 200 by popular referendum. Proposition 200 requires that a person must present proof of citizenship when registering to vote and a voter must present identification when casting a ballot. Multiple parties sued the state of Arizona, arguing that Congress had preempted the states in this area of election law with the National Voter Registration Act. While the Ninth Circuit ruled that the National Voter Registration Act superseded the registration requirement, the court also held that the identification requirement at a polling place is legal. Arizona is now appealing the registration requirement to the Supreme Court, arguing that this falls within their powers and the lower courts are taking a broader view of preemption that is not in line with the past rulings of the Supreme Court. The outcome of this case will play a large role in the ability of the states to pass laws governing voter registration, and the Court’s evaluation of preemption will likely have a large effect on the balance of power between the states and federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by