JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the First Step Act requires or merely allows courts to consider post-sentencing developments during First Step Act sentence modifications. Petitioner Carlos Concepcion argues that the First Step Act requires courts to consider post-sentencing legal and factual developments during sentence modifications. Respondent United States counters that the First Step Act grants courts the discretion to consider post-sentencing developments during sentence modifications. The outcome of this case will impact the sentencing of many low-level drug offenders as well as a court’s authority over resentencing under Section 404 of the First Step Act.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the scope of a trial court’s discretion in considering the mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (mandating a minimum sentence if a firearm is used in furtherance of a violent crime) when determining a sentence for the predicate offense. In deciding whether the lower courts erred by not further reducing the petitioner’s sentence for his predicate offense, the Court will look at whether United States v. Pepper (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 implied that a sentencing court should consider all relevant information about a defendant when determining an appropriate sentence) overruled United States v. Hatcher (holding that a trial court could not impose a mere one-day sentence for crimes that were not subject to a mandatory minimum just because the § 924(c)-mandated sentence had been 300 months). Petitioner Levon Dean, Jr. argues that trial courts should be given full discretion to consider all possible information and that Congressional support of a shorter sentence is evinced by the text of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1986. The United States, as respondent, counters that the Sentencing Reform Act cannot be used simply to lower the aggregate sentence and that Congress specifically intended to prohibit lighter sentences because of the unique dangers of a § 924(c) violation. If the Court rules that Pepper overruled Hatcher, this will give trial courts more discretion in fashioning shorter aggregate sentences for defendants who used a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether a district court presiding over a revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) may consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) despite their absence from Section 3583(e)’s enumerated list. Section 3553(a)(2)(A)’s sentencing factors include reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, and providing just punishment for the offense. Petitioner argues that Section 3583(e)’s list is exhaustive, and omission of the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors precludes a district court from considering them to determine revocation of supervised release. Respondent counters that the consideration factors set out in Section 3583 are not exhaustive, and the factors in Section 3553 may be relied upon by a district court when determining the modification or revocation of supervised release. This case touches on important questions regarding the purpose of supervised release, a court’s discretion to revoke and reimprison violators, and the impact that judicial discretion has on the carceral system.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether federal judges may reduce a prisoner’s sentence under the compassionate release statute for reasons that may also fall under a post-conviction motion challenging the legality of a sentence. Joe Fernandez, convicted and sentenced to life on October 7, 2014, for participating in a double murder-for-hire conspiracy, sought a sentence reduction after the trial judge expressed doubts regarding the credibility of the government’s witness and the fairness of the verdict based on extraordinary and compelling reasons. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that prisoners must bring arguments regarding innocence or sentencing errors through the habeas process, not via compassionate release. Fernandez argues that Congress designed the compassionate release statute to afford courts broad discretion to reduce sentences in exceptional circumstances. The United States government, meanwhile, argues that the compassionate release statute is limited to four specific categories of circumstances: age, illness, family hardship, or other circumstances the Bureau of Prisons finds compelling. The outcome of this case will have a major impact on how much discretion federal judges have in revisiting sentences they believe are unjust, thereby clarifying the balance between mercy and finality for criminal defendants. 

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In 2013, the Supreme Court decided in favor of Supap Kirtsaeng in a copyright infringement action brought by publisher John Wiley & Sons (“Wiley”), reversing the lower courts and remanding for an order in compliance with the opinion. On remand in the district court, Kirtsaeng petitioned for costs and attorneys’ fees. Although 17 U.S.C. § 505 empowers a district court in its discretion to award costs and attorneys’ fees, the court denied the petition and reaffirmed the circuit precedent assigning more weight to one factor in the equitable discretion analysis over all others. Here, the Supreme Court will provide a non-exclusive list of factors a district court should consider in a § 505 equitable discretion analysis and determine whether any of those factors, such as the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position, should be assigned substantial weight. Kirtsaeng argues that placing substantial weight on any  one factor  risks compromising the discretion granted to the district court by the statute. Alternatively, Wiley argues that a district court in its discretion can assign more weight to the objective reasonableness of the defeated party’s position without defying § 505. This case will clarify the approach a district court should take in a § 505 equitable discretion analysis.

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 This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the common-law doctrine of international comity provides federal courts with the discretion to dismiss claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Respondent the Republic of Hungary argues that the FSIA must be construed in light of international comity doctrine, and that the federal court should defer to Hungary as Hungary’s interests in hearing this case outweigh those of the United States. Petitioners Rosalie Simon and other Hungarian Holocaust survivors argue that the FSIA has displaced common law and that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction in cases such as this one, where a sovereign state has failed to provide an adequate alternate forum. The outcome of this case will have implications on foreign policy, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, and the remedies available to the victims of Holocaust.

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