mitigating evidence

Ayers v. Belmontes (05-493)

Issues

1. Given the Court’s previous ruling in Boyde v. California, does California’s jury instruction, known as factor (k), sufficiently guide a jury in the sentencing phase of a capital case to consider the defendant’s future conduct in prison when determining whether to mitigate the defendant’s sentence from death to life in prison?

2. Is the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, that factor (k) does not sufficiently guide jurors to consider a capital defendant’s future conduct when determining whether to mitigate the sentence from death to life without parole, a new rule in criminal procedure law that may have retroactive effect on defendants in similar situations?

Court below

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Fernando Belmontes, a criminal defendant sentenced to death by a California jury, challenges the constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment of California’s jury instruction, arguing that the instruction prevents the jury from considering evidence about his future prospects as a productive member of society. The Court will assess whether there is a reasonable likelihood that this jury instruction will prevent a jury from considering the defendant’s future conduct when determining whether to mitigate the defendant’s punishment to life without parole. If the Court determines that the instruction is insufficient, it will also consider whether its ruling should apply retroactively to other criminal defendants. The case will affect how states draft their capital sentencing jury instructions and will give Justices Roberts and Alito an opportunity to articulate their opinions on the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does Boyde confirm the constitutional sufficiency of California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction where a defendant presents mitigating evidence of his background and character which relates to, or has a bearing on, his future prospects as a life prisoner?

2. Does the Ninth Circuit’s holding, that California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction is constitutionally inadequate to inform jurors they may consider "forward-looking" mitigation evidence constitute a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)?

The Crime and State Proceedings

On March 15, 1981, Fernando Belmontes burglarized the house of 19-year-old Steacy McConnell. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Upon finding McConnell at home, Belmontes struck her several times in the head with a metal dumbbell bar before stealing her stereo equipment. Id. at 2–3.

Written by

fozturk

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Sheri Johnson, Stephen Garvey, and John Blume for their insights into this case.

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Oregon v. Guzek

Issues

May a defendant, in the sentencing phase of a capital crime trial, present mitigating evidence regarding his culpability to the jury that is deciding whether to impose the death penalty, when that evidence also tends to cast doubt on the defendant’s guilt?

Court below

Oregon Supreme Court

Randy Lee Guzek, along with his friends Mark Wilson and Ross Cathey, murdered an Oregon couple in the summer of 1987. After eighteen years of litigation, involving three different appeals, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the alibi testimony Guzek attempted to introduce during the sentencing phase of his trial—statements from his grandfather and his mother placing him at home during the time of the crime—could be introduced as “mitigating evidence” tending to show that Guzek should not receive the death penalty. The State of Oregon took issue with this ruling, and appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that such evidence cannot be admitted because the so-called “residual doubt” evidence is no longer relevant at the sentencing phase of a defendant’s capital trial. Guzek, on the other hand, argues that the Constitution requires admittance of such evidence at his sentencing phase—he claims that the jury will not improperly use this evidence and that in order to meet the state’s case and refute the state’s evidence, he must be able to introduce the so-called “residual doubt” evidence. The Supreme Court will decide whether Guzek is correct, and whether the trial court is Constitutionally required to admit this “residual doubt” evidence, despite the fact that it might introduce doubt about Guzek’s previously determined and settled guilt.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a capital defendant have a right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to offer evidence and argument in support of a residual-doubt claim - that is, that the jury in a penalty-phase proceeding should consider doubt about the defendant’s guilt in deciding whether to impose the death penalty?

Randy Lee Guzek has been before the Oregon Supreme Court on three occasions between 1990 and 2004, all regarding the sentencing phase of a capital trial in which he was convicted for the murders of Rod and Lois Houser. Because of the errors in the lower court and intervening new law instituted during the more than fifteen years of Guzek’s trial, the state’s highest court has repeatedly affirmed Guzek’s guilt in the murders, but vacated the jury’s sentence of death.

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Smith v. Texas

Issues

If the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Smith’s case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals after finding that the jury had not been able to adequately consider the mitigating evidence, was the Court of Criminal Appeals’ finding that the violation was a harmless error consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision?

Must a defendant prove that a jury instruction that violated his constitutional rights caused him egregious harm?

Court below

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

LaRoyce Lathair Smith, who was sentenced to death in 1991, appears before the Supreme Court for the second time. Smith argues that the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals denied his petition for state habeas corpus relief in contravention of the analysis standards handed down in the Supreme Court’s first opinion. In addition, Smith argues that the Criminal Court of Appeals applied a heightened egregious harm standard to a procedural issue that it failed to consider on direct appeal. Texas, on the other hand, contends that the Criminal Court of Appeals was justified in reconsidering issues not addressed by the Supreme Court and asserts that the standards applied were the prevailing state standards for evaluating Smith’s claim. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case should clarify the proper way for state courts to evaluate defendants’ claims attacking the constitutionality of jury instructions regarding mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of capital cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), this Court summarily reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and found constitutional error under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Is it consistent with this Court’s remand in this case for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to deem the error in petitioner’s case harmless based on its view that jurors were in fact able to give adequate consideration and effect to petitioner’s mitigating evidence notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion to the contrary?

Can the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, based on a procedural determination that it declined to adopt in its original decision that this Court then summarily reversed, impose on remand a daunting standard of harm (“egregious harm”) to the constitutional violation found by this Court?

In 1991, 19 year old LaRoyce Lathair Smith was convicted of the capital murder of his coworker, who Smith had pistol whipped and shot. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 38 (2004) (“Smith I”). After Smith was convicted, the jury was tasked with deciding Smith’s sentence. Id. at 39.