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QUESTION OF LAW

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, Att’y Gen.

Issues

Can courts of appeal judicially review, as a “question of law,” statutory motions to reopen deportation proceedings to determine if equitable tolling should apply?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the issue of a petitioner’s request for equitable tolling in filing motions to reopen his deportation proceedings is a purely legal question or a mixed question of law and fact. Petitioners Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ruben Ovalles contend that the term “question of law” in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(D) encompasses mixed questions of law and fact, thereby permitting appellate courts to review whether immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals correctly applied the law to settled historical facts. They contend that even if the Court finds that “question of law” does not encompass mixed questions of law and fact, Guerrero and Ovalles assert that the issue of equitable tolling is closer to a legal rather than factual inquiry, therefore also allowing the appellate courts to review the decision. Attorney General William P. Barr counters that “question of law” does not extend to mixed questions of law and fact, and that even if it did, equitable tolling is a primarily factual determination that cannot be subject to judicial review. This case will affect whether courts experience an increase in the amount of litigation and expended resources, and the effectiveness and meaningfulness of judicial review of immigration proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a request for equitable tolling as it applies to statutory motions to reopen, is judicially reviewable as a “question of law.”

Petitioner Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla (“Guerrero”) is a native and citizen of Colombia. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Sessions at 1. Guerrero was admitted to the United States in 1986. Id.

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Hana Financial v. Hana Bank

Issues

Is trademark tacking an issue of law or fact?

The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to address the issue of whether trademark tacking is a question of law or fact. In this case, Hana Bank argues that its use of “Hana Overseas Korean Club” should be tacked to its use of “Hana World Center”—as the district court jury seemingly allowed. Hana Financial counters, argues that a judge, not a jury, should decide the tacking issue; and, Hana Bank’s tacking claim fails as a matter of law. The outcome of this case may touch on judicial efficiency, predictability of trademark law, and consumer protection. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

To own a trademark, one must be the first to use it; the first to use a mark has “priority.”  The trademark “tacking” doctrine permits a party to “tack” the use of an older mark onto a new mark for purposes of determining priority, allowing one to make slight modifications to a mark over time without losing priority. Trademark tacking is available where the two marks are “legal equivalents.” The question presented, which has divided the courts of appeals and determined the outcome in this case, is:

Whether the jury or the court determines whether use of an older trademark may be tacked to a newer one is a question of fact?

In the mid-1990s two companies began providing financial services in the United States. See Hana Financial, Inc. v Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.

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Wilkinson v. Garland

Issues

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, can a court review an agency’s ruling that an applicant’s removal “would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” or is this determination discretionary and unreviewable?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether courts can review an agency’s determination of 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1)(D), which permits a cancellation of removal if an applicant meets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. Wilkinson contends that whether an applicant’s case meets the standard of hardship is a mixed question of fact and law that courts can review. Wilkinson argues that this procedure does not involve finding new facts but instead applies a legal standard to established facts, such as determining whether an applicant’s removal would bring extreme emotional distress to their family. The United States argues that whether an applicant’s case meets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard does not involve applying a legal standard and is therefore an agency’s discretionary determination that is unreviewable by courts. The outcome of the case may significantly impact the procedure and available remedies in removal cases.  Also, the outcome could influence judicial efficiency and the method courts use to interpret statutes in other areas of law.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D), or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

In 2003, Petitioner Situ Wilkinson entered the United States on a valid tourist visa after fleeing his native Trinidad and Tobago due to a violent encounter with local police.

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